CHAPTER VII "The war must be fought to a finish. Either Germany or England must win and the interests here on the Rhine are ready to fight until Germany wins." "Do you think Germany wants war with America?" I asked Thyssen. "Never!" was his emphatic response. "First, because we have enemies enough, and, secondly, because in peace times, our relations with America are always most friendly. We want them to continue so after the war." Thyssen's remarks could be taken on their face value were it not for the fact that the week before we arrived in these cities General Ludendorf, von Hindenhurg's chief assistant and co-worker, was there to get the industrial leaders to manufacture more ammunition. Von Falkenhayn had made many enemies in this section because he cut down the ammunition manufacturing until these men were losing money. So the first thing von Hindenburg did was to double all orders for ammunition and war supplies and to send Ludendorf to the industrial centres to make peace with the men who were opposed to the Government. Thus from May to November German politics went through a period of transformation. No one knew exactly what would happen,--there were so many conflicting opinions. Political parties, industrial leaders and the press were so divided it was evident that something would have to be done or the German political organisation would strike a rock and go to pieces. The Socialists were still demanding election reforms during the war. The National Liberals were intriguing for a Reichstag Committee to have equal authority with the Foreign Office in dealing with all matters of international affairs. The landowners, who were losing money because the Government was confiscating so much food, were not only criticising von Bethmann-Hollweg but holding back as much food as they could for higher prices. The industrial leaders, who had been losing money because von Falkenhayn had decreased ammunition orders, were only partially satisfied by von Hindenburg's step because they realised that unless the war was intensified the Government would not need such supplies indefinitely. They saw, too, that the attitude of President Wilson had so injured what little standing they still had in the neutral world that unless Germany won the war in a decisive way, their world connections would disappear forever and they would be forced to begin all over after the war. Faced by this predicament, they demanded a ruthless submarine warfare against all shipping in order that not only England but every other power should suffer, because the more ships and property of the enemies destroyed the more their chances with the rest of the world would be equalised when the war was over. Food conditions were becoming worse, the people were becoming more dissatisfied; losses on the battlefields were touching nearly every family. Depression was growing. Every one felt that something had to be done and done immediately. The press referred to these months of turmoil as a period of "new orientation." It was a time of readjustment which did not reach a climax until December twelfth when the Chancellor proposed peace conferences to the Allies. WHAT YOU CANNOT EAT OR DRINK FOODSTUFFS WHICH ARE COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED IN GERMANY Rice Coffee Tea Cocoa Chocolate Olive oil Cream Fruit flavorings Canned soups or soup cubes Syrups Dried vegetables, beans, peas, etc. Nuts Candy (a very limited number of persons can buy one-quarter of a pound about once a week). Malted milk Beer made of either malt or hops Caviar Ice cream Macaroni WHAT YOU MAY EAT FOOD OBTAINABLE ONLY BY CARD Bread, 1,900 grams per week per person. Meat, 250 grams (1/2 pound) per week per head. Eggs, 1 per person every two weeks. Butter, 90 grams per week per person. Milk, 1 quart daily only for children under ten and invalids. Potatoes, formerly 9 pounds per week; lately in many parts of Germany no potatoes were available. Sugar, formerly 2 pounds per month, now 4 pounds, but this will not continue long. Marmalade, or jam, 1/4 of a pound every month. Noodles, 1/2 pound per person a month. Sardines, or canned fish, small box per month. Saccharine (a coal tar product substitute for sugar), about 25 small tablets a month. Oatmeal, 1/2 of a pound per month for adults or 1 pound per month for children under twelve years. WHAT YOU CAN EAT FOOD WHICH EVERY ONE WITH MONEY CAN BUY Geese, costing 8 to 10 marks per pound ($1.60 to $2 per pound). Wild game, rabbits, ducks, deer, etc. Smuggled meat, such as ham and bacon, for $2.50 per pound. Vegetables, carrots, spinach, onions, cabbage, beets. Apples, lemons, oranges. Bottled oil made from seeds and roots for cooking purposes, costing $5 per pound. Vinegar. Fresh fish. Fish sausage. Pickles. Duck, chicken and geese heads, feet and wings. Black crows. THE FOOD SITUATION AT A GLANCE CHAPTER VII THE BUBBLING ECONOMIC VOLCANO When I entered Germany in 1915 there was plenty of food everywhere and prices were normal. But a year later the situation had changed so that the number of food cards--Germany's economic barometer--had increased eight times. March and April of 1916 were the worst months in the year and a great many people had difficulty in getting enough food to eat. There was growing dissatisfaction with the way the Government was handling the food problem but the people's hope was centred upon the next harvest. In April and May the submarine issue and the American crisis turned public attention from food to politics. From July to October the Somme battles kept the people's minds centred upon military operations. While the scarcity of food became greater the Government, through inspired articles in the press, informed the people that the harvest was so big that there would be no more food difficulties. Germany began to pay serious attention to the food situation, when early in the year, Adolph von Batocki, the president of East Prussia and a big land owner, was made food dictator. At the same time there were organised various government food departments. There was an Imperial Bureau for collecting fats; another to take charge of the meat supply; another to control the milk and another in charge of the vegetables and fruit. Germany became practically a socialistic state and in this way the Government kept abreast of the growth of Socialism among the people. The most important step the Government took was to organise the Zentral Einkaufgesellschaft, popularly known as the "Z. E. G." The first object of this organisation was to purchase food in neutral countries. Previously German merchants had been going to Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries to buy supplies. These merchants had been bidding against each other in order to get products for their concerns. In this way food was made much more expensive than it would have been had one purchaser gone outside of Germany. So the Government prohibited all firms from buying food abroad. Travelling agents of the "Z. E. G." went to these countries and bought all of the supplies available at a fixed price. Then these resold to German dealers at cost. Such drastic measures were necessitated by the public demand that every one share alike. The Government found it extremely difficult to control the food. Farmers and rich landowners insisted upon slaughtering their own pigs for their own use. They insisted upon eating the eggs their chickens laid, or, upon sending them through the mail to friends at high prices, thereby evading the egg card regulations. But the Government stepped in and farmers were prohibited from killing their own cattle and from sending foods to friends and special customers. Farmers had to sell everything to the "Z. E. G." That was another result of State Socialism. The optimistic statements of Herr von Batocki about the food outlook led the people to believe that by fall conditions would be greatly improved but instead of becoming more plentiful food supplies became more and more organised until all food was upon an absolute ration basis. "Although the crops were good this year, there will be so much organisation that food will spoil," said practically every German. Batocki's method of confiscating food did cause a great deal to spoil and the public blamed him any time anything disappeared from the market. One day a carload of plums was shipped from Werder, the big fruit district near Berlin, to the capital. The "Z. E. G." confiscated it but did not sell the goods immediately to the merchants and the plums spoiled. Before this was found out, a crowd of women surrounded the train one day, which was standing on a side track, broke into a car and found most of the plums in such rotten condition they could not be used. So they painted on the sides of the car: "This is the kind of plum jam the 'Z. E. G.' makes." There was a growing scarcity of all other supplies, too. The armies demanded every possible labouring man and woman so even the canning factories had to close and food which formerly was canned had to be eaten while fresh or it spoiled. Even the private German family, which was accustomed to canning food, had to forego this practice because of a lack of tin cans, jars and rubber bands. The food depots are by far the most successful undertaking of the Government. In Cologne and Berlin alone close to 500,000 poor are being fed daily by municipal kitchens. Last October I went through the Cologne food department with the director. The city has rented a number of large vacant factory buildings and made them into kitchens. Municipal buyers go through the country to buy meat and vegetables. This is shipped to Cologne, and in these kitchens it is prepared by women workers, under the direction of volunteers. A stew is cooked each day and sold for 42 pfennigs (about eight cents) a quart. The people must give up their potato, fat and meat cards to obtain it. In Berlin and all other large cities, the same system is used. In one kitchen in Berlin, at the main market hall, 80,000 quarts a day are prepared. In Cologne this food is distributed through the city streets by municipal wagons, and the people get it almost boiling hot, ready to eat. Were it not for these food depots there would be many thousands of people who would starve because they could not buy and cook such nourishing food for the price the city asks. These food kitchens have been in use now almost a year, and, while the poor are obtaining food here, they are becoming very tired of the supply, because they must eat stews every day. They can have nothing fried or roasted. In addition to these kitchens the Government has opened throughout Germany "mittlestand kueche," a restaurant for the middle classes. Here government employees, with small wages, the poor who do not keep house and others with little means can obtain a meal for 10 cents, consisting of a stew and a dessert. But it is very difficult for people to live on this food. Most every one who is compelled by circumstances to eat here is losing weight and feels under-nourished all the time. A few months ago, after one of my secretaries had been called to the army; I employed another. He had been earning only $7 a week and had to support his wife. On this money they ate at the middle class cafes. In six months he had lost twenty pounds. Because the food is so scarce and because it lacks real nourishment people eat all the time. It used to be said before the war that the Germans were the biggest eaters in Europe--that they ate seven meals a day. The blockade has not made them less eaters, for they eat every few hours all day long now, but because the food lacks fats and sugars, they need more food. Restaurants are doing big business because after one has eaten a "meal" at any leading Berlin hotel at 1 o'clock in the afternoon one is hungry by 3 o'clock and ready for another "meal." Last winter the Socialists of Munich, who saw that the rich were having plenty of food and that the poor were existing as best they could in food kitchens, wrote Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and demanded the immediate confiscation of all food in Germany, even that in private residences. The Socialists' demand was, as are most others, thrown into the waste basket because men like the Chancellor, President Batocki, of the Food Department, wealthy bankers, statesmen and army generals have country estates where they have stored food for an indefinite period. They know that no matter how hard the blockade pinches the people it won't starve them. When the Chancellor invites people to his palace he has real coffee, white bread, plenty of potatoes, cake and meat. Being a government official he can get what he wants from the food department. So can other officials. Therefore, they were willing to disregard the demand of the Bavarian Socialists. But the Socialists, although they don't get publicity when they start something, don't give up until they accomplish what they set out to do. First, they enlisted the Berlin Socialists, and the report went around to people that the rich were going to Copenhagen and bringing back food while the poor starved. So the Government had to prohibit all food from coming into Germany by way of Denmark unless it was imported by the Government. That was the first success of the Bavarian Socialists. Now they have had another. Batocki is reported as having announced that all food supplies will be confiscated. The Socialists are responsible. Excepting the very wealthy and those who have stored quantities of food for the "siege," every German is undernourished. A great many people are starving. The head physician of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Hospital, in Berlin, stated that 80,000 children died in Berlin in 1916 from lack of food. The Lokal-Anzeiger printed the item and the Foreign Office censor prohibited me from sending it to New York. But starvation under the blockade is a slow process, and it has not yet reached the army. When I was on the Somme battlefields last November and in Rumania in December the soldiers were not only well fed, but they had luxuries which their families at home did not have. Two years ago there was so much food at home the women sent food boxes to the front. To-day the soldiers not only send but carry quantities of food from the front to their homes. The army has more than the people. It is almost impossible to say whether Germany, as a nation, can be starved into submission. Everything depends upon the next harvest, the length of the war and future military operations. The German Government, I think, can make the people hold out until the coming harvest, unless there is a big military defeat. In their present undernourished condition the public could not face a defeat. If the war ends this year Germany will not be so starved that she will accept any peace terms. But if the war continues another year or two Germany will have to give up. I entered Germany at the beginning of the Allied blockade when one could purchase any kind and any quantity of food in Germany. Two years later, when I left, there were at least eighteen foodstuffs which could not be purchased anywhere, and there were twelve kinds of food which could be obtained only by government cards. That is what the Allied blockade did to the food supplies. It made Germany look like a grocery store after a closing out sale. Suppose in the United States you wanted the simplest breakfast--coffee and bread and butter. Suppose you wanted a light luncheon of eggs or a sandwich, tea and fruit. Suppose for dinner you wanted a plain menu of soup, meat, vegetables and dessert. At any grocery or lunch counter you could get not only these plain foods, but anything else you wanted. Not so in Germany! For breakfast you cannot have pure coffee, and you can have only a very small quantity of butter with your butter card. Hotels serve a coffee substitute, but most people prefer nothing. For luncheon you may have an egg, but only one day during two weeks. Hotels still serve a weak, highly colored tea and apples or oranges. For dinner you may have soup without any meat or fat in it. Soups are just a mixture of water and vegetables. Two days a week you can get a small piece of meat with a meat card. Other days you can eat boiled fish. People who keep house, of course, have more food, because as a rule they have been storing supplies. Take the Christian Scientists as an instance. Members of this Church have organised a semi-official club. Members buy all the extra food possible. Then they divide and store away what they want for the "siege"--the time when food will be scarcer than it is to-day. Two women practitioners in Berlin, who live together, bought thirty pounds of butter from an American who had brought it in from Copenhagen. They canned it and planned to make this butter last one year. Until a few weeks ago people with money could go to Switzerland, Holland and Denmark and bring back food with them, either with or without permission. Some wealthy citizens who import machinery and other things from outside neutral countries have their agents smuggle food at the same time. While the Dutch, Danish and Swiss governments try to stop smuggling; there is always some going through. The rich have the money to bribe border officers and inspectors. When I was in Düsseldorf, last October, I met the owner of a number of canal boats, who shipped coal and iron products from the Rhine Valley to Denmark. He told me his canal barges brought back food from Copenhagen every trip and that the border authorities were not very careful in making an investigation of his boats. In Düsseldorf, too, as well as in Cologne, business men spoke about the food they got from Belgium. They did not get great quantities, of course, but the leakage was enough to enable them to live better than those who had to depend upon the food in Germany. When the food supplies began to decrease the Government instituted the card system of distribution. Bread cards had been very successful, so the authorities figured that meat, butter, potato and other cards would be equally so. But their calculations were wrong. When potato cards were issued each person was given nine pounds a week. But the potato harvest was a big failure. The supply was so much less than the estimates that seed potatoes had to be used to keep the people satisfied. Even then the supply was short; and the quantity to be sold on potato cards was cut to three pounds a week. Then transportation difficulties arose, and potatoes spoiled before they reached Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Dresden, Leipsic and other large cities. The same thing happened when the Government confiscated the fruit crop last year. One day I was asked on the telephone whether I wanted to buy an 11-pound ham. I asked to have it sent to my office immediately. When it came the price was $2.50 a pound. I sent the meat back and told the man I would not pay such a price. "That's all right," he replied. "Dr. Stein and a dozen other people will pay me that price. I sent it to you because I wanted to help you out." Dr. Ludwig Stein, one of the editors of the Vossiche Zeitung , paid the price and ordered all he could get for the same money. When I left Berlin the Government had issued an order prohibiting the sale of all canned vegetables and fruit. It was explained that this food would be sold when the present supplies of other foods were exhausted. There were in Berlin many thousand cans, but no one can say how long such food will last. When Americans ask, "How long can Germany hold out?" I reply, "As long as the German Government can satisfy the vanity and stimulate the nerves of the people, and as long as the people permit the Government to do the nation's thinking." How long a time that will be no one can say. It was formerly believed that whenever a nation reached the limit which Germany has reached it would crumple up. But Germany fails to crumple. Instead of breaking up, she fights harder and more desperately. Why can she do this? The answer is simple: Because the German people believe in their Government and the Government knows that as long as it can convince the people that it is winning the war the people will fight. Germany is to-day in the position of a man on the verge of a nervous breakdown; in the position of a man who is under-nourished, who is depressed, who is weighed down by colossal burdens, who is brooding over the loss of friends and relatives, but of a man who feels that his future health and happiness depend upon his ability to hold out until the crisis passes. If a physician were called in to prescribe for such a patient his first act would in all probability be to stimulate this man's hope, to make him believe that if he would only "hold out" he would pass the crisis successfully. But no physician could say that his patient could stand it for one week, a month or a year more. The doctor would have to gamble upon that man's nerves. He would have to stimulate him daily, perhaps hourly. So it is with the German nation. The country is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Men and women, business men and generals, long ago lost their patience. They are under-nourished. They are depressed, distressed, suffering and anxious for peace. It is as true of the Hamburg-American Line directors as it is true of the officers at the front. There have been more cases of nervous breakdowns among the people during the last year than at any time in Germany's history. There have been so many suicides that the newspapers are forbidden to publish them. There have been so many losses on the battlefields that every family has been affected not once, but two, three and four times. Dance halls have been closed. Cafes and hotels must stop serving meals by 11 o'clock. Theatres are presenting the most sullen plays. Rumours spread like prairie fires. One day Hindenburg is dead. Two days later he is alive again. But the Kaiser has studied this war psychology. He and his ministers know that one thing keeps the German people fighting--their hope of ultimate victory; their belief that they have won already. The Kaiser knows, too, that if the public mind is stimulated from day to day by new victories, by reports of many prisoners, of new territory gained, of enemy ships torpedoed, or by promises of reforms after the war, the public will continue fighting. So the Kaiser gambles from day to day with his people's nerves. For two years he has done this, and for two years he has been supported by a 12,000,000-man-power army and a larger army of workers and women at home. The Kaiser believes he can gamble for a long time yet with his people. Just as it is impossible for a physician to say how long his patient can be stimulated without breaking down, so is it impossible for an observer in Germany to say how long it will be before the break-up comes in Germany. Many times during the war Germany has been on the verge of a collapse. President Wilson's ultimatum after the sinking of the Sussex in the English Channel brought about one crisis. Von Falkenhayn's defeat at Verdun caused another. The Somme battle brought on a third. General Brusiloff's offensive against the Austrians upset conditions throughout the Central Powers. Rumania's declaration of war made another crisis. But Germany passed all of these successfully. The ability of the German Government to convince the people that Wilson was unneutral and wanted war caused them to accept Germany's note in the Sussex case. The defeat at Verdun was explained as a tactical success. The Somme battles, with their terrible losses, failed to bring a break-up because the Allies stopped attacking at the critical moment. Von Hindenburg as chief of the General Staff of Central Europe remedied the mistakes of the Austrians during Brusiloff's attacks by reorganising the Dual Monarchy's army. The crisis which Rumania's entrance on the Allies' side brought in Germany and Hungary was forgotten after von Mackensen took Bucharest. In each of these instances it will be noticed that the crisis was successfully passed by "stimulation." The German mind was made to believe what the Kaiser willed. But what about the future? Is there a bottomless well of stimulation in Germany? Before these questions can be answered others must be asked: Why don't the German people think for themselves? Will they ever think for themselves? An incident which occurred in Berlin last December illustrates the fact that the people are beginning to think. After the Allies replied to President Wilson's peace note the Kaiser issued an appeal to the German people. One morning it was printed on the first pages of all newspapers in boldface type. When I arrived at my office the janitor handed me the morning papers and, pointing to the Kaiser's letter, said: "I see the Kaiser has written US another letter. You know he never wrote to US in peace time." There are evidences, too, that others are beginning to think. The Russian revolution is going to cause many Socialists to discuss the future of Germany. They have discussed it before, but always behind closed doors and with lowered voices. I attended one night a secret meeting of three Socialist leaders of the Reichstag, an editor of a Berlin paper and several business men. What they said of the Kaiser that night would, if it were published, send every man to the military firing squad. But these men didn't dare speak that way in public at that time. Perhaps the Russian revolt will give them more courage. But the Government is not asleep to these changes. The Kaiser believes he can continue juggling public opinion, but he knows that from now on it will be more difficult. But he will not stop. He will always hold forth the vision of victory as the reward for German faithfulness. Today, for instance, in the United States we hear very little about the German submarine warfare. It is the policy of the Allies not to publish all losses immediately; first because the enemy must not be given any important information if possible, and, secondly, because, losses have a bad effect upon any people. But the German people do not read what we do. Their newspapers are printing daily the ship losses of the Entente. Submarines are returning and making reports. These reports are published and in a way to give the people the impression that the submarine war is a success. We get the opposite impression here, but we are not in a position better to judge than the Germans, because we don't hear everything. The important question, however, is: What are the German people being told about submarine warfare? Judging from past events, the Kaiser and his Navy are undoubtedly magnifying every sinking for the purpose of stimulating the people into believing that the victory they seek is getting nearer. The Government knows that the public favours ruthless torpedoing of all ships bound for the enemy, so the Government is safe in concluding that the public can be stimulated for some months more by reports of submarine victory. Military operations in the West are probably not arousing the discussion in Berlin that the plans against Russia are. The Government will see to it that the press points regularly to the possibilities of a separate peace with Russia, or to the possibility of a Hindenburg advance against England and France. The people have childlike faith in von Hindenburg. If Paul von Hindenburg says a retreat is a victory the people will take his judgment. But all German leaders know that the time is coming when they will have to show the German people a victory or take the consequences themselves. Hence it would not be surprising if, after present military operations are concluded, either by an offensive against Russia or by an attack on the Western line, the Chancellor again made peace proposals. The Socialists will force the Chancellor to do it sooner or later. They are the real power behind the throne, although they have not enough spunk to try to oust the Kaiser and tell the people to do their own thinking. A big Allied military victory would, of course, change everything. Defeat of the German army would mean defeat of von Hindenburg, the German god. It would put an end to the Kaiser's juggling with his people's nerves. But few people in Germany expect an Entente victory this year, and they believe that if the Allies don't win this year they never will win. Germany is stronger militarily now than she has been and Germany will be able for many months to keep many Entente armies occupied. Before the year is passed the Entente may need American troops as badly as France needed English assistance last year. General von Falkenhayn, former chief of the German General Staff, told me about the same thing last December, in Rumania. "In war," he remarked, "nothing is certain except that everything is uncertain, but one thing I know is certain: We will win the war." America's entrance, however, will have the decisive effect . The Allies, especially the French, appreciate this. As a high French official remarked one day when Ambassador Gerard's party was in Paris: "There have been two great moments in the war for France. The first was when England declared war to support us. The second was the breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany." The Germans don't believe this. As General von Stein, Prussian Minister of War, said, Germany doesn't fear the United States. He said that, of course, for its effect upon the German people. The people must be made to believe this or they will not be able to hate America in true German fashion. America's participation, however, will upset Hindenburg's war plans. American intervention can put a stop to the Kaiser's juggling with his people's minds by helping the Allies defeat Germany. Only a big military defeat will shake the confidence of the Germans in the Kaiser, Hindenburg and their organised might. The people are beginning to think now, but they will do a great deal more thinking if they are beaten. So the answer to the question: "How long can Germany hold out?" is really answered by saying that Germany can keep on until she is decisively defeated militarily. CHAPTER VIII THE PEACE DRIVE OF DECEMBER 12TH I Disturbed by internal political dissension and tormented by lack of food the German ship of state was sailing troubled waters by November, 1916. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech to the Reichstag on September 28th satisfied no one. After he had spoken the only thing people could recall were his words: "The mighty tasks which await us in all the domains of public, social, economic, and political life need all the strength of the people for their fulfilment. It is a necessity of state which will triumph over all obstacles to utilise to the utmost those forces which have been forged in the fire and which clamour for work and creation. A free path for all who are capable--that must be our watch-word . If we carry it out freely, without prejudice, then our empire goes to a healthy future." The press interpreted this as meaning that the Chancellor might some day change his mind about the advisability of a ruthless submarine warfare. Early in November when it appeared that the Allies would not succeed in breaking through at the Somme peace forces were again mobilised. But when various neutral countries sounded Germany as to possible terms they discovered that Germany was the self-appointed "victor" and would consider only a peace which recognised Germany as the dominant power in Europe. The confidence of the army in the victory was so great that the following article was printed in all the German newspapers: "FAITH IN VICTORY" "Great Headquarters sends us the following: "Since the beginning of the war, when enemies arose on all sides and millions of troops proceeded from all directions--since then more than two long years have brought no more eventful days than those of the present. The unity of the front--our enemies have prepared it for a long time past with great care and proclaimed it in loud tones. Again and again our unexpected attacks have disturbed this boldly thought out plan in its development, destroying its force, but now at last something has been accomplished that realises at least part of the intentions of our enemies and all their strength is being concentrated for a simultaneous attack. The victory which was withheld from them on all the theatres of war is to be accomplished by an elaborate attack against the defensive walls of our best blood. The masses of iron supplied them by half the world are poured on our gallant troops day and night with the object of weakening their will and then the mass attacks of white, yellow, brown and black come on. "The world never experienced anything so monstrous and never have armies kept up a resistance such as ours. "Our enemies combine the hunger and lie campaign with that of arms, both aimed at the head and heart of our home. The hunger campaign they will lose as the troublesome work of just an equal administration and distribution of the necessities of life is almost complete. And a promising harvest has ripened on our broad fields. From the first day of the war, we alone of all the belligerent nations published the army reports of all of our enemies in full, as our confidence in the constancy of those at home is unlimited. But our enemies have taken advantage of this confidence and several times a day they send out war reports to the world; the English since the beginning of their offensive send a despatch every two hours. Each of these publications is two or three times as long as our daily report and all written in a style which has nothing in common with military brevity and simplicity. This is no longer the language of the soldier. They are mere fantastic hymns of victory and their parade of names and of conquered villages and woods and stormed positions, and the number of captured guns, and tens of thousands of prisoners is a mockery of the truth. "Why is all this done? Is it only intended to restore the wearying confidence of their own armies and people and the tottering faith of their allies? Is it only intended to blind the eagerly observing eye of the neutrals? No, this flood of telegrams is intended to pass through the channels which we ourselves have opened to our enemy, and to dash against the heart of the German people, undermining and washing away our steadfastness. "But this despicable game will not succeed. In the same manner as our gallant troops in the field defy superior numbers, so the German people at home will defy the enemies' legions of lies, and remember that the German army reports cannot tell them and the world at large everything at present, but they never publish a word the truth of which could not be minutely sifted. With proud confidence in the concise, but absolutely reliable publications of our own army administration, Germany will accept these legions of enemy reports at their own value, as wicked concoctions, attempting to rob them of calm and confidence which the soldier must feel supporting him, if he joyfully risks his all for the protection of those at home. Thus our enemies' legions of lies will break against the wall of our iron faith. Our warriors defy the iron and fire--those at home will also defy the floods of printed paper and remain unruffled. The nation and army alike are one in their will and faith in victory." [Illustration: THE POPE TO PRESIDENT WILSON----"HOW CAN MY PEACE ANGEL FLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHEN YOU ALWAYS PUT SHELLS IN HER POCKETS?"] This is a typical example of the kind of inspired stories which are printed in the German newspapers from time to time to keep up the confidence of the people. This was particularly needed last fall because the people were depressed and melancholy over the losses at the Somme, and because there was so much criticism and dissatisfaction over the Chancellor's attitude towards the submarine warfare and peace. People, too, were suffering agonies in their homes because of the inferior quality of the food,--the lack of necessary fats and sugar which normal people need for regular nourishment. The Socialists, who are in closer touch with the people than any others, increased their demands for peace while the National Liberals and the Conservatives, who wanted a war of exhaustion against Great Britain, increased their agitation for the submarine warfare. The Chancellor was between two tormentors. Either he had to attempt to make peace to satisfy the Socialists and the people, or he had to give in to the demands for submarine warfare as outlined by the National Liberals. One day Scheidemann went to the Chancellor's palace, after he had visited all the big centres of Germany, and said to von Bethmann-Hollweg: "Unless you try to make peace at once the people will revolt and I shall lead the revolution!" At the same time the industrial leaders of the Rhine Valley and the Army and Navy were serving notice on the Government that there could not possibly be a German victory unless every weapon in Germany's possession, which included of course the submarine, was used against Germany's so-called chief foe--England. Confronted by graver troubles within Germany than those from the outside, the Chancellor went to Great Headquarters to report to the Kaiser and to discuss with von Hindenburg and Ludendorf what should be done to unite the German nation. While the Army had been successful in Roumania and had given the people renewed confidence, this was not great enough to carry the people through another hard winter. While Germany had made promises to the United States in May that no ships would be sunk without warning, the submarines were not adhering very closely to the written instructions. The whole world was aroused over Germany's repeated disregard of the rules and practice of sea warfare. President Wilson through Ambassador Gerard had sent nine inquiries to the Foreign Office asking for a report from Germany on the sinking of various ships not only contrary to international law but contrary to Germany's pledges. In an attempt to ward off many of the neutral indictments of Germany's sea warfare the official North German Gazette published an explanation containing the following: "The activity of our submarines in the Atlantic Ocean and White Sea has led the press of the entire world to producing articles as to the waging of cruiser warfare by means of submarines. In both cases it can be accurately stated that there is no question of submarine warfare here, but of cruiser warfare waged with the support of submarines and the details reported hitherto as to the activities of our submarines do not admit of any other explanation, in spite of the endeavours of the British press to twist and misrepresent facts. It is also strictly correct to state that the cruiser warfare which is being waged by means of submarines is in strict compliance with the German prize regulations which correspond to the International Rules laid down and agreed to in the Declaration of London which are not being any more complied with by England. The accusations and charges brought forward by the British press and propaganda campaign in connection with ships sunk, can be shown as futile, as our position is both militarily and from the standpoint of international law irreproachable. We do not sink neutral ships per se, as was recently declared in a proclamation, but the ammunition transports and other contraband wares conducive to the prolongation of the war, and the rights of defensive measures as regards this cannot be denied Germany any more than any other country. "Based on this idea, it is clearly obvious that the real loss of the destruction of tonnage must be attributed to the supplies sent to England and not to the attitude displayed by Germany which has but recourse to purely defensive measures. If the attitude displayed by England towards neutrals during the course of this war be considered, the manner in which it forced compulsory supplies of contraband goods, etc., it can be further recognised that England is responsible for the losses in ships; as it is owing to England's attitude that the cause is to be found. . . . "Although England has hit and crippled legitimate trade to such an extent, Germany does not wish to act in the same manner, but simply to stop the shipments of contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war. England evidently is being hard hit by our defensive submarine measures and is therefore doing all in her power to incite public opinion against the German methods of warfare and confuse opinion in neutral countries. . . . "Therefore it must again be recalled that it is: "England, which has crippled neutral trade! "England, which has rendered the freedom of the seas impossible! "England, which has extended the risk of contraband wares in excess of international agreements, and now raises a cry when the same weapons are used against herself. "England, which has compelled the neutrals to supply these shipments of contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war! "As the neutrals quietly acquiesced when there was a question of abandoning trade with the Central Powers they have remedies in hand for the losses of ships which affect them so deeply. They need only consider the fact that the German submarines on the high seas are able to prevent war services to the enemy in the shipments of contraband goods, in a manner that is both militarily and from the standpoint of international law, irreproachable. If they agree to desist from the shipment of contraband goods and cease yielding to British pressure then they will not have to complain of losses in ships and can retain the same for peaceful aims." This was aimed especially at America. Naval critics did not permit the opportunity to pass to call to the attention of the Government that Germany's promises in the Sussex case were only conditional and that, therefore, they could be broken at any time. The Chancellor was in a most difficult situation; so was von Hindenburg and the Kaiser. On December 10th it was announced that the Reichstag would be called to a special session on the twelfth and that the Chancellor would discuss the international situation as it was affected by the Roumanian campaign. The meeting of December 12th was the best attended and most impressive one of the Reichstag since August 4th, 1914. Before the Chancellor left his palace he called the representatives of the neutral nations and handed them Germany's peace proposal. The same day Germany sent to every part of the globe through her wireless stations, Germany's note to the Allies and the Chancellor's address. The world was astonished and surprised at the German move but no one knew whether it was to be taken seriously. Great Britain instructed her embassies and legations in neutral countries to attempt to find out whether the Chancellor really desired to make peace or whether his statements were to be interpreted as something to quiet internal troubles. During the days of discussion which followed I was in close touch with the Foreign Office, the American Embassy and the General Staff. The first intimation I received that Germany did not expect the peace plan to succeed was on December 14th at a meeting of the neutral correspondents with Lieut. Col. von Haeften. When von Hindenburg became Chief of the General Staff he reorganised the press department in Berlin and sent von Haeften from his personal staff to Berlin to direct the press propaganda. As a student of public opinion abroad von Haeften was a genius and was extremely frank and honest with the correspondents. "We have proposed peace to our enemies," he said to the correspondents, "because we feel that we have been victorious and because we believe that no matter how long the war continues the Allies will not be able to defeat us. It will be interesting to see what effect our proposal has upon Russia. Reports which we have received, coming from unquestionable sources, state that internal conditions in Russia are desperate; that food is scarce; that the transportation system is so demoralised and that it will be at least eight months before Russia can do anything in a military way. Russia wants peace and needs peace and we shall see now whether she has enough influence upon England to compel England to make peace. We are prepared to go on with the war if the Allies refuse our proposals. If we do we shall not give an inch without making the Allies pay such a dear cost that they will not be able to continue." The Foreign Office was not optimistic over the possibilities of success; officials realised that the new Lloyd-George Cabinet meant a stronger war policy by Great Britain, but they thought the peace proposals might shake the British confidence in the new government and cause the overthrow of Lloyd-George and the return of Asquith and Viscount Edward Grey. From all appearances in Berlin it was evident to every neutral diplomat with whom I talked that while Germany was proclaiming to the whole world her desire for peace she had in mind only the most drastic peace terms as far as Belgium, certain sections of northern France, Poland and the Balkans were concerned. Neutrals observed that Germany was so exalted over the Roumanian victory and the possibilities of that campaign solving the food problem that she was not only ready to defy the Allies but the neutral world unless the world was ready to bow to a German victory. There were some people in Germany who realised that the sooner she made peace the better peace terms she could get but the Government was not of this opinion. The Allies, as was expected, defiantly refused the Prussian olive branch which had been extended like everything else from Germany with a string tied to it. For the purposes of the Kaiser and his Government the Allies' reply was exactly what they wanted. The German Government was in this position: If the Allies accepted Germany's proposal it would enable the Government to unite all factions in Germany by making a peace which would satisfy the political parties as well as the people. If the Allies refused, the German Government calculated that the refusal would be so bitter that it would unite the German people political organisations and enable the Government to continue the war in any way it saw fit. Nothing which had happened during the year so solidified the German nation as the Allies' replies to Berlin and to President Wilson. It proved to the German people that their Government was waging a defensive war because the Allies demanded annexation, compensation and guarantees, all of which meant a change in the map of Europe from what it was at the beginning of the war. The interests which had been demanding a submarine warfare saw their opportunity had come. They knew that as a result of the Allies' notes the public would sanction an unrestricted sea warfare against the whole world if that was necessary. From December 12th until after Christmas, discussions of peace filled the German newspapers. By January 1st all possibilities of peace had disappeared. The Government and the public realised that the war would go on and that preparations would have to be made at once for the biggest campaign in the history of the world in 1917. Throughout the peace discussions one thing was evident to all Americans. Opposition to American intervention in any peace discussion was so great that the United States would not be able to take any leading part without being faced by the animosity of a great section of Germany. When it was stated in the press that Joseph O. Grew, the American Charge d'Affaires, had received the German note and transmitted it to his Government, public indignation was so great that the Government had to inform all of the German newspapers to explain that Germany had not asked the United States to make peace; that Germany had in fact not asked any neutrals to make peace but had only handed these neutrals the German note in order to get it officially before the Allies. At this time the defiant attitude of the whole nation was well expressed in an editorial in the Morgen Post saying: "If Germany's hand is refused her fist will soon be felt with increased force." II The Conferences at Pless As early as September, 1916, Ambassador Gerard reported to the State Department that the forces demanding an unrestricted submarine campaign were gaining such strength in Germany that the Government would not be able to maintain its position very long. Gerard saw that not only the political difficulties but the scarcity of food and the anti-American campaign of hate were making such headway that unless peace were made there would be nothing to prevent a rupture with the United States. The latter part of December when Gerard returned from the United States after conferences with President Wilson he began to study the submarine situation. He saw that only the most desperate resistance on the part of the Chancellor would be able to stem the tide of hate and keep America out of the war. On January 7th the American Chamber of Commerce and Trade in Berlin gave a dinner to Ambassador Gerard and invited the Chancellor, Dr. Helfferich, Dr. Solf, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zimmermann, prominent German bankers and business men, leading editors and all others who a few months before during the Sussex crisis had combined in maintaining friendly relations. At this banquet Gerard made the statement, "As long as such men as Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorf, as long as Admirals von Capelle, von Holtzendorff and von Mueller headed the Navy Department, and the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg directed the political affairs there would be no trouble with the United States." Gerard was severely criticised abroad not only for this statement but for a further remark "That the relations between Germany and the United States had never been better than they were to-day." Gerard saw before he had been in Berlin a week that Germany was desperate, that conditions were getting worse and that with no possibilities of peace Germany would probably renew the von Tirpitz submarine warfare. He chose desperate means himself at this banquet to appeal to the democratic forces in Germany to side with the Chancellor when the question of a ruthless submarine warfare again came up. The German Government, however, had planned its moves months in advance. Just as every great offensive on the battlefields is planned, even to the finest details, six months before operations begin, so are the big moves on the political chessboard of Europe. There are very few men in public life in Germany who have the courage of their convictions to resign if their policies are overruled. Von Jagow, who was Secretary of State from the beginning of the war until December, 1916, was one of these "few." Because von Jagow had to sign all of the foolish, explanatory and excusing notes which the German Government sent to the United States he was considered abroad as being weak and incapable. But when he realised early in November that the Government was determined to renew the submarine warfare unless peace was made von Jagow was the only man in German public life who would not remain an official of the Government and bring about a break with America. Zimmermann, however, was a different type of official. Zimmermann, like the Chancellor, is ambitious, bigoted, cold-blooded and an intriguer of the first calibre. As long as he was Under Secretary of State he fought von Jagow and tried repeatedly to oust him. So it was not surprising to Americans when they heard that Zimmermann had succeeded von Jagow. The Gerard banquet, however, came too late. The die was cast. But the world was not to learn of it for some weeks. On the 27th of January, the Kaiser's birthday, the Chancellor, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, First Quartermaster General Ludendorf, Admirals von Capelle, von Holtzendorff and von Mueller and Secretary of State Zimmermann were invited to Great Headquarters to attend the Kaiser's birthday dinner. Ever since von Hindenburg has been Chief of the General Staff the Grand Chief Headquarters of the German Army have been located at Pless, on the estate of the Prince of Pless in Silicia. Previously, the Kaiser had had his headquarters here, because it was said and popularly believed that His Majesty was in love with the beautiful Princess of Pless, an Englishwoman by birth. When von Hindenburg took his headquarters to the big castle there, the Princess was exiled and sent to Parkenkirchen, one of the winter resorts of Bavaria. On previous birthdays of the Emperor and when questions of great moment were debated the civilian ministers of the Kaiser were always invited. But on the Kaiser's birthday in 1917 only the military leaders were asked. Dr. Helfferich, Minister of Colonies Solf, German bankers and business men as well as German shippers were not consulted. Germany was becoming so desperate that she was willing to defy not only her enemies and neutral countries but her own financiers and business men. Previously, when the submarine issue was debated the Kaiser wanted to know what effect such a warfare would have upon German economic and industrial life. But this time he did not care. He wanted to know the naval and military arguments. In August, 1914, when the Chancellor and a very small group of people were appealing to His Majesty not to go to war, the Kaiser sided with General von Moltke and Admiral von Tirpitz. During the various submarine crises with the United States it appeared that the Kaiser was changing--that he was willing and ready to side with the forces of democracy in his own country. President Wilson and Ambassador Gerard thought that after the downfall of von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn the Kaiser would join hands with the reform forces. But in 1917 when the final decision came the Kaiser cast his lot with his generals against the United States and against democracy in Germany. The Chancellor, who had impressed neutral observers as being a real leader of democracy in Germany, sided with the Kaiser. Thus by one stroke the democratic movement which was under way in Germany received a rude slap. The man the people had looked upon as a friend became an enemy. III