Moral Impossibility: What It Is and Why It Matters

The category of moral impossibility is ubiquitous, it defines individual moral acts and character, and has far-reaching consequences for central moral concepts such as choice and freedom; hence, it deserves keen philosophical attention. Yet, so far, moral impossibility has been discussed scantily and under separate categories. My aim in this chapter is threefold: first, to make a case for the importance of moral impossibility in ethics; second, to put together its various existing discussions under one conceptual umbrella; third, to sketch the central implications and further questions that arise if we take moral impossibility seriously. In order to achieve these aims, the chapter is structured as follows: after the introduction, I offer a taxonomy of the forms of moral impossibility, highlighting differences and unity; having described the phenomenon, I give two broad reasons for taking moral impossibility as an ethical category in its own right; that requires accepting that impossibility can indeed be an ethical category, a question I address in the following section; in the last section I draw out some of the key implications of moral impossibility, affecting moral identity, the nature of value, and the processes of choice, decision-making, moral debate, and conflict.