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Dynamically hiding information in noise — Fiske Software Llc (US11171934B2)

Fiske Software Llc · Google Patents

Google Patents · Patents · License: Open Access

patent, google patents, intellectual property, US11171934B2, Fiske Software Llc, Michael Stephen Fiske, en, 2021

ABSTRACT

Abstract

A process of hiding a key or data inside of random noise is introduced, whose purpose is to protect the privacy of the key or data. In some embodiments, the random noise is produced by quantum randomness, using photonic emission with a light emitting diode. When the data or key generation and random noise have the same probability distributions, and the key size is fixed, the security of the hiding can be made arbitrarily close to perfect secrecy, by increasing the noise size. The hiding process is practical in terms of infrastructure and cost, utilizing the existing TCP/IP infrastructure as a transmission medium, and using light emitting diode(s) and a photodetector in the random noise generator. In some embodiments, symmetric cryptography encrypts the data before the encrypted data is hidden in random noise, which substantially amplifies the computational complexity.

Description

1 RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 62/085,338, entitled âHiding Data Transmissions in Random Noiseâ, filed Nov. 28, 2014, which is incorporated herein by reference; this application claims priority benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 62/092,795, entitled âHiding Data Transmissions in Random Noiseâ, filed Dec. 16, 2014, which is incorporated herein by reference; this application claims priority benefit of U.S. Non-provisional patent application Ser. No. 14/953,300, entitled âHiding Information in Noiseâ, filed Nov. 28, 2015, which is incorporated herein by reference.

This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Non-provisional patent application Ser. No. 14/953,300, entitled âHiding Information in Noiseâ, filed Nov. 28, 2015, which is incorporated herein by reference. This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Non-provisional patent application Ser. No. 15/158,596, entitled âHiding a Public Key Exchange in Noiseâ, filed May 19, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference.

2 BACKGROUNDâFIELD OF INVENTION

The present invention relates broadly to protecting the privacy of information and devices. The processes and device are generally used to maintain the privacy of information transmitted through communication and transmission systems. For example, the hiding processes may be used to protect the metadata of a phone call; in some embodiments, the phone call may be transmitted via voice over IP (internet protocol) with a mobile phone. These processes and devices also may be used to hide passive data stored on a computer or another physical device such as a tape drive. In some embodiments, symmetric cryptographic methods and machines are also used to supplement the hiding process.

In an embodiment, the information (data) is hidden by a sending agent, called Alice. Alice transmits the hidden data to a receiving agent, called Bob. The receiving agent, Bob, applies an extraction process or device. The output of this extraction process or device is the same information (data) that Alice gathered before hiding and sending it. Eve is the name of the agent who is attempting to obtain the information or data. One of Alice and Bob's primary objectives is to assure that Eve cannot capture the private information that was hidden and transmitted between them.

In another embodiment, Alice desires to hide data and securely store the hidden data somewhere and retrieve it and access the hidden data at a later time. The output of this extraction process or device is the same information (data) that Alice gathered before hiding and storing it.

3 BACKGROUNDâPRIOR ART

The subject matter discussed in this background section should not be assumed to be prior art merely as a result of its mention in the background section. Similarly, a problem mentioned in the background section or associated with the subject matter of the background section should not be assumed to have been previously recognized in the prior art. The subject matter in the Summary and some Advantages of Invention section represents different approaches, which in and of themselves may also be inventions, and various problems, which may have been first recognized by the inventor.

In information security, a fundamental problem is for a sender, Alice, to securely transmit a message M to a receiver, Bob, so that the adversary, Eve, receives no information about the message. In Shannon's seminal paper [1], his model assumes that Eve has complete access to a public, noiseless channel: Eve sees an identical copy of ciphertext C that Bob receives, where C(M, K) is a function of message M lying in message space

and secret key K lying in key space

In this specification, the symbol P will express a probability. The expression P(E) is the probability that event E occurs and it satisfies 0â¤P(E)â¤1. For example, suppose the sample space is the 6 faces of die and E is the event of rolling a 1 or 5 with that die and each of the 6 faces is equally likely. Then P(E)= 2/6=â. The conditional probability

P â¡

(

A | B

)

P â¡

(

A â B

)

P â¡

( B )

P(Aâ©B) is the probability that event A occurs and also event B occurs. The conditional probability P(A|B) expresses the probability that event A will occur, under the condition that someone knows event B already occurred. The expression that follows the symbol â|â represents the conditional event. Events A and B are independent if P(Aâ©B)=P(A)P(B).

Expressed in terms of conditional probabilities, Shannon [1] defined a cryptographic method to be perfectly secret if P(M)=P(M|Eve sees ciphertext C) for every cipher text C and for every message M in the message space

. In other words, Eve has no more information about what the message M is after Eve sees ciphertext C pass through the public channel. Shannon showed for a noiseless, public channel that the entropy of the keyspace

must be at least as large as the message space

in order to achieve perfect

secrecy.

Shannon's communication secrecy model [1] assumes that message sizes in the message space are finite and the same size. Shannon's model assumes that the transformations (encryption methods) on the message space are invertible and map a message of one size to the same size. Shannon's model assumes that the transformation applied to the message is based on the key. In the prior art, there is no use of random noise that is independent of the message or the key. In the prior art, there is no notion of being able to send a hidden or encrypted message inside the random noise where Eve is not necessarily revealed the size of the message. In the prior art, there is no notion of using random noise to hide the secret channel and transmitting a key inside this channel that is indistinguishable from the noise.

Quantum cryptography was introduced by Weisner and eventually published by Bennett, Brassard, et al. [2, 3]. Quantum cryptography based on the uncertainty principle of quantum physics: by measuring one component of the polarization of a photon, Eve irreversibly loses her ability to measure the orthogonal component of the polarization. Unfortunately, this type of cryptography requires an expensive physical infrastructure that is challenging to implement over long distances [4, 5]. Furthermore, Alice and Bob still need a shared, authentication secret to successfully perform this quantum cryptography in order to assure that Eve cannot corrupt messages about the polarization bases, communicated on Alice and Bob's public channel.

4 SUMMARY AND SOME ADVANTAGES OF THE INVENTION(S)

In some parts of the prior art, conventional wisdom believes that hiding data in the open cannot provide adequate information security. The invention(s), described herein, demonstrate that our process of hiding data inside noise is quite effective. A process for hiding data inside of random noise is demonstrated and described. In some embodiments, the data hidden is a key. In some embodiments, the data hidden is a public key. In some embodiments, the data hidden is encrypted data. In some embodiments, the data hidden is encrypted data that was first encrypted by a block cipher. In some embodiments, the data hidden is encrypted data that was first encrypted by a stream cipher. In some embodiments, the hidden data may be hidden metadata that is associated with the TCP/IP infrastructure [6] used to transmit information.

The invention(s) described herein are not bound to Shannon's limitations [1] because they use noise, rather than seek to eliminate noise. When the data generation and random noise have a uniform probability distribution, and the key size is fixed, the security of the key transmission can be made arbitrarily close to perfect secrecyâwhere arbitrarily close is defined in section 7.11âby increasing the noise size. The processes, devices and machines described herein are practical; they can be implemented with current TCP/IP infrastructure acting as a transmission medium and a random noise generator providing the random noise and key generation.

5 ADVANTAGES AND FAVORABLE PROPERTIES

Overall, our invention(s) that hide data and keys inside random noise exhibits the following favorable security properties.

The hiding process is O(n). For a fixed key size m bits and Ï=nâm bits of random noise, as Ïââ, the security of the hidden data can be made arbitrarily close to perfect secrecy. In some applications, the key size can also be kept secret and is not revealed to Eve. From the binomial distribution, the closeness to perfect secrecy can be efficiently computed. The scatter map a can reused when both the key generation and noise generation have a uniform probability distribution and a new random key and new noise are created for each transmission. The reuse property enables a practical process of hiding data that is first encrypted by a block or stream cipher. The complexity of finding this hidden encrypted data can be substantially greater than the computational complexity of the underlying block or stream cipher. See section 7.14. Our hiding process uses a noiseless, public channel, which means it can implemented with our current Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol internet infrastructure (TCP/IP). No expensive, physical infrastructure is needed to create noisy channels or transmit and maintain polarized photons, as is required by the prior art of quantum cryptography. Random noise generators are commercially feasible and inexpensive. A random noise generator that produces more than 10,000 random bits per second can be manufactured in high volume for less than three U.S. dollars per device. Alice and Bob possess their sources of randomness. This system design decentralizes the security to each user. Decentralization helps eliminate potential single points of failure, and backdoors in the transmission medium that may be outside the inspection and control of Alice and Bob. In an embodiment where Alice wishes to store her hidden data, the inventions described herein have an additional advantage over the prior art of cryptography. In the inventions described herein, Eve does not know the size of the hidden data. The noise size can be substantially larger than the data size so that hidden data could be a telephone number in one case and the whole sequence of DNA of human chromosome 4 in a second case of hiding. Typically in the prior art, an encryption preserve the file size or voice packet size.

6 DESCRIPTION of FIGURES

In the following figures, although they may depict various examples of the invention, the invention is not limited to the examples depicted in the figures.

FIG. 1A shows an embodiment of an information system for sending and receiving hidden information or data.

FIG. 1B shows an embodiment of a process for hiding information that can be used in the embodiment of FIG. 1A .

FIG. 1C shows an embodiment of an information system for sending and receiving hidden public keys.

FIG. 1D shows an embodiment of a process for hiding public keys that can be used in the embodiment of FIG. 1C .

FIG. 1E shows an embodiment of storing machine 180 that executes hiding process 184 to hide data 182 and store hidden data 186 in memory system 188 .

FIG. 2A shows an embodiment of a computer network transmitting hidden data or keys, hidden encrypted data or hidden metadata. In some embodiments, the transmission may be over the Internet or a part of a network that supports an infrastructure such as the electrical grid, a financial exchange, or a power plant, which can be used with the embodiment of FIG. 1A .

<div id="p-

1 RELATED APPLICATIONS

2 BACKGROUNDâFIELD OF INVENTION

3 BACKGROUNDâPRIOR ART

and secret key K lying in key space

P â¡

(

A | B

)

P â¡

(

A â B

)

P â¡

( B )

must be at least as large as the message space

in order to achieve perfect

secrecy.

4 SUMMARY AND SOME ADVANTAGES OF THE INVENTION(S)

5 ADVANTAGES AND FAVORABLE PROPERTIES

Overall, our invention(s) that hide data and keys inside random noise exhibits the following favorable security properties.

6 DESCRIPTION of FIGURES

In the following figures, although they may depict various examples of the invention, the invention is not limited to the examples depicted in the figures.

FIG. 1A shows an embodiment of an information system for sending and receiving hidden information or data.

FIG. 1B shows an embodiment of a process for hiding information that can be used in the embodiment of FIG. 1A .

FIG. 1C shows an embodiment of an information system for sending and receiving hidden public keys.

FIG. 1D shows an embodiment of a process for hiding public keys that can be used in the embodiment of FIG. 1C .

FIG. 1E shows an embodiment of storing machine 180 that executes hiding process 184 to hide data 182 and store hidden data 186 in memory system 188 .

FIG. 2B shows an embodiment for hiding information, which includes a processor, memory and input/output system, that may be sending and/or receiving machines of FIG. 1A .

FIG. 3A shows an embodiment of a USB drive that can act as a sending machine and receiving machine to store and protect a user's data.

FIG. 3B shows an embodiment of an authentication token, which may include the sending and/or receiving machines of FIG. 1A , that contains a computer processor that can hide data or hide keys.

FIG. 4 shows a mobile phone embodiment 400 that hides wireless voice metadata and extracts wireless voice data that was hidden, which may include the sending and/or receiving machines of FIG. 1A . The mobile phone 500 is an embodiment that sends wireless hidden metadata, hidden encrypted data, or hidden keys to an automobile, which may include the sending and/or receiving machines of FIG. 1A .

FIG. 5 shows key(s) hidden in random noise where the probability distribution of the key and the noise are uniform.

FIG. 6 shows a data hidden in random noise where the probability distribution of the data and the noise are uniform.

FIG. 7 shows a key hidden in random noise where the probability distribution of the key and the noise are not the same. The probability distribution of the key is somewhat biased.

FIG. 8 shows data hidden in random noise where the probability distribution of the data and the noise are not the same. The probability distribution of the data is more biased.

FIG. 9A shows an embodiment of a non-deterministic generator, based on quantum randomness. Non-deterministic generator 942 is based on the behavior of photons to help generate noise and in some embodiments one or more keys. Non-deterministic generator 942 contains a light emitting diode 946 that emits photons and a phototransistor 944 that absorbs photons.

FIG. 9B shows an embodiment of a non-deterministic generator, based on quantum randomness. Non-deterministic generator 952 is based on the behavior of photons to help generate noise and in some embodiments one or more keys. Non-deterministic generator 952 contains a light emitting diode 956 that emits photons and a photodiode 954 that absorbs photons.

FIG. 9C shows an embodiment of a deterministic generator 962 , implemented with a machine. Deterministic generator 962 may generate one or more keys 970 or noise 972 . Deterministic generator 962 has generator update instructions 966 , one- way hash instructions 964 and one- way hash instructions 968 .

FIG. 9D shows an embodiment of a hiding locator machine 980 with dynamic hiding locations 982 , one-way hash Î¦ instructions 988 , hiding locator instructions 986 , one-way hash Î¨ instructions 988 , and noise 990 .

FIG. 10 shows a light emitting diode, which emits photons and in some embodiments is part of the random number generator. The light emitting diode contains a cathode, a diode, an anode, one terminal pin connected to the cathode and one terminal pin connected to the anode, a p-layer of semiconductor, an active region, an n-layer of semiconductor, a substrate and a transparent plastic case.

FIG. 11 shows a scatter map that hides 128 bits of data inside of 128 bits of noise. In an embodiment, the data is a 128 bit public key.

FIG. 12 shows a data transformation that transforms 18 bits of data to a larger sequence of data.

FIG. 13 shows probabilities after Eve observes a hidden key or hidden data inside random noise. The hidden key or hidden noise is represented as

7 DETAILED DESCRIPTION

7.1 Information System

In this specification, the term âdataâ is broad and refers to any kind of information. In some embodiments, data may refer to plaintext information. In some embodiments, data may refer to voice information, transmitted with a landline phone or mobile phone. In some embodiments, data may refer to metadata. In some embodiments, data may refer to email or other information available on the Internet. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a sequence of values. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a sequence of bit values. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a sequence of numbers. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a sequence or collection of physical values or physical measurements. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a physical location (e.g., GPS coordinates of an auto or a mailing address in Venezia, Italia) or to the information in an abstract locationâfor example, a computer memory address or a virtual address. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information contained in Shakespeare's King Lear or Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor or Euclid's Elements. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in Kepler's astronomical measurements or a collection of geophysical measurements. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in to a sequence of times or collection of times. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in statistical data such as economic or insurance information. In some embodiments, data may refer to medical information (e.g., an incurable cancer diagnosis) or genetic information (e.g., that a person has the amino acid substitution causing sickle cell anemia). In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a photograph of friends or family or satellite photos. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a code or sequence of codes. In some embodiments, data may refer to the information in a sequence of language symbols for a language that has not yet been discovered or designed. In some embodiments, data may refer to financial informationâfor example, data may refer to a bid quote on a financial security, or an ask quote on a financial security. In some embodiments, data may refer to information about a machine or a collection of machinesâfor example, an electrical grid or a power plant. In some embodiments, data may refer to what electrical engineers sometimes call signal in information theory. In some embodiments, data may refer to a cryptographic key. In some embodiments, data may refer to a sequence or collection of computer program instructions (e.g., native machine instructions or source code information). In some embodiments, data may refer to a prime number or a mathematical formula or a mathematical invariant information. In some embodiments, data may refer to an internet protocol address or internet traffic information. In some embodiments, data may refer to a combination or amalgamation or synthesis of one or more of these types of aforementioned information.

In this specification, the term ânoiseâ is information that is distinct from data and has a different purpose. Noise is information that helps hide the data so that the noise hinders the adversary Eve from finding or obtaining the data. This hiding of the data helps maintain the privacy of the data. In some embodiments, hiding the data means rearranging or permuting the data inside the noise. An example of data is a key. Hiding a key inside noise helps protect the privacy of the key; the key may subsequently help execute a cryptographic algorithm by a first party (e.g., Alice) or a second party (e.g., Bob).

In this specification, the term âlocationâ may refer to geographic locations and/or storage locations. A particular storage location may be a collection of contiguous and/or noncontiguous locations on one or more machine readable media. Two different storage locations may refer to two different sets of locations on one or more machine-readable media in which the locations of one set may be intermingled with the locations of the other set.

In this specification, the term âmachine-readable mediumâ refers to any non-transitory medium capable of carrying or conveying information that is readable by a machine. One example of a machine-readable medium is a computer-readable medium. Another example of a machine-readable medium is paper having holes that are detected that trigger different mechanical, electrical, and/or logic responses. The term machine-readable medium also includes media that carry information while the information is in transit from one location to another, such as copper wire and/or optical fiber and/or the atmosphere and/or outer space.

In this specification, the term âprocessâ refers to a series of one or more operations. In an embodiment, âprocessâ may also include operations or effects that are best described as non-deterministic. In an embodiment, âprocessâ may include some operations that can be executed by a digital computer program and some physical effects that are non-deterministic, which cannot be executed by a digital computer program and cannot be performed by a finite sequence of processor instructions.

In this specification, the machine-implemented processes implement algorithms and non-deterministic processes on a machine. The formal notion of âalgorithmâ was introduced in Turing's work [7] and refers to a finite machine that executes a finite number of instructions with finite memory. In other words, an algorithm can be executed with a finite number of machine instructions on a processor. âAlgorithmâ is a deterministic process in the following sense: if the finite machine is completely known and the input to the machine is known, then the future behavior of the machine can be determined. However, there is quantum random number generator (QRNG) hardware [9, 10] and other embodiments that measure quantum effects from photons (or other physically non-deterministic processes), whose physical process is non-deterministic. The recognition of non-determinism produced by quantum randomness and other quantum embodiments is based on many years of experimental evidence and statistical testing. Furthermore, the quantum theoryâderived from the Kochen-Specker theorem and its extensions [8, 9]âpredicts that the outcome of a quantum measurement cannot be known in advance and cannot be generated by a Turing machine (digital computer program). As a consequence, a physically non-deterministic process cannot be generated by an algorithm: namely, a sequence of operations executed by a digital computer program. FIG. 9A shows an embodiment of a non-deterministic process arising from quantum events; that is, the emission and absorption of photons.

Some examples of physically non-deterministic processes are as follows. In some embodiments that utilize non-determinism, photons strike a semitransparent mirror and can take two or more paths in space. In one embodiment, if the photon is reflected by the semitransparent mirror, then it takes on one bit value bâ{0, 1}; if the photon passes through by the semitransparent mirror, then the non-deterministic process produces another bit value 1âb. In another embodiment, the spin of an electron may be sampled to generate the next non-deterministic bit. In still another embodiment, a protein, composed of amino acids, spanning a cell membrane or artificial membrane, that has two or more conformations can be used to detect non-determinism: the protein conformation sampled may be used to generate a non-deterministic value in {0, . . . nâ1} where the protein has n distinct conformations. In an alternative embodiment, one or more rhodopsin proteins could be used to detect the arrival times of photons and the differences of arrival times could generate non-deterministic bits. In some embodiments, a Geiger counter may be used to sample non-determinism.

In this specification, the term âphotodetectorâ refers to any type of device or physical object that detects or absorbs photons. A photodiode is an embodiment of a photodetector. A phototransistor is an embodiment of a photodetector. A rhodopsin protein is an embodiment of a photodetector.

In this specification, the term âkeyâ is a type of information and is a value or collection of values to which one or more operations are performed. In some embodiments, one or more of these operations are cryptographic operations. {0, 1} n is the set of all bit-strings of length n. When a key is represented with bits, mathematically a n-bit key is an element of the collection {0, 1} n which is the collection of strings of 0's and 1's of length n. For example, the string of 0's and 1's that starts after this colon is a 128-bit key: 01100001 11000110 01010011 01110001 11000101 10001110 11011001 11010101 01011001 01100100 10110010 10101010 01101101 10000111 10101011 00010111. In an embodiment, n=3000 so that a key is a string of 3000 bits.

In other embodiments, a key may be a sequence of values that are not represented as bits. Consider the set {A, B, C, D, E}. For example, the string that starts after this colon is a 40-symbol key selected from the set {A,B,C,D,E}: ACDEB AADBC EAEBB AAECB ADDCB BDCCE ACECB EACAE. In an embodiment, a key could be a string of length n selected from {A, B, C, D, E} n . In an embodiment, n=700 so that the key is a string of 700 symbols where each symbol is selected from {A, B, C, D, E}.

In some embodiments, a key is a collection of one or more values, that specifies how a particular encryption function will encrypt a message. For example, a key may be a sequence of 0's and 1's that are bitwise exclusive-or'ed with the bits that comprise a message to form the encrypted message.

In some embodiments, hidden data (key) 109 in FIG. 1A may be read as input by processor system 258 , that executes instructions which perform a cryptographic algorithm. In some embodiments, hidden data (key) 132 in FIG. 1B , may be read as input by processor system 258 , that executes instructions which perform a cryptographic algorithm. Symmetric cryptography typically is implemented with a block cipher or a stream cipher. In another embodiment, a key K may be a sequence of values that a stream cipher reads as input so that Alice can encrypt a message M as

(K, M) with this key and Bob can decrypt

(K, M) message. In the expression

(K, M), K represents the key, M represents the message and

represents the encryption method.

In another embodiment, a key may be a sequence of values that a block cipher reads as input in order to encrypt a message with the block cipher encryption algorithm

. In another embodiment, a key may be a sequence of values that a block cipher reads as input in order to decrypt an encrypted message with the block cipher's decryption algorithm

. If Eve does not know that key, then it is difficult for Eve to decrypt the encrypted message

(K, M). AES [13] is a common block cipher algorithm that reads 256-bit keys as input. Serpent [14] is also a block cipher algorithm that reads 256-bit keys as input.

In other embodiments, the key be a public key. In some embodiments, a key may refer to a public key for the RSA public-key algorithm [10]. In this case, a key is a huge prime number. In some embodiments, random generator 128 generates a key that is subsequently hidden by scatter map instructions 130 .

FIG. 1A shows an information system 100 for hiding information in a manner that is expected to be secure. In this specification, data will sometimes refer to information that has not yet been hidden or encrypted. Information system 100 includes data 104 (not hidden information), and hiding process 106 , a sending machine 102 , hidden data (hidden information) 109 and a transmission path 110 , a receiving machine 112 , extraction process 116 , extracted data 114 . In other embodiments, information system 100 may not have all of the components listed above or may have other components instead of and/or in addition to those listed above.

Information system 100 may be a system for transmitting hidden data. Data 104 refers to information that has a purpose and that has not been hidden yet. In some embodiments, data is intended to be delivered to another location, software unit, machine, person, or other entity.

In some embodiments, data 104 is voice metadata that has not yet been hidden. Voice metadata may contain the IP address of the sending (calling) phone and also the IP address of the receiving phone. Voice metadata may contain the time of the call and the date. Some embodiments of a mobile phone are shown in FIG. 4 . In other embodiments, data 104 is email metadata or text metadata or browser metadata.

In an embodiment, data may be unhidden information being transmitted wirelessly between satellites. Data may be represented in analog form in some embodiments and may be represented in digital form. In an embodiment, the sound waves transmitted from a speaker's mouth into a mobile phone microphone are data. The representation of this data information before reaching the microphone is in analog form. Subsequently, the data information may be digitally sampled so it is represented digitally after being received by the mobile phone microphone. In general, data herein refers to any kind of information that has not been hidden or encrypted and that has a purpose.

In information system 100 , noise helps hide the data. It may be desirable to keep the contents of data 104 private or secret. Consequently, it may be desirable to hide data 104 , so that the transmitted information is expected to be unintelligible to an unintended recipient should the unintended recipient attempt to read and/or extract the hidden data transmitted. Data 104 may be a collection of multiple, not yet hidden information blocks, an entire message of data, a segment of data (information), or any other portion of a data.

Hiding process 106 may be a series of steps that are performed on data 104 . In one embodiment, the term âprocessâ refers to one or more instructions for sending machine 102 to execute the series of operations that may be stored on a machine-readable medium. Alternatively, the process may be carried out by and therefore refer to hardware (e.g., logic circuits) or may be a combination of instructions stored on a machine-readable medium and hardware that cause the operations to be executed by sending machine 102 or receiving machine 112 . Data 104 may be input for hiding process 106 . The steps that are included in hiding process 106 may include one or more mathematical operations and/or one or more other operations.

As a post-processing step, one- way hash function 948 may be applied to a sequence of random events such as quantum events (non-deterministic) generated by non-deterministic generator 942 in FIG. 9A . As a post-processing step, one- way hash function 948 may be applied to a sequence of random events such as quantum events (non-deterministic) generated by non-deterministic generator 952 in FIG. 9B .

In FIG. 1B

hiding process 122 may implement hiding process 106 in FIG. 1A . In some embodiments, cipher instructions 129 may first encrypt the data 124 and subsequently scatter map instructions 130 hide the encrypted data to produce hidden encrypted data 132 before sending machine 102 transmits the hidden data via transmission path 110 . In some embodiments, data transformation instructions 126 may transform data 124 before scatter map process instructions 130 are applied to this transformed data. In some embodiments, scatter map process instructions 130 are at least part of the hiding process. In some embodiments, data 124 is transformed by data transformation instructions 126 and encrypted by cipher instructions 129 before scatter map process instructions 130 are applied to this transformed and encrypted data.

In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 1B , random generator 128 is used to help generate the scatter map that helps perform scatter map process instructions 130 . In some embodiments, random generator 128 generates noise that is used by scatter map process instructions 130 to hide data 124 that has previously been transformed by data transformation instructions 126 and/or encrypted by cipher instructions 129 . In some embodiments, random generator 128 generates one or more keys as input to cipher instructions 129 that are applied to <figure-callout id="124" label="data" filenames="US11171934-20211109-D00000.png,US11171934-20211109-D00002.png" s

CLAIMS

Claims ( 23 )

The invention claimed is:

1. An information system comprising:

generating noise from a non-deterministic generator;

encrypting data with a machine;

the machine having a processor system and a memory system, the processor system including one or more processors;

hiding the encrypted data inside the noise;

wherein a probability distribution of the encrypted data is Ïµ-close to a probability distribution of the noise;

wherein Ïµ is greater than zero;

a first party transmitting the encrypted data that was hidden inside the noise to a second party;

the second party computes a map to find the hiding locations of the parts of the encrypted data;

the second party extracting the encrypted data from the noise based on the map.

2. The system of claim 1 further comprising: wherein Ïµ<1/5.

3. The system of claim 1 further comprising:

generating the noise based at least on a behavior of photons.

4. The system of claim 1 further comprising:

during a second instance of hiding the encrypted data the map has changed, resulting in a change of the locations of the encrypted data and noise.

5. The system of claim 3 further comprising: emitting the photons from a light emitting diode.

6. The system of claim 1 wherein a block cipher encrypts the data.

7. The system of claim 1 wherein a stream cipher encrypts the data.

8. An information system comprising:

generating noise from a non-deterministic generator;

encrypting data with a machine;

the machine having a processor system and a memory system, the processor system including one or more processors;

hiding the encrypted data inside the noise;

wherein a probability distribution of the encrypted data is Îµ-close to a probability distribution of the noise;

wherein Ïµ is greater than zero;

a first party computes a map to find the hiding locations of the parts of the encrypted data;

the first party storing the encrypted data in the noise based on the hiding locations;

the first party decrypting the first party's encryption from the encrypted data.

9. The system of claim 8 wherein a stream cipher encrypts the data.

10. The system of claim 8 wherein a block cipher encrypts the data.

11. The system of claim 8 further comprising: wherein Ïµ<1/5.

12. The system of claim 8 wherein the first party storing the encrypted data in the noise based on the hiding locations is comprised of the following:

a first party selecting a hiding location for each part of the encrypted data; the first party storing each part of the encrypted data in the hiding location that was selected; the first party storing the noise in the remaining locations that are unoccupied by parts of the encrypted data.

13. The system of claim 8 further comprising:

during a second instance of hiding the encrypted data the locations of the encrypted data and the locations of noise have changed.

14. The system of claim 8 further comprising:

during a second instance of hiding the encrypted data the map has changed,

resulting in a change of the locations of the encrypted data and noise.

15. The system of claim 8 further comprising:

generating the noise is at least based on a behavior of photons.

16. The system of claim 15 further comprising: emitting said photons from a light emitting diode.

17. The system of claim 15 further comprising:

generating the noise based at least on arrival times of emitted photons.

18. A machine-implemented method comprising:

generating noise from a non-deterministic generator;

encrypting data with a machine;

the machine having a processor system and a memory system, the processor system including one or more processors;

hiding the encrypted data inside the noise;

wherein a probability distribution of the encrypted data is Îµ-close to a probability distribution of the noise;

wherein Ïµ is greater than zero;

a first party transmitting the encrypted data that was hidden inside the noise to a second party;

the second party computes a map to find the hiding locations of the parts of the encrypted data;

the second party extracting the encrypted data from the noise based on the map.

19. The method of claim 18 , wherein a stream cipher encrypts the data.

20. The method of claim 18 , wherein a block cipher encrypts the data.

21. The method of claim 18 further comprising: during a second instance of hiding the encrypted data the locations of the encrypted data and the locations of noise have changed.

22. The method of claim 18 further comprising: during a second instance of hiding the encrypted data the map has changed, resulting in a change of the locations of the encrypted data and noise.

23. The method of claim 18 further comprising: generating the noise is at least based on a behavior of photons.

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