PART 124—COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM AUTHORITY FOR STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 6 U.S.C. 124n, as amended by the SAFER SKIES Act (Division H, Title LXXXVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, Pub. L. 119-60, sec. 8601-8607, 139 Stat. 718, 1938-45 (2025)). Source: 91 FR 41498, July 6, 2026, unless otherwise noted. § 124.1 Purpose and scope. (a) Purpose. (b) Scope. (c) Relationship to other laws. (d) Comprehensive framework. (e) Parallel regulations. § 124.2 Definitions. As used in this part: Agency accreditation Agency Approving Official Authorized Systems List Authorized Technologies List Control communications Correctional agency Correctional facility Credible threat (1) A credible threat may be based on, but is not limited to: (i) Specific intelligence, including information from law enforcement databases, threat assessments, or intelligence community products; (ii) Behavioral indicators, including operation in airspace in which UAS operations have been restricted or prohibited by the Federal Aviation Administration, operation not in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration's flight requirements, approach toward a protected interest, failure to respond to warnings, or evasive maneuvering inconsistent with normal flight operations; (iii) Payload or physical configuration indicators, including observed attachments, modifications, or configurations inconsistent with ordinary recreational or commercial UAS use that suggest capability to cause harm or to deliver prohibited items; (iv) Unauthorized surveillance or reconnaissance of a protected interest that by law is protected from such activities, or interference with the operational mission of a protected interest; (v) Indications that the UAS is being used to gain unauthorized access to, or to disclose, classified, law enforcement sensitive, or otherwise lawfully protected information; or (vi) Pattern-based indicators, including repeated unauthorized UAS activity at a specific location (such as repeat incursions of national defense airspace in violation of 49 U.S.C. 46307), which may inform but do not independently satisfy the credible threat standard. (2) A credible threat determination rests on the totality of the circumstances. A single indicator may establish a credible threat where it is sufficiently probative. For mitigation actions under 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(1)(C), (D), and (F), the determination must be supported by a contemporaneous indicator that the specific unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft at issue poses a current, articulable risk if unabated. For detection and warning actions under 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(1)(A) and (B), a credible threat determination may also be supported by a reasonable basis to anticipate that one or more unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft poses an articulable risk. Activity protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States may not be considered in making a credible threat determination. Critical infrastructure Data purge verification Designated Federal C-UAS coordination portal Detection and Warning Certification Detection and warning operations Detection system FAA-designated coordination mechanism Hazardous Devices School Mitigation action Mitigation Certification Mitigation operation Mitigation system National Counter-UAS Training Center (NCUTC) Pattern data Personnel Raw sensor data RF-emitting C-UAS system SLTT law enforcement agency Special Event Assessment Rating § 124.3 Scope of authority and mitigation standards. (a) Scope of authority. (b) Credible threat determination for mitigation actions. (c) Proportionality. (d) Protective purpose limitation. (e) Mitigation operator requirement. (2) Support functions that do not involve the initiation of mitigation actions, such as detection system monitoring, threat triage and prioritization, ground intercept team dispatch, communications, and administrative functions, do not require Mitigation Certification, but must be performed by personnel trained in accordance with the agency's implementation policy and, where the support function involves operation of systems requiring the authority of 6 U.S.C. 124n(a)(2) or the relief it provides from certain laws, by personnel holding a current Detection and Warning Certification. (3) For operations involving multiple personnel performing distinct roles, the agency's implementation policy must define the roles and responsibilities of each position, identify which positions require Mitigation Certification, and which require Detection and Warning Certification only, and establish the communication and concurrence procedures between the mitigation operator and other personnel. (f) Independent professional judgment. (2) A supervisor, commander, or other official, regardless of rank, may provide operational direction, tactical context, and coordination guidance to the operator, and may direct the operator to withhold or cease mitigation when broader operational considerations warrant. (3) A supervisor, commander, or other official may not direct a certified operator to initiate a mitigation action when the operator has determined that the credible threat standard is not met or that the proportionality requirement of paragraph (c) of this section is not satisfied. (4) The agency's implementation policy must address the chain of command for mitigation decisions and must make clear that non-certified personnel, regardless of rank, may not direct mitigation actions that override the certified operator's professional judgment on whether the conditions for mitigation are present. (5) An operator who declines to initiate mitigation based on a good-faith professional determination that the conditions for mitigation are not met may not be subjected to adverse employment action for that decision. (g) Airspace awareness. (2) The scope and formality of this role must be commensurate with the complexity of the aviation environment. For operations with minimal or no known authorized aviation, this role may be performed as an additional duty by the certified operator or other command post personnel; for operations with significant aviation activity, the agency must designate a dedicated individual with airspace awareness and coordination responsibilities. When a target cannot be correlated with any known, authorized aircraft and meets the credible threat standard, mitigation may proceed. § 124.4 Authorized personnel, contractors, and mutual aid. (a) Officers and employees. (b) Prohibition on contractor exercise. (c) Mutual aid and regional C-UAS support. (2) When the requesting or host agency is not accredited under 6 U.S.C. 124n(d)(2), the accredited agency providing C-UAS support is the C-UAS operating agency for purposes of this part and is responsible for compliance with the applicable requirements of this part. (3) Personnel of a non-accredited requesting or host agency may support the operation through ordinary law enforcement, correctional, public safety, evidence-handling, perimeter-security, ground-intercept, evacuation, traffic-control, or incident-command functions. Such personnel may not exercise C-UAS authority under 6 U.S.C. 124n(a)(2), operate systems whose operation requires the authority of or relief from certain laws under 6 U.S.C. 124n, make a credible-threat determination, or initiate any mitigation action, unless those personnel independently satisfy the requirements of this part, hold the applicable certification under § 124.5, and are expressly designated in the accredited C-UAS operating agency's C-UAS Operations Plan to perform that function. Personnel so designated operate under that agency's implementation policy, Agency Approving Official approval, supervision, and compliance responsibility. An individual certification does not, by itself, authorize personnel to exercise 6 U.S.C. 124n(a)(2) authority, and this designation must be established in advance through the C-UAS Operations Plan and the mutual-aid arrangement under paragraph (c)(4) of this section. (4) The written mutual aid arrangement must identify the requesting or host agency, the accredited agency providing C-UAS support, the legal basis for the accredited agency's personnel to operate in the host jurisdiction, the allocation of operational responsibilities, and the handling of C-UAS-derived information consistent with §§ 124.14 and 124.15. (5) For multi-jurisdictional operations, the participating agencies must identify a lead C-UAS agency for tactical C-UAS coordination. The lead C-UAS agency must be an accredited agency unless the operation is conducted under Federal authority pursuant to § 124.19. A non-accredited requesting or host agency may serve as the lead public safety, law enforcement, correctional, or incident-command agency for the overall event or incident, but may not serve as the lead C-UAS agency unless accredited under this part. (6) An accredited agency may enter into standing regional, county, statewide, or other multi-jurisdictional arrangements to provide recurring or on-call C-UAS support to non-accredited agencies. A standing arrangement does not itself authorize a mitigation operation; each mitigation operation remains subject to the applicable requirements of this part. (7) Nothing in this part requires a small, rural, or otherwise resource-limited SLTT law enforcement or correctional agency to acquire C-UAS equipment, obtain accreditation, or establish an independent C-UAS program in order to receive C-UAS support from an accredited agency. (d) Anti-circumvention. (2) Prohibited circumvention includes using an accredited agency as a nominal sponsor while a non-accredited agency, contractor, vendor, or other entity exercises de facto operational control of C-UAS activity requiring the authority of or relief from certain laws under 6 U.S.C. 124n; allowing personnel who lack the certifications required by § 124.5 to exercise C-UAS authority; using systems outside the requirements of § 124.7; avoiding the coordination, reporting, privacy, sensitive-information, or compliance requirements of this part; or acquiring third-party intercepted communications in a manner inconsistent with § 124.14(i). (3) A mutual aid, regional support, statewide support, county support, or multi-jurisdictional C-UAS arrangement is not circumvention merely because the requesting or host agency is not accredited, provided that the C-UAS operating agency is accredited, the personnel exercising C-UAS authority hold the required certifications, and the operation is conducted in compliance with this part. § 124.5 Training and certification. (a) Training and certification structure. (b) Agency implementation policy. (c) Detection and Warning Certification. (d) Mitigation training and certification. (2) A person who holds a current Mitigation Certification under this paragraph (d) may conduct mitigation operations at a correctional facility. An abbreviated Correctional Mitigation Certification, limited to correctional-facility operations, is available for personnel who will operate only at correctional facilities. (3) The mitigation training course under this paragraph is delivered at the NCUTC. The Attorney General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may authorize the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers or another qualified Federal training provider to deliver the mitigation training course at one or more additional sites, provided the NCUTC retains approval authority over curriculum and standards, exercises oversight of the delivery, and issues all certifications upon verified completion. Any such authorization is at the sole discretion of the Attorney General, acting through the Director, confers no entitlement on any agency or training provider, and may be modified or withdrawn at any time. (e) Correctional mitigation training and certification. (f) Training standards. (g) Eligible personnel. (h) Sufficiency of certification. (i) Suspension. (j) Suspension notice. (k) Administrative review. (l) Conditions. (m) Reinstatement. (n) Transition for previously trained personnel. § 124.6 Agency implementation policy. (a) Requirement. (1) Designate an Agency Approving Official meeting the requirements of § 124.2; (2) Designate the personnel authorized to exercise C-UAS authority and describe the recurrent training requirements applicable to such personnel; (3) Establish procedures consistent with § 124.14 for the handling, retention, and dissemination of data acquired during C-UAS operations, including written anonymization standards specifying the aggregation thresholds, identifier suppression, and re-identification risk assessment used to qualify a data product as pattern data; (4) Include provisions for public notification regarding the potential use of C-UAS authority within the agency's jurisdiction; (5) Ensure compliance with the requirements of this part; and (6) Detail standing tactical procedures governing the execution of C-UAS operations, including engagement protocols that account for the risk to persons and property on the surface and in the air before engagement, escalation procedures, use of force considerations, ground intercept team procedures, render safe procedures, evidence collection and chain-of-custody procedures, communications procedures, system operating procedures, data handling and purge procedures consistent with the retention requirements of this part, operation plan requirements, and post-operation procedures that incorporate data purge verification. (b) Legal counsel review. (c) Alternative certification for agencies without in-house counsel. (d) Portal attestation. (e) Retention and availability. (f) Operating without attestation. (g) Detection and warning policy. § 124.7 Authorized technologies. (a) Two-list authorization framework. (b) General requirement. (c) Scope of the list requirement. (d) Mitigation technology and training alignment. (e) Scope of interception authority. (f) Maintenance of the lists. (g) Emergency suspension. § 124.8 C-UAS Operations Plan. (a) Requirement and function. (b) Legal counsel certification. (c) Form. (d) Content. (1) Operation identification, including the submitting agency, points of contact, the Agency Approving Official, the operation type, planned dates, geographic location, venue type, any Special Event Assessment Rating or National Special Security Event designation, and the identification of any mutual aid agencies; (2) Systems and airspace, including the systems to be deployed by reference to the Authorized Systems List or Authorized Technologies List category; a description of each system's configuration and the hardware version, firmware revision, and software version of each system as deployed; RF-emitting system parameters; class of airspace; and anticipated flight restrictions; (3) Coordination confirmation, including operator certification status, compliance with the agency implementation policy, the legal counsel certification, and compliance with the privacy and civil liberties requirements of this part; and (4) Operational planning elements, including deployment configuration and spectrum deconfliction, personnel and team assignments, render safe and contingency planning, known authorized manned and unmanned aviation and deconfliction processes and procedures, communications, investigative response and data handling, and demobilization. (e) Risk-based assessment. (f) Timing and submission. (g) Relationship to implementation policy. (h) Operational windows. (2) For fixed-site facilities for which SLTT law enforcement and correctional agencies conduct ongoing persistent-protection operations, including correctional facilities, critical infrastructure sites, other permanent facilities with a continuing C-UAS mission, and venues where the agency expects to provide recurring C-UAS coverage within the authorization period, the Agency Approving Official may authorize a standing operational window of up to 365 calendar days, renewable upon submission of a renewal plan. The advance notification for a standing operational window must specify the venue and anticipated events or coverage periods; for a detection and warning operation not subject to the advance notification requirement of § 124.9, the C-UAS Operations Plan must specify the venue, the area covered, which may be stated as a radius around the site, and the anticipated coverage periods. Material changes, including a new event, new systems, or a changed threat environment, require an update to the advance notification under § 124.9(a) or, for such a detection and warning operation, an updated C-UAS Operations Plan. Federal coordination requirements continue to apply to each event within a standing window, including lead C-UAS agency coordination under § 124.10 and per-event coordination among the Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission. (3) No C-UAS Operations Plan may authorize an indefinite or open-ended operational window. § 124.9 Advance coordination, notification, and authorization. (a) Advance notification. (2) The advance notification is a coordination document that routes the relevant data elements to each recipient agency through a single submission. The advance notification is not a request for approval by the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security, and the absence of a response from the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security does not affect the agency's authority to proceed. (3) The advance notification must identify the submitting SLTT law enforcement or correctional agency, the planned dates and geographic location of the operation, the systems to be deployed by reference to the Authorized Systems List or Authorized Technologies List category, RF-emitting system parameters, a characterization of the airspace and operational environment, and confirmation of operator certification status and compliance with the agency implementation policy and the privacy requirements of this part. (b) C-UAS Operations Plan. (c) FBI and DHS notification and routing. (d) DOT/FAA coordination. (e) Categorical FAA determinations. (f) FCC authorization. (g) Emergency exception. (h) Federal coordination. (i) Detection and warning operations. § 124.10 Interagency and lead-agency coordination. (a) Early coordination and notice of intent. (b) Special event coordination. (c) Tactical coordination under a lead C-UAS agency. (d) Coordination required. (e) Overlapping SLTT operations. (f) Deconfliction direction. (g) Emergency exception preserved. (h) The requirements in paragraphs (a) through (g) of this section are established under the Attorney General's oversight authority pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 124n(d)(1) and the coordination obligations of 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(4) and (d)(3); they do not transfer or diminish the SLTT agency's statutory authority and relief from certain laws under 6 U.S.C. 124n(a)(2). § 124.11 Real-time air traffic control notification. (a) Notification required. (b) Notification procedures. (c) Notification upon termination. (d) Non-RF mitigation. § 124.12 Detection and warning operations. (a) Scope. (b) Conditions. (1) All personnel conducting detection and warning operations hold a current Detection and Warning Certification; (2) The agency deploys only systems within technology categories listed on the Authorized Technologies List and, where populated, specific systems listed on the Authorized Systems List; (3) The agency has adopted an implementation policy under § 124.6(a) or a detection and warning policy under § 124.6(g), has completed the applicable portal attestation, and has authorized the operation by a C-UAS Operations Plan under § 124.8; and (4) The agency complies with the privacy, data handling, and retention requirements of § 124.14. (c) Coordination. (d) Reporting. (e) Prohibition on mitigation. § 124.13 Post-operation reporting. (a) Report required. (1) Taking any mitigation action described in 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(1)(C), (D), or (F); (2) Any confiscation of an unmanned aircraft or UAS under 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(1)(E); or (3) The conclusion of an operation where notification was provided. (b) Other confiscations. (c) Content. (1) Confirmation whether the planned operation did or did not occur as notified; (2) The date, time, and geographic location of the reportable action; (3) A brief description of the credible threat that a UAS or unmanned aircraft posed to the safety or security of people, a facility, or an asset; a venue or set of venues used for large-scale public gatherings or events; critical infrastructure; or a correctional facility necessitating the action; (4) The type of capability employed, including the specific system or systems used by reference to the Authorized Systems List and Authorized Technologies List category, or where the Authorized Systems List had not yet been populated for a particular Authorized Technologies List category at the time of the action, the Authorized Technologies List category; and in all cases the make, model, hardware version, firmware revision, and software version of the system or systems as deployed; (5) Any known operational effects, including the seizure, disabling, damage, or destruction of a UAS or unmanned aircraft; any reported effects on other aviation systems, spectrum users, or persons and property on the surface or in the air; any aviation accident; whether a temporary flight restriction was granted or denied; and any other harm, damage, or loss to a person or to private property; (6) Any issues, anomalies, or deviations encountered during the operation; and (7) Summary operational statistics, including the number of UAS detected, counted as confirmed detections attributable to a distinct unmanned aircraft and reported in good faith with reasonable deduplication; warnings issued; mitigation actions taken; UAS or unmanned aircraft seized or confiscated; and any criminal charges, citations, regulatory enforcement actions, or arrests resulting from the operation. (d) Submission mechanism. (e) Immediate notification for unintended consequences. (f) Consolidated reporting. (g) Recurring venue reporting. (h) Semiannual operational summary. (i) Reporting to support congressional and oversight requirements. (1) The frequency, location, and circumstances of SLTT law enforcement and correctional agencies' mitigation deployments and the types of mitigation employed; (2) A list of any aviation security or safety incidents, and any aviation accidents, that occurred due to SLTT law enforcement and correctional agencies' deployment of C-UAS technologies; (3) Recommendations for improving SLTT law enforcement and correctional agencies' C-UAS training, oversight, compliance, and execution, and the compliance audits required by section 8606(b)(2) of the SAFER SKIES Act; and (4) A determination whether SLTT law enforcement and correctional agencies are able to fully protect critical infrastructure from the UAS threat and, if not, recommendations on how to expand C-UAS authorities to critical infrastructure owners. This determination is informed by the protection-request data reported under paragraph (h) of this section. (5) Instances in which records of communications were retained beyond 180 days, or in which control communications were disclosed outside the originating agency. § 124.14 Privacy and civil liberties. (a) General. (b) First Amendment. (c) Scope of interception. (1) Material captured that is not control communications is incidental capture. Agencies must configure systems to minimize incidental capture, and incidentally captured material determined not to be relevant to a C-UAS, law enforcement, or national security purpose must not be reviewed, retained, or disseminated and must be purged as soon as practicable. (2) During the contemporaneous C-UAS operation, personnel may view incidentally captured material only to the extent necessary for C-UAS detection, tracking, identification, or mitigation purposes and may not use it for general surveillance or monitoring. If it becomes apparent that the captured video, audio, or other data stream is not control communications, the interception of such communications must be discontinued, and the interception of incidentally captured material must be documented in the post-operation report. When a system's configuration permits adjustment of the scope of interception, such as frequency range, geographic coverage, or signal type, operators must use the narrowest configuration consistent with operational effectiveness. (3) For standing detection deployments exceeding 30 days, the agency must conduct a review, not less than quarterly, to confirm that the scope of interception remains proportionate to the operational need, that incidental collection of non-UAS communications is being minimized, and that data handling and purge procedures are being executed on schedule. The review may be conducted on a program-wide basis for facilities. (4) Where identifying the threat requires processing the control signaling of all unmanned aircraft in range, the control communications of an unmanned aircraft determined not to pose a threat may not be retained or used beyond what is needed to make the threat determination and must be purged on the same schedule as other incidental material. (d) Records of communications and retention. (2) Data retained under the ongoing security operation exception must be reviewed at 90-day intervals and purged when the operation concludes, unless another exception applies. (3) When an agency determines that records of communications will be retained beyond 180 days under any exception, the agency must notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the portal within 30 days of the determination. (4) Pattern data, once extracted and recorded independently, is not a record of communications and is not subject to the 180-day limit. Data generated by systems whose operation does not implicate the electronic surveillance laws referenced in the notwithstanding clause of 6 U.S.C. 124n(a)(2) is likewise not subject to the 180-day limit. (5) For data retained under the investigation or prosecution exception, the existence of an open investigative or prosecutorial case file documenting the data as evidence satisfies the required determination. For data retained under any other exception, the Agency Approving Official or the agency's chief legal officer must document the specific basis for retention. If an agency has neither an Agency Approving Official nor a chief legal officer, an official holding a rank not below a Senior Executive or Senior Official, or its equivalent, must document the specific basis for retention. (6) A standing operational window authorized under § 124.8(h) does not itself constitute an ongoing security operation for purposes of the retention exception; that exception applies only when a specific, identified threat or other intelligence justifies continued retention of specific records to support a discrete protective objective, and the 90-day review must assess whether the specific security basis for retention continues to exist. (7) The exception for retention required under Federal, State, local, Tribal, or territorial law applies when a specific provision of law affirmatively requires retention of the particular type of data at issue, not when a general records retention schedule incidentally encompasses C-UAS data. (e) Dissemination. (2) This part does not prohibit the use, as evidence in a subsequent proceeding, of information lawfully obtained incidental to an SLTT law enforcement or correctional agency C-UAS operation, consistent with applicable law. (3) At the time of any dissemination of control communications, the disseminating agency must document, in the audit trail required by paragraph (g) of this section, the 6 U.S.C. 124n(e)(4) basis for the dissemination, the category of recipient, whether the handling caveat required by paragraph (f) of this section was conveyed, and whether the dissemination included control communications. (4) A real-time detection feed is governed by the substantive character of the data it transmits. A feed that transmits control communications acquired under this part is subject to the requirements of this section applicable to such data and the limitations under 6 U.S.C. 124n(e)(1), (2), and (4). A feed that transmits only data described in paragraph (e)(6) of this section is not subject to those limitations. (5) Pattern data that contains no control communications may be disseminated consistent with the agency's standard data handling and information sharing policies and applicable law. Before disseminating pattern data beyond the agency, the disseminating agency must verify anonymization in accordance with its implementation policy and screen the product for operationally sensitive information that would reveal specific coverage patterns, capabilities, gaps, or methods. Public release of pattern data products requires approval at the level designated by the agency's implementation policy. (6) Data not acquired using the authorities or reliefs provided by 6 U.S.C. 124n, including data generated by systems whose operation does not implicate the electronic surveillance laws referenced in the notwithstanding clause of 6 U.S.C. 124n(a)(2), is not subject to the disclosure limitations of paragraph (e)(1) of this section and may be shared consistent with the agency's standard data handling and information sharing policies and applicable law. Sharing for situational awareness with recipients that are not law enforcement or correctional agencies, including critical infrastructure owners or operators and the public, is limited to data described in this paragraph, unless the disclosure of control communications is authorized under paragraph (e)(1) of this section. (f) Protective purpose limitation. (g) Audit trail. (h) State and local retention conflicts. (i) Third-party acquisition. (j) Vendor data sharing. § 124.15 Protection of sensitive operational information. (a) Sensitive system information. (b) Protection from disclosure. (c) Markings. (d) Permitted disclosures. § 124.16 Compliance and enforcement. (a) Compliance audits. (b) Civil fines and penalties. (c) Civil enforcement. (d) Relationship to certification or accreditation suspension. § 124.17 Confiscation and forfeiture. (a) Confiscation authority. (2) This authority does not require Mitigation Certification, the use of systems on the Authorized Technologies List or Authorized Systems List, or advance coordination under § 124.9. However, personnel exercising confiscation authority under 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(1)(E) must hold a current Detection and Warning Certification issued by the NCUTC. An officer who seizes an unmanned aircraft or any other UAS component under traditional law enforcement authority, including an abandoned or crashed unmanned aircraft, does not require Detection and Warning Certification. (3) Any action that employs C-UAS technology to disrupt or seize control of, damage, disable, or destroy the unmanned aircraft or UAS is an action under 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(1)(C), (D), or (F) and requires Mitigation Certification. (4) Personnel exercising confiscation authority should follow standard law enforcement evidence handling procedures, including maintaining chain of custody, preserving digital evidence stored on the aircraft or its flight controller, and observing applicable hazardous materials precautions. (5) This part does not affect the authority of any law enforcement or correctional officer to take physical custody of an unmanned aircraft or UAS under traditional law enforcement authority independent of 6 U.S.C. 124n. Traditional law enforcement authority refers to the seizure authorities generally available to law enforcement under applicable Federal, State, local, Tribal, or territorial law, including seizure incident to arrest, seizure of evidence or contraband pursuant to a warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and seizure of abandoned property. Once an unmanned aircraft or UAS is on the ground and confiscated, subsequent law enforcement actions, including threat assessment, render safe procedures, evidence collection, and search warrant execution, are governed by traditional legal authorities, including Fourth Amendment requirements and applicable exigency or emergency doctrines, rather than by 6 U.S.C. 124n. (6) When a C-UAS operation involves a known or suspected unmanned aircraft being used as a delivery mechanism for a hazardous device, the response to the hazardous device must be conducted by a public safety bomb squad accredited through the Hazardous Devices School, consistent with the National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians or any successor publication. (7) The physical act of interception of a third-party unmanned aircraft while it is in flight, such as catching or netting an aircraft by hand or using a non-electronic physical device to capture it in the air, implicates 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(1)(D), (E), or (F). Personnel conducting such actions must therefore hold a Mitigation Certification. This does not apply to the erection of physical barriers that a drone operator has an obligation to avoid, such as netting affixed to a physical structure. (b) Forfeiture. § 124.18 Activities for evaluation, testing, training, and pre-operational validation. (a) Scope and legal basis. (b) Personnel. (c) Evaluation testing and training activities plan. (d) Coordination. (e) Privacy within evaluation testing and training. (f) Mitigation restriction. (g) Pre-operational validation. (h) Participation in Federal RTTE. § 124.19 Task force arrangements and Federal support. (a) Task force and deputization arrangements preserved. (b) Concurrent authority. (c) Federal support. § 124.20 Construction. (a) No private right. (b) Manned aircraft. (c) Mass gatherings. (d) Statutory scope. § 124.21 Termination. (a) Termination. (b) Savings. § 124.22 Severability. If any provision of this part, or the application of any provision to any person, entity, or circumstance, is held to be invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this part, and the application of its provisions to any other persons, entities, or circumstances, shall not be affected and shall remain in full force and effect.