Google Patentsopen access

A system and method for satellite quantum key distribution — Arqit Limited (US20220393865A1)

ABSTRACT

Abstract

A method of scheduling and managing key data in a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations. The method comprises: using a satellite of the constellation of satellites to deliver key data to a user ground station using a quantum communication link; at the user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; using the satellite to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; at each other user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; based upon the reports, determining an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instructing the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data

Description

The present application relates to a method of controlling key distribution in a satellite quantum key distribution system, and a system and software for carrying out the method.

BACKGROUND

Cryptography is used to protect billions of transactions every day from, without limitation, for example Transport Layer Security (TLS) security for online shopping and banking to ultra-secure government communications. These transactions rely on reliable and secure means for at least two or more transacting parties to share a secret key, enabling encryption of data by one party and subsequent decryption by the other party(ies). When commercially usable universal quantum computers become available, a variety of these types of transactions, tasks and applications including, without limitation, for example digital banking, web certification, Know Your own Client (KYC), digital asset transfer, and authentication will be vulnerable. These transactions, tasks and applications are currently provided using software systems that typically use conventional cryptography and/or encryption techniques and protocols that are not sufficiently resilient enough to withstand an attack from such quantum computers (QCs).

QCs can potentially crack many classical cryptography codes almost effortlessly. There has also been a ground swell in interest in quantum computing within the last year as a result of the success of D-Wave in selling commercial systems. Furthermore, a number of breakthroughs by technology companies such as, without limitation, for example Microsoft®, Intel®, Google® and others in QC techniques promise to make a universal QC viable in the near future (e.g. five to ten years time). QCs have already become a threat to current cryptography and/or encryption techniques.

For example, current methods to exchange cryptographic keys between two parties will be vulnerable to QC attack. If the cryptographic primitives involved in the key-exchange protocol can be broken, the exchanged key is compromised and the encrypted data is revealed to the attacker. Classical key-exchange protocols are based on the hardness of discrete logarithm problem (e.g. Diffie-Hellman (DH)) or the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (e.g. Elliptic-Curve DH (ECDH)). Neither of these problems is guaranteed to be hard and both problems can be broken by a QC in polynomial time. This is of particular concern to both large and small organisations, corporations and also to individual users of public and private networks (e.g. Internet or corporate Intranets). If one is unable to reliably perform key exchange, then all current transactions, tasks and applications are vulnerable to attack by a QC.

The field of “Quantum Cryptography” aims to address these risks by developing both quantum secure cryptographic algorithms (so-called quantum-safe algorithms) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques. Whilst the combination of both provides the ultimate solution, QKD as a stand-alone technique still has much to offer and is not in itself reliant on the development of quantum-safe algorithms to become widely adopted. However, even reliably performing QKD at scale for a wide range of users from small to large corporations and/or individuals is still a costly and time consuming exercise.

There is a desire for a robust, secure and cost effective approach for carrying out QKD, and one approach which has been proposed is to carry out QKD between one or more satellites and users on the ground. However, it is difficult to ensure correct delivery of cryptographic keys from satellites to the different ground users in such a system.

The embodiments described below are not limited to implementations which solve any or all of the disadvantages of the known approaches described above.

SUMMARY

This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used to determine the scope of the claimed subject matter; variants and alternative features which facilitate the working of the invention and/or serve to achieve a substantially similar technical effect should be considered as falling into the scope of the invention disclosed herein.

In a first aspect, the present disclosure provides a method of scheduling and managing key data in a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the method comprising: using a satellite of the constellation of satellites to deliver key data to a user ground station using a quantum communication link; at the user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; using the satellite to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; at each other user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; based upon the reports, determining an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instructing the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a second aspect, the present disclosure provides method of scheduling managing key data in a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the method comprising: delivering key data stored at a user ground station from the user ground station to a satellite of the constellation of satellites using a quantum communication link; at the user ground station, reporting the amount of delivered key data; at the satellite, storing the delivered key data; the satellite using the copy of the key data stored on the satellite to deliver the key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; at each other user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; based upon the reports, determining an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instructing the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a third aspect, the present disclosure provides a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the system comprising: a satellite of the constellation of satellites arranged to deliver key data to a user ground station using a quantum communication link; a user ground station arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; wherein the satellite is further arranged to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; and each at least one other user ground station is arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; and the system further comprising means arranged to, based upon the reports, determine an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instruct the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a fourth aspect, the present disclosure provides a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the system comprising: a satellite of the constellation of satellites arranged to deliver key data stored at a user ground station using a quantum communication link; a user ground station arranged to report the amount of delivered key data; wherein the satellite is further arranged to store the delivered key data and to use the copy of the key data stored on the satellite to deliver the key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; each at least one other user ground station arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; the system further comprising means arranged to, based upon the reports, determine an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instruct the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a fifth aspect, the present disclosure provides an apparatus comprising a processor unit, a memory unit and a communication interface, the processor unit connected to the memory unit and the communication unit, wherein the apparatus is configured to implement the computer-implemented method according to any of the first and second aspects.

In a sixth aspect, the present disclosure provides a computer-readable medium comprising code or computer instructions stored thereon, which when executed by a processor unit, causes the processor unit to perform the computer-implemented method according to any one of the first and second aspects.

The methods described herein may be performed by software in machine readable form on a tangible storage medium e.g. in the form of a computer program comprising computer program code means adapted to perform all the steps of any of the methods described herein when the program is run on a computer and where the computer program may be embodied on a computer readable medium. Examples of tangible (or non-transitory) storage media include disks, thumb drives, memory cards etc. and do not include propagated signals. The software can be suitable for execution on a parallel processor or a serial processor such that the method steps may be carried out in any suitable order, or simultaneously.

This application acknowledges that firmware and software can be valuable, separately tradable commodities. It is intended to encompass software, which runs on or controls “dumb” or standard hardware, to carry out the desired functions. It is also intended to encompass software which “describes” or defines the configuration of hardware, such as HDL (hardware description language) software, as is used for designing silicon chips, or for configuring universal programmable chips, to carry out desired functions.

The preferred features may be combined as appropriate, as would be apparent to a skilled person, and may be combined with any of the aspects of the invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Embodiments of the invention will be described, by way of example, with reference to the following drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a satellite quantum key distribution system according to a first embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the system architecture of the satellite quantum key distribution system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a first quantum key distribution methodology which can be used by the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of a sequence of actions taken in the first quantum key distribution methodology of FIG. 3 ;

FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key lifecycle useable on the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram illustrating key management in the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a key management system useable in the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a method of operation of the key management system of FIG. 7 ;

FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram illustrating operation of the key management system of FIG. 7 ;

FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of an example of a method of operation of the key management system of FIG. 7 ;

FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram of the issue of formatted encryption keys to users by the system of FIG. 1 ; and

FIG. 12 is a schematic diagram illustrating a second quantum key distribution methodology which can be used by the system of FIG. 1 .

Common reference numerals are used throughout the figures to indicate similar features.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments of the present invention are described below by way of example only. These examples represent the best mode of putting the invention into practice that are currently known to the Applicant although they are not the only ways in which this could be achieved. The description sets forth the functions of the example and the sequence of steps for constructing and operating the example. However, the same or equivalent functions and sequences may be accomplished by different examples.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an overview of an example of a satellite quantum key distribution system 100 according

The present application relates to a method of controlling key distribution in a satellite quantum key distribution system, and a system and software for carrying out the method.

BACKGROUND

Cryptography is used to protect billions of transactions every day from, without limitation, for example Transport Layer Security (TLS) security for online shopping and banking to ultra-secure government communications. These transactions rely on reliable and secure means for at least two or more transacting parties to share a secret key, enabling encryption of data by one party and subsequent decryption by the other party(ies). When commercially usable universal quantum computers become available, a variety of these types of transactions, tasks and applications including, without limitation, for example digital banking, web certification, Know Your own Client (KYC), digital asset transfer, and authentication will be vulnerable. These transactions, tasks and applications are currently provided using software systems that typically use conventional cryptography and/or encryption techniques and protocols that are not sufficiently resilient enough to withstand an attack from such quantum computers (QCs).

QCs can potentially crack many classical cryptography codes almost effortlessly. There has also been a ground swell in interest in quantum computing within the last year as a result of the success of D-Wave in selling commercial systems. Furthermore, a number of breakthroughs by technology companies such as, without limitation, for example Microsoft®, Intel®, Google® and others in QC techniques promise to make a universal QC viable in the near future (e.g. five to ten years time). QCs have already become a threat to current cryptography and/or encryption techniques.

For example, current methods to exchange cryptographic keys between two parties will be vulnerable to QC attack. If the cryptographic primitives involved in the key-exchange protocol can be broken, the exchanged key is compromised and the encrypted data is revealed to the attacker. Classical key-exchange protocols are based on the hardness of discrete logarithm problem (e.g. Diffie-Hellman (DH)) or the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (e.g. Elliptic-Curve DH (ECDH)). Neither of these problems is guaranteed to be hard and both problems can be broken by a QC in polynomial time. This is of particular concern to both large and small organisations, corporations and also to individual users of public and private networks (e.g. Internet or corporate Intranets). If one is unable to reliably perform key exchange, then all current transactions, tasks and applications are vulnerable to attack by a QC.

The field of “Quantum Cryptography” aims to address these risks by developing both quantum secure cryptographic algorithms (so-called quantum-safe algorithms) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques. Whilst the combination of both provides the ultimate solution, QKD as a stand-alone technique still has much to offer and is not in itself reliant on the development of quantum-safe algorithms to become widely adopted. However, even reliably performing QKD at scale for a wide range of users from small to large corporations and/or individuals is still a costly and time consuming exercise.

There is a desire for a robust, secure and cost effective approach for carrying out QKD, and one approach which has been proposed is to carry out QKD between one or more satellites and users on the ground. However, it is difficult to ensure correct delivery of cryptographic keys from satellites to the different ground users in such a system.

The embodiments described below are not limited to implementations which solve any or all of the disadvantages of the known approaches described above.

SUMMARY

This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used to determine the scope of the claimed subject matter; variants and alternative features which facilitate the working of the invention and/or serve to achieve a substantially similar technical effect should be considered as falling into the scope of the invention disclosed herein.

In a first aspect, the present disclosure provides a method of scheduling and managing key data in a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the method comprising: using a satellite of the constellation of satellites to deliver key data to a user ground station using a quantum communication link; at the user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; using the satellite to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; at each other user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; based upon the reports, determining an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instructing the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a second aspect, the present disclosure provides method of scheduling managing key data in a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the method comprising: delivering key data stored at a user ground station from the user ground station to a satellite of the constellation of satellites using a quantum communication link; at the user ground station, reporting the amount of delivered key data; at the satellite, storing the delivered key data; the satellite using the copy of the key data stored on the satellite to deliver the key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; at each other user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; based upon the reports, determining an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instructing the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a third aspect, the present disclosure provides a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the system comprising: a satellite of the constellation of satellites arranged to deliver key data to a user ground station using a quantum communication link; a user ground station arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; wherein the satellite is further arranged to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; and each at least one other user ground station is arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; and the system further comprising means arranged to, based upon the reports, determine an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instruct the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a fourth aspect, the present disclosure provides a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the system comprising: a satellite of the constellation of satellites arranged to deliver key data stored at a user ground station using a quantum communication link; a user ground station arranged to report the amount of delivered key data; wherein the satellite is further arranged to store the delivered key data and to use the copy of the key data stored on the satellite to deliver the key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; each at least one other user ground station arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; the system further comprising means arranged to, based upon the reports, determine an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instruct the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

In a fifth aspect, the present disclosure provides an apparatus comprising a processor unit, a memory unit and a communication interface, the processor unit connected to the memory unit and the communication unit, wherein the apparatus is configured to implement the computer-implemented method according to any of the first and second aspects.

In a sixth aspect, the present disclosure provides a computer-readable medium comprising code or computer instructions stored thereon, which when executed by a processor unit, causes the processor unit to perform the computer-implemented method according to any one of the first and second aspects.

The methods described herein may be performed by software in machine readable form on a tangible storage medium e.g. in the form of a computer program comprising computer program code means adapted to perform all the steps of any of the methods described herein when the program is run on a computer and where the computer program may be embodied on a computer readable medium. Examples of tangible (or non-transitory) storage media include disks, thumb drives, memory cards etc. and do not include propagated signals. The software can be suitable for execution on a parallel processor or a serial processor such that the method steps may be carried out in any suitable order, or simultaneously.

This application acknowledges that firmware and software can be valuable, separately tradable commodities. It is intended to encompass software, which runs on or controls “dumb” or standard hardware, to carry out the desired functions. It is also intended to encompass software which “describes” or defines the configuration of hardware, such as HDL (hardware description language) software, as is used for designing silicon chips, or for configuring universal programmable chips, to carry out desired functions.

The preferred features may be combined as appropriate, as would be apparent to a skilled person, and may be combined with any of the aspects of the invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Embodiments of the invention will be described, by way of example, with reference to the following drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a satellite quantum key distribution system according to a first embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the system architecture of the satellite quantum key distribution system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a first quantum key distribution methodology which can be used by the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of a sequence of actions taken in the first quantum key distribution methodology of FIG. 3 ;

FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key lifecycle useable on the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram illustrating key management in the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a key management system useable in the system of FIG. 1 ;

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a method of operation of the key management system of FIG. 7 ;

FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram illustrating operation of the key management system of FIG. 7 ;

FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of an example of a method of operation of the key management system of FIG. 7 ;

FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram of the issue of formatted encryption keys to users by the system of FIG. 1 ; and

FIG. 12 is a schematic diagram illustrating a second quantum key distribution methodology which can be used by the system of FIG. 1 .

Common reference numerals are used throughout the figures to indicate similar features.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments of the present invention are described below by way of example only. These examples represent the best mode of putting the invention into practice that are currently known to the Applicant although they are not the only ways in which this could be achieved. The description sets forth the functions of the example and the sequence of steps for constructing and operating the example. However, the same or equivalent functions and sequences may be accomplished by different examples.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an overview of an example of a satellite quantum key distribution system 100 according to a first embodiment of the invention, while FIG. 2 shows a more detailed system architecture of the satellite quantum key distribution system 100 . The satellite quantum key distribution system 100 comprises a constellation of satellites 1 in earth orbit, a number of user ground stations 2 , at least one ground control station 3 , and a key management system 4 . Communications between the at least one ground control station 3 and the constellation of satellites 1 may be provided by a satellite communications center 6 . In the illustrated example the satellites 1 are in low earth orbit (LEO) inclined polar orbits. However, in other examples constellation may comprise satellites 1 in other orbits, for example geostationary orbit (GEO), or mid earth orbit (MEO). The constellation of satellites 1 may comprise one satellite 1 , or may comprise multiple, i.e., two or more, satellites 1 . In operation of the satellite quantum key distribution system 100 the satellites 1 use quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques to distribute encryption key data to the user ground stations 2 . Each user ground station 2 then stores the encryption key data it has received in a key buffer 7 associated with the user ground station 2 for subsequent supply to users 8 for use in cryptographic services by the users 8 associated with the user ground station 2 . In some examples, a user ground station 2 may be associated with, and provide encryption key to, only a single user 8 . In other examples, a user ground station 2 may be associated with, and provide encryption key to, a plurality of users 8 . Different ones of the user ground stations 2 of the system 100 may be associated with different numbers of users 8 .

In order to support operation of the system 100 each satellite 1 may comprise a computer responsible for storing, securing and manipulating encryption key data and associated data. The computer may support security partitions within the satellite.

The key buffers 7 are data stores. Preferably, the key buffers 7 of the user ground stations 2 are data stores incorporated in hardware security modules (HSM). The HSM will ensure that any unauthorised attempts to extract keys are blocked or detected. The HSM provides tamper-detection sensors, such as wire cages surrounding encapsulated memory modules, detection of over- or under-voltages and temperatures, etc, The HSM will also provide restricted and authenticated communications interfaces to the cryptographic systems of end users 8 associated with the user ground stations 2 .

The encryption key data provided to the user ground stations 2 by the constellation of satellites 1 are used to produce encryption keys to support cryptographic services between different users 8 associated with the user ground stations 2 , such as encryption key based services. One example of such an encryption key based cryptographic service is encrypted communications, where the encryption keys may be used to encrypt transmissions over a conventional communication channel (e.g. a phone line, an internet connection, a radio frequency transmission, a fibre optic network, a private or proprietary secure network, such as a network using the Arqit secure communications methodology, etc.) between different users in order to maintain confidentiality of the communications. Other examples of encryption key based cryptographic services include other security related services such as confidentiality, data integrity, data/message origin authentication, entity identification, and non-repudiation. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. Other encryption key based services may be supported in some examples.

It will be understood that in order for cryptographic services between different users to be supported, the user ground stations 2 associated with the users participating in the cryptographic services must be provided with the same, common, encryption keys by the constellation of satellites 1 , so that the user ground stations 2 can in turn provide the users participating in the cryptographic services with the same, common, encryption keys. Depending upon the details of the cryptographic services being supported this may require any number of users associated with different user ground stations 2 to be provided with the same common encryption keys, for example, two users, or three users, or more, and potentially a large number of users. The key management system 4 manages the supply of encryption key data from the constellation of satellites 1 to the different user ground stations 2 in order to ensure that the required encryption keys can be made available by the different ground user stations 2 to the users 8 associated with them.

In the illustrated embodiment the key management system 4 is located at one of the at least one ground control stations 3 . This is not essential. However, the key management system 4 will need to be able to communicate securely with the at least one ground control stations 3 , as will be explained below.

In the illustrated embodiment the at least one ground control station 3 comprises two ground control stations 3 a and 3 b . In other examples there may be a different number of ground control stations 3 .

The, or each, satellite 1 has at least one optical transmitter and each user ground station 2 has at least one optical transceiver 9 , which optical transmitters and transceivers 9 enable quantum optical communications links 30 to be established from the satellites 1 to the user ground stations 2 . The, or each, satellite 1 also comprises at least one optical transceiver and each user ground station 2 has at least one optical transceiver 9 , which enable classical (that is, non-quantum) optical communications links 31 to be established from between the user ground stations 2 and the satellites 1 .

An overview of the operation of the satellite quantum key distribution system 100 is that the key management system 4 determines what encryption key data is required to be delivered to which user ground stations 2 by each of the satellites 1 . The ground control station 3 generates schedules for encryption key delivery communication sessions between the satellites 1 and the user ground stations 2 based at least in part on this determination, and a respective schedule is transmitted to each of the satellites 1 , and to selected user ground stations 2 , by the ground control station 3 and stored on-board the satellites 1 for subsequent execution. The satellites 1 then proceed to carry out encryption key delivery sessions with the user ground stations 2 to distribute the encryption key data as they travel in their orbits, according to the respective schedules transmitted to the satellites 1 and user ground stations 2 . The user ground stations 2 then use the encryption key data they have received to provide the encryption keys to their associated users, as required.

From the above summary it can be understood that key management across the entire satellite quantum key distribution system 100 is complex. The system 100 , and in particular the key management system 4 , needs to ensure that all user ground stations 2 associated with users requiring a common shared encryption key obtain exactly the same key data in a coordinated manner. All of the user ground stations 2 associated with users 8 requiring a common shared key for use in an encryption based service must obtain information as to when a shared common key is synchronised across all of the user ground stations 2 associated with the users 8 that require the shared common key before releasing the shared common key to the users 8 for use. This requirement can be understood as setting two objectives which must be achieved, that users requiring shared encryption keys must be provided with identical key data, and that users sharing keys must all be in possession of the key data at the time they wish to use the key.

Achieving these objectives is made more difficult by the characteristics of satellite key distribution, where for example, key distribution from a satellite 1 to a particular user ground station 2 may be impossible at some times, or may be disrupted part way through a key delivery session, for example due to cloud cover.

As is clear from the above, encryption key management in a satellite quantum key distribution environment is much more complex than in the classical encryption key environment, where two users mutually agree the content of an encryption key and the timing at which it is to be used between them using a common key exchange protocol such as Diffe Hellman.

An example of a first QKD methodology which may be used in operation of the satellite quantum key distribution system 100 is shown in FIGS. 3 to 4 . In the illustrated example of FIGS. 3 to 4 , the satellite 1 is arranged to carry out quantum key distribution of common encryption keys to users associated with a group of ground user stations 2 comprising a plurality of user ground stations 2 a to 2 n . FIG. 3 shows a schematic diagram of the interactions between a satellite 1 and a plurality of user ground stations 2 a to 2 n , FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of the activities and messaging carried out within the system 100 , and FIG. 5 shows an explanatory diagram of example of an encryption key lifecycle 500 which may be used in the system 100 .

In the example of the first QKD methodology shown in FIGS. 3 to 5 , in a first encryption key delivery communication session 200 between the satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 a at a time T 1 , a first string of random numbers is generated on the satellite 1 and used to encode data onto a stream of photons emitted by a single photon source on the satellite 1 that is directed in a beam to the first user ground station 2 a to form a quantum optical communications link 10 from the satellite 1 to the first user ground station 2 a . The stream of photons sent by the satellite 1 through the quantum optical communications link 10 is transmitted quantum key data 501 . This is a series of quantum states of photons which may be used as a basis for the generation of encryption key bits, as explained below.

When the first encryption key delivery communication session 200 between the satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 a has been completed the data received by the first user ground station 2 a is raw key data 502 . This is based on the quantum key data 501 sent by the satellite 1 , but may contain errors from the transmission and reception by the satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 a , introduced both through noise in the quantum channel and through differences in the transmission and reception measurement bases, such as differences between transmitted and measured polarity.

The satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 a then perform key sifting 201 of the transmitted quantum key data and the received raw key data by processing and exchanging information using a classical communication channel between the satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 a to publish the transmission and measurement bases utilised by the satellite 1 and ground station 2 a , agree on a subset of bits of raw key data where the generating basis matches the measurement basis, and thereby sift out and delete bits of the raw key data where the transmitted polarisation differs from the measurement polarisation, to produce sifted key data 503 extracted from the photon stream.

The satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 a then perform error detection, error correction and privacy amplification 202 on the sifted key data by processing and exchanging information using a classical communication channel between the satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 a to correct errors introduced by the transmission process or by a potential eavesdropper and at the same time reduce an eavesdroppers knowledge of the key to an arbitrarily small amount at the cost of reducing the length of the key. The process results in the derivation of first secure key data 504 , and then assigns a first one or more unique key handles to the first secure key data. A unique key handle is a name or identifier which can be used to uniquely reference a specific block of secure key data. Accordingly, the one or more key handles assigned to the first secure key data are associated with, and can be used to uniquely reference, the first secure key data. To maintain security, once the first secure key data has been derived the quantum key data, raw key data and sifted key data are deleted by the satellite 1 and the first user ground station 2 . The number of key handles assigned to the first secure key data will depend upon the relative sizes of the blocks of secure key data to which the handles are assigned and the amount of the first key data which is delivered. The block of secure key data referenced by a key handle may have an arbitrary length.

The one or more unique key handles are assigned to a block of secure key data by the satellite 1 and communicated to the user ground station 2 using the classical communication channel between the satellite 1 and the user ground station 2 . In alternative examples, the one or more unique key handles may be assigned by the user ground station 2 .

The first ground user station 2 a then stores 203 the received first secure key data together with the associated key handles and any associated metadata, in a key buffer 7 of the first user ground station 2 a , and sends a report 204 of this, including the amount, i.e., the number of bits, of the first secure key data associated with each key handle to the key management system 4 . The first secure key data, together with the associated key handles and any associated metadata, is also stored 205 in a key data store of the <figure-callout id="1" label="satellite" filenames="US20220393865A1-20221208-D00000.png,US20220393865A1-

CLAIMS

Claims ( 21 )

1 - 86 . (canceled)

87 . A method of scheduling and managing key data in a satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the method comprising:

using a satellite of the constellation of satellites to deliver key data to a user ground station using a quantum communication link; at the user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; using the satellite to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; at each other user ground station, storing the delivered key data and reporting the amount of delivered key data; based upon the reports, determining an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instructing the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

88 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein the determining an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station is carried out at a key management system.

89 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein, when the satellite of the constellation of satellites delivers key data to the user ground station the satellite stores a copy of the key data on the satellite.

90 . The method as claimed in claim 89 , wherein the satellite uses the copy of the key data stored on the satellite to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station.

91 . The method as claimed in claim 89 , wherein, when the satellite has delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station, the satellite deletes the commonly stored key data from the copy of the key data on the satellite.

92 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein the key data delivered to a user ground station comprises blocks of data, each block being assigned a unique identifier, and the reporting the amount of delivered key data comprises reporting the unique identifier of each received block together with metadata associated with the unique identifier which identifies the total size of the block.

93 . The method as claimed in claim 92 , wherein the metadata associated with the unique identifier also identifies the status of the block.

94 . The method as claimed in claim 92 , wherein each block is assigned the unique identifier by the user ground station; or

wherein each block is assigned the unique identifier by the satellite.

95 . The method as claimed in claim 92 , wherein reporting the amount of delivered key data at each other user ground station comprises reporting the unique identifier of each at least partially received block together with metadata associated with the unique identifier which identifies the total size of the block and the current amount of the block stored at that other user ground station.

96 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein each of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station respond to the instruction to release the commonly stored delivered key data by formatting the commonly stored data into formatted keys and releasing the formatted keys.

97 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein the key data is delivered to the user ground station and one other user ground station by a methodology comprising:

forming quantum optical communication links from the satellite to the user ground stations and the other user ground station to send respective photons of entangled pairs to each of the user ground station and the other user ground station; detecting the quantum information of the respective photons at each of the user ground station and the other user ground station; and conducting an encryption key agreement process between user ground station and the other user ground station using the detected quantum information to determine key data.

98 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein the key data is delivered to the user ground station and to the at least one other user ground station by a methodology comprising:

generating a first string of random numbers on the satellite; using the first string of random numbers to form a first quantum optical communication link from the satellite to the user ground station; conducting an encryption key agreement process between the satellite and the user ground station using the first string of random numbers to determine the key data; storing the key data on the satellite; and subsequently: generating a second string of random numbers on the satellite; using the second string of random numbers to form a second quantum optical communication link from the satellite to one of the at least one other user ground stations; conducting an encryption key agreement process between the satellite and the one of the at least one other user ground stations using the second string of random numbers to determine second key data; sending one-time-pad “OTP” data of an OTP operation of the key data and the second key data from the satellite to the one of the at least one other user ground stations; using the second key data and the OTP data to derive the key data at the one of the at least one other user ground stations.

99 . The method as claimed in claim 98 , wherein the methodology further comprises subsequently:

generating a further string of random numbers on the satellite; using the further string of random numbers to form a further quantum optical communication link from the satellite to a further one of the at least one other user ground stations; conducting an encryption key agreement process between the satellite and the further one of the at least one other user ground stations using the further string of random numbers to determine further key data; sending OTP data of an OTP operation of the key data and the further key data from the satellite to the further one of the at least one other user ground stations; using the further key data and the OTP data to derive the key data at the further one of the at least one other user ground stations.

100 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein satellites of the constellation are able to use multiple methodologies to deliver key data.

101 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , wherein the constellation of satellites comprises one satellite or multiple satellites.

102 . The method as claimed in claim 87 , and further comprising, after using the satellite to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link, harvesting a portion of the delivered key data for utilization in internal security functions associated with the delivery.

103 . The method as claimed in claim 102 , wherein the harvesting a portion of the delivered key data comprises the satellite and the at least one other user ground station retaining a portion of the key data, such retained key data not being available for release by the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station.

104 . The method as claimed in claim 103 , wherein the retained key data is used to provide authentication and encryption for current and future quantum key delivery.

105 . A satellite quantum key distribution system comprising a constellation of one or more satellites and a plurality of user ground stations, the system comprising:

a satellite of the constellation of satellites arranged to deliver key data to a user ground station using a quantum communication link; a user ground station arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; wherein the satellite is further arranged to deliver key data to at least one other user ground station requiring common encryption keys with the user ground station using a respective quantum communication link; and each at least one other user ground station is arranged to store the delivered key data and report the amount of delivered key data; and the system further comprising means arranged to, based upon the reports, determine an amount of the delivered key data which is commonly stored at all of the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station; and instruct the user ground station and the at least one other user ground station to release the commonly stored delivered key data.

106 . A computer-readable medium comprising code or computer instructions stored thereon, which when executed by a processor unit, causes the processor unit to perform the computer-implemented method according to claim 87 .

US17/775,201

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A system and method for satellite quantum key distribution

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