The Emancipation of South America

CHAPTER VI.

THE WAR IN THE NORTH.

1814. CHAPTER VI. THE WAR IN THE NORTH. 1814. T HE Army of the North when reinforced, barely numbered 2,000 men, mostly recruits, among whom desertion was frequent. Disorganized, short of officers, and badly clothed, it was quite incapable of making head against the enemy. Jujui and Salta were held by the victorious Spaniards, who threatened the whole of the northern frontier. San Martin was more especially troubled by the lack of officers and the general want of discipline in the troops. Pezuela, the Spanish general who had defeated Belgrano at Vilcapugio and Ayohuma, had established his headquarters at Tupiza on the frontier of Upper Peru, and ordered a levy of two to three thousand men in the Highlands of Lower Peru. He also formed two battalions out of contingents from the nearer valleys of Chichas and Ciuti, raising his army to about four thousand regulars. His vanguard under Ramirez, one thousand five hundred to two thousand strong, with eight guns, occupied Jujui, and his cavalry scoured the country as far as Salta. San Martin’s outposts also reached almost to this city, and at this time the men of the city and of the country round about, rose en masse and formed a sort of vanguard to the Army of the North. San Martin had at that time no regular plan, he neither knew his own resources nor the designs of the enemy, and confined his efforts to the reorganization of the army. After consultation with Colonel Dorrego, who commanded the advanced posts, he determined to confide these positions to the district militia and to concentrate his regular forces in Tucuman. In carrying out this plan he received most valuable assistance from the devotion of the country people, who masked all his movements and prevented the enemy from discovering anything either of his intentions or of his strength. His first step was the construction of an entrenched camp to the north of the city, which put a stop to desertion, and he increased the number of his troops by recruiting. Here he stood on the defensive and limited his efforts to aiding the popular movements in Salta, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In this entrenched camp, which is known to history as the citadel of Tucuman, he established a school of instruction, holding up the mounted grenadiers as a model for the rest of his force. Belgrano was a most docile pupil, but Dorrego, though his talents were highly esteemed by San Martin, was sent off to Santiago del Estero for insubordinate conduct. Belgrano soon afterwards left the army, giving as his last advice to his friends the maxim, “that war must be waged not with arms alone but with the force of public opinion,” which maxim was at that time exemplified by facts, for the Royalist armies held only the ground on which they stood, and their movements were paralyzed by the popular insurrections all around them. In the Province of Salta the revolutionary movement was most pronounced. The first popular manifestation in the city produced the organization of the civic militia. In 1810 the urban guard was raised by the voluntary enlistment of youths of respectable families. Then arose spontaneously among the peasants of the campaña, a corps of cavalry, with the instincts of the Cossacks, and the qualities of the Mamelukes, headed by a chieftain who made his name famous for deeds of prowess. Martin Güemes had first borne arms against the English in the reconquest of Buenos Ayres in 1806 and in the memorable defence of 1807. He with his men, formed the vanguard of the first Patriot army which invaded Upper Peru. His horsemen penetrated as far as Potosi, and covered every movement of the Patriots. At Suipacha he did good service. In 1811 he escorted the prisoners of the campaign to Buenos Ayres, where he was appointed to the general staff with the rank of captain. In 1813 he took part in the second siege of Monte Video, and was absent from his native province at the time of Belgrano’s expedition, but when San Martin took command of the army he was at Santiago del Estero on his way back. The insurrection of Salta in the face of the victorious enemy, was carried out with equal deliberation and courage. The population emigrated en masse , the peasants abandoned their huts and the towns were left desolate. In the capital even the tongues were taken from the church bells, lest the enemy should use them to celebrate their victories. Two old friars alone remained in each convent to administer the sacraments to the sick and aged who could not go away. When the Royalist vanguard occupied the city of Salta a lieutenant, named Ezenarro, was detached with thirty men to occupy a district thirty-two miles to the south in the valley of Lerma. The first Sunday after his arrival, one of the men of the place after morning mass, said:— “We must rise against this canalla.” “With what arms?” asked another. “With those we take from them,” said yet another. A proprietor, named Luis Burela, put himself at their head, surprised the guard, disarmed Ezenarro and his men, and sent them prisoners to Tucuman. Then, with the arms they had captured, they marched to within ten miles of Salta, where they were met by a company of Spanish troops, whom they charged at once, and completely routed, taking most of the men with their leader prisoners, and sending them also to Tucuman. Another proprietor, named Pedro Zabala, followed the example of Burela, armed his peons and some volunteers and took the field. So began the resistance to the enemy, in which the whole people speedily joined, so that Salta became a bulwark to the United Provinces impregnable to Royalist arms, solely by the force of public opinion roused to action. The Province of Salta, which at that time formed a part of the jurisdiction of Jujui, enters within the first spurs of the Andes which branch from the second of the two ranges which enclose Upper Peru, and has the same physical characteristics, plains, mountains, and an intermediate tropical zone. Its possession was thus of great importance to the invaders, as it was the gate to Argentine territory. The occupation of Jujui opened the road to the plains and valleys of Salta, but even the occupation of Salta itself did not secure their position. The agricultural lands, from which alone supplies could be drawn, lay in valleys to the south of the capital, and it was this part of the Province the guerillas undertook to defend. The nature of the country eminently adapted it to guerilla warfare. The inhabitants were a hard-working race of men, strong, active, and inured to hardships, individually brave, and with a natural instinct for the class of warfare they waged. They were horsemen, accustomed to go either up or down hill at full speed, whose ordinary equipment enabled them to gallop unharmed through thorny brushwood. They were good marksmen, either from the tree-tops or from horseback, or on foot from behind their horses if need were. San Martin made no mistake when he entrusted to them the task of keeping the Royalists at bay while he was engaged in the reorganization of the regular army at Tucuman. He had seen in Spain what might be accomplished by this class of irregular troops. Pezuela, deceived by false despatches which San Martin caused to fall into his hands, believed that these raw levies were the vanguard of the Patriot army advancing on Salta, and in consequence lost much valuable time waiting for reinforcements. In March the Royalist vanguard advanced from Salta into the valley of Lerma, in search of supplies, under the command of Colonel Saturnino Castro, a native of Salta, who had the repute of being the first cavalry officer of the Royalist army of Peru, and whose valour had decided the day at Vilcapugio. The guerillas, who became known to history as the Gauchos of Salta, greatly harassed the progress of the expedition, swarming in the woods along the line of march, cutting off stragglers, driving in small detachments, and firing upon the main body from any convenient shelter. On the 24th, videttes on the Guachipas River at the end of the valley, descried fifty-six of the enemy, under Captain Fajardo, approaching them. Captain Saravia collected thirty men armed with short muskets, and a group of peasantry with clubs and pikes, charged upon them and completely routed them, killing eleven including the captain, and making twenty-seven prisoners, while he had only three men killed and one wounded. Meantime Güemes had entered the Sierra to the east of Salta, and on the 9th and 18th, two parties of his Gauchos surprised two detachments of the enemy. On the 29th he came so close to the city that Castro sallied out against him for about a league with eighty men, but was completely routed, with the loss of half his force. For this feat Güemes was named Commandant-General of the Vanguard, and on the recommendation of San Martin, was raised to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Güemes then occupied the approaches to the city and harassed the garrison by daily attacks upon the suburbs. Being reinforced from Jujui, the Royalists then organised two expeditions of 500 men each. One, composed of a battalion of infantry and a squadron of light horse under Colonel Alvarez, marched early in June into the valley of Lerma. At the town of Sumalao, Alvarez found the vanguard of the Guachipas awaiting him. The Patriot outposts were driven in, but the main body sheltered by trees and broken ground, poured so heavy a fire upon him that he was forced to return to the city, with many killed and wounded, and with the loss of all the supplies he had seized. The other column, also composed of infantry and cavalry, was under the command of Colonel Marquiegui, who like Castro was a native of Salta, and of great repute for skill and knowledge of the country. This column marched to the east and was met by Güemes in person, who made so stubborn a resistance that it was also forced back to the city, and the siege was re-established. Pezuela had drawn in his reserves and advanced to Jujui. Thence he sent orders to Colonel Marquiegui to march with one hundred infantry and one hundred and fifty horse, by the north-eastern frontiers of Tucuman and Santiago del Estero, to the rear of the advanced guard of the Patriots on the river Pasaje. Marquiegui carried out his instructions with great skill, captured several forts, and learned from prisoners that the army of San Martin consisted only of three thousand recruits, and that the vanguard which gave them so much trouble, was nothing but a swarm of undisciplined Gauchos; but he also learned that the object of the campaign, which was the relief of Monte Video, was now impossible, that city having already fallen. When news of this expedition reached Tucuman, Güemes was immediately reinforced by one hundred infantry and one hundred mounted grenadiers, and Marquiegui retreated, marching one hundred leagues in a semicircle, but was prevented from carrying off either horses or cattle. This was the last attempt at invasion; five thousand men were not enough to capture Tucuman, much less to conquer the country. Pezuela withdrew his troops beyond the frontier, and sent off a strong detachment to Cuzco to crush an insurrection which had broken out in that city. The object of the Royalist invasion was, by a powerful diversion, to compel the Argentine Government to withdraw their army from the Banda Oriental for the protection of the northern provinces, but meantime that government had armed and equipped a small naval force, which, under the command of an Irishman named BROWN, had, on the 16th May, defeated and almost destroyed the Spanish squadron stationed at Monte Video, which city soon after surrendered to the Argentine army then besieging it under the command of Alvear. Before the conclusion of these events, the General of the Army of the North had disappeared from the theatre of war. San Martin, after careful study of the question, had clearly discerned that the road by Upper Peru was not the true strategical line of the South American revolution. His idea was to carry the war to the West, to pass the Andes, to occupy Chile, to secure the dominion of the Pacific, and to attack Lower Peru on the flank, continuing military operations to the North merely as a subordinate detail of the main design. This plan, the merits of which were not appreciated by his contemporaries until it was crowned with victory, is looked upon by posterity as not merely the most simple, but as the only possible plan which could give the desired result. It was then held to be folly, whilst in reality the folly lay in persevering in the attempt to reach Lima with insufficient means and by an impracticable route. Knowing that it would be looked upon as folly, San Martin kept his idea to himself, as his secret , as he himself styled it in confidential intercourse, waiting to disclose it for the day when he should hold in his hand the thunderbolt which was to shatter the power of Spain in America. Three months after taking command of the Army of the North, he wrote to his friend, Don Nicolas Rodriguez Peña:— “Don’t flatter yourself with thinking of what I can do here. I shall do nothing, and nothing here pleases me. Our country can do nothing more here than act on the defensive, for which war the brave Gauchos of Salta suffice, if aided by two squadrons of regular troops. To think otherwise is to throw men and money into an abyss. I have already told you my secret . A small, well-disciplined army in Mendoza, to cross to Chile and finish off the Goths there, aiding a government of trusty friends to put an end to the anarchy which reigns. Allying our forces, we shall then go by sea to Lima. This is our course, and no other.” This idea, which was a secret in 1814, and which would, if divulged, have caused its author to be looked upon as a lunatic, is the idea which has given San Martin his place in the history of the world, and which finally changed the destinies of South America. With such plans in his head, San Martin could not rest content with the command of the Army of the North. Further, his rival, Alvear, after crowning himself with the laurels of victory at Monte Video, aspired also to those of Peru. Doubtless, with his enterprising character and sparks of genius, he would have broken the routine of the previous campaigns, and San Martin was willing to yield his post to him, asking for himself, as for a resting-place, the government of the obscure province of Mendoza, by which he threw dust in the eyes, not only of the enemies of America but also in those of his own friends, imitating the tactics of William the Silent, to whose character his own bears some analogy. In addition he was, towards the end of April, attacked by an affection of the lungs, which obliged him to leave Don Francisco Fernandez de la Cruz in command of the army, and to retire, by the advice of his physician, to the Sierra of Cordoba, in search of a drier climate. On the 10th August, 1814, the ex-General of the Army of the North was appointed Governor of Cuyo. From that moment he lived only for his idea. Mendoza was the starting-point in the realization of his plans; it was the soil whence sprang the legions which were to liberate America. CHAPTER VII. THE CHILENO-ARGENTINE REVOLUTION. 1810—1811. I N September, 1814, San Martin took charge of the Government of Cuyo. The revolution in Chile had then lasted four years and was about to succumb, a prey to intestine discords and to the arms of Peru. In order to understand what followed we must first know what preceded the appearance of San Martin upon the scene. Never were two peoples more analogous and less alike than the peoples of Chile and of the United Provinces. Both countries were situate at the southern extremity of the new continent, under the same degrees of latitude, but while one was shut up between the mountains and the sea, the other spread over vast plains. The first was agricultural, the second pastoral and commercial. Chile possessed a territorial aristocracy, and a population of half-breeds, whose relations were somewhat feudal in character. The Argentine people were by nature democratic. Both people sprang from the same origin, and were in temperament alike. The colonization of Mexico and Peru was an imitation of the feudal system of Europe; the labour of an enslaved race was utilized for the production of the precious metals. The colonization of the River Plate and of Chile was effected by the colonists themselves. Assimilating in some degree the indigenous races, they conquered their territories from a warlike people, and, in so doing, developed their own aptitude for war, while they supplied themselves with the first necessaries of life by their own labour. While the colonists of the River Plate crossed immense deserts and reached the Pacific by way of Upper Peru, the colonists of Chile crossed the Andes from Arauco and established themselves to the east of the Cordillera at Mendoza, opening for themselves a road to the Atlantic. Thus the city of Mendoza, capital of the Argentine Province of Cuyo, was a bond of union between the two countries. During the colonial epoch Chile had vegetated in obscurity amid peace and plenty, but the Provinces of the River Plate had lived in a state of almost constant warfare with their neighbours the Portuguese, with the English, and with the Indians, which gave them some knowledge of their own strength, and inoculated them with new ideas. These ideas filtered across the Cordillera to Chile, and there smouldered till, in the year 1810, the flames of revolution burst out in both countries almost simultaneously. The kingdom of Chile, as it was called, was colonized under the auspices of Peru, but was, in 1778, separated from this Viceroyalty and placed under the orders of a governor, who was at the same time President of the Real Audiencia. These two authorities, with the Cabildos granted to some cities, constituted the whole political, judicial, and municipal system of the colony. The separation from Peru inspired the colonists with instinctive ideas of independent autonomy, till the death of the then governor, Muñoz Guzman, on the 10th February, 1808, plunged the hitherto pacific colony into a fever of expectancy. The Home Government followed no fixed system in the appointment of the superior authorities in the colonies. Their nomination came from the Crown direct; sometimes vacancies were provided for beforehand, sometimes the colonists were empowered to make a provisional appointment; but, latterly, that power was, as a rule, vested in the Audiencia. In 1806 all this was changed by Royal decree, which enacted that, in case of a vacancy, the military official of the highest rank then in the colony should assume the vacant post. On the death of Muñoz Guzman, the Audiencia of Chile raised its own President to the vacant office. The officers stationed on the frontier of Araucania protested against this appointment, and proclaimed Colonel Don Francisco Garcia Carrasco Provisional Governor and Captain-General, and the Audiencia was forced to yield. The new Captain-General took with him to the capital, as his secretary and councillor, a man who had for many years resided at Concepcion, who had great influence in the south and was highly thought of throughout the country. This was Dr. Don Juan Martinez de Rozas, an Argentine, born in Mendoza, who was at that time forty-nine years of age. He was a graduate of the University of Cordoba, and a fellow-student with Dr. Castelli, through whom he afterwards entered into political relations with Belgrano. In various official positions in Chile he had gained experience of public affairs, and his wife was a daughter of one of the principal families of the South. Of a passionate character, he was at the same time prudent, was well read in the current literature of the day, and was the leading spirit in a group of men who discussed among themselves the future destinies of America. The new Captain-General was a man of limited intelligence, violent in his proceedings, and with no firmness of character. Thus he soon made himself hated, and was despised by all. His one passion was cock-fighting, his greatest pleasure was in listening to jokes, and his affections were concentrated upon a domestic of African race, through whose hands all favours were bestowed. The whole aim of Rozas was to make him an instrument for social and political reform. To this end he strove to raise the Cabildo of Santiago into a position analogous to that of Buenos Ayres, and to use it as a counterpoise to that of the Audiencia. The Governor, by his advice, added twelve new members to this body, influential citizens, most of whom were men of advanced opinions. The immediate result of this innovation was to inoculate this assembly with revolutionary ideas. Ferdinand VII. being now a prisoner of Napoleon, the Creoles thought that the time had come to replace the colonial system by a government of their own, but the Spaniards, who thought only of preserving their own privileges, protested against the idea. The two parties soon came into collision. The Governor cancelled the decree which added twelve members to the Cabildo, and quarrelled first with the Audiencia and then with Dr. Rozas. The Spaniards strove to reconcile him with the Audiencia, and advised him to fortify the hill of Santa Lucia which commands the city, and to arm their partisans; but finding their counsels set at nought, they denounced him to the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres as unfit for the post he held. He, on his part, appealed for help both to the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres and to him of Peru. At the same time several leading Chilians, aided by young Argentines resident at Santiago, opened communications with the popular leaders of Buenos Ayres. Carrasco then tried what intimidation would do. On the 25th May, 1810, the same day on which the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres was deposed by the people, he ordered the arrest of three of the principal citizens of Santiago, as advocates of revolutionary ideas. The municipal authorities protested, and convened an open Cabildo, which cited the Governor before them. He thought at first of resistance, but 3,000 men filled the Plaza. He could not depend upon the troops, and at the request of the Audiencia he presented himself, amid the shouts of the populace who clamoured for his deposition. A new Procurator, elected by the Cabildo, the previous one being among the prisoners, opened the case by declaring that it was the will of the people that the prisoners should be set free, and that the Cabildo would remain sitting till it was done. This was the first time that such a thing as “the will of the people” had been heard of in Chile, and the speech of the new tribune was loudly applauded. Carrasco yielded, and decreed not only the liberation of the prisoners, but also the dismissal from their posts of those who had aided in the arbitrary measure. He also accepted the control of an Assessor, without whose authorization his judicial acts should, in future, be invalid. These decrees were endorsed by the Audiencia, which was a virtual dismissal from office of the last Governor and Captain-General of Chile. From that day the latent spirit of revolution gained ground, but the efforts of the Patriots were as yet limited to theoretical discussions. Their head-quarters were in Santiago, the warlike Province of Concepcion was their base, and their teaching came from Buenos Ayres, “the Athens of the New World,” as it is styled by a Chilian historian. The growth of public opinion in Santiago, and the news constantly arriving from Spain, more especially that of the battle of Ocaña, kept the interest alive. The south of Chile, whose capital was Concepcion, virtually formed a distinct country. The people called themselves “Penquistos,” to distinguish themselves from their northern neighbours, who styled themselves “Chilians.” Their troublesome neighbours, the Indians of Araucania, had accustomed them to war; their pastoral and agricultural pursuits made them strong and hardy. Their society included a class of free peasantry, among whom the army of the frontier found recruits, and from whom sprang the most distinguished leaders on both sides in the war which followed. The man of most influence in this district in 1809 was Dr. Rozas, who, after his quarrel with Carrasco, returned to Concepcion and began openly to work for independence. He advised that Chile, without renouncing her allegiance to her captive sovereign, should provisionally appoint a National government, after the example set by the Provinces of Spain, which idea he advocated in a manuscript circular, for at that day there was no printing-press in Chile. Among the co-workers with Rozas was a wealthy proprietor of the South named Don Bernardo O’Higgins , son of the celebrated Viceroy of the same name. Educated in Europe he spoke English, and was, by reason of his Irish descent, partial to the institutions of England. A disciple and confidant of Miranda he had been affiliated in his lodge, swearing as did San Martin and Bolívar to work for the liberty of the New World. Carrasco kept the prisoners in gaol in spite of his promise to the Cabildo, and issued a decree establishing a special Junta to keep watch over the advocates of the new ideas. The excitement in Santiago increased, and eight hundred armed citizens demanded the institution of a governing Junta, in imitation of that established in Buenos Ayres on the 25th May. The Audiencia prevailed upon Carrasco to resign his power into the hands of the Count de la Conquista, a Chilian noble, who was eighty-five years of age. The Patriots were not satisfied, but as they succeeded in surrounding the new Governor by councillors in whom they could trust, they for a time acquiesced. About the end of July an emissary from Belgrano and Castelli crossed the Andes. The Patriots, stimulated by the news he brought, determined to persist in their previous design, and induced the Count to convene an open Cabildo on the 18th September. To ensure their triumph the Cabildo called out the city militia, and the proprietors of Santiago filled the suburbs with their armed tenantry. They were also joined by some officers of the garrison. In spite of the protest of the Audiencia, the Count laid down his baton of command, and the Cabildo appointed a governing Junta of seven members, of whom Dr. Rozas was one, the Count being named President. The new Government was accepted by the whole country, but nothing was changed until the arrival of Dr. Rozas, who on the 2nd November entered the capital in triumph, between lines of troops, amid salvoes of artillery, the clang of bells, music, and loud acclamations. All that night the city was illuminated and fireworks blazed in his honour. Never had Santiago witnessed such an ovation. The Chilian revolution resembled that of Buenos Ayres, in that it was Parliamentary and legal, initiated and carried out within the precincts of the municipal forum; and that it triumphed by the force of opinion, without violence, in the name of the public weal. Both followed the same formula, the resumption of their own rights, without a rupture with the mother country and protesting fidelity to the legitimate sovereign. The first was an aristocratic revolution, the second was democratic and radical; but, both were essentially American and obeyed the same historic law. Thus from the beginning, the two nations were bound together by fraternal ties and by a common cause. The news of the installation of the Junta of Chile was received in Buenos Ayres with transports of joy, and the thunder of their guns on the 11th October, reverberated in the hearts of the Chilian people. Buenos Ayres proposed at once an alliance offensive and defensive, assuring the Chilians that England would recognise any constitution they might give themselves, now that Spain had fallen. Rozas, in return, presented a plan for a vast continental confederation, which idea found an eager advocate in Alvarez Jonte, the Argentine envoy, who as a practical exposition of it, asked Chile for an auxiliary force in aid of the Argentine Government against the reactionary movement which had its headquarters in Monte Video. The Cabildo opposed the project, but Rozas had the majority of the Junta with him, and in 1811 a decree was published for the despatch of an auxiliary force of 500 men, and authorizing the Argentine envoy to enlist 2,000 recruits. This sealed the alliance of the two countries and united their destinies for good or evil. Of the promised contingent, 100 dragoons and 200 infantry reached Buenos Ayres on the 14th June, 1811, and met with an enthusiastic reception. The Patriot party soon became divided into two factions. The Radicals, who aimed at independence, were headed by Rozas, and had in their front line the Argentine residents. The death of the Count de la Conquista in February, 1811, left Rozas at the head of affairs, but his power was more apparent than real. Against him, at the head of the Moderate party, was ranged the Cabildo, sustained by the Creole aristocracy, whose timid temporising policy almost placed them in line with the party of reaction. The Royalist, called the Goth or Saracen party, recognized the leadership of the Audiencia, accused Rozas of personal ambition and even of aspiring to the crown. Rozas had no such ambition and lacked even the spontaneous courage of the man of action. Through all this opposition he carried on his plan of reform, of which freedom of commerce was the most important feature. This was proclaimed in February, 1811, with the result that in a few months the revenue was doubled and was soon after quadrupled. He also raised troops and summoned a general Congress of Deputies from the Provinces, whose election was based upon the limitations established by municipal precedent. The 1st April was the day appointed for the elections. That same day a part of the garrison of Santiago mutinied under Colonel Figueroa, who was a friend of Rozas. At first the daring Royalist was successful, and occupied the Plaza, placing himself under the orders of the Audiencia, who however, declined all responsibility. Rozas, who alone of his colleagues preserved his presence of mind, ordered the rest of the troops to march against the mutineers. The two forces met in the Plaza and opened fire on each other simultaneously, at close quarters. The affair soon ended in favour of the Patriots, young Manuel Dorrego, of Buenos Ayres, at that time a student of the University, particularly distinguishing himself in the fight. Figueroa took refuge in a convent, where he was captured by Rozas at the head of a party of citizens, was tried that same night, sentenced to death “as a traitor to his country and the government,” and was shot the next morning at four o’clock. The bodies of five of the mutineers who had been killed, were hung on a gallows in the Plaza on the afternoon of the 1st, and next day proclamation was made that all who conspired against the State would be similarly punished. Immediately afterwards the Audiencia was dissolved, and with it disappeared the last semblance of monarchical authority in Chile. Meantime the elections passed off quietly in the rest of the country. In the Centre the Creole oligarchy triumphed, the great proprietors being elected by their tenants without opposition; but in the South and in some of the northern districts, the Radicals were successful. Following the example of Buenos Ayres, the Deputies were incorporated with the executive, in spite of the just protest of the Cabildo, which revenged itself by procuring the election of twelve deputies for the capital in place of the six it ought to have had according to the electoral census. On the 6th May the interrupted election took place in Santiago. The candidates of Rozas being defeated from this day his power waned. Congress met on the 4th July. Out of forty members Rozas could only count upon thirteen votes. On the same day the Junta resigned, and the “High Congress” assumed the executive power. Rozas in an eloquent speech gave a sketch of his policy, which he recommended for their adoption, and was listened to with deep attention by the whole Assembly; for the moment all the discordant opinions vibrated in harmony. It is an interesting question whether this early establishment of the Parliamentary system was of benefit or was an evil to Chile. The Chilian historian, Vicuña Mackenna, considers it premature. He says, “the dictatorship of a Cæsar rather than that of a Cicero” would have been preferable for a people without constitutional education. Gervinus thinks that it assured to Chile, later on, that tranquillity so wanting in the other republics of South America. Lastarria, more philosophical than either, observes that the establishment of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, even under such restrictions as placed them in the hands of a few only, was the true way to weaken colonial prejudices and to arouse the idea of the dignity of man. The fact is that it was the natural outcome of the feudal character of Chilian society. In the Parliamentary drama the people played the part of the Greek chorus, which repeated the words of the principal actor. Chile soon remedied the error, copied from Buenos Ayres, of incorporating Congress with the Executive, which shows the existence of a hidden force neutralising the effect of an evil example. The revolutions of Holland and the United States had shown the world that a regulating Congress was compatible with a dictatorship; and even in South America it was seen later on that no dictatorship, however powerful, could disregard the will of the people from whom its authority was derived. In Chile less than in any other colony was this possible; nevertheless it is certain that Rozas convened this Congress in obedience to a solemn promise exacted from him by O’Higgins as a condition of his support. The Moderate party, which had a large majority in Congress, knew not what use to make of their power; they were without experience, without plans, and had no fixed ideas; most of them desired only peace and security for their properties. The minority had clearer views; they aimed at raising their leader to the head of the State, and at independence. On the 27th July an English ship of war reached Valparaiso, whose captain was commissioned by the Viceroy of Peru, with credentials from the Regency of Spain, to receive the subsidy which Chile was expected to contribute for the maintenance of the war in the Peninsula. One million six hundred thousand dollars had been deposited in the treasury for this purpose. The Moderates and the Royalists were for paying the amount at once, but O’Higgins, speaking for the Liberals, said:— “Although we are in a minority we shall know how to supply that defect by our energy and our courage; we are sufficient to oppose effectually the delivery of this money, of which our country threatened with invasion has need.” This bold protest decided the question in the negative. The Liberals afterwards proposed the appointment of an Executive of three; one for each of the three territorial divisions of the country, the North, the South, and the Centre. The Moderates accepted the idea but put off the election. The Liberals then attempted to intimidate Congress by popular tumults, sadly compromising their leader by these sinister manœuvres. Congress showed more firmness than could have been expected from its composition, and the defeated minority seceded from the Assembly. The majority then named three of their own party as the Junta, and Rozas, looking upon his cause as lost, retired to Concepcion, where he was received in triumph, and set up an opposition Junta, the South recalling its members from Congress. Congress then drew up a constitution, so unworkable that it only served to show their utter lack of all political knowledge. It never came into operation. CHAPTER VIII. PROGRESS AND FALL OF THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION. 1811—1814. T HE disappearance of the Radical party in Congress, the reactionary policy of the Conservatives, and the proceedings of Rozas at Concepcion, had most evil effect upon the course of the revolution in Chile. Liberalism became anarchy, and the Moderates became mixed up with the Spanish party. At this juncture Don José Miguel Carrera returned to his native land. Carrera was a scion of one of the most distinguished families of Chile, and was at that time twenty-seven years of age. He had fought in Spain against the French, and brought with him a major’s commission, granted by the Junta of Galicia, and the brilliant uniform of an hussar. He had two brothers, officers in the army of Chile. The elder, Juan José, was a man of herculean strength, but of feeble intellect, wanting in moral courage, and full of envy of his more talented brother. The youngest and most amiable of the three, was named Luis, and was at that time twenty years of age. In danger he was always found in the front rank, and was devoted to José Miguel. These three had a sister, Javiera, of great beauty and of masculine strength of mind; she was skilful in intrigue and ambitious, but was distinguished both by social and domestic virtues; her intrepid spirit made her the Egeria of her brothers. José Miguel was a man of action, and a thinker so far as his unruly nature would permit; of vehement passions, and licentious life, a ready writer and a brilliant speaker, of good presence and of attractive manners, but with an overweening sense of his own importance. He was a sort of an Alcibiades shorn of his great qualities. Carrera presented himself publicly to Congress, dressed in his brilliant uniform, offered his services and his sword, and then entered into secret negotiations with the Liberal party, through the powerful family of Larrain. With them he organized a popular demonstration by which the Government was upset on the 4th September, a new Junta of five members was appointed, six of the members of Congress for the capital were dismissed as illegally elected, and three seats were declared vacant. Congress had hesitated to grant the request of the Government of Buenos Ayres for forty quintals of gunpowder from the factory in Chile; the new Government sent off two hundred quintals. It reduced the taxes, reformed some abuses in administration, encouraged industry, armed the militia, and had the glory of making Chile the first nation in America to abolish slavery. The principal posts were monopolised by the Larrain family, greatly to the disgust of Carrera. One of this family boasting that the legislative, executive, and judicial presidencies were all held by them, Carrera asked:— “And who has the presidency of the bayonets?” Dazzled by his popularity, he now only thought of how to overturn the new Government, and even sought and obtained help from the Spanish party to this end. On the 15th November Juan José Carrera mutinied with his battalion and seized the barracks of the artillery. Luis headed the artillerymen and dragged the guns into the street, the roll of their wheels on the pavement giving the signal for a fresh revolution. José Miguel put himself at the head of the mutiny, and summoned the Executive and Congress to meet and hear the petitions of the people. He was joined only by the Spanish party, who shouted for the dissolution of the Junta and of Congress. The next day an open Cabildo was convened, which named a new Junta, composed of José Miguel Carrera, as representative of the capital, Gaspar Marin for the North, and Rozas, or in his absence Don Bernardo O’Higgins, for the South. This resolution was presented to Congress by the military chiefs, and Congress, after some delay, authorised the appointment of the new Junta. On the 27th November, on pretext that he was in danger of assassination, Carrera made several arrests. He himself took one of the prisoners to the barracks, made him kneel before a crucifix, and by threatening him with immediate execution, forced from him a declaration against the others. The trial which followed proved the innocence of the accused. Called to account by his colleagues and by Congress, he, on the 2nd December, demanded the dissolution of the latter, occupied the Legislative Palace with troops, and forced from the Assembly a decree to that effect. Marin and O’Higgins protested and withdrew from the Junta. Carrera replaced them by one of his own partisans and by a noted leader of the Spanish party. The two political parties, which represented the aristocracy and democracy of Chile, disappeared, and the country fell under the domination of a military oligarchy, which setting aside laws, juntas, and congresses, depended only on the army for support. Juan José Carrera was raised to the rank of brigadier-general, and his brothers were made lieutenant-colonels, with special decorations for their services. Public opinion was entirely against the Carreras, all eyes turned to the South and to Rozas as the only man who could vindicate the law. Rozas protested against the mutiny and offered his assistance to Congress, but he was in an anomalous position. By leaving the capital and setting up an opposition Junta at Concepcion, he had entered upon dangerous ground and had sapped the base of his moral power; he had destroyed the territorial unity of the revolution and had aroused provincial jealousies. Thus Carrera, though destitute of political principle, and seeking only his own aggrandisement, was the true representative of the cause of national unity. The Centre of Chile is divided from the South by the river Maule. Carrera stationed an army on the north bank, while, through the intervention of O’Higgins, he conferred with Rozas. On the 12th January, 1812, a convention was drawn up by three plenipotentiaries, which recognised the South, Centre, and North as three distinct provinces, each of which should name one member of an Executive, until a Constituent Congress could be convened. Carrera was in no haste to ratify this convention, till an army from the South advanced to the line of the Maule. A collision was prevented by an interview on the 25th April between the two leaders, who verbally agreed to the ratification of the convention and the re-installation of Congress. This agreement was hailed with joy throughout the country, and Carrera was received in triumph on his return to Santiago. It was not patriotism nor fear of the Penquistos, which induced Carrera to restore the Congress he had dissolved; the Argentine Government, appealed to by the Government of Concepcion, had offered their mediation, but the most serious matter was that the province of Valdivia had on the 12th March declared itself Royalist, and proclaimed Carrera Captain-General of the kingdom, an appointment which he indignantly rejected. Valdivia occupied the extreme south of the country, had a seaport with fortifications which were considered impregnable, and was supported by the Archipelago of Chiloe, where the people were all Royalists and had a Royalist garrison. Early in 1812 the first printing-press was established in Chile, and on the 13th February appeared the first newspaper, entitled La Aurora de Chile , edited by Camilo Enriquez, a priest, assisted by an Argentine named Vera y Pintado, and by Irrizarra of Guatemala. From the United States, together with the printing-press, came Mr. Poinsett as consular agent, who introduced a new element into the political opinions of the country, democratic ideas, which new ideas found at first little acceptance save in the army, where they were fostered by Carrera as a counterpoise to the federal ideas which had gained strength during the recent events. On the night of the 9th July a revolutionary movement broke out in Concepcion, headed by the partisans of Rozas, but secretly fomented by the Spanish party, which dissolved the Provincial Junta. Rozas went to Santiago, whence he was banished by Carrera to Mendoza, and died there on the 3rd March, 1813. Carrera was now without a rival, and the revolution gained in unity and in strength. The various parties commenced to fuse together, with his authority as a common centre, and the desire for independence became more marked. When Consul Poinsett celebrated his national anniversary of the 4th July, the flag of the stars and stripes was seen entwined with an unknown tricoloured flag, bearing a lone star in one of its corners. This unknown flag was the new flag of Chile. On the 16th July the tricoloured cockade was worn by all the citizens of Santiago, and on the 30th September the new flag was formally recognised as the national ensign. Nevertheless independence was not then declared, still government was carried on in the name of Ferdinand VII., while the Carreras went about the city at night in disguise, with groups of young men, pulling down the escutcheons of the Creole aristocracy. In order to test his popularity, Carrera then sent in his resignation, which the Cabildo refused to accept. In consequence of a misunderstanding with his brother, Juan José, who was still envious of him, he repeated his resignation, but in conjunction with his brother Luis, reserved the command of the army. His father, Don Ignacio, was appointed to succeed him, and supported by Don Juan José adopted a reactionary policy, which was opposed by José Miguel and Luis, at the head of the troops. The two brothers, assisted by two friends, then drew up a plan for a constitution, which was presented to the Junta by one of their adherents. This plan created a Senate of seven members, and contained two clauses which provided that:— “Ferdinand VII. was king on condition of accepting and swearing the Constitution made by the people,” and “no decree emanating from authority outside the territory shall have any effect, those who obey it being punished as traitors to the State.” These clauses were accepted by the Junta, but Don Ignacio Carrera, being afraid to sign them, retired from the Government, and Don José Miguel returned to office. Carrera was again dictator, and opposition was silent in the face of a new danger. A Royalist army had invaded Chilian territory and occupied the South. He was now the champion of a noble cause; all the military chiefs, even those who opposed his policy, obeyed him willingly; the people saw in danger the justification of a strong government; the military repute he had brought with him from Europe caused him to be regarded as the first soldier of his country. Abascal, Viceroy of Peru, was then more than seventy years old. By firmness and prudence he had maintained peace in his Viceroyalty in the midst of the commotions which stirred all Spanish America. More than that, he had made Peru the centre of the Royalist reaction, had crushed rebellion in Upper Peru, had made war on the Argentine provinces, had sent an expedition to Quito, and had kept Chiloe under his orders. He had watched the Chilian revolution from its commencement, waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack it. Antonio Pareja, an experienced soldier, was named Commandant-General of Valdivia and Chiloe, and early in 1813 reached the island with five vessels, a number of officers, fifty soldiers, and fifty thousand dollars. He quickly organised the militia of the Archipelago, with the garrison as a nucleus, and crossed to Valdivia with 1,400 men, where he incorporated the garrison of that fortress, raising his force to over 2,000 men. These he arranged in three divisions, each with six guns, and re-embarking, sailed northwards, keeping his destination secret. Three days afterwards, on the 26th March, he landed in the bay of San Vicente, taking the town of Talcahuano in the rear, and threatening Concepcion in front. Talcahuano was taken by assault; the garrison of Concepcion mutinied and gave up the city. Thus speedily he was master of the South, and further strengthened his force by the garrisons of Arauco. With 2,000 regulars, from 2,000 to 3,000 militia, and with twenty-five guns, he opened the campaign early in April. At Chillán the country rose in his favour, increasing his force to 6,000 men, with whom he occupied the line of the river Nuble, which lies to the south of the Maule. Carrera was equally active; he proclaimed himself General-in-chief with full powers, declared war against the Viceroy of Peru, set up a gibbet in the Plaza of Santiago, on which to hang all who should hold communication with the enemy, and caused the imposition of a forced loan of two hundred and sixty thousand dollars upon those hostile to the revolution, which measures inspired general enthusiasm and confidence. On the 1st April he established his headquarters to the north of the Maule, with merely an escort, and gave orders for the concentration of the army at Talca. His friend, Consul Poinsett, accompanied him as a volunteer, and the same day he was joined by O’Higgins, who forgot his resentment, an example followed by Mackenna, who was a talented engineer. Calling in the militia of the South, who remained faithful, in twenty days he was at the head of 10,000 men, from whom he organised an army of 2,500 regulars, badly armed, and as many lancers of the militia, with sixteen field-pieces. The campaign opened with a piece of good fortune which greatly encouraged the Patriots. It chanced that an officer sent with 500 men to surprise the vanguard of the enemy at a pass on the Maule, misunderstood his orders, and on the night of the 27th April fell in with the main body of the Royalists, some five or six thousand strong. Not knowing who they were, he attacked them and captured the whole of the artillery. At dawn the enemy recovered from their panic, pursued him and recaptured the guns and prisoners. The loss of the Patriots in killed and wounded was four times that of the Royalists, but the moral effect was that of a victory. The greater part of the irregular cavalry deserted from Pareja, who nevertheless advanced to the Maule. The army was drawn up to force the passage, when the men from Chiloe and Valdivia threw down their arms and refused to go further; they cared nothing for the Royalist cause beyond the Maule. Pareja, lying on a stretcher, stricken with a mortal disease, ordered a retreat, on which the rest of the irregulars dispersed, and he was left with little more than a thousand men. Carrera knew nothing of what had occurred, and let fifteen days pass before he made up his mind to cross the river. The Patriot vanguard under Luis Carrera came up with Pareja on the 15th May, as he was about to pass the Nuble. The Royalists halted, the dying general mounted on horseback for the last time, and placed Captain Sanchez in command. Sanchez at once occupied some rising ground, where he threw up an entrenchment with his baggage, and formed his infantry in square, and opened fire with twenty-seven guns upon the Patriots, checking their advance. Carrera then took the command, and on the arrival of Don Juan José with the second division, drew up his infantry in line with cavalry on the flanks to surround the enemy. Don Juan José, without waiting for orders, attacked the position and was driven back; the same fate befell another battalion which followed his example. The guns were dismounted at the first shot. The cavalry which had passed to the rear of the enemy, were dispersed by artillery fire, and the infantry fell back in disorder. The third division, under O’Higgins and Mackenna, then came up and prevented the advance of the enemy, which would have turned the repulse into a rout. Night put a stop to this strange affair, and Carrera retreated in disorder to San Carlos. Sanchez crossed the Nuble with all his artillery, without further molestation, and retreated to Chillán, with a loss of six killed and fifteen wounded. This battle of San Carlos showed that Carrera was destitute of military talent; but he had the strength of mind to reject the councils of his disheartened officers, who advised him to withdraw the army beyond the Maule, and for the first time drew up a definite plan of operations. With one part of his army he occupied Concepcion and Talcahuano, cutting off the retreat of the enemy by sea, and despatched O’Higgins with his division to Arauco, securing the South, but in these manœuvres he lost much time, and one detachment of 650 men left in reserve on the Nuble, was captured by a Royalist force from Chillán. Sanchez was an obscure soldier, born in Galicia, of no real genius, but quick-sighted, of great tenacity, and devoted to the cause he served. At Chillán he entrenched himself, aided by the people, who were all Royalists, and by the preaching friars, who had there a convent, which soon became a well-provisioned citadel. When Carrera, against the advice of O’Higgins and Mackenna, determined at the end of July to besiege Chillán, it was already winter, the season of heavy rains. On the 3rd August, Mackenna established a battery of six guns, at four hundred and fifty yards from the trenches. The following morning Sanchez made a vigorous sally but was driven back. The same afternoon he made another attack upon a reserve battery, under the fire of his own redoubts, a ball from which blew up the ammunition of the battery, causing great confusion. Carrera ordered the battery to be abandoned, but his officers disobeyed him, and O’Higgins coming up to the rescue, the enemy was again repulsed. The losses were considerable on both sides, but the sufferings of the besiegers were augmented by the inclemency of the weather. A convoy of ammunition for Carrera was intercepted by Royalist guerillas, thirty miles from the encampment, and delivered to Sanchez, whose supplies were running short. On the 5th Sanchez made another attack upon the advanced battery, which was bravely repelled by Luis Carrera. The Patriot general then ordered an assault upon the town, which was beaten off by the townspeople themselves. The spirit of the Patriot army was broken, deaths and desertions greatly reduced their numbers. Carrera summoned the garrison to surrender. Sanchez replied by proposing an armistice, during which the Patriots should recross the Maule. A council of war was called, and against the advice of Mackenna the siege was raised. On the 14th August the Patriot army encamped on the banks of the Itata, and from this moment their cause declined. Carrera again fell into the error of dividing his army. He posted one division near the mouth of the Itata, under command of his brother Juan José, to protect the line of the Maule, and O’Higgins was despatched with a weak division to secure the frontier on the Bio-Bio. With the rest of his forces he went to Concepcion, while his guerillas scoured the country in every direction. This was just what suited Sanchez, who could do nothing with a strong force in front of him. He had plenty of irregulars who knew the country well, and split up his force into flying columns to the north and south. The depredations of the Patriots stirred up the resistance of the people, and various detachments were cut up in detail. O’Higgins could not prevent the reconquest of the line of the Bio-Bio and the occupation of Arauco, by which supplies were drawn by the Royalists from Valdivia and Chiloe. At the end of September Carrera was shut up in Concepcion, and the Patriot army was blockaded in three separate divisions. He ordered their concentration at Concepcion. Juan José Carrera reached the Membrillar near to the junction of the Diguillin with the Itata early in October, where he was forced to entrench himself. Carrera then marched to meet O’Higgins, and joined him at the pass of “El Roble,” some ten miles to the east of Membrillar. The united forces, about 1,000 strong, encamped on ground badly chosen. Sanchez, joining the irregulars with a division from Chillán, attacked them there on the night of the 19th October. In the confusion Carrera jumped his horse into the river and went off to join his brother, receiving a lance wound in his flight. His absence was not noticed, but O’Higgins, after three hours’ firing, led a bayonet charge upon the enemy, and drove them across the river. When Carrera returned to the camp he saluted O’Higgins as “the saviour of the division and of the country,” and in his official despatch spoke of him as “the first of soldiers, capable of uniting in himself the glories of Chile.” These words were his own abdication, his military star was eclipsed. After this affair Carrera again changed his plan. He left his brother and O’Higgins at the confluence of the Diguillin and Itata, protected by fieldworks, and returned to Concepcion. This destroyed his prestige in the army and in public opinion; the Press gave the signal of general discontent; even from the pulpit the disastrous influence of the three Carreras was condemned. When Carrera took command of the army his place as Dictator was for a time filled by his brother Juan José; when he also took the field his two colleagues resigned. The Corporations and the Senate then named a new Junta of three, chosen from the Moderate party, two of whom were enemies of Carrera. The new Junta were active in furnishing supplies until the raising of the siege of Chillán and the revolt of the province of Concepcion produced strained relations between them and Carrera. The capital became excited by the adverse course of the war, and the Liberals of 1811 clamoured for a change in the constitution. The Press advocated the adoption of a more Republican system. On the 8th October a meeting of the corporations, convened by the Junta, confirmed them in power, but directed that the seat of Government should be removed to Talca. Don José Ignacio Cienfuegos, a man of great influence in the South and an enemy of Carrera, joined the Junta, and Larrain, ex-President of the late Congress, and also an enemy of Carrera, was left in charge of the affairs at Santiago. Government had organized in the capital a new battalion officered by their own adherents, and had asked for a supply of arms from Buenos Ayres. The 300 Chilian auxiliaries came back from that city, and the Argentine Government, in return for their services, had decreed that an Argentine auxiliary force of equal number should march to the assistance of Chile. This column, raised in the provinces of Cordoba and Mendoza, crossed the Andes under the command of Don Juan Gregorio Las Heras , and were warmly welcomed. Their first duty was to escort the Junta to Talca, where Colonel Don Marcos Balcarce took command of the contingent. The Junta, on receiving news of the affair at El Roble, resolved to remove Carrera from the command, and first thought of replacing him by Balcarce, but, yielding to national sentiment, decided to appoint Colonel O’Higgins, whose tried valour and civic virtues gave him great popularity, both in the army and throughout the country. This appointment in February, 1814, had an evil effect upon the army, where Carrera had still many partizans, splitting it into two parties. Carrera left for the capital accompanied by his brother Luis, but on the road they were taken prisoners by a party of Royalist irregulars under Barañao, and carried off to Chillán. The army of which O’Higgins took command consisted of about 2,500 men dispersed in fractions, disheartened, and badly armed and equipped. On the 31st January a reinforcement of Royalist troops landed at Arauco, consisting of 800 men and six guns under Brigadier-General Gainza, appointed by the Viceroy as successor to Pareja. Eight days later he crossed the Bio-Bio and joined Sanchez at Chillán, without meeting an insurgent on his march. O’Higgins stationed one division of his army at Membrillar, while with the rest he marched to the line of the Bio-Bio to intercept the supplies of the enemy. This plan was as bad as those of Carrera. Mackenna, left in command at Membrillar, had under his orders on the 14th February, 800 infantry, 100 dragoons, and sixteen guns. Soon after the country around was occupied by the light troops of the enemy, so that he was obliged to make sallies in force to procure supplies and forage. On one of these occasions, when he had taken a considerable number of cattle his rear-guard was attacked by a much stronger force, which was driven off with heavy loss by Las Heras with 100 of the Argentine auxiliaries. Meantime a Royalist detachment of 300 men had crossed the Maule, and on the 4th March attacked the city of Talca, from which the Junta had already withdrawn. The feeble garrison made a stout resistance under Colonel Spano, a Spaniard who had joined the Patriots in 1809, but was overpowered, Spano dying wrapped in the tricoloured flag he had so bravely defended. This blow spread consternation in Santiago. The people crowded to the Plaza, and Irizarri proposed the appointment of a Dictator, following the example of the Roman Republic in times of danger, and Colonel Lastra, Governor of Valparaiso, was named Supreme Director. The new Government in a few days organized a force of 1,500 men with six guns, and placed in command a young man named Don Manuel Blanco Encalada , but these raw troops were repulsed in an attack upon Talca, and were afterwards completely routed at Cancha-Rayada on the 27th March. The position of Mackenna at Membrillar became very difficult. The loss of Talca cut his communications with the capital; he threw up more entrenchments and remained steadily on the defensive. O’Higgins started to his assistance on the 16th March, leaving weak garrisons in Concepcion and Talcahuana. It was time; Gainza was already between them. On the 19th O’Higgins drove in the Royalist vanguard at Quilo, and Gainza, withdrawing the garrison from Chillán, fell next day upon Mackenna, but was beaten off with the loss of eighty killed. On the 23rd O’Higgins joined Mackenna, and next day moved off northwards with 2,600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and twenty guns. Gainza, harassing his rear, marched in the same direction; victory would lie with him who could first cross the Maule. O’Higgins, by a skilful manœuvre, captured a pass, and throwing up defences of brushwood in his rear, beat off an attack, and crossed on the 4th April. Gainza crossed by a different pass on the same day, and tried to stop the march of the Patriot army at a pass on the Claro River. On the 7th O’Higgins forced the pass, and the two armies faced each other between that river and the Lontué. At Quecheraguas O’Higgins threw up entrenchments, and on the 8th and 9th beat off attacks of the enemy, giving time for the arrival of reinforcements from Santiago. Gainza then retreated to Talca, and the garrisons of Concepcion and Talcahuano capitulated. By this time the Anglo-Spanish armies had driven the French from Spain, and the Government of Spain called upon the insurgent colonies to send deputies to Cortes. In Mexico the Royalist arms were triumphant; the rising star of Bolívar at Caracas was about to suffer eclipse; the revolutions of Quito, Venezuela, and New Granada were crushed; Lima, still the great centre of reaction, prepared yet another expedition for the conquest of Chile; only in the united provinces of the River Plate did the revolution still hold its ground. In these circumstances Hillyar, commodore of the British squadron of the Pacific, offered his mediation to the Viceroy of Peru for the pacification of Chile. His offer was accepted, and he reached Santiago just after the successful defence of Quecheraguas. Government appointed O’Higgins and Mackenna to conduct the negotiation. It was accordingly arranged on the 3rd May that Chile should return to the state of the year 1811, under the rule of a provisional Junta subject to the Regency of Spain; that the Royalist troops should withdraw from Chile within one month; that Chile should send deputies to the Peninsula to settle all disputes, and should do what she could to help the cause of Spain. This arrangement, which is known as the Treaty of Lircay, was badly received in the Royalist camp, and also by public opinion in Chile, and resulted in nothing more than a truce. It is a question whether these terms were agreed upon in good faith by either party. So far as Gainza was concerned, they saved him from certain defeat. Don Francisco Antonio Pinto, diplomatic agent of Chile in London, was instructed to repair to Madrid in representation of her interests, but the Royalist troops were not withdrawn, and the Government remained in the hands of Lastra as Supreme Director. Chile was resolved upon liberty at any cost, and public opinion, which had forced on the treaty, was now equally pronounced against it. The alliance between Chile and the United Provinces was de facto at an end, and the Argentine auxiliaries were withdrawn from the army to Santiago. On the 22nd July a mutiny in the barracks restored the Carreras to power. They proclaimed themselves the saviours of the country. By the Treaty of Lircay Don José Miguel and Don Luis were excluded from the arrangement for a mutual exchange of prisoners; they were to be sent by sea to Valparaiso, and thence banished into honourable exile; but, escaping from their prison at Chillán, they had reached the capital and raised this mutiny, in which style of work Don José Miguel displayed more skill than he had done in the field against the national enemy. A provisional Junta was named by the noisy shouts of an open Cabildo, of which Carrera made himself president. Had Carrera torn up the Treaty of Lircay, he would have had both reason and patriotism on his side, but his first step was to confirm the clause relating to freedom of commerce with Peru and to exhort the people to preserve peace. As before, he had neither ideas nor courage, and in his hands Congress, army, and revolution were all lost together. In spite of the protests of Las Heras, the Argentine auxiliaries were ignominiously expelled from the capital, on the pretext that it was their duty to assist the Government when called upon. O’Higgins counselled them to observe absolute neutrality in all civil disputes, following the example of the Chilian auxiliaries in Buenos Ayres in the revolution of 1812, and at the invitation of the Cabildo marched his army upon Santiago. Carrera met him on the plains of Maipó, where, for the first time, Chilian blood was shed by Chilians, and O’Higgins was defeated. Meantime, the Viceroy of Peru had refused to ratify the treaty of peace, had despatched a fresh expedition to Talcahuano, and General Osorio at the head of 5,000 men was now marching on the capital. In this emergency O’Higgins put himself and the remnants of his force under the orders of Carrera, who speedily collected five or six thousand men, who might have done something had they been well led, but neither he nor O’Higgins showed any capacity for command. The latter, with 1,700 men, was cut off from the main body and shut up in Rancagua, where he defended himself with desperate valour for thirty-two hours against the whole army of the Royalists, till, his ammunition being exhausted, he cut his way through the enemy at the head of 300 men, and rejoined Carrera, who had retreated to Santiago.

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