Skip to main Communities My dashboard Log in Sign up Pan-African Research Journal Africa Published April 16, 2026 | Version v1 Journal article Open Perverse Decentralization: Federal Bargains, Ethnic Outbidding, and Conflict Management in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Sudan Authors/Creators Ph.D., Abraham Kuol Nyuon, 1 Show affiliations 1.
¹ Associate Professor of Politics, Peace, and Security; Principal, Graduate College, University of Juba, South Sudan Description Perverse decentralization is developed as a framework for understanding federal bargains and ethnic outbidding, with a focus on decentralization as a strategy of conflict management in multi-national African states. The argument advanced is that decentralization can displace conflict from the centre to the local arena when boundary design, fiscal authority, and security command are misaligned, encouraging elites to mobilize ethnicity within subnational institutions. Drawing on controlled comparison of three federal or quasi-federal systems; subnational quantitative analysis of conflict events (ACLED) before and after decentralization; process tracing of constitutional design episodes; and interviews with constitutional law practitioners, the study engages debates in federalism theory, ethnic outbidding, power-sharing, and political settlements. It develops the concept of "perverse decentralization," in which devolution fragments political competition at the local level without resolving national distributional conflicts. Three core claims are advanced. First, devolution reduces conflict only where subnational units possess credible fiscal authority, clear boundaries, and safeguards against security sector capture by dominant local coalitions. Second, ethnic entrepreneurs exploit ambiguities in federal design by translating national distributional struggles into local contests over offices, districts, and customary authority. Third, comparative evidence from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Sudan shows that decentralization becomes perverse when it multiplies veto points without establishing impartial arbitration and stable revenue-sharing rules. The study concludes that constitutional design must be paired with clear intergovernmental fiscal compacts and dispute-resolution Files final_69e0a1ace5b572.44318091_perverse-decentralization-federal-bargains-ethnic-outbidding-and-conflict-management-in-ethiopia-nigeria-and-south-sudan.pdf Files (842.8 kB) Name Size Download all article.html md5:7bd45af69aaf94b16bc6cf2fb3b454aa 533.2 kB Download final_69e0a1ace5b572.44318091_perverse-decentralization-federal-bargains-ethnic-outbidding-and-conflict-management-in-ethiopia-nigeria-and-south-sudan.pdf md5:3a158aab7bc65f2e23dd9824acac6905 305.1 kB Preview Download review_bundle.zip md5:545f36cbfb8f1c366b4c43218a1a6ba6 4.5 kB Preview Download Additional details Related works Is identical to Journal article: https://parj.africa/ajpubadm_decentral/article/view/32285 (URL) 44 Views 28 Downloads Show more details All versions This version Views Total views 44 44 Downloads Total downloads 28 28 Data volume Total data volume 8.8 MB 8.8 MB More info on how stats are collected.... Versions External resources Indexed in OpenAIRE Communities Keywords and subjects Keywords Federalism ethnic conflict decentralisation ethnic outbidding power sharing Nigeria Ethiopia Details DOI DOI Badge DOI 10.5281/zenodo.19604744 Markdown [](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19604744) reStructuredText .. image:: https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.19604744.svg :target: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19604744 HTML <a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19604744"><img src="https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.19604744.svg" alt="DOI"></a> Image URL https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.19604744.svg Target URL https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19604744 Resource type Journal article Publisher Zenodo Published in African Decentralization Studies, 1(6), 2026. Languages English Rights License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International The Creative Commons Attribution license allows re-distribution and re-use of a licensed work on the condition that the creator is appropriately credited. Read more Citation Export Technical metadata Created April 16, 2026 Modified April 16, 2026 Jump up About About Policies Infrastructure Principles Projects Roadmap Contact Blog Blog Support Help FAQ Developers REST API OAI-PMH Contribute GitHub Donate Funded by Powered by CERN Data Centre & InvenioRDM Status Privacy policy Cookie policy Terms of Use This site uses cookies. Find out more on how we use cookies Accept all cookies Accept only essential cookies