Official Story of Two Sea Fights Official Story of Two Sea Fights [From The London Times, March 3, 1915.] Admiralty, March 3, 1915. The following dispatch has been received from Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of January, 1915: H.M.S. Princess Royal, Feb. 2, 1915. Sir: I have the honor to report that at daybreak on Jan. 24, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company: The battle cruisers Lion, Capt. Alfred E.M. Chatfield, C.V.O., flying my flag; Princess Royal, Capt. Osmond de B. Brock, Aide de Camp; Tiger, Capt. Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; New Zealand, Capt. Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide de Camp, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O., and Indomitable, Capt. Francis W. Kennedy. The light cruisers Southampton, flying the broad pennant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; Nottingham, Capt. Charles B. Miller; Birmingham, Capt. Arthur A.M. Duff, and Lowestoft, Capt. Theobald W.B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam. Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in Arethusa, Aurora, Capt. Wilmot S. Nicholson; Undaunted, Capt. Francis G. St. John, M.V.O.; Arethusa and the destroyer flotillas were ahead. At 7:25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed south-southeast. Shortly afterward a report reached me from Aurora that she was engaged with enemy's ships. I immediately altered course to south-southeast, increased to 22 knots, and ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase south-southeast to get in touch and report movements of enemy. This order was acted upon with great promptitude, indeed my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports almost immediately followed from Southampton, Arethusa, and Aurora as to the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of three battle cruisers and Blücher, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steering northwest. The enemy had altered course to southeast. From now onward the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements. The battle cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward. The wind at the time was northeast, light, with extreme visibility. At 7:30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming fast, steering approximately southeast, distant 14 miles. Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to southeast parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the engineer staffs of New Zealand and Indomitable—these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed. At 8:52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship, the battle cruisers manoeuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that guns would bear, and Lion fired a single shot, which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam. Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9:09 A.M. Lion made her first hit on the Blücher, No. 4 in the line. The Tiger opened fire at 9:20 A.M. on the rear ship, the Lion shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvos. The enemy returned our fire at 9:14 A.M. Princess Royal, on coming into range, opened fire on Blücher, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards, at 9:35 A.M. New Zealand was within range of Blücher, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. Princess Royal shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her. Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their smoke; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, the Meteor and M Division passed ahead of us, Capt. the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this division with conspicuous ability. About 9:45 A.M. the situation was as follows: Blücher, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun fire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire, Lion was engaging No. 1, Princess Royal No. 3, New Zealand No. 4, while the Tiger, which was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4. The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing north-northwest, and proceed at their utmost speed. Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. Lion and Tiger opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume their original course. The light cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe and keep touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line. At 10:48 A.M. the Blücher, which had dropped considerably astern of enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently ordered Indomitable to attack enemy breaking northward. At 10:54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope two points on our starboard bow. I immediately turned to port. At 11:03 A.M. an injury to the Lion being reported as incapable of immediate repair, I directed Lion to shape course northwest. At 11:20 A.M. I called the Attack alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11:35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring north-northwest. I boarded and hoisted my flag on Princess Royal at about 12:20 P.M., when Capt. Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the Lion fell out of the line, namely, that Blücher had been sunk and that the enemy battle cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavored to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of Blücher. The good seamanship of Lieut. Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. Attack, in placing his vessel alongside the Lion and subsequently the Princess Royal, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in the shortest possible time. At 2 P.M. I closed Lion and received a report that the starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3:38 P.M. I ordered Indomitable to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 P.M. The greatest credit is due to the Captains of Indomitable and Lion for the seaman-like manner in which the Lion was taken in tow under difficult circumstances. The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature. I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men who specially distinguished themselves. Where all did well it is difficult to single out officers and men for special mention, and as Lion and Tiger were the only ships hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mention belong to those ships. I have the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) DAVID BEATTY, Vice Admiral. OFFICERS. Commander Charles A. Fountaine, H.M.S. Lion. Lieut. Commander Evan C. Bunbury, H.M.S. Lion. Lieut. Frederick T. Peters, H.M.S. Meteor. Lieut. Charles M.R. Schwerdt, H.M.S. Lion. Engineer Commander Donald P. Green, H.M.S. Lion. Engineer Commander James L. Sands, H.M.S. Southampton. Engineer Commander Thomas H. Turner, H.M.S. New Zealand. Engineer Lieut. Commander George Preece, H.M.S. Lion. Engineer Lieut. Albert Knothe, H.M.S. Indomitable. Surgeon Probationer James A. Stirling, R.N.V.R., H.M.S. Meteor. Mr. Joseph H. Burton, Gunner (T), H.M.S. Lion. Chief Carpenter Frederick E. Dailey, H.M.S. Lion. PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN. Py. Or. J.W. Kemmett, O.N. 186,788, Lion. A.B.H. Davis, O.N. 184,526, Tiger. A.B.H.F. Griffin, O.N.J. 14,160, Princess Royal. A.B.P.S. Livingstone, O.N. 234,328, Lion. A.B.H. Robison, O.N. 209,112, Tiger. A.B.G.H. le Seilleur, O.N. 156,802, Lion. Boy, 1st CL., F.G.H. Bamford, O.N.J. 26,598, Tiger. Boy, 1st CL., J.F. Rogers, O.N.J. 28,329, Tiger. Ch. Ee. R. Artr., 1st CL., E.R. Hughes, O.N. 268,999, Indomitable. Ch. Ee. R. Artr., 2d CL, W.B. Dand, O.N. 270,648, New Zealand. Ch. Ee. A. Artr. W. Gillespie, O.N. 270,080, Meteor. Mechn. A.J. Cannon, O.N. 175,440, Lion. Mechn. E.C. Ephgrave, O.N. 288,231, Lion. Ch. Stkr. P. Callaghan, O.N. 278,953, Lion. Ch. Stkr. A.W. Ferris, O.N. 175,824, Lion. Ch. Stkr. J.E. James, O.N. 174,232, New Zealand. Ch. Stkr. W.E. James, O.N. 294,406, Indomitable. Ch. Stkr. J. Keating, R.F.R., O.N. 165,732, Meteor. Stkr. Py. Or. M. Flood, R.F.R., O.N. 153,418, Meteor. Stkr. Py. Or. T.W. Hardy, O.N. 292,542, Indomitable. Stkr. Py. Or. A.J. Sims, O.N. 276,502, New Zealand. Stkr. Py. Or. S. Westaway, R.F.R., O.N. 300,938, Meteor. Actg. Ldg. Skr. J. Blackburn, O.N.K. 4,844, Tiger. Stkr., 1st Cl., A.H. Bennet, O.N.K. 10,700, Tiger. Stkr., 2d Cl., H. Turner, O.N.K. 22,720, Tiger. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E.O. Bradley, O.N. 346,621, Lion. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E. Currie, O.N. 344,851, Lion. Sick Berth Attendant C.S. Hutchinson, O.N.M. 3,882, Tiger. Ch. Writer S.G. White, O.N. 340,597, Tiger. Third Writer H.C. Green, O.N.M. 8,266, Tiger. Officers' Steward, 3d Cl., F.W. Kearley, O.N.L. 2,716, Tiger. HONORS AWARDED. Lord Chamberlain's Office, St. James's Palace, March 3, 1915. The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, in recognition of the services of the undermentioned officer mentioned in the foregoing dispatch: To be an Additional Member of the Military Division of the Third Class or Companion. Capt. Osmond de Beauvoir Brock, A.D.C., Royal Navy. Admiralty, S.W., March 3, 1915. The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Distinguished Service Order, and for the award of the Distinguished Service Cross, to the undermentioned officers in recognition of their services mentioned in the foregoing dispatch: To be Companion of the Distinguished Service Order. Lieut. Frederic Thornton Peters, Royal Navy. To receive the Distinguished Service Cross. Surg. Probationer James Alexander Stirling, R.N.V.R. Gunner (T) Joseph H. Burton. Chief Carpenter Frederick E. Dailey. The following promotion has been made: Commander Charles Andrew Fountaine to be a Captain in his Majesty's fleet, to date March 3, 1915. The following awards have also been made: To receive the Distinguished Service Medal. P.O. J.W. Kemmett, O.N. 186,788. A.B. H. Davis, O.N. 184,526. A.B. H.F. Griffin, O.N.J. 14,160. A.B. P.S. Livingstone, O.N. 234,328. A.B. H. Robison, O.N. 209,112. A.B. G.H. le Seilleur, O.N. 156,802. Boy, 1st Cl., F.G.H. Bamford, O.N.J. 26,598. Boy, 1st Cl., J.F. Rogers, O.N.J. 28,329. Ch. E.R. Art., 1st Cl., E.R. Hughes, O.N. 268,999. Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., W.B. Dand, O.N. 270,648. Ch. E.R. Art., W. Gillespie, O.N. 270,080. Mechn. A.J. Cannon, O.N. 175,440. Mechn. E.C. Ephgrave, O.N. 288,231. Ch. Stkr. P. Callaghan, O.N. 278,953. Ch. Stkr. A.W. Ferris, O.N. 175,824. Ch. Stkr. J.E. James, O.N. 174,232. Ch. Stkr. W.E. James, O.N. 294,406. Ch. Stkr. J. Keating, R.F.R., O.N. 165,732. Stkr. P.O. M. Flood, R.F.R., O.N. 153,418. Stkr. P.O. T.W. Hardy, O.N. 292,542. Stkr. P.O. A.J. Sims, O.N. 276,502. Stkr. P.O. S. Westaway, R.F.R., O.N. 300,938. Actg. Ldg. Stkr. J. Blackburn, O.N.K. 4,844. Stkr., 1st Cl., A.H. Bennet, O.N.K. 10,700. Stkr., 2d Cl., H. Turner, O.N.K. 22,720. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E.O. Bradley, O.N. 346,621. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E. Currie, O.N. 344,851. Sick Berth Attendant C.S. Hutchinson, O.N.M. 3,882. Ch. Writer S.G. White, O.N. 340,597. Third Writer H.C. Green, O.N.M. 8,266. Officers' Steward, 3d Cl., F.W. Kearley, O.N.L. 2,716. BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS Admiralty, March 3, 1915. The following dispatch has been received from Vice Admiral Sir F.C. Doveton-Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of December, 1914: INVINCIBLE, at Sea, Dec. 19, 1914. Sir: I have the honor to forward a report on the action which took place on Dec. 8, 1914, against a German squadron off the Falkland Islands. I have the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, F.C.D. STURDEE, Vice Admiral, Commander in Chief. The Secretary, Admiralty. (A)—PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships Invincible, flying my flag, Flag Capt. Percy T.M. Beamish; Inflexible, Capt. Richard F. Phillimore; Carnarvon, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Archibald P. Soddart, Flag Capt. Harry L.d'E. Skipwith; Cornwall, Capt. Walter M. Ellerton; Kent, Capt. John D. Allen; Glasgow, Capt. John Loce; Bristol, Capt. Basil H. Fanshawe, and Macedonia, Capt. Bertram S. Evans, arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10:30 A.M. on Monday, Dec. 7, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, Dec. 8. At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, Dec. 8, a signal was received from the signal station on shore: "A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northward." THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF ADMIRAL STURDEE. The numbers given on the plan show the corresponding positions of vessels at various times. All ships bearing the same number were simultaneously in the positions charted.] At this time the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows: Macedonia: At anchor as lookout ship. Kent (guard ship): At anchor in Port William. Invincible and Inflexible: In Port William. Carnarvon: In Port William. Cornwall: In Port William. Glasgow: In Port Stanley. Bristol: In Port Stanley. The Kent was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed. At 8:20 A.M. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8:45 A.M. the Kent passed down the harbor and took up a station at the entrance. The Canopus, Capt. Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8:47 A.M. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8:20 A.M. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off. At 8:50 A.M. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward. The Macedonia was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders. At 9:20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy, (Gneisenau and Nürnberg,) with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the Canopus, which opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colors and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William. A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbor, but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts. The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9:40 A.M. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy's movements. At 9:45 A.M. the squadron—less the Bristol—weighed, and proceeded out of harbor in the following order: Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the northwest. At 10:20 A.M. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11:15 A.M., to enable the other cruisers to get into station. At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon. Information was received from the Bristol at 11:27 A.M. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The Bristol was therefore directed to take the Macedonia under orders and destroy transports. The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12:20 P.M., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the Glasgow. At 12:47 P.M. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made. The Inflexible opened fire at 12:55 P.M. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship. The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, which was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1:20 P.M. she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Nürnberg and Dresden, to the southwest. These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instructions. The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing. (B.)—ACTION WITH THE ARMORED CRUISERS. The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen when, at 1:25 P.M., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned about seven points to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1:30 P.M. Shortly afterward speed was eased to twenty-four knots and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the Invincible leading. The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased until at 2 P.M. it had reached 16,450 yards. The enemy then (2:10 P.M.) turned away about ten points to starboard, and a second chase ensued until at 2:45 P.M. the battle cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2:53 P.M., to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2:55 P.M. The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible. At 3:30 P.M. the Scharnhorst led around about ten points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam. At times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4:04 P.M. the Scharnhorst, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship, for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4:17 P.M. she disappeared. The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers. At 5:08 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much. At 5:15 P.M. one of the Gneisenau's shells struck the Invincible; this was her last effective effort. At 5:30 P.M. she turned toward the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire!" but before it was hoisted the Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun. At 5:40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau, and at this time the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying. At 5:50 P.M. "Cease fire!" was made. At 6 P.M. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking. The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that by the time the ammunition was expended some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water. When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship. Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; lifebuoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a portion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board. These men were buried at sea the following day with full military honors. (C)—ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS. At about 1 P.M., when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port to engage the Invincible and Inflexible, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the Dresden was leading and the Nürnberg and Leipzig followed on each quarter. In accordance with my instructions, the Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall at once went in chase of these ships; the Carnarvon, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers. The Glasgow drew well ahead of the Cornwall and Kent, and at 3 P.M. shots were exchanged with the Leipzig at 12,000 yards. The Glasgow's object was to endeavor to outrange the Leipzig with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the Cornwall and Kent a chance of coming into action. At 4:17 P.M. the Cornwall opened fire, also on the Leipzig. At 7:17 P.M. the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and the Cornwall and Glasgow ceased fire. The Leipzig turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 P.M. Seven officers and eleven men were saved. At 3:36 P.M. the Cornwall ordered the Kent to engage the Nürnberg, the nearest cruiser to her. Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine room department, the Kent was able to get within range of the Nürnberg at 5 P.M. At 6:35 P.M. the Nürnberg was on fire forward and ceased firing. The Kent also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colors were still observed to be flying on the Nürnberg, the Kent opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colors being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The Nürnberg sank at 7:27 P.M., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived. The Kent had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell. During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the Nürnberg and Leipzig, the Dresden, which was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The Glasgow was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the Leipzig for over an hour before either the Cornwall or Kent could come up and get within range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight. The weather changed after 4 P.M., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the Dresden to get away unobserved. (D)—ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS. A report was received at 11:27 A.M. from H.M.S. Bristol that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The Bristol was ordered to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy the transports. H.M.S. Macedonia reports that only two ships, steamships Baden and Santa Isabel, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crews. I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the engineer officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed. The names of the following are specially mentioned: OFFICERS. Commander Richard Herbert Denny Townsend, H.M.S. Invincible. Commander Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford, H.M.S. Kent. Lieut. Commander Wilfred Arthur Thompson, H.M.S. Glasgow. Lieut. Commander Hubert Edward Danreuther, First and Gunnery Lieutenant, H.M.S. Invincible. Engineer Commander George Edward Andrew, H.M.S. Kent. Engineer Commander Edward John Weeks, H.M.S. Invincible. Paymaster Cyril Sheldon Johnson, H.M.S. Invincible. Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls, H.M.S. Invincible. Carpenter William Henry Venning, H.M.S. Kent. Carpenter George Henry Egford, H.M.S. Cornwall. PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN. Ch. P.O. D. Leighton, O.N. 124,288, Kent. P.O., 2d Cl., M.J. Walton, (R.F.R., A. 1,756,) O.N. 118,358, Kent. Ldg. Smn. F.S. Martin, O.N. 233,301, Invincible, Gnr's. Mate, Gunlayer, 1st Cl. Sigmn. F. Glover, O.N. 225,731, Cornwall. Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., J.G. Hill, O.N. 269,646, Cornwall. Actg. Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270,654, Inflexible. E.R. Art., 1st Cl., G.H.F. McCarten, O.N. 270,023, Invincible. Stkr. P.O. G.S. Brewer, O.N. 150,950, Kent. Stkr. P.O. W.A. Townsend, O.N. 301,650, Cornwall. Stkr., 1st Cl., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111,915, Cornwall. Shpwrt., 1st Cl., A.N.E. England, O.N. 341,971, Glasgow. Shpwrt., 2d Cl., A.C.H. Dymott, O.N.M. 8,047, Kent. Portsmouth R.F.R.B. 3,307 Sergt. Charles Mayes, H.M.S. Kent. F.C.D. STURDEE. BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND MORNING. By SIR OWEN SEAMAN. [From King Albert's Book.] You that have faith to look with fearless eyes Beyond the tragedy of a world at strife, And trust that out of night and death shall rise The dawn of ampler life; Rejoice, whatever anguish rend your heart, That God has given you, for a priceless dower, To live in these great times and have your part In Freedom's crowning hour. That you may tell your sons who see the light High in the heavens, their heritage to take— "I saw the powers of darkness put to flight! I saw the morning break!" The Greatest of Campaigns The French Official Account Concluded The second and succeeding installments—the first installment appeared in CURRENT HISTORY for April—of the official French historical review of the operations in the western theatre of war from the beginning until the end of January, 1915—the first six months—are described in the subjoined correspondence of The Associated Press. LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—The Associated Press has received the second installment of the historical review emanating from French official sources of the operations in the Western theatre of war, from its beginning up to the end of January. It should be understood that the narrative is made purely from the French standpoint. The additional installment of the document dealing with the victory of the Marne, Sept. 6th to 15th, is as follows: If one examines on the map the respective positions of the German and French armies on Sept. 6 as previously described, it will be seen that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exposing his right to the offensive action of our left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne. On the evening of Sept. 5 our left army had reached the front Penchard-Saint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and Fourth Army Corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. But in spite of this pressure our troops held their ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and, being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we established ourselves on the Aisne. LEFT OF KLUCK'S ARMY THREATENED. Why did the German forces which were confronting us and on the evening before attacking so furiously retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face our left the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the British Army, which had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on Sept. 8 and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect. On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny and had that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Chateau-Thiery, taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, our left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British Army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. The rôle of the French Army, which was operating to the right of the British Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support our centre, which from Sept. 7 had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it. On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and 1,300,000 cartridges. On the 12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with our centre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste. THE ACTION OF FERE-CHAMPENOISE. Our centre consisted of a new army created on Aug. 29 and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated on Aug. 29 to Sept. 5 from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sézanne-Mailly. The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line Humbauville-Chateau-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy. The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th to pierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fére-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, which retired as far as Gouragançon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre. Despite this retreat the General commanding the army ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco Division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the division which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sézanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold manoeuvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. Our other army of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that, being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and our two centre armies were solidly established on the ground gained. THE OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT. To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from our centre. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German Army Corps. On the 10th inst. the Eighth and Fifteenth German Army Corps counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th our progress continued with new successes, and on the 12th we were able to face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th. The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of our right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by our left and our centre. Map showing the successive stages of the Battle of the Marne. Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command. To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole German army, and that from the time they marched forward they never again fell back. Under their pressure the German retreat at certain times had the appearance of a rout. In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, we took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, more than a million cartridges, and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery, which, from information brought by our airmen, was destroyed by our guns. "THE RUSH TO THE SEA." LONDON, March 18.—The third installment of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. The French narrative contains a long chapter on the siege war from the Oise to the Vosges, which lasted from Sept. 13 to Nov. 30. Most of the incidents in this prolonged and severe warfare have been recorded in the daily bulletins. The operations were of secondary importance, and were conducted on both sides with the same idea of wearing down the troops and the artillery of the opposing forces with the view of influencing the decisive result in the great theatre of war in the north. The next chapter deals with "the rush to the sea," Sept. 13 to Oct. 23, and is as follows: GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE ACTION. As early as Sept. 11 the Commander in Chief had directed our left army to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the Oise. On Sept. 17 he made that instruction more precise by ordering "a mass to be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capable of coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy." Everything led us to expect that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking in invention. Indeed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal of their manoeuvre of August. In the parallel race the opponents were bound in the end to be stopped only by the sea; that is what happened about Oct. 20. The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance at the map—the concentric form of their front, which shortened the length of their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived in time. From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting went on continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we were fighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movement brought into line more than eighteen new army corps, (twelve active army corps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps.) On our side it ended in the constitution of three fresh armies on our left and in the transport into the same district of the British Army and the Belgian Army from Antwerp. For the conception and realization of this fresh and extended disposition the French command, in the first place, had to reduce to a minimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise, and afterwards to utilize to the utmost our means of transport. It succeeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the battle of Flanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration of their forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce our left, they flung themselves upon a resistance which inflicted upon them a complete defeat. DEPLOYMENT OF A FIRST ARMY. The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army which had held the left of our front during the battle of the Marne, reinforced on Sept. 15 by one army corps. This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive, (district of Vaudelincourt-Mouchy-Uaugy,) a fresh army was transported more to the left, with the task "of acting against the German right wing in order to disengage its neighbor, ... while preserving a flanking direction in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemy might be able to put into line." To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the district Clermont-Beauvais-Boix a cavalry corps and four territorial divisions were ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In the wooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny the enemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless, the order still further to broaden the movement toward the left was maintained, while the territorial divisions were to move toward Bethune and Aubigny. The march to the sea went on. From the 21st to the 26th all our forces were engaged in the district Lassigny-Roye-Peronne, with alternations of reverse and success. It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as it went on. On the 26th the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployed against us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more; consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of a fresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us. Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed no longer on Beauvais, but toward Amiens. The front was then again to extend. A fresh army was constituted more to the north. DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND ARMY. From Sept. 30 onward we could not but observe that the enemy, already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continually slipping his forces from south to north, and everywhere confronting us with remarkable energy. Accordingly, on Oct. 1 two cavalry corps were directed to make a leap forward and, operating on both banks of the Scarpe, to put themselves in touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushed forward as far as Douai. But on Oct. 2 and 3 the bulk of our fresh army was very strongly attacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were two corps of cavalry, the guards, four active army corps, and two reserve corps. A fresh French army corps was immediately transported and detrained in the Lille district. But once more the attacks became more pressing, and on Oct. 4 it was a question whether, in view of the enemy's activity both west of the Oise and south of the Somme, and also further to the north, a retreat would not have to be made. General Joffre resolutely put this hypothesis aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with the reinforcements that had arrived. It was, however, clear that, despite the efforts of all, our front, extended to the sea as it was by a mere ribbon of troops, did not possess the solidity to enable it to resist with complete safety a German attack, the violence of which could well be foreseen. In the Arras district the position was fairly good. But between the Oise and Arras we were holding our own only with difficulty. Finally, to the north, on the Lille-Estaires-Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel front, our cavalry and our territorials had their work cut out against eight divisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It was at this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northern theatre of operations began. VICE ADMIRAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF THE ABRUZZI— Cousin of the King of Italy, Commander of the dreadnought squadron of the Italian Navy.— (Photo (c) by Pach Bros., N.Y.) H.M. FERDINAND I.—Tsar of the Bulgars.— (Photo from P.S. Rogers.) THE TRANSPORT OF THE BRITISH ARMY. Field Marshal French had, as early as the end of September, expressed the wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of the allied armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greater facility of which his communications would have the advantage in this new position, and also of the impending arrival of two divisions of infantry from home and of two infantry divisions and a cavalry division from India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain. In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to the intensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decided at the beginning of October to meet the Field Marshal's wishes and to have the British Army removed from the Aisne. It was clearly specified that on the northern terrain the British Army should co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of the German right. In other terms, the British Army was to prolong the front of the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon as possible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army. But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was not possible to attack the Germans during the time when they had only cavalry in the Lille district and further to the north. THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN ARMY. There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on Oct. 9 the Belgian Army, which was covered by 8,000 British bluejackets and 6,000 French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian territory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate hopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans and delayed their execution. On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that, in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was not capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previous few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effort was necessary. That effort was immediately made by the dispatch to the north of the Lys of considerable French forces, which formed the French Army of Belgium. THE FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM. The French Army of Belgium consisted, to begin with, of two territorial divisions, four divisions of cavalry, and a naval brigade. Directly after its constitution it was strengthened by elements from other points on the front whose arrival extended from Oct. 27 to Nov. 11. These reinforcements were equivalent altogether in value to five army corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteen regiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery. Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructions of the General in Chief on Sept. 11 and developed during the five following weeks with the ampleness we have just seen. The movements of troops carried out during this period were methodically combined with the pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oise to the North Sea. On Oct. 22 our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district, rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresh armies—three French armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army. Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General in Chief attained its end. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against the enemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the battle of Flanders, Oct. 22 to Nov. 15. OPERATIONS IN FLANDERS. The fourth installment of the French review takes up the operations in Flanders, as follows: The German attack in Flanders was conducted strategically and tactically with remarkable energy. The complete and indisputable defeat in which it resulted is therefore significant. The forces of which the enemy disposed for this operation between the sea and the Lys comprised: (1) The entire Fourth Army commanded by the Duke of Württemberg, consisting of one naval division, one division of Ersatz Reserve, (men who had received no training before the war,) which was liberated by the fall of Antwerp; the Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps, and the Forty-eighth Division belonging to the Twenty-fourth Reserve Corps. (2) A portion of another army under General von Fabeck, consisting of the Fifteenth Corps, two Bavarian corps and three (unspecified) divisions. (3) Part of the Sixth Army under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. This army, more than a third of which took part in the battle of Flanders, comprised the Nineteenth Army Corps, portions of the Thirteenth Corps and the Eighteenth Reserve Corps, the Seventh and Fourteenth Corps, the First Bavarian Reserve Corps, the Guards, and the Fourth Army Corps. (4) Four highly mobile cavalry corps prepared and supported the action of the troops enumerated above. Everything possible had been done to fortify the "morale" of the troops. At the beginning of October the Crown Prince of Bavaria in a proclamation had exhorted his soldiers "to make the decisive effort against the French left wing," and "to settle thus the fate of the great battle which has lasted for weeks." Map showing the swaying battle line from Belfort to the North Sea and the intrenched line on April 15, 1915. On Oct. 28, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria declared in an army order that his troops "had just been fighting under very difficult conditions," and he added: "It is our business now not to let the struggle with our most detested enemy drag on longer.... The decisive blow is still to be struck." On Oct. 30, General von Deimling, commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps (belonging to General von Fabeck's command,) issued an order declaring that "the thrust against Ypres will be of decisive importance." It should be noted also that the Emperor proceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence the ardor of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire German press incessantly proclaimed the importance of the "Battle of Calais." It is superfluous to add that events in Poland explain in a large measure the passionate resolve of the German General Staff to obtain a decision in the Western theatre of operations at all costs. This decision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. To reach Calais, that is, to break our left; to carry Ypres, that is, to cut it in half; through both points to menace the communications and supplies of the British expeditionary corps, perhaps even to threaten Britain in her island—such was the German plan in the Battle of Flanders. It was a plan that could not be executed. CHECK OF GERMAN ATTACK. The enemy, who had at his disposal a considerable quantity of heavy artillery, directed his efforts at first upon the coast and the country to the north of Dixmude. His objective was manifestly the capture of Dunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursued until Nov. 1. On Oct. 23 the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport to Dixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied by our marines (fusiliers marins). During the subsequent day our forces along the railway developed a significant resistance against an enemy superior in number and backed by heavy artillery. On the 29th the inundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread along our front. On the 30th we recaptured Ramscapelle, the only point on the railway which Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2d of November the enemy bombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2d he evacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoning cannon, dead and wounded. On the 3d our troops were able to re-enter the Dixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at this juncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. They could not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a total failure. Since then it has never been renewed. The Battle of Calais, so noisily announced by the German press, amounted to a decided reverse for the Germans. GERMAN DEFEAT AT YPRES. The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor, in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful masses. This was the Battle of Ypres. In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle, we must hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry reached Roulers and Cortemark (Oct. 28) our territorial divisions from Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized a defensive position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us to prepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From Oct. 23 two British and French army corps were in occupation of this position, which was to be the base of their forward march in the direction of Roulers-Menin. The delays already explained and the strength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to a standstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle, Paschendaele, Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres was solidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled from Oct. 25 to Nov. 13, to the north, the east, and the south of Ypres. From Oct. 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on Oct. 31, we were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and finally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to two army corps. Between Oct. 30 and Nov. 6 Ypres was several times in danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to defend; but defended it was without a recoil. REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE. The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th this offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcements had to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on Nov. 12. By the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who advanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible in consequence of the fact that the French and British artillery had crowded nearly 300 guns on to these few kilometers of front. Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack itself had been. During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lost in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south of Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization of the position the inviolability of our front. [The compiler of the report here adds a footnote saying that the bodies of more than 40,000 Germans were found on the battlefield during these three weeks of battle. The report next proceeds to summarize the character and results of the operations since the Battle of Flanders—that is, during the period Nov. 30-Feb. 1.] Since the former date the French supreme command had not thought it advisable to embark upon important offensive operations. It has confined itself to local attacks, the main object of which was to hold in front of us as large a number of German corps as possible, and thus to hinder the withdrawal of the troops which to our knowledge the German General Staff was anxious to dispatch to Russia. FEW SENT TO THE EAST. As a matter of fact, the numbers transported to the eastern front have been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the western front, Germany has only been able to take four and one-half corps for the eastern front. On the other hand, climatic conditions—the rain, mud, and mist—were such as to diminish the effectiveness of offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken, which was another reason for postponing them. Still another reason lies in the fact that from now on the allied forces can count upon a steadily expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material, while the German forces have attained the maximum of their power, and can only diminish now both in numbers and in value. These conditions explain the character of the siege warfare which the operations have assumed during the period under review. Map illustrating the Battle of Flanders, the Battle of Ypres, and the terrain of the frustrated German efforts to reach Dunkirk and Calais. Meanwhile, it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the same results for the Germans as for us. From Nov. 15 to Feb. 1, our opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, did not succeed in taking anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreciable results. [The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses between the allied and the German forces in France during the Winter campaign. The result he sums up as follows:] 1. A general progress of our troops; very marked at certain points. 2. A general falling back of the enemy, except to the northeast of Soissons. To complete the balance it must be added that: 1. The German offensive in Poland was checked a month ago. 2. The Russian offensive continues in Galicia and the Carpathians. 3. A large part of the Turkish Caucasian army has been annihilated. 4. Germany has exhausted her resources of officers, (there are now on an average twelve officers to a regiment,) and henceforth will only be able to develop her resources in men to the detriment of the existing units. 5. The allied armies, on the contrary, possess the power of reinforcing themselves in a very considerable degree. It may, therefore, be declared that in order to obtain complete success it is sufficient for France and her allies to know how to wait and to prepare victory with indefatigable patience. The German offensive is broken. The German defensive will be broken in its turn. [It is evident from the report that the numbered German army corps are Prussian corps unless otherwise specified.] THE FRENCH ARMY AS IT IS. LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—All of Part II., of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources, and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. Part II, deals with the conditions in the French Army, furnishing a most interesting chapter on this subject under the title, "The French Army as it Is." The compiler of the report, beginning this part of his review on Feb. 1, says that the condition of the French Army is excellent and appreciably superior to what it was at the beginning of the war from the three points of view of numbers, quality, and equipment. Continuing, he says: In the higher command important changes have been made. It has, in fact, been rejuvenated by the promotion of young commanders of proved quality to high rank. All the old Generals, who at the beginning of August were at the head of large commands, have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war and others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the army has been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies. The result has been to lower the average age of general officers by ten years. Today more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps are less than 60 years of age. Some are considerably younger. A number of the army corps commanders are from 46 to 54 years of age, and the brigade commanders are usually under 50. There are, in fact, at the front extremely few general officers over 60, and these are men who are in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers. MANY COLONELS PROMOTED. This rejuvenation of the high command was facilitated by a number of circumstances, notable among which were the strengthening of the higher regimental ranks carried out during the three years preceding the war, as a result of which at the outset of the campaign each infantry regiment had two Lieutenant Colonels, and each cavalry and artillery regiment a Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, and also the system of promotion for the duration of the war. Many officers who began the war as Colonels now command brigades. Some are even at the head of divisions or army corps. Ability proved on the field of battle is now immediately recognized and utilized, and in this way it has been possible to provide in the most favorable manner for the vacancies created by the changes in command which were considered necessary in the first weeks of the war. The higher grades of the French Army are inspired by a remarkable unity in the matter of military theory, and by a solidarity of spirit which has found striking expression in the course of the numerous moves of army corps from one part of the theatre of operations to another, which have been carried out since the beginning of the war. The cavalry after six months of war still possesses an excess of officers. There are on an average thirty-six officers to a regiment instead of the thirty-one considered to be the necessary minimum. The artillery, which has suffered relatively little, has also an excess of officers, and is further able to count upon a large number of Captains and other officers, who before the war were employed in the arsenals or in technical research. Finally the reserve artillery officers have nearly all proved to be excellent battery commanders. The losses in the junior commissioned ranks have naturally been highest in the infantry. There is, however, nothing like a want of officers in this arm. Many Captains and Lieutenants who have been wounded by machine-gun fire (such wounds are usually slight and quickly healed,) have been able to return speedily to the front. The reserve officers have in general done remarkably well, and in many cases have shown quite exceptional aptitude for the rank of company commanders. The non-commissioned officers promoted to sub-Lieutenancies make excellent section leaders, and even show themselves very clever and energetic company commanders in the field. It must be remembered also that thanks to the intellectual and physical development of the generation now serving with the colors; and thanks, above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic spirit of our army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades and even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on Aug. 2 as privates, now wear the officers' epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements. The state of our infantry on Jan. 15 was very satisfactory and much superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers, fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each regiment six of the twelve companies are commanded by Captains who are regular officers, three by Captains of the reserve and three by Lieutenants. Each company has at least three officers. The state of the army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest is declared to be exceptionally brilliant. The army is led by young, well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have acquired the art of war by experience. 2,500,000 FRENCH AT FRONT. Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the front, and every unit is, or was on Jan. 15, at war strength. The infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the companies have a strength of 250 or more. In other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are all up to, or above, regulation strength. This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French Army over the Germans. While Germany has created a great number of new units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number, and has only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future requirements of the new units, as regards all ranks, without encroaching upon the reserves needed for the existing units. At the same time, thanks to the depots in the interior of the country, the effectives at the front have been maintained at full strength. The sources of supply for this purpose were the remainder of the eleven classes of the reserves, the younger classes of the territorial army, and the new class of 1914. A large number of the men wounded in the earlier engagements of the war have been able to return to the front. They have been incorporated in the new drafts, providing these with a useful stiffening of war-tried men. With regard to the supplies of men upon which the army can draw to repair the wastage at the front, we learn that there are practically half as many men in the depots as at the front, in other words about 1,250,000. Further supplies of men are provided by the class of 1915 and the revision of the various categories of men of military age previously exempted on grounds of health or for other reasons from the duty of bearing arms. As a result of this measure nearly half a million men have been claimed for the army, almost all of whom, after rigorous physical tests, have been declared fit for military service. DRILLED BY CONVALESCENTS. In the depots in which the new soldiers are being trained the services of many officers and non-commissioned officers discharged as convalescents after being wounded are utilized in order to give a practical turn to the instruction. There are still many voluntary enlistments, and with all these resources of men the army can count upon reinforcements soon to be available which will considerably augment its offensive power. The quality of the troops has improved perceptibly since the beginning of the war. The men have become hardened and used to war, and their health—largely owing to the excellence of the commissariat—is extremely satisfactory. In spite of the severity of the Winter hardly any cases of disease of the respiratory organs have occurred, and the sanitary returns of the army show an appreciable improvement on those of the preceding Winter. With regard to the reserves, experience has verified the dictum of the Serbian and Bulgarian Generals in the war of 1913, namely, that "two months in the field are necessary in order to get at the full value of reserves." Our infantry is now accustomed to the rapid and thorough "organization" of the defensive. In August it neither liked nor had the habit of using the spade. Today those who see our trenches are astounded. They are veritable improvised fortresses, proof against the 77-millimeter gun and often against artillery of higher calibre. During the last five months not a single encounter can be cited in which our infantry did not have the advantage over the German infantry. All the enemy's attacks have been repulsed, except to the north of Soissons, where their success was due to the flooded state of the Aisne and the carrying away of our bridges. Our attacks, on the other hand, have yielded important results, and have been carried out with plenty of spirit, although without the imprudence which cost us such heavy losses in August. The cavalry has made remarkable progress. Throughout October this branch was called on to eke out the inadequate numbers of the infantry, and showed itself perfectly adapted to the necessities of fighting on foot. Several regiments of cavalry have been used as infantry, and, armed with rifles, have rendered the most valuable services. The artillery has displayed a superiority in the use of its admirable material, which is recognized by the Germans themselves. LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—Further installments of the French official review of the condition of the French Army after six months of war have been obtained by The Associated Press. The sixth installment deals with material, artillery, transport, and supplies, and the seventh takes up the situation of the German Army and makes an analysis of the German forces in the field and available for service. The first chapter of the seventh installment, headed "The German Effort," opens with a statement as to the German forces at the beginning of the campaign. The writer says: The military effort of Germany at the outset of the campaign exceeded all anticipations. Her design was to crush the French Army in a few weeks under a tremendous mass of troops. Nothing was neglected to bring that mass together. The number of German army corps in time of peace is twenty-five. When war began the German General Staff put in the field on the two theatres of operations: 1, as fighting troops, (active, reserve, Ersatz or Landwehr,) sixty-one army corps; 2, as troops to guard communications and territory, formations of the Landsturm. In October six and a half new army corps made their appearance, plus a division of sailors—in all seven corps. From the end of November to the end of December there was only an insignificant increase, consisting of the division of sailors. In January, 1915, the number of fighting formations put into line by the German Army was therefore sixty-nine army corps, divided as follows: Active corps, twenty-five and a half; reserve corps, twenty-one and a half; Ersatz brigades, six and a half; reserve corps of new formation, seven and a half, and corps of Landwehr, eight and a half. GERMANY'S GREAT INITIAL EFFORT. The immense effort thus made by Germany explains itself very well, if, having regard to the position of Germany at the opening of the war, one considers that of the Allies. Germany desired to take advantage of the circumstances which enabled her to make a simultaneous mobilization of all her forces—a mobilization which the three allied armies could not carry out so rapidly. Germany wished with the mass of troops to crush first of all the adversary who appeared to her the most dangerous. This effort, broken for the first time on the Marne, attained its maximum at the moment of the battle of Flanders, in which more than fifty army corps out of sixty-nine were pitted against the French, British, and Belgian Armies. Here also the method followed by Germany is easily comprehensible. At the end of October the Russian danger was beginning to become pressing, and it was necessary to win a decisive victory in the western theatre of the war. It was imperative to give international opinion the impression that Germany remained in that quarter mistress of operations. Finally, it behooved her by this victory to gain the freedom to transport a large number of army corps to Poland. We have seen that the battle of Flanders, instead of being a success for Germany, was a marked defeat. This defeat was fraught with results, and it dominates the present position of the German Army. The plans above described of the German mobilization, which had their justification in view of a prompt victory, were calculated to become extremely perilous from the moment that that victory failed to be gained. INITIATIVE LOST BY GERMANY. From that moment, in fact, Germany lost the initiative and the direction of the war. And, furthermore, she was condemned to suffer the counter-effects of the enormous and precipitate effort which she had made in vain. From the point of view of her effectiveness and her regimental cadres, (basic organization,) she had undergone a wastage which her adversaries, on the other hand, had been able to save themselves. She had, in the words of the proverb, put all her eggs in one basket, and in spite of her large population she could no longer, owing to the immediate and sterile abuse which she had made of her resources, pretend to regain the superiority of numbers. She was reduced to facing as best she could on both war fronts the unceasingly increasing forces of the Allies. She had attained the maximum of tension and had secured a minimum of results. She had thus landed herself in a difficulty which will henceforward go on increasing and which is made clear when the wastage which her army has suffered is closely studied. WASTAGE OF GERMAN EFFECTIVES. Chapter II. of this section of the review bears the headline "Wastage of German Effectives." The wastage of effectives is easy to establish, it says. We have for the purpose two sources—the official lists of losses published by the German General Staff and the notebooks, letters, and archives of soldiers and officers killed and taken prisoners. These different documents show that by the middle of January the German losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men. These figures are certainly less than the reality, because, for one thing, the sick are not comprised, and, for another, the losses in the last battle in Poland are not included. Let us accept them, however; let us accept also that out of these 1,800,000 men 500,000—this is the normal proportion—have been able to rejoin after being cured. Thus the final loss for five months of the campaign has been 1,300,000 men, or 260,000 men per month. These figures agree exactly with what can be ascertained when the variations of effectives in certain regiments are examined. It is certain that the majority of the German regiments have had to be completely renewed. What, then, is the situation created by these enormous losses? This question is answered by a statement headed "German troops available for 1915." The total of German formations known at the beginning of January, says the review, represented in round numbers 4,000,000 men. According to the official reports on German recruiting, the entire resources of Germany in men amount to 9,000,000. But from these 9,000,000 have to be deducted men employed on railways, in the police, and in certain administrations and industries—altogether 500,000 men. The total resources available for the war were therefore 8,500,000. Out of these about one-half, say 4,000,000, are now at the front. The definitive losses represent at least 1,300,000 men. The available resources amounted, then, at the beginning of January, to 3,200,000 men. GERMANY'S RESERVES UNTRAINED. Of what are these resources composed? Chiefly of men who were untrained in time of peace, the trained reservists having almost all left the depots for the front. It has, moreover, to be noted that out of these 3,200,000 men there are, according to the statistics, 800,000 who are more than 39 years of age, and therefore of only mediocre military value. Thus there remain 2,400,000. Finally, the category of the untrained in peace comprises, according to the estimates of German military authorities themselves, one-quarter of inefficients. The really valuable resources capable of campaigning are therefore just 2,000,000. These men, comprising the 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes, called out in anticipation, constitute—and this point cannot be too strongly insisted upon—the total of available resources for the operations during the twelve months of 1915. As to what the military value of these troops will be, considering the haste with which they have been trained, the formidable losses sustained in the battle of Flanders by the newly formed corps show very clearly. Their military value will be limited. GERMAN LOSSES 260,000 A MONTH. When it is remembered that, according to the German documents themselves, the definite loss each month is 260,000 men, it is manifest that the available resources for the year 1915 will not suffice to fill the gaps of a war of ten months. It is then superabundantly established that in the matter of effectives Germany has reached the maximum of possible effort. If with the men at present available she creates, as it is certain that she is preparing to do at this moment, fresh formations, she will be preventing herself, if the war lasts another ten months, as is admissible, from being able to complete afresh her old formations. If she creates no new formations, she will have in 1915 exactly what is necessary and no more to complete the existing units afresh. Bearing in mind the ways of the German General Staff, one may suppose that, disregarding the eventual impossibility of recompleting, it is still addressing itself to creating new formations. The weakness to which Germany will expose herself in the matter of effectives has just been set forth, and it is easy to show that this weakness will be still further aggravated by the wastage in the regimental orders. PRAISES FRENCH "SEVENTY-FIVES." In the sixth installment, beginning with the field gun, the famous "seventy-fives," the compiler of the report, after rehearsing the splendid qualities of this weapon—its power, its rapidity of action, and its precision—points out that it possesses a degree of strength and endurance which makes it an implement of war of the first order. It may be stated without hesitation [says the review] that our "seventy-five" guns are in as perfect condition today as they were on the first day of the war, although the use made of them has exceeded all calculations. The consumption of projectiles was, in fact, so enormous as to cause for a moment an ammunition crisis, which, however, was completely overcome several weeks ago. The methodical and complete exploitation of all the resources of the country, organized since the beginning of the war, has enabled us to accumulate a considerable stock of fresh munitions, and an increasing rate of production is henceforth assured. We are thus sure of being able to provide without particular effort for all the needs of the campaign, present and future, however long the war may last, and it is this certainty which has enabled us to supply projectiles to several of the allied armies, among others, to the Serbian and Belgian armies. From the statements of German prisoners we have learned that the effectiveness of our new projectiles is superior to that of the old ones. FRENCH HEAVY GUNS SUPERIOR. Our heavy artillery was in process of reorganization when the war broke out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But today the rôles have been changed and our adversaries themselves acknowledge the superiority of our heavy artillery. The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved in the fortresses. The very large number of heavy guns at the front represents only a part of the total number available for use. There is an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in the case of the field gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance. The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives and of all materials needed for the manufacture of shells. With regard to small arms, hand grenades, bombs, and all the devices for lifetaking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into use, the position of the French troops is in every way favorable. There follows a passage on the development of the machine gun in this kind of warfare. Owing to the extended use of this weapon, the number supplied to the various units has been appreciably increased, says the review. Not only is each unit in possession of its full regulation complement of machine guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been increased since Feb. 1 by one-third. The report next passes to the transport service, which, it says, has worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. This section of the review closes by referring to food supplies for the army, which are described as abundant. LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—The eighth installment of the French official review of the war, previous chapters of which have been published, takes up the German losses of officers, the wastage of guns and projectiles, and "the moral wastage of the German Army." The chapter on losses of officers begins with the statement that the condition of the cadres, or basic organizations, in the German Army is bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession, has been enormously reduced, it says; and a report made in December showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were only 49 officers of the active army. The active regiments have at the present time, according to the review, an average of 12 professional officers; the reserve regiments, 9 to 10; the reserve regiments of new formation, 6 to 7; and it is to be remembered that these officers have to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units. "If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months," it continues, "she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient." FRENCH CONDITIONS IN CONTRAST. The French report points out that on the other hand, all the French regiments have been constantly kept at a minimum figure of eighteen professional officers per regiment. At the same time it admits that the commanders of German corps, commanders of active battalions, and the officers attached to the commanders of army corps are officers by profession. The French report then addresses itself to the wastage of material. Discussing the wastage of guns, it says: It is easy to ascertain the German losses in artillery. On Dec. 28 the Sixty-sixth Regiment of Artillery entrained at Courtrai for Germany twenty-two guns, of which eighteen were used up. This figure is extremely high for a single regiment. The same facts have been ascertained as regards heavy artillery. On Dec. 21 and 22 seventy-seven guns of heavy artillery, which were no longer serviceable, were sent to Cologne. These movements, which are not isolated facts, show how ill the German artillery has resisted the ordeal of the campaign. Other proofs, moreover, are decisive. For some weeks we have noted the very peculiar aspect of the marking on the bands of a great number of shells of the 77 gun. When these markings are compared with those of shells fired three months ago it is plain beyond all question that the tubes are worn and that many of them require to be replaced. This loss in guns is aggravated by the necessity which has arisen of drawing upon the original army corps for the guns assigned to the recently formed corps or those in course of formation. Several regiments of field artillery have, in fact, had to give up two batteries. WEARING OUT OF MATERIAL. These two phenomena—wearing out of material and drafts upon batteries—will inevitably result either in the reduction of batteries from six to four guns, a reduction of the number of batteries in the army corps, or the partial substitution for 77 guns of 9-centimeter cannon of the old pattern, the presence of which has been many times perceived at the front. Furthermore, the German artillery lacks and has lacked for a very long time munitions. It has been obliged to reduce its consumption of shells in a notable degree. No doubt is possible in this respect. The statements of prisoners since the battle of the Marne, and still more since the battle of the Yser, make it clear that the number of shots allowed to the batteries for each action is strictly limited. We have found on officers killed or taken prisoner the actual orders prescribing positively a strict economy of munitions. For the last three months, too, we notice that the quality of the projectiles is mediocre. Many of them do not burst. On Jan. 7, in the course of a bombardment of Laventie, scarcely any of the German shells burst. The proportion of non-bursts was estimated at two-fifths by the British on Dec. 14, two-thirds by ourselves in the same month. On Jan. 3 at Bourg-et-Comin, and at other places since then, shrapnel fell the explosion of which scarcely broke the envelope and the bullets were projected without any force. About the same time our Fourteenth Army Corps was fired at with shrapnel loaded with fragments of glass, and on several points of our front shell casings of very bad quality have been found, denoting hasty manufacture and the use of materials taken at hazard. From numerous indications it appears that the Germans are beginning to run short of their 1898 pattern rifle. A certain number of the last reinforcements (January) are armed with carbines or rifles of a poor sort without bayonets. Others have not even rifles. Prisoners taken at Woevre had old-pattern weapons. The upshot of these observations is that Germany, despite her large stores at the beginning, and the great resources of her industrial production, presents manifest signs of wear, and that the official optimism which she displays does not correspond with the reality of the facts. MORAL WASTAGE. Under the caption "Moral Wastage of the German Army," the review continues: The material losses of the German Army have corresponded with a moral wastage which it is interesting and possible to follow, both from the interrogation of prisoners and the pocketbooks and letters seized upon them or on the killed. At the beginning of the war the entire German Army, as was natural, was animated by an unshakable faith in the military superiority of the empire. It lived on the recollections of 1870, and on those of the long years of peace, during which all the powers which had to do with Germany displayed toward her a spirit of conciliation and patience which might pass for weakness. The first prisoners we took in August showed themselves wholly indifferent to the reverses of the German Army. They were sincerely and profoundly convinced that, if the German Army retired, it was in virtue of a preconceived plan, and that our successes would lead to nothing. The events at the end of August were calculated to strengthen this contention in the minds of the German soldiers. The strategic retreat of the French Army, the facility with which the German armies were able to advance from Aug. 25 to Sept. 5, gave our adversaries a feeling of absolute and final superiority, which manifested itself at that time by all the statements gleaned and all the documents seized. At the moment of the battle of the Marne the first impression was one of failure of comprehension and of stupor. A great number of German soldiers, notably those who fell into our hands during the first days of that battle, believed fully, as at the end of August, that the retreat they were ordered to make was only a means of luring us into a trap. German military opinion was suddenly converted when the soldiers saw that this retreat continued, and that it was being carried out in disorder, under conditions which left no doubt as to its cause and its extent. This time it was really a defeat, and a defeat aggravated by the absence of regular supplies and by the physical and moral depression which was the result. The severity of the losses sustained, the overpowering effects of the French artillery, began from this moment to be noted in the German pocketbooks with veritable terror. Hope revived, however, at the end of some weeks, and there is to be found in the letters of soldiers and officers the announcement of "a great movement" which is being prepared, and which is to lead the German armies anew as far as Paris. LOSSES IN "BATTLE OF CALAIS." This is the great "battle of Calais," which, contrary to the anticipations of the enemy, was in reality fought to the east of the Yser. The losses of the Germans, which during those ten days exceeded 150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000, produced a terrifying impression on the troops. From that moment prisoners no longer declared themselves sure of success. For a certain time they had been consoled by the announcement of the capture of Warsaw. This pretended success having proved to be fictitious, incredulity became general. During the last two months the most intelligent of the prisoners have all admitted that no one could any longer say on which side victory would rest. If we think of the absolute confidence with which the German people had been sustained, this avowal is of great importance. Letters seized on a dead officer speak of the imminence of a military and economic hemming-in of Germany. They discuss the possibility of Germany finding herself after the war with "empty hands and pockets turned inside out." There is no longer any question of imposing the conqueror's law upon adversaries at his mercy, but of fighting with the energy of despair to secure an honorable peace. An officer of the General Staff who was made prisoner on Jan. 18 said: "Perhaps this struggle of despair has already begun." There follows a chapter bearing the title, "The System of Lies," in which the review describes the methods by which it is alleged the German Government "made a sustained effort to create in the army an artificial state of mind based entirely upon lies and a scientific system of fables."