Google Patentsopen access

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing … — Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (US11824967B2)

ABSTRACT

Abstract

An electronic device includes a memory storing data from an external source, an application processing unit (APU) transmitting a secret key and public key generation command, an isolated execution environment (IEE) generating a secret key in response to the secret key generation command, generating a public key based on the secret key in response to the public key generation command, and storing the secret key, and a non-volatile memory performing write and read operations depending on a request of the APU. When the data are stored in the memory, the APU transmits a public key request to the IEE and in response the IEE transfers the public key to the APU through a mailbox protocol. The APU generates a ciphertext by performing homomorphic encryption on the data based on an encryption key in the public key, and classifies and stores the public key and the ciphertext in the non-volatile memory.

Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 to Korean Patent Application No. 10-2020-0083213 filed on Jul. 7, 2020, in the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Embodiments of the inventive concept described herein relate to an encryption system, and more particularly, relate to an electronic device processing data by using homomorphic encryption and an encrypted data processing method thereof.

As information communication technologies develop, the era of hyper-connectivity in which a lot of data are constantly collected and all devices are connected by the activation of the Internet of Things has arrived. As the traffic of data is increased by the development of communication technologies, there is the increasing need for the development of security technologies. An encryption system is used to exchange communication information as secret information and is directed to provide a user with a network or storage safe in security. To this end, the development of an encryption system is being actively made, and nowadays, there is the increasing concern about a homomorphic encryption technology being a fourth-generation encryption system.

The first-generation encryption system uses a password-based authentication technology. The first-generation encryption system generates a cryptogram by simply changing characters to different characters or changing the order of characters. A second-generation encryption system uses symmetric key encryption. A symmetric key encryption system in which an encryption key and a decryption key are identical performs encryption and decryption by using one encryption key. The symmetric key encryption scheme is advantageous in that a computing speed is relatively fast. However, because a key itself is not encrypted, the symmetric key encryption scheme has the following issues: difficulty in key management and considerable weakness in security. A third-generation encryption system uses asymmetric key encryption. An asymmetric key encryption system in which an encryption key and a decryption key are two different keys. The asymmetric key encryption scheme in which a private key is not opened is advantageous in that a security level is high. However, the asymmetric key encryption scheme is disadvantageous in that a high capacity is required and a processing speed is relatively slow. Also, even in the case of the third-generation encryption system providing a high security level, decryption is performed at least once for the purpose of interpreting data. For this reason, it is impossible to essentially prevent data from being leaked out.

SUMMARY

Embodiments of the inventive concept provide an electronic device processing data internally by using homomorphic encryption and an encrypted data processing method thereof.

According to an exemplary embodiment, an electronic device includes a memory that stores data received from an external source, an application processing unit (APU) that transmits a secret key generation command and a public key generation command, an isolated execution environment (IEE) that generates a secret key in response to the secret key generation command, generates a public key based on the secret key in response to the public key generation command, and stores the secret key, and a non-volatile memory that performs a write operation and a read operation depending on a request of the APU. When the data are stored in the memory, the APU transmits a public key request to the IEE. The IEE transfers the public key to the APU through a mailbox protocol in response to the public key request. The APU generates a ciphertext by performing homomorphic encryption on the data based on an encryption key included in the public key, and the APU classifies and stores the public key and the ciphertext in the non-volatile memory.

According to an exemplary embodiment, an encrypted data processing method includes receiving first data from an external source, loading a public key generated at an isolated execution environment (IEE) through a mailbox protocol, homomorphic encrypting the first data based on an encryption key included in the public key to generate first encrypted data, storing the public key and the first encrypted data in a non-volatile memory, receiving second data from the external source, loading the public key stored in the non-volatile memory, homomorphic encrypting the second data based on the encryption key included in the public key to generate second encrypted data, and performing computation on the first encrypted data and the second encrypted data based on a multiplication key included in the public key.

According to an exemplary embodiment, an electronic device with a malicious code determination function includes a modem that receives information of a malicious code from an external source, an application processing unit (APU) that extracts feature information of the malicious code from the information of the malicious code and transmits a secret key generation command and a public key generation command, an isolated execution environment (IEE) that generates a secret key in response to the secret key generation command, generates a public key based on the secret key in response to the public key generation command, and stores the secret key, and a non-volatile memory that performs a write operation and a read operation depending on a request of the APU. When the feature information of the malicious code is extracted, the APU transmits a public key request to the IEE. The IEE transfers the public key to the APU through a mailbox protocol in response to the public key request. The APU generates first encrypted data by performing homomorphic encryption on the feature information of the malicious code based on an encryption key included in the public key, and the APU stores the first encrypted data in the non-volatile memory.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The above and other objects and features of the inventive concept will become apparent by describing in detail exemplary embodiments thereof with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device using homomorphic encryption according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating how an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept generates an encryption key.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of an IEE illustrated in FIG. 1 .

FIG. 4 is a diagram indicating regions of a non-volatile memory for classifying and storing encrypted data generated at an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a way to classify encrypted data generated according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a data encryption method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating an encrypted data processing method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device providing a biometric authentication function using an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating an operating method of an electronic device providing a biometric authentication function disclosed in FIG. 8 .

FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device providing a malicious code determination function using an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a method of building a malicious code database at an electronic device with a malicious code determination function disclosed in FIG. 10 .

FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a method of detecting a malicious code at an electronic device with a malicious code determination function disclosed in FIG. 10 .

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Below, embodiments of the inventive concept may be described in detail and clearly to such an extent that an ordinary one in the art easily implements the inventive concept.

The terms used in the specification are provided to describe the embodiments, not to limit the inventive concept. As used in the specification, the singular terms “a,” “an” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. The terms “comprises” and/or “comprising,” when used in the specification, specify the presence of steps, operations, elements, and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof.

Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used in the specification should have the same meaning as commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which the inventive concept pertains. The terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unless expressly so defined herein. The same reference numerals represent the same elements throughout the specification.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device 100 using homomorphic encryption (HE) according to an embodiment of the inventive concept. The electronic device 100 disclosed in FIG. 1 may encrypt specific data by using homomorphic encryption and may process the encrypted data.

Referring to FIG. 1 , according to an embodiment of the inventive concept, the electronic device 100 using the homomorphic encryption may include an application processing unit (APU) 110 , an isolated execution environment (IEE) 140 , a non-volatile memory 150 , a memory 160 , and a data input device 170 . The APU 110 may include a core 120 and a homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 . The core 120 and homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may be individual processing units of the APU 110 , each of which reads and executes program instructions.

The APU 110 may comprise a general-purpose processor and may drive an operating system or an application program. Also, the APU 110 may control a plurality of hardware components connected with the APU 110 , may execute various software components, and may perform processing and computing on various kinds of data including multimedia data. In some embodiments, the APU 110 may be implemented with a system-on-chip (SoC).

The core 120 may control the homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 for the purpose of encrypting data input to the electronic device 100 and processing the encrypted data. The homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may be designed to more efficiently perform computationally intensive cryptographic operations. Also, the core 120 may control the non-volatile memory 150 for the purpose of storing the encrypted data and utilizing the stored data.

The homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may accelerate a speed at which the data input to the electronic device 100 are processed and interpreted. A homomorphic encryption technology is advantageous in that data are stored, transmitted, and used at a high level of security. However, because the size of a key for encryption is relatively large, the homomorphic encryption technology is disadvantageous in that a processing speed is slower, as much as hundreds to thousands times, when compared to a speed at which plain data are interpreted. Accordingly, the homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may accelerate a speed at which homomorphic encryption of data is performed and the encrypted data is processed, thus making it possible to implement homomorphic encryption more efficiently.

The IEE 140 means a hardware isolated zone for the purpose of performing homomorphic encryption on the input data. The <figure-callout id="140" label="IEE" filenames="US11824967-20231121-D00000.png,US11824967-20231121-D00001.png" state="{{stat

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 to Korean Patent Application No. 10-2020-0083213 filed on Jul. 7, 2020, in the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Embodiments of the inventive concept described herein relate to an encryption system, and more particularly, relate to an electronic device processing data by using homomorphic encryption and an encrypted data processing method thereof.

As information communication technologies develop, the era of hyper-connectivity in which a lot of data are constantly collected and all devices are connected by the activation of the Internet of Things has arrived. As the traffic of data is increased by the development of communication technologies, there is the increasing need for the development of security technologies. An encryption system is used to exchange communication information as secret information and is directed to provide a user with a network or storage safe in security. To this end, the development of an encryption system is being actively made, and nowadays, there is the increasing concern about a homomorphic encryption technology being a fourth-generation encryption system.

The first-generation encryption system uses a password-based authentication technology. The first-generation encryption system generates a cryptogram by simply changing characters to different characters or changing the order of characters. A second-generation encryption system uses symmetric key encryption. A symmetric key encryption system in which an encryption key and a decryption key are identical performs encryption and decryption by using one encryption key. The symmetric key encryption scheme is advantageous in that a computing speed is relatively fast. However, because a key itself is not encrypted, the symmetric key encryption scheme has the following issues: difficulty in key management and considerable weakness in security. A third-generation encryption system uses asymmetric key encryption. An asymmetric key encryption system in which an encryption key and a decryption key are two different keys. The asymmetric key encryption scheme in which a private key is not opened is advantageous in that a security level is high. However, the asymmetric key encryption scheme is disadvantageous in that a high capacity is required and a processing speed is relatively slow. Also, even in the case of the third-generation encryption system providing a high security level, decryption is performed at least once for the purpose of interpreting data. For this reason, it is impossible to essentially prevent data from being leaked out.

SUMMARY

Embodiments of the inventive concept provide an electronic device processing data internally by using homomorphic encryption and an encrypted data processing method thereof.

According to an exemplary embodiment, an electronic device includes a memory that stores data received from an external source, an application processing unit (APU) that transmits a secret key generation command and a public key generation command, an isolated execution environment (IEE) that generates a secret key in response to the secret key generation command, generates a public key based on the secret key in response to the public key generation command, and stores the secret key, and a non-volatile memory that performs a write operation and a read operation depending on a request of the APU. When the data are stored in the memory, the APU transmits a public key request to the IEE. The IEE transfers the public key to the APU through a mailbox protocol in response to the public key request. The APU generates a ciphertext by performing homomorphic encryption on the data based on an encryption key included in the public key, and the APU classifies and stores the public key and the ciphertext in the non-volatile memory.

According to an exemplary embodiment, an encrypted data processing method includes receiving first data from an external source, loading a public key generated at an isolated execution environment (IEE) through a mailbox protocol, homomorphic encrypting the first data based on an encryption key included in the public key to generate first encrypted data, storing the public key and the first encrypted data in a non-volatile memory, receiving second data from the external source, loading the public key stored in the non-volatile memory, homomorphic encrypting the second data based on the encryption key included in the public key to generate second encrypted data, and performing computation on the first encrypted data and the second encrypted data based on a multiplication key included in the public key.

According to an exemplary embodiment, an electronic device with a malicious code determination function includes a modem that receives information of a malicious code from an external source, an application processing unit (APU) that extracts feature information of the malicious code from the information of the malicious code and transmits a secret key generation command and a public key generation command, an isolated execution environment (IEE) that generates a secret key in response to the secret key generation command, generates a public key based on the secret key in response to the public key generation command, and stores the secret key, and a non-volatile memory that performs a write operation and a read operation depending on a request of the APU. When the feature information of the malicious code is extracted, the APU transmits a public key request to the IEE. The IEE transfers the public key to the APU through a mailbox protocol in response to the public key request. The APU generates first encrypted data by performing homomorphic encryption on the feature information of the malicious code based on an encryption key included in the public key, and the APU stores the first encrypted data in the non-volatile memory.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The above and other objects and features of the inventive concept will become apparent by describing in detail exemplary embodiments thereof with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device using homomorphic encryption according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating how an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept generates an encryption key.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of an IEE illustrated in FIG. 1 .

FIG. 4 is a diagram indicating regions of a non-volatile memory for classifying and storing encrypted data generated at an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a way to classify encrypted data generated according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a data encryption method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating an encrypted data processing method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device providing a biometric authentication function using an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating an operating method of an electronic device providing a biometric authentication function disclosed in FIG. 8 .

FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device providing a malicious code determination function using an electronic device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a method of building a malicious code database at an electronic device with a malicious code determination function disclosed in FIG. 10 .

FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a method of detecting a malicious code at an electronic device with a malicious code determination function disclosed in FIG. 10 .

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Below, embodiments of the inventive concept may be described in detail and clearly to such an extent that an ordinary one in the art easily implements the inventive concept.

The terms used in the specification are provided to describe the embodiments, not to limit the inventive concept. As used in the specification, the singular terms “a,” “an” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. The terms “comprises” and/or “comprising,” when used in the specification, specify the presence of steps, operations, elements, and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof.

Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used in the specification should have the same meaning as commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which the inventive concept pertains. The terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unless expressly so defined herein. The same reference numerals represent the same elements throughout the specification.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device 100 using homomorphic encryption (HE) according to an embodiment of the inventive concept. The electronic device 100 disclosed in FIG. 1 may encrypt specific data by using homomorphic encryption and may process the encrypted data.

Referring to FIG. 1 , according to an embodiment of the inventive concept, the electronic device 100 using the homomorphic encryption may include an application processing unit (APU) 110 , an isolated execution environment (IEE) 140 , a non-volatile memory 150 , a memory 160 , and a data input device 170 . The APU 110 may include a core 120 and a homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 . The core 120 and homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may be individual processing units of the APU 110 , each of which reads and executes program instructions.

The APU 110 may comprise a general-purpose processor and may drive an operating system or an application program. Also, the APU 110 may control a plurality of hardware components connected with the APU 110 , may execute various software components, and may perform processing and computing on various kinds of data including multimedia data. In some embodiments, the APU 110 may be implemented with a system-on-chip (SoC).

The core 120 may control the homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 for the purpose of encrypting data input to the electronic device 100 and processing the encrypted data. The homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may be designed to more efficiently perform computationally intensive cryptographic operations. Also, the core 120 may control the non-volatile memory 150 for the purpose of storing the encrypted data and utilizing the stored data.

The homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may accelerate a speed at which the data input to the electronic device 100 are processed and interpreted. A homomorphic encryption technology is advantageous in that data are stored, transmitted, and used at a high level of security. However, because the size of a key for encryption is relatively large, the homomorphic encryption technology is disadvantageous in that a processing speed is slower, as much as hundreds to thousands times, when compared to a speed at which plain data are interpreted. Accordingly, the homomorphic encryption accelerator 130 may accelerate a speed at which homomorphic encryption of data is performed and the encrypted data is processed, thus making it possible to implement homomorphic encryption more efficiently.

The IEE 140 means a hardware isolated zone for the purpose of performing homomorphic encryption on the input data. The IEE 140 may be an independent component from the other components of the electronic device 100 . For example, the IEE 140 and may include a separate processor and a separate memory such that is comprised of hardware that is independent from the hardware of the other hardware of the other components of the electronic device 100 (i.e., “hardware independent”). The IEE 140 may generate a secret key and a public key necessary for homomorphic encryption of data. The secret key generated by the IEE 140 may be stored within the IEE 140 . The public key may be generated based on the secret key, and the generated public key may be transferred to the outside of the IEE 140 for the purpose of homomorphic encryption of data and computation of the homomorphic encrypted data.

The non-volatile memory 150 may store data that are used by the electronic device 100 . The non-volatile memory 150 may include at least one of a NAND flash memory, a programmable read only memory (PROM), an erasable and programmable ROM (EPROM), an electrically erasable and programmable ROM (EEPROM), a one-time programmable ROM (OTPROM), and a mask ROM. An example is illustrated in FIG. 1 as the non-volatile memory 150 is embedded in the electronic device 100 , but the non-volatile memory 150 may be implemented in the form of an external memory.

The memory 160 may store data received from the outside. The memory 160 may be a working memory of the electronic device 100 . The memory 160 may include at least one of a dynamic random access memory (DRAM), a synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), a static RAM (SRAM), a phase-change RAM (PRAM), a magnetic RAM (MRAM), a ferroelectric RAM (FRAM), a resistive RAM (RRAM), and a flash memory.

The data input device 170 may receive data from the outside. The data input device 170 may include a keyboard, a keypad, a touch panel, a mouse, a microphone, a sensor, a camera, and the like. An example is illustrated in FIG. 1 as the electronic device 100 includes the data input device 170 . However, in another embodiment, the electronic device 100 may further include a data output device that outputs data processed within the electronic device 100 .

In FIG. 1 , the data input device 170 may receive data requiring a high level of security. The core 120 may provide the IEE 140 with a command for generating keys necessary for homomorphic encryption of data. The keys necessary for homomorphic encryption may include a secret key and a public key, and a secret key generation command and a public key generation command may be transmitted to the IEE 140 simultaneously or sequentially. In the case where the secret key generation command and the public key generation command are sequentially transmitted to the IEE 140 , the secret key generation command may be transmitted prior to the public key generation command.

The IEE 140 that receives the command for generating a secret key may generate a secret key for homomorphic encryption. When the secret key is generated, the IEE 140 may block access from the core 120 to the IEE 140 for the purpose of preventing the secret key from being leaked out. Alternatively, after the IEE 140 transfers the public key to the core 120 depending on a procedure to be described below, the IEE 140 may block access from the core 120 to the IEE 140 . After the IEE 140 blocks the access from the core 120 , a separate authentication procedure in which the IEE 140 releases the blocking of the access from the core 120 may exist. The secret key may be stored in the hardware independent IEE 140 for the purpose of preventing the secret key from being leaked out to the outside.

The IEE 140 may generate the public key based on the secret key. The public key may be stored in a normal region of the electronic device 100 for the purpose of performing homomorphic encryption on input data. For example, the public key may be stored in the non-volatile memory 150 included in the electronic device 100 . In an embodiment, the public key may include an encryption key, a multiplication key, a rotation key, and a conjugate key. The encryption key may be used for encryption of input data. The multiplication key may be used for computation of a ciphertext. The rotation key and the conjugate key may be used for boot-strapping to remove noise occurring in the process of encryption. The boot-strapping means a rebooting process for removing noise that is increased in amount as a homomorphic encryption operation is performed several times. How the IEE 140 generates a key will be more fully described with reference to FIG. 2 .

The core 120 may request the public key generated by the IEE 140 . The IEE 140 may transfer the public key to the outside in compliance with a mailbox protocol. Alternatively, in compliance with the mailbox protocol, the core 120 may request the IEE 140 to load the public key. When the public key request is received from a mailbox, the IEE 140 may transfer the public key to the outside through the mailbox. The public key transferred to the outside may be stored in the non-volatile memory 150 . The public key may be classified depending on a size, an access frequency, a kind, and the like and may be stored in the non-volatile memory 150 . A way to classify and store a public key will be more fully described with reference to FIGS. 4 and 5 .

Data input to the electronic device 100 may be homomorphic encrypted by using an encryption key being a kind of public key. Based on the degree of demand on a security level, the electronic device 100 may select a portion of the input data and may homomorphic encrypt the selected portion. That is, the portion of the input data may be encrypted by using homomorphic encryption, and another portion may be encrypted by using symmetric key encryption or asymmetric key encryption, and the other portion being data not requiring security may not go through an encryption process. The homomorphic encrypted data, the data encrypted by using an existing encryption scheme, and the data not encrypted may be classified depending on sizes, access frequencies, kinds, and the like and may be stored in the non-volatile memory 150 . A way to classify and store the data will be more fully described with reference to FIGS. 4 and 5 .

The electronic device 100 according to the inventive concept may generate a secret key and a public key at the IEE 140 being a hardware isolated zone and may store the secret key in the IEE 140 , thus reducing a risk of data leakage through a network and providing a high level of security. Also, the electronic device 100 may classify a public key, a ciphertext, and any other data depending on sizes, access frequencies, kinds, and the like and may store the classified result in the non-volatile memory 150 , thus preventing data processing from being delayed and improving performance of processing encrypted data.

Also, the electronic device 100 according to the inventive concept may perform homomorphic encryption complying with a learning with errors (LWE)-based encryption technique. In particular, the electronic device 100 may implement computation more efficiently through homomorphic encryption complying with a ring learning with errors (RLWE)-based encryption technique. In the specification, the electronic device 100 according to the inventive concept will be described as examples in which the electronic device 100 changes a complex plaintext to polynomial computation depending on the RLWE-based encryption technique and performs computation, but this is only an example. A kind of an encryption technique to be applied to the inventive concept is not limited.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating how the electronic device 100 (refer to FIG. 1 ) according to an embodiment of the inventive concept generates an encryption key. The electronic device 100 according to an embodiment of the inventive concept may internally generate a key to be used in a homomorphic encryption system for the purpose of performing homomorphic encryption and processing encrypted data internally.

The core 120 (refer to FIG. 1 ) of the electronic device 100 may transmit the secret key generation command to the IEE 140 (refer to FIG. 1 ) (S 11 ). When IEE 140 receives the secret key generation command from the core 120 , the IEE 140 may generate a secret key s(x) based on a polynomial element sampled from a Gaussian distribution χ σ . The secret key s(x) means a polynomial of degree n in which coefficients consist of “−1”, “0”, “1”. When the secret key s(x) is generated, the IEE 140 may transmit a secret key generation response to the core 120 . The secret key s(x) thus generated may be stored in an independent region of the IEE 140 .

Also, the core 120 may transmit the public key generation command to the IEE 140 (S 13 ). When the IEE 140 receives the public key generation command from the core 120 , the IEE 140 may generate a public key based on the secret key s(x) by using a homomorphic encryption algorithm. The public key may be composed of (a(x), b(x)) being in the form of a polynomial ordered pair in the RLWE-based encryption technique. A first random polynomial a(x) may be determined based on a uniform distribution, and a second random polynomial b(x) may be determined by Equation 1 below.

b ( x )=− a ( x ) s ( x )+ e ( x )  [Equation 1]

In Equation 1, a(x) means a first random polynomial determined based on the uniform distribution, and s(x) means a secret key generated at the IEE 140 . e(x) may be determined based on an error extracted from a discrete Gaussian distribution. The first random polynomial a(x), the second random polynomial b(x), and e(x) may be polynomials of degree N in which a coefficient is a q-bit, and a key generation process may be expressed by Equation 2 below.

Key Generation( N,q )→(Secret Key:= s ( x ),Public Key:=( a ( x ), b ( x )))  [Equation 2]

When the public key is generated, the IEE 140 may transmit a public key generation response to the core 120 (S 14 ). When a public key transmission command is received from the core 120 (S 15 ), the IEE 140 may transmit the public key to the outside of the IEE 140 through the mailbox protocol (S 16 ). Alternatively, without a separate command from the core 120 , the IEE 140 may transmit the public key to the outside of the IEE 140 (e.g., the core 120 ) through the mailbox protocol based on the public key generation response.

An example is illustrated in FIG. 2 as the core 120 , included in the APU 110 , transmits the secret key generation command and the public key generation command to the IEE 140 independently or sequentially, but the core 120 may transmit the secret key generation command and the public key generation command to the IEE 140 at the same time. In the case where the secret key generation command and the public key generation command are transmitted at the same time, the IEE 140 may generate a secret key and may then generate a public key based on the secret key.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of the IEE 140 illustrated in FIG. 1 . Referring to FIG. 3 , the IEE 140 may include a homomorphic encryption key generator 141 , secret key storage 142 , a decoder 143 , and a memory 144 . The homomorphic encryption key generator 141 may generate a secret key and a public key, which are necessary for homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing, in response to a request of the core 120 (refer to FIG. 1 ). The secret key and the public key may be generated depending on a series of processes described with reference to FIG. 2 . The public key may include an encryption key for encrypting a plaintext to a ciphertext, a multiplication key for performing computation on the ciphertext, a rotation key and a conjugate key for boot-strapping, and the like.

The secret key storage 142 may store the secret key generated by the homomorphic encryption key generator 141 . Because the homomorphic encryption is computed in a state where encrypted data are not decrypted, the homomorphic encryption does not require an access to the secret key for the purpose of processing the encrypted data. However, the homomorphic encryption uses the secret key only in the case where decryption is required to check a result value. Accordingly, the electronic device 100 (refer to FIG. 1 ) according to an embodiment of the inventive concept may prevent an access from the outside and the leakage of the secret key to the outside by storing the secret key in the secret key storage 142 of the IEE 140 , which is physically isolated from the other components of the electronic device.

The decoder 143 may decode a result value of a homomorphic encryption form, obtained by processing the encrypted data at the electronic device 100 according to the inventive concept, to data of a plaintext form. The decoder 143 may decode the result value of the homomorphic encryption form based on the secret key stored in the secret key storage 142 . The result value of the homomorphic encryption form may be input to the decoder 143 through the mailbox protocol, and a result value obtained after the decoder 143 decodes the input may be transferred to the outside of the IEE 140 through the mailbox protocol.

The memory 144 may be a working memory of the IEE 140 . The homomorphic encryption key generator 141 may generate a secret key and a public key by using the memory 144 . The decoder 143 may perform decryption by using the memory 144 and may store a result of the decryption in the memory 144 .

The IEE 140 may further include additional components configured to process the decryption result. The IEE 140 may further include an interface for providing a result of processing the decryption result. Alternatively, the IEE 140 may further include an interface for providing the decryption result or the processing result to the core 120 .

According to an embodiment of the inventive concept, because the electronic device 100 utilizes the RLWE-based encryption technique, the electronic device 100 may perform polynomial multiplication, polynomial addition, modulo reduction, and the like on a ring R q . For an arithmetic operation of a ring, the homomorphic encryption key generator 141 may include an NTT/INTT (Number Theoretic Transform/Inverse Number Theoretic Transform) computing unit 141 a , a Mult/Modulo (Multiplication/Modulo) computing unit 141 b , and a Gaussian random number generator 141 c.

The NTT/ INTT computing unit 141 a may provide an NTT/INTT-based algorithm for performing polynomial multiplication in RLWE-based homomorphic encryption computation. Because the polynomial multiplication of the ring requires an arithmetic process in which a long processing time is necessary, the polynomial multiplication of the ring may be efficiently performed through the NTT/INTT-based algorithm. Two polynomials above the ring may mean a(x) and b(x) obtained through Equation 2 above and may be expressed by Equation 3 below.

a ( x )= a 0 +a 1 x+a 2 x 2 + . . . +a n-1 x n-1 ,b ( x )= b 0 +b 1 x+b 2 x 2 + . . . +b n-1 x n-1   [Equation 3]

For multiplication of the polynomials a(x) and b(x), NTT computation and INTT computation for a(x) and b(x) may be individually performed. The NTT computation and the INTT computation are respectively expressed by Equation 4 and Equation 5 below.

A

j

=

∑

j

=

0

n

-

1

a

j

⁢

w

n

ij

⁢

mod

⁢

q

,

for

⁢

i

=

0

,

1

,

…

,

n

-

1

[

Equation

⁢

4

]

a

j

=

n

-

1

⁢

∑

j

=

0

n

-

1

A

j

CLAIMS

Claims ( 20 )

What is claimed is:

1. An electronic device comprising:

a memory configured to store data received from an external source;

an application processing unit (APU) configured to transmit a secret key generation command and a public key generation command;

an isolated execution environment (IEE) configured to generate a secret key in response to the secret key generation command, to generate a public key based on the secret key in response to the public key generation command, and to store the secret key; and

a non-volatile memory configured to perform a write operation and a read operation depending on a request of the APU,

wherein, when the data are stored in the memory, the APU transmits a public key request to the IEE,

wherein the IEE transfers the public key to the APU through a mailbox protocol in response to the public key request,

wherein the APU generates a ciphertext by performing homomorphic encryption on the data based on an encryption key included in the public key, and

wherein the APU classifies and stores the public key and the ciphertext in the non-volatile memory.

2. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the APU includes:

a homomorphic encryption accelerator configured to accelerate the homomorphic encryption.

3. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the IEE includes:

a homomorphic encryption key generator configured to generate the secret key and the public key;

a secret key storage configured to store the secret key; and

a decoder configured to decode a computation result associated with the ciphertext based on the secret key.

4. The electronic device of claim 3 , wherein the homomorphic encryption key generator includes:

an NTT/INTT computing unit configured to perform a number theoretic transform (NTT) and an inverse number theoretic transform (INTT);

a Mult/Modulo computing unit configured to perform a multiplication operation and a modulo operation; and

a Gaussian random number generator configured to generate a random number for generating the secret key and the public key.

5. The electronic device of claim 3 , wherein, when the secret key and the public key are generated, the IEE blocks an access from the APU to the IEE.

6. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the public key includes a rotation key for performing boot-strapping.

7. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein

the non-volatile memory includes a non-encrypted data region, an encrypted data region, and a homomorphic encryption data region, and

wherein the public key and the ciphertext generated based on the homomorphic encryption are stored in the homomorphic encryption data region.

8. The electronic device of claim 7 , wherein the homomorphic encryption data region includes a single level cell (SLC), a multi-level cell (MLC), a triple level cell (TLC), and a quad level cell (QLC), and

wherein the APU classifies the ciphertext based on a size, an access frequency, or a required speed of the ciphertext and stores the ciphertext in one of the SLC, the MLC, the TLC, and the QLC.

9. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the APU performs the homomorphic encryption by using a ring learning with errors (RLWE) encryption technique.

10. An encrypted data processing method comprising:

receiving first data from an external source;

loading a public key generated at an isolated execution environment (IEE) through a mailbox protocol;

homomorphic encrypting the first data based on an encryption key included in the public key to generate first encrypted data;

storing the public key and the first encrypted data in a non-volatile memory;

receiving second data from the external source;

loading the public key stored in the non-volatile memory;

homomorphic encrypting the second data based on the encryption key included in the public key to generate second encrypted data; and

performing computation on the first encrypted data and the second encrypted data based on a multiplication key included in the public key.

11. The encrypted data processing method of claim 10 , further comprising:

transmitting, from an application processing unit (APU), a command for generating a secret key and a public key to the IEE when the first data are received.

12. The encrypted data processing method of claim 11 , further comprising:

when the command is received by the IEE, generating, at the IEE, the secret key and generating the public key based on the secret key.

13. The encrypted data processing method of claim 12 , further comprising:

transferring the public key to a location external of the IEE through the mailbox protocol; and

storing the secret key in a secret key storage included in the IEE.

14. The encrypted data processing method of claim 10 , wherein the performing of the computation includes:

performing a boot-strapping process based on a rotation key included in the public key.

15. The encrypted data processing method of claim 11 , wherein the non-volatile memory includes a non-encrypted data region, an encrypted data region, and a homomorphic encryption data region, and

wherein the first encrypted data generated based on the public key and the homomorphic encrypting are stored in the homomorphic encryption data region.

16. The encrypted data processing method of claim 15 , wherein the homomorphic encryption data region includes a single level cell (SLC), a multi-level cell (MLC), a triple level cell (TLC), and a quad level cell (QLC), and

wherein the APU classifies the second encrypted data based on a size, an access frequency, or a required speed of the second encrypted data and stores the second encrypted data in one of the SLC, the MLC, the TLC, and the QLC.

17. The encrypted data processing method of claim 10 , wherein the homomorphic encrypting uses a ring learning with errors (RLWE) encryption technique.

18. An electronic device with a malicious code determination function, comprising:

a modem configured to receive information of a malicious code from an external source;

an application processing unit (APU) configured to extract feature information of the malicious code from the information of the malicious code and to transmit a secret key generation command and a public key generation command;

an isolated execution environment (IEE) configured to generate a secret key in response to the secret key generation command, to generate a public key based on the secret key in response to the public key generation command, and to store the secret key; and

a non-volatile memory configured to perform a write operation and a read operation depending on a request of the APU,

wherein, when the feature information of the malicious code is extracted, the APU transmits a public key request to the IEE,

wherein the IEE transfers the public key to the APU through a mailbox protocol in response to the public key request,

wherein the APU generates first encrypted data by performing homomorphic encryption on the feature information of the malicious code based on an encryption key included in the public key, and

wherein the APU stores the first encrypted data in the non-volatile memory.

19. The electronic device of claim 18 , wherein the APU includes:

a homomorphic encryption accelerator configured to accelerate the homomorphic encryption,

wherein the IEE includes:

a homomorphic encryption key generator configured to generate the secret key and the public key;

a secret key storage configured to store the secret key; and

a decoder configured to decode a computation result associated with the first encrypted data based on the secret key.

20. The electronic device of claim 18 , wherein the APU is configured to:

when a candidate access pattern of the malicious code is detected, generate second encrypted data by encrypting the candidate access pattern based on the encryption key;

read the first encrypted data from the non-volatile memory; and

preform a computation on the second encrypted data and the first encrypted data.

US17/347,055

2020-07-07

2021-06-14

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing method thereof

Active

2042-05-12

US11824967B2

( en )

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number

Priority Date

Filing Date

Title

EP21181760.6A

EP3937419B1

( en )

2020-07-07

2021-06-25

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing method thereof

US18/379,384

US12170719B2

( en )

2020-07-07

2023-10-12

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing method thereof

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number

Priority Date

Filing Date

Title

KR10-2020-0083213

2020-07-07

KR1020200083213A

KR20220005705A

( en )

2020-07-07

2020-07-07

The electronic device for using homomorphic encryption and the method for processing encrypted data thereof

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number

Title

Priority Date

Filing Date

US18/379,384

Continuation

US12170719B2

( en )

2020-07-07

2023-10-12

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing method thereof

Publications (2)

Publication Number

Publication Date

US20220014351A1

US20220014351A1 ( en )

2022-01-13

US11824967B2

true

US11824967B2 ( en )

2023-11-21

Family

ID=79173236

Family Applications (1)

Application Number

Title

Priority Date

Filing Date

US17/347,055

Active

2042-05-12

US11824967B2

( en )

2020-07-07

2021-06-14

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing method thereof

Country Status (3)

Country

Link

US

( 1 )

US11824967B2

( en )

KR

( 1 )

KR20220005705A

( en )

CN

( 1 )

CN113972978B

( en )

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party

Publication number

Priority date

Publication date

Assignee

Title

US12423422B2

( en )

*

2023-04-07

2025-09-23

Fortinet, Inc.

Tetra systems and methods for clustering files based upon structure

Families Citing this family (24)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party

Publication number

Priority date

Publication date

Assignee

Title

KR102799441B1

( en )

*

2020-03-18

2025-04-29

한국전자통신연구원

System and method for controlling transaction data access

US11588617B2

( en )

*

2020-11-01

2023-02-21

The Toronto-Dominion Bank

Validating confidential data using homomorphic computations

WO2022213048A1

( en )

*

2021-03-27

2022-10-06

Geneial Llc

Hardware-accelerated homomorphic encryption in marketplace platforms

FR3122004B1

( en )

*

2021-04-15

2024-03-29

Idemia Identity &amp; Security France

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROCESSING PERSONAL DATA

US11907402B1

( en )

*

2021-04-28

2024-02-20

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Computer-implemented methods, apparatuses, and computer program products for frequency based operations

KR102430219B1

( en )

*

2021-09-15

2022-08-05

삼성전자주식회사

Storage device and method for generating key and performing certification of the storage device

US20240256466A1

( en )

*

2021-11-10

2024-08-01

Tdk Corporation

Memory controller and flash memory system

US12323507B2

( en )

2021-11-24

2025-06-03

Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute

Method and apparatus for hardware-based accelerated arithmetic operation on homomorphically encrypted message

EP4228197B1

( en )

*

2022-02-10

2024-10-23

Seoul National University R &amp; DB Foundation

Key management system for homomorphic encryption operation and method of operating the same

EP4228198B1

( en )

*

2022-02-10

2025-03-05

Seoul National University R &amp; DB Foundation

Electronic device for delegating generation of homomorphic rotation key to server and method of operating the same

US12362904B2

( en )

*

2022-02-18

2025-07-15

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Homomorphic encryption operation accelerator, and operating method of homomorphic encryption operation accelerator

KR102947582B1

( en )

2022-02-24

2026-04-03

서울대학교산학협력단

Method and Device for multi-key homomorphic encryption

US12556363B2

( en )

2022-02-24

2026-02-17

Seoul National University R&amp;Db Foundation

Method and device for multi-key homomorphic encryption

CN115242369B

( en )

*

2022-05-11

2024-06-25

西安电子科技大学

Federated learning privacy protection method and device based on multi-key homomorphic encryption

CN115118751B

( en )

*

2022-07-15

2024-04-19

广东浪潮智慧计算技术有限公司

A blockchain-based supervision system, method, device and medium

CN115442021A

( en )

*

2022-08-09

2022-12-06

中国银联股份有限公司

Data matching method, device, system, equipment and medium

EP4325768A1

( en )

*

2022-08-18

2024-02-21

Zama SAS

Key sets with common or predefined digits

US12603756B2

( en )

2023-05-26

2026-04-14

Niobium Microsystems, Inc.

Fully homomorphic encrypted processing acceleration

KR102637234B1

( en )

*

2023-07-06

2024-02-15

기초과학연구원

Lattice-based public key cryptosystem and electronic device included in the same

US20250119286A1

( en )

*

2023-10-10

2025-04-10

International Business Machines Corporation

Homomorphic generation of rotation keys

US20250165407A1

( en )

*

2023-11-22

2025-05-22

Macronix International Co., Ltd.

Managing data security in storage devices

US20250192980A1

( en )

*

2023-12-08

2025-06-12

Pienomial Inc.

Compression-based homomorphic encryption data search

US20250310093A1

( en )

*

2024-03-31

2025-10-02

Cyberark Software Ltd.

Blind secret management and rotation

US12567965B2

( en )

*

2024-04-11

2026-03-03

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

System and method for approximate homomorphic ring encryption

Citations (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party

Publication number

Priority date

Publication date

Assignee

Title

US20160204936A1

( en )

2015-01-14

2016-07-14

Fujitsu Limited

Information processing method, computer-readable recording medium, and information processing apparatus

KR20160124598A

( en )

2015-04-20

2016-10-28

삼성전자주식회사

Electronic apparatus for determining whether program comprises malicious code and method for controlling thereof

US9760737B2

( en )

2015-06-12

2017-09-12

Qualcomm Incorporated

Techniques for integrated circuit data path confidentiality and extensions thereof

CA2935130A1

( en )

2016-07-26

2018-01-26

Mirza Kamaludeen

Encrypted data - computer virus, malware and ransom ware detection system

US20180137284A1

( en )

2016-11-16

2018-05-17

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Computing system for managing firmware and firmware managing method thereof

US10095880B2

( en )

2016-09-01

2018-10-09

International Business Machines Corporation

Performing secure queries from a higher security domain of information in a lower security domain

US10439799B2

( en )

2017-02-27

2019-10-08

United States Of America As Represented By Secretary Of The Navy

System and method for automating indirect fire protocol using fully homomorphic encryption

US20190327077A1

( en )

2018-04-18

2019-10-24

Fujitsu Limited

Outsourcing processing operations with homomorphic encryption

US20200028693A1

( en )

2018-07-17

2020-01-23

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

Verifiable Encryption Based on Trusted Execution Environment

US20200036512A1

( en )

2018-07-24

2020-01-30

Duality Technologies, Inc.

Hybrid system and method for secure collaboration using homomorphic encryption and trusted hardware

US20200320206A1

( en )

*

2020-06-24

2020-10-08

Intel Corporation

Systems, methods, apparatus and articles of manufacture to prevent unauthorized release of information associated with a function as a service

US20210211290A1

( en )

*

2020-01-08

2021-07-08

Tata Consultancy Services Limited

Method and system for biometric verification

US20210266170A1

( en )

*

2020-02-26

2021-08-26

Antonio Rossi

System and method of trustless confidential positive identification and de-anonymization of data using blockchain

US20220094519A1

( en )

*

2020-09-24

2022-03-24

Seagate Technology Llc

Preserving aggregation using homomorphic encryption and trusted execution environment, secure against malicious aggregator

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party

Publication number

Priority date

Publication date

Assignee

Title

KR20140073384A

( en )

*

2012-12-06

2014-06-16

삼성전자주식회사

system on chip for performing secure boot, image forming apparatus comprising it, and methods thereof

CN104426973B

( en )

*

2013-09-03

2018-03-23

中国移动通信集团公司

A kind of cloud database encryption method, system and device

US10841087B2

( en )

*

2015-11-05

2020-11-17

Mitsubishi Electric Corporation

Security device, system, and security method

2020

2020-07-07

KR

KR1020200083213A

patent/KR20220005705A/en

active

Pending

2021

2021-06-07

CN

CN202110633384.0A

patent/CN113972978B/en

active

Active

2021-06-14

US

US17/347,055

patent/US11824967B2/en

active

Active

Patent Citations (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party

Publication number

Priority date

Publication date

Assignee

Title

US20160204936A1

( en )

2015-01-14

2016-07-14

Fujitsu Limited

Information processing method, computer-readable recording medium, and information processing apparatus

KR20160124598A

( en )

2015-04-20

2016-10-28

삼성전자주식회사

Electronic apparatus for determining whether program comprises malicious code and method for controlling thereof

US9760737B2

( en )

2015-06-12

2017-09-12

Qualcomm Incorporated

Techniques for integrated circuit data path confidentiality and extensions thereof

CA2935130A1

( en )

2016-07-26

2018-01-26

Mirza Kamaludeen

Encrypted data - computer virus, malware and ransom ware detection system

US10095880B2

( en )

2016-09-01

2018-10-09

International Business Machines Corporation

Performing secure queries from a higher security domain of information in a lower security domain

US20180137284A1

( en )

2016-11-16

2018-05-17

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Computing system for managing firmware and firmware managing method thereof

US10439799B2

( en )

2017-02-27

2019-10-08

United States Of America As Represented By Secretary Of The Navy

System and method for automating indirect fire protocol using fully homomorphic encryption

US20190327077A1

( en )

2018-04-18

2019-10-24

Fujitsu Limited

Outsourcing processing operations with homomorphic encryption

US20200028693A1

( en )

2018-07-17

2020-01-23

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

Verifiable Encryption Based on Trusted Execution Environment

US20200036512A1

( en )

2018-07-24

2020-01-30

Duality Technologies, Inc.

Hybrid system and method for secure collaboration using homomorphic encryption and trusted hardware

US20210211290A1

( en )

*

2020-01-08

2021-07-08

Tata Consultancy Services Limited

Method and system for biometric verification

US20210266170A1

( en )

*

2020-02-26

2021-08-26

Antonio Rossi

System and method of trustless confidential positive identification and de-anonymization of data using blockchain

US20200320206A1

( en )

*

2020-06-24

2020-10-08

Intel Corporation

Systems, methods, apparatus and articles of manufacture to prevent unauthorized release of information associated with a function as a service

US20220094519A1

( en )

*

2020-09-24

2022-03-24

Seagate Technology Llc

Preserving aggregation using homomorphic encryption and trusted execution environment, secure against malicious aggregator

Non-Patent Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party

Title

About Homomorphic Encryption, The Most Secure Encryption Technology in Existence, https://post.naver.com/viewer/postView.nhn?volumeNo=15914201&amp;memberNo=10728965, Jun. 4, 2018.

Data Centric Security in Cloud Era 2, https://www.samsungsds.com/global/ko/support/insights/Data-Centric-Security-in-Cloud-Era-2.html, Oct. 5, 2018.

Jung Hee Cheon et al., A Full RNS Variant of Approximate Homomorphic Encryption, https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/931.pdf, 21 pages.

Jung Hee Cheon et al., Bootstrapping for approximate homomorphic encryption, https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/153.pdf, 21 pages.

Jung Hee Cheon et al., Homomorphic Encryption for Arithmetic of Approximate Numbers, https://eprint iacr.org/2016/421.pdf, 23 pages.

R. Agrawal et al., " Fast Arithmetic Hardware Library for RLWE-Based Homomorphic Encryption, " Jul. 3, 2020.

Revolution of Encryption Technology—Homomorphic Encryption, http://imdarc.math.snu.ac.kr/board_apmJ27/3058, Oct. 26, 2018.

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party

Publication number

Priority date

Publication date

Assignee

Title

US12423422B2

( en )

*

2023-04-07

2025-09-23

Fortinet, Inc.

Tetra systems and methods for clustering files based upon structure

Also Published As

Publication number

Publication date

US20220014351A1

( en )

2022-01-13

KR20220005705A

( en )

2022-01-14

CN113972978B

( en )

2025-08-19

CN113972978A

( en )

2022-01-25

Similar Documents

Publication

Publication Date

Title

US20220014351A1

( en )

2022-01-13

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing method thereof

US12170719B2

( en )

2024-12-17

Electronic device using homomorphic encryption and encrypted data processing method thereof

KR102570801B1

( en )

2023-08-24

Generation of cryptographic function parameters from compact source code

CN110457912B

( en )

2020-08-14

Data processing method and device and electronic equipment

Ganji et al.

2015

Why attackers win: on the learnability of XOR arbiter PUFs

CN102138300B

( en )

2014-11-26

Application of message authentication code precomputation in secure memory

US10904231B2

( en )

2021-01-26

Encryption using multi-level encryption key derivation

US11556630B2

( en )

2023-01-17

Private password constraint validation

Barbareschi et al.

2021

On the adoption of physically unclonable functions to secure IIoT devices

US10361844B2

( en )

2019-07-23

Generating cryptographic function parameters based on an observed astronomical event

Cambou et al.

2018

Ternary computing to strengthen cybersecurity: development of ternary state based public key exchange

US9571281B2

( en )

2017-02-14

CRT-RSA encryption method and apparatus

US11748521B2

( en )

2023-09-05

Privacy-enhanced computation via sequestered encryption

JP2017195595A

( en )

2017-10-26

Encryption/decoding device and method of protecting power analysis

Khalil et al.

2025

Lightweight hardware security and physically unclonable functions

Feng et al.

2017

Secure code updates for smart embedded devices based on PUFs

CN117708798A

( en )

2024-03-15

Method and system for controlling blockchain terminal equipment based on cryptography

Khan et al.

2025

Enhancing virtual physically unclonable function security through neuron-criticality analysis and lightweight encryption

Sayed et al.

2023

Split-n-swap: A new modification of the Twofish block Cipher algorithm

Islam et al.

2020

Fuzzy vault for behavioral authentication system

Zhang et al.

2015

Enhanced‐Bivium Algorithm for RFID System

Sivertsen

2024

Modeling and Design of SRAM-Based Physical Unclonable Function

CN118300879B

( en )

2025-12-09

Communication authentication method, apparatus, computer device, storage medium, and program product

Korenda et al.

2024

Performance Evaluation of Response Based Cryptography Versus Fuzzy Extractors Based on Error Correction Codes

KR20240048985A

( en )

2024-04-16

method for generating homo encrypted message and apparatus for thereof

Legal Events

Date

Code

Title

Description

2021-06-14

FEPP

Fee payment procedure

Free format text : ENTITY STATUS SET TO UNDISCOUNTED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: BIG.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY

2021-06-17

AS

Assignment

Owner name : SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., KOREA, REPUBLIC OF

Free format text : ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:JUNG, JU-YOUNG;KIM, JIYOUP;SEOL, CHANGKYU;AND OTHERS;SIGNING DATES FROM 20210521 TO 20210531;REEL/FRAME:056572/0807

2021-08-23

STPP

Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text : DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION

2023-07-10

STPP

Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text : NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE MAILED -- APPLICATION RECEIVED IN OFFICE OF PUBLICATIONS

2023-10-13

STPP

Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text : PUBLICATIONS -- ISSUE FEE PAYMENT VERIFIED

2023-11-01

STCF

Information on status: patent grant

Free format text : PATENTED CASE

Related documents

• Big data-based autonomous flight drone system and autonomous flight method … — Rgblab Co., Ltd. (US20210390867A1)#653964
• Generating augmented reality experiences utilizing physical objects to … — Meta Platforms Technologies, Llc (US20260037214A1)#653960
• Virtual reality system using multiple force arrays for a solver — DeepMotion, Inc. (US10657696B2)#653961
• Tracking position of device inside-out for virtual reality interactivity — Sony Interactive Entertainment America Llc (US10535153B2)#653962
• Augmented reality system with spatialized audio tied to user manipulated … — Magic Leap, Inc. (US11231770B2)#653963