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Search Search CSRC MENU Search Search Projects Publications Expand or Collapse Drafts for Public Comment All Public Drafts Final Pubs FIPS (standards) Special Publications (SP s ) IR (interagency/internal reports) CSWP (cybersecurity white papers) ITL Bulletins Project Descriptions Journal Articles Conference Papers Books Topics Expand or Collapse Security & Privacy Applications Technologies Sectors Laws & Regulations Activities & Products News & Updates Events Glossary About CSRC Expand or Collapse Computer Security Division Cryptographic Technology Software Security Group Hardware Security Group Security Engineering and Risk Management Applied Cybersecurity Division Cybersecurity and Privacy Applications National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Contact Us Information Technology Laboratory Computer Security Resource Center Publications NIST SP 800-189 Rev. 1 (Initial Public Draft) Border Gateway Protocol Security and Resilience Share to Facebook Share to X Share to LinkedIn Share ia Email Documentation Topics Date Published: January 3, 2025 Comments Due: February 25, 2025 (public comment period is CLOSED) Email Questions to: [email protected] Author(s) Kotikalapudi Sriram (NIST) , Douglas Montgomery (NIST) Announcement In recent years, numerous Internet routing incidents — such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) prefix hijacking, and route leaks — have resulted in denial of service (DoS), unwanted data traffic detours, and performance degradation. Large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on servers using spoofed Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and reflection amplification in the data plane have resulted in significant disruptions of services and damages. This document provides technical guidance and recommendations to improve the security and resilience of Internet routing based on BGP. Technologies recommended in this document for securing Internet routing include Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Route Origin Authorization (ROA), ROA-based route origin validation (ROA-ROV), and prefix filtering. Additionally, the technologies recommended for mitigating DDoS attacks focus on the prevention of IP address spoofing using source address validation (SAV) with access control lists (ACLs) and unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF). Other technologies are also recommended as part of the overall security mechanisms, such as remotely triggered black hole (RTBH) filtering and flow specification (Flowspec). While this document is intended to guide information security officers and managers of federal enterprise networks, it also applies to the network services of hosting providers (e.g., cloud-based applications and service hosting) and Internet service providers (ISPs) that support federal IT systems. This guidance may also be useful for enterprise and transit network operators and equipment vendors in general. Abstract This publication provides guidance on Internet routing security, preventing IP address spoofing, and certain aspects of DDoS detection and mitigation. It particularly focuses on Border Gateway Protocol, which is the routing protocol used to distribute and compute paths between the tens of thousands of autonomous networks that comprise the internet. Technologies recommended in this document for securing BGP routing include Resource Public Key Infrastructure, Route Origin Authorization, ROA-based route origin validation, and prefix filtering. Additionally, technologies recommended for mitigating DDoS attacks focus on preventing IP address spoofing using source address validation with access control lists and unicast Reverse Path Forwarding. Other technologies are also recommended as part of the overall routing security mechanisms, such as remotely triggered black hole filtering and flow specification. This publication provides guidance on Internet routing security, preventing IP address spoofing, and certain aspects of DDoS detection and mitigation. It particularly focuses on Border Gateway Protocol, which is the routing protocol used to distribute and compute paths between the tens of thousands... See full abstract This publication provides guidance on Internet routing security, preventing IP address spoofing, and certain aspects of DDoS detection and mitigation. It particularly focuses on Border Gateway Protocol, which is the routing protocol used to distribute and compute paths between the tens of thousands of autonomous networks that comprise the internet. Technologies recommended in this document for securing BGP routing include Resource Public Key Infrastructure, Route Origin Authorization, ROA-based route origin validation, and prefix filtering. Additionally, technologies recommended for mitigating DDoS attacks focus on preventing IP address spoofing using source address validation with access control lists and unicast Reverse Path Forwarding. Other technologies are also recommended as part of the overall routing security mechanisms, such as remotely triggered black hole filtering and flow specification. Hide full abstract Keywords Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) ; Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security ; distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) ; Flowspec ; Only to Customer (OTC) ; Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) ; ROA-based route origin validation (ROA-ROV) ; Route Origin Authorization (ROA) ; routing security and resilience Control Families None selected Documentation Publication: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-189r1.ipd Download URL Supplemental Material: Project: Robust Inter-Domain Routing NIST RPKI Monitor Document History: 01/03/25: SP 800-189 Rev. 1 (Draft) Topics Security and Privacy configuration management , general security & privacy , public key infrastructure , resilience , threats Technologies internet HEADQUARTERS 100 Bureau Drive Gaithersburg, MD 20899 X (link is external) facebook (link is external) linkedin (link is external) instagram (link is external) youtube (link is external) rss govdelivery (link is external) Want updates about CSRC and our publications? 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