◉ Logic Without Theological Ownership: Structure, Normativity, and the Failure of God-as-Ground Arguments

Arguments from logic to theism commonly begin with plausible features of logical consequence: its apparent necessity, objectivity, generality, and independence from human preference. A sophisticated version identifies logical laws with necessarily true propositions, propositions with intrinsically intentional thoughts, and necessary thoughts with the contents of a necessarily existent personal mind. This paper reconstructs that argument in its strongest form and audits each bridge. The crucial inferences are neither delivered by logic alone nor jointly compulsory. Logical laws may be characterized as rules, relations, properties, or proposition-like contents; contemporary theories disagree about whether propositions are intrinsically representational, mind-dependent, or reducible to cognitive acts. Even if propositions are thoughts, moving from necessarily available content to one numerically identical necessary thinker requires a substantive essential-ownership premise. A necessarily existent mind also falls short of a developed theistic God-concept unless further attributes are supplied. The paper also corrects a common objection. An argument may use logic while proposing a metaphysical ground of logic without thereby becoming viciously circular; operational priority is not metaphysical independence. What does follow is an epistemic limit: logical competence, proof, counterexample, and rational disagreement do not require prior acceptance of the proposed ground. Logical normativity likewise needs bridge principles connecting consequence with belief revision, and logical pluralism complicates any appeal to a single unqualified body of laws. The result is bounded. Divine conceptualism may remain a coherent worldview-level interpretation, but logic does not establish theological ownership, identify non-theists as epistemic borrowers, or uniquely select theism from the available metaphysical accounts.