ABSTRACT
Abstract
Systems and methods for end-to-end encryption of a web browsing process are described herein. A web query is encrypted at a client using a homomorphic encryption scheme. The encrypted query is sent to a server where the encrypted query is evaluated over web content to generate an encrypted response without decrypting the encrypted query and without decrypting the response. The encrypted response is sent to the client where it is decrypted to obtain the results of the query without revealing the query or results to the owner of the web content, an observer, or an attacker.
Description
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
This application claims the benefit and priority of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/448,916, filed on Jan. 20, 2017; U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/448,883, filed on Jan. 20, 2017; U.S. Provisional Application 62/448,885, filed on Jan. 20, 2017; and U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/462,818, filed on Feb. 23, 2017, all of which are hereby incorporated by reference herein, including all references and appendices, for all purposes.
FIELD OF THE PRESENT TECHNOLOGY
The present disclosure relates to the technical field of encryption and decryption methods and apparatus as applied to computing systems. More particularly, the present invention is in the technical field of homomorphic encryption methods and apparatus.
SUMMARY
The present invention is a system and/or method for secure web browsing using a homomorphically encrypted query within an end-to-end secure web browser system that uses homomorphic encryption. The system and/or method includes static web pages loaded into data sources of content that support homomorphically encrypted queries. The system and/or method securely executes a user request and/or query using homomorphic encryption techniques, via embedded web browser techniques.
Various embodiments of the present technology include a method of receiving at the client an action via a web browser; converting the action to a query; encrypting the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme at the client; sending the encrypted query from the client to the server. The method further includes receiving at a server an encrypted query from a client, the query encrypted using a homomorphic encryption scheme, the encrypted query received without a key for decrypting the query; evaluating the encrypted query over web content D without decrypting the encrypted query to produce an encrypted response; and sending the encrypted response from the server to the client for decryption at the client. The method further includes receiving at the client the encrypted response from the server; decrypting the response to produce an unencrypted result at the client; and using the unencrypted result at the web browser.
Various embodiments of the present technology include a system including a browser configured to receive an action from a user. The system further includes a client configured to convert the action to a query, encrypt the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme and an encryption key, send the encrypted query to a server without the encryption key, and decrypt an encrypted response using the homomorphic encryption scheme and the key. The system further includes a server configured to receive the encrypted query without the encryption key from the client via a network, evaluate the encrypted query over web content D to generate an encrypted response without decrypting the encrypted query and without decrypting the encrypted response, and send the encrypted response to the client.
Various embodiments of the present technology include a non-transitory computer readable storage media having a program embodied thereon, the program being executable by a processor at a client to perform a method for secure queries of web content D, the method comprising receiving the action from a web browser; converting an action to a query; encrypting the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme and a public encryption key; sending the encrypted query to one or more servers without a corresponding private encryption key. The method further includes receiving an encrypted response from the one or more servers, the encrypted response generated from an evaluation of the encrypted query over the web content D at the one or more servers, the evaluation having been performed without decrypting the encrypted query and without decrypting the encrypted response. The method further includes decrypting the encrypted response to generate an unencrypted result of the action over the web content D and providing the unencrypted result to a web browser for use by the web browser.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Certain embodiments of the present technology are illustrated by the accompanying figures. It will be understood that the figures are not necessarily to scale and that details not necessary for an understanding of the technology or that render other details difficult to perceive may be omitted. It will be understood that the technology is not necessarily limited to the particular embodiments illustrated herein.
FIG. 1A illustrates an exemplary end-to-end encryption system, in accordance with aspects of the claimed technology.
FIG. 1B illustrates an exemplary end-to-end encryption system, in accordance with aspects of the claimed technology.
FIG. 2 illustrates details of a client of FIG. 1A .
FIG. 3 illustrates details of a server of FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B .
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary method for end-to-end encryption, in accordance with various aspects of the technology.
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary computing system that is used to implement embodiments according to the present technology.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption in which a specific algebraic operation (generally referred to as addition or multiplication) performed on data is equivalent to another operation performed on the encrypted form of data. For example, in Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) schemes, multiplication performed on data such as ciphertext may be equal to addition of the same values in plaintext. Thus, a specific operation performed on homomorphically encrypted data (e.g., a web action or web operation) may generate an encrypted response, which, when decrypted, allows recovery of the result of the operation as if it had been performed on the unencrypted data. For example, a homomorphically encrypted web action such as a query may be evaluated over web content to generate an encrypted response including resulting web content. The encrypted response may be decrypted, and the decrypted response may be used to recover the resulting web content from evaluation of the encrypted query as if unencrypted query had been evaluated over the web content.
Homomorphic encryption can also be used to securely chain together multiple operations on homomorphically encrypted data without exposing unencrypted data. The result of the multiple chained operations can then be recovered as if the multiple operations had been performed on the unencrypted data. It is noteworthy that if web browsing includes multiple operations using homomorphic encryption, the results of the operations performed on homomorphically encrypted data may be recovered as if the operations had been performed on unencrypted data. For example, a homomorphically encrypted query may include a chain of operations to be evaluated over web content to generate an encrypted query response. The unencrypted result of the chain of operations may be web content and/or analytics of the web content. The result of the query evaluation may be recovered using decryption of the encrypted query response as if the query operations had been performed on web content using an unencrypted query.
FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B illustrate exemplary end-to- end encryption systems 100 in accordance with aspects of the claimed technology. The encryption system 100 may provide for end-to-end secure web actions, such as queries, using homomorphic encryption. The encryption system 100 includes a client 102 , a web browser 104 , and one or more servers 110 that include data 112 . FIGS. 1A and 1B illustrates one client 102 and three servers 110 that include data 112 . However, the encryption system 100 may comprise more than one client 102 . Also, the encryption system 100 may comprise more servers 110 or fewer servers 110 that include data 112 . In some embodiments, a plurality of clients 102 communicate encrypted analytics to one server 110 and receive encrypted responses from the server 110 . In some embodiments, one client 102 communicates encrypted analytics to a plurality of servers 110 and receives encrypted responses from the plurality of servers 110 . In some embodiments, one client 102 communicates encrypted analytics to one server 110 and receives encrypted responses from the server 110 . In some embodiments, a plurality of clients 102 communicate encrypted analytics to a plurality of servers 110 and receive encrypted responses from the plurality of servers 110 . In general, one or more clients 102 communicate encrypted analytics to, and/or receive encrypted responses from, one or more of servers 110 . While in general, one or more clients 102 and one or more servers 110 is contemplated, where for simplicity the case of one client 102 and multiple servers 110 is illustrated elsewhere herein, it is no way intended to limit the practice of the claimed technology to a single client 102 and/or a plurality of servers 110 . Thus, various descriptions of modules, acts, communications, and/or acts that are illustrated in the context of one client 102 for simplicity and clarity, may apply to multiple clients 102 and vice versa. Similarly, various descriptions of modules, acts, communications, and/or acts that are illustrated in the context of one client server 110 for simplicity and clarity, may apply to multiple servers 110 and vice versa.
In various embodiments, the client 102 resides in computing environments that include shared computing architectures, hybrid architectures, distinct architectures such as those in a cloud computing environment, and/or the like. The client 102 and the web browser 104 of FIG. 1A are co-located such that computations are performed by the client 102 on the same computing device on which the web browser 104 is located. FIG. 1B differs from FIG. 1A in that the <figure-callout id="102" label="client" filenames="US10972251-20210406-D00001.png,US10972251-20210406-D00002.png" state="{{
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
This application claims the benefit and priority of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/448,916, filed on Jan. 20, 2017; U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/448,883, filed on Jan. 20, 2017; U.S. Provisional Application 62/448,885, filed on Jan. 20, 2017; and U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/462,818, filed on Feb. 23, 2017, all of which are hereby incorporated by reference herein, including all references and appendices, for all purposes.
FIELD OF THE PRESENT TECHNOLOGY
The present disclosure relates to the technical field of encryption and decryption methods and apparatus as applied to computing systems. More particularly, the present invention is in the technical field of homomorphic encryption methods and apparatus.
SUMMARY
The present invention is a system and/or method for secure web browsing using a homomorphically encrypted query within an end-to-end secure web browser system that uses homomorphic encryption. The system and/or method includes static web pages loaded into data sources of content that support homomorphically encrypted queries. The system and/or method securely executes a user request and/or query using homomorphic encryption techniques, via embedded web browser techniques.
Various embodiments of the present technology include a method of receiving at the client an action via a web browser; converting the action to a query; encrypting the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme at the client; sending the encrypted query from the client to the server. The method further includes receiving at a server an encrypted query from a client, the query encrypted using a homomorphic encryption scheme, the encrypted query received without a key for decrypting the query; evaluating the encrypted query over web content D without decrypting the encrypted query to produce an encrypted response; and sending the encrypted response from the server to the client for decryption at the client. The method further includes receiving at the client the encrypted response from the server; decrypting the response to produce an unencrypted result at the client; and using the unencrypted result at the web browser.
Various embodiments of the present technology include a system including a browser configured to receive an action from a user. The system further includes a client configured to convert the action to a query, encrypt the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme and an encryption key, send the encrypted query to a server without the encryption key, and decrypt an encrypted response using the homomorphic encryption scheme and the key. The system further includes a server configured to receive the encrypted query without the encryption key from the client via a network, evaluate the encrypted query over web content D to generate an encrypted response without decrypting the encrypted query and without decrypting the encrypted response, and send the encrypted response to the client.
Various embodiments of the present technology include a non-transitory computer readable storage media having a program embodied thereon, the program being executable by a processor at a client to perform a method for secure queries of web content D, the method comprising receiving the action from a web browser; converting an action to a query; encrypting the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme and a public encryption key; sending the encrypted query to one or more servers without a corresponding private encryption key. The method further includes receiving an encrypted response from the one or more servers, the encrypted response generated from an evaluation of the encrypted query over the web content D at the one or more servers, the evaluation having been performed without decrypting the encrypted query and without decrypting the encrypted response. The method further includes decrypting the encrypted response to generate an unencrypted result of the action over the web content D and providing the unencrypted result to a web browser for use by the web browser.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Certain embodiments of the present technology are illustrated by the accompanying figures. It will be understood that the figures are not necessarily to scale and that details not necessary for an understanding of the technology or that render other details difficult to perceive may be omitted. It will be understood that the technology is not necessarily limited to the particular embodiments illustrated herein.
FIG. 1A illustrates an exemplary end-to-end encryption system, in accordance with aspects of the claimed technology.
FIG. 1B illustrates an exemplary end-to-end encryption system, in accordance with aspects of the claimed technology.
FIG. 2 illustrates details of a client of FIG. 1A .
FIG. 3 illustrates details of a server of FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B .
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary method for end-to-end encryption, in accordance with various aspects of the technology.
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary computing system that is used to implement embodiments according to the present technology.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption in which a specific algebraic operation (generally referred to as addition or multiplication) performed on data is equivalent to another operation performed on the encrypted form of data. For example, in Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) schemes, multiplication performed on data such as ciphertext may be equal to addition of the same values in plaintext. Thus, a specific operation performed on homomorphically encrypted data (e.g., a web action or web operation) may generate an encrypted response, which, when decrypted, allows recovery of the result of the operation as if it had been performed on the unencrypted data. For example, a homomorphically encrypted web action such as a query may be evaluated over web content to generate an encrypted response including resulting web content. The encrypted response may be decrypted, and the decrypted response may be used to recover the resulting web content from evaluation of the encrypted query as if unencrypted query had been evaluated over the web content.
Homomorphic encryption can also be used to securely chain together multiple operations on homomorphically encrypted data without exposing unencrypted data. The result of the multiple chained operations can then be recovered as if the multiple operations had been performed on the unencrypted data. It is noteworthy that if web browsing includes multiple operations using homomorphic encryption, the results of the operations performed on homomorphically encrypted data may be recovered as if the operations had been performed on unencrypted data. For example, a homomorphically encrypted query may include a chain of operations to be evaluated over web content to generate an encrypted query response. The unencrypted result of the chain of operations may be web content and/or analytics of the web content. The result of the query evaluation may be recovered using decryption of the encrypted query response as if the query operations had been performed on web content using an unencrypted query.
FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B illustrate exemplary end-to- end encryption systems 100 in accordance with aspects of the claimed technology. The encryption system 100 may provide for end-to-end secure web actions, such as queries, using homomorphic encryption. The encryption system 100 includes a client 102 , a web browser 104 , and one or more servers 110 that include data 112 . FIGS. 1A and 1B illustrates one client 102 and three servers 110 that include data 112 . However, the encryption system 100 may comprise more than one client 102 . Also, the encryption system 100 may comprise more servers 110 or fewer servers 110 that include data 112 . In some embodiments, a plurality of clients 102 communicate encrypted analytics to one server 110 and receive encrypted responses from the server 110 . In some embodiments, one client 102 communicates encrypted analytics to a plurality of servers 110 and receives encrypted responses from the plurality of servers 110 . In some embodiments, one client 102 communicates encrypted analytics to one server 110 and receives encrypted responses from the server 110 . In some embodiments, a plurality of clients 102 communicate encrypted analytics to a plurality of servers 110 and receive encrypted responses from the plurality of servers 110 . In general, one or more clients 102 communicate encrypted analytics to, and/or receive encrypted responses from, one or more of servers 110 . While in general, one or more clients 102 and one or more servers 110 is contemplated, where for simplicity the case of one client 102 and multiple servers 110 is illustrated elsewhere herein, it is no way intended to limit the practice of the claimed technology to a single client 102 and/or a plurality of servers 110 . Thus, various descriptions of modules, acts, communications, and/or acts that are illustrated in the context of one client 102 for simplicity and clarity, may apply to multiple clients 102 and vice versa. Similarly, various descriptions of modules, acts, communications, and/or acts that are illustrated in the context of one client server 110 for simplicity and clarity, may apply to multiple servers 110 and vice versa.
In various embodiments, the client 102 resides in computing environments that include shared computing architectures, hybrid architectures, distinct architectures such as those in a cloud computing environment, and/or the like. The client 102 and the web browser 104 of FIG. 1A are co-located such that computations are performed by the client 102 on the same computing device on which the web browser 104 is located. FIG. 1B differs from FIG. 1A in that the client 102 and the web browser 104 of FIG. 1B are located on different computing devices; the client 102 and web browser 104 of FIG. 1B communicate directly and/or via the network 122 . The network 122 may be various combinations and permutations of wired and wireless networks (e.g., Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, mobile broadband, the Internet, etc.), internal/external computer busses, and/or the like. In some embodiments, one or more clients 102 communicate directly with one or more servers 110 .
There may be multiple servers 110 having data 112 that are available for access from the client 102 using the web browser 104 , as illustrated in FIGS. 1A and 1B . A target data source D contains content of one or more static web pages or web sites. For simplicity, âtarget data source Dâ will also be referred to as âcontent Dâ or âweb content D.â The web content D may reside in data 112 on a single server 110 or may be distributed over data 112 in multiple servers 110 in the encryption system 100 , in a plurality of distinct locations, which could include different blades in a server system, containers in a cloud, or servers that are geographically remote from one another, just as examples. Thus, the web content D could be partly stored on one or more data 112 , partly on a cloud (not illustrated), or the data source could be wholly stored on either. In various embodiments, the web content D is unencrypted (in plaintext form), deterministically encrypted, semantically encrypted, and/or other similar formats that would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art with the present disclosure before them, or any combination thereof.
FIGS. 1A and 1B illustrate three servers 110 that include data 112 . However, the encryption system 100 may comprise more servers 110 or fewer servers 110 . The encryption system 100 of FIGS. 1A and 1B illustrates a single client 102 and web browser 104 . However, the encryption system 100 may comprise multiple clients 102 and/or multiple web browsers 104 . In some embodiments, the client 102 and/or web browser 104 are implemented on multiple systems and/or locations. In various embodiments, the client(s) 102 , web browser(s) 104 , and/or the server(s) 110 are implemented in varied computing environments, including a shared computing architectures, hybrid architectures, or distinct architectures such as those in a cloud computing environment.
FIG. 2 illustrates details of the client 102 of FIG. 1A . The client 102 includes a homomorphic encryption module 202 , a homomorphic decryption module 204 , and an encryption key 206 . The homomorphic encryption module 202 , homomorphic decryption module 204 , and an encryption key 206 may be associated with a homomorphic encryption scheme E, such as Paillier encryption, or any other homomorphic encryption. The homomorphic encryption scheme E may be a fully or partially homomorphic encryption scheme. Examples of partially homomorphic cryptosystems include: RSA (multiplicative homomorphism), ElGamal (multiplicative homomorphism), and Paillier (additive homomorphism). Other partially homomorphic cryptosystems include the Okamoto-Uchiyama, Naccache-Stern, Damgård-Jurik, Sander-Young-Yung, Boneh-Goh-Nissim, and Ishai-Paskin cryptosystems. Examples of fully homomorphic cryptosystems include: the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan, Brakerski's scale-invariant, NTRU-based, and Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) cryptosystems.
FIG. 2 illustrates a single encryption key 206 . However, in some embodiments the encryption key 206 includes a public key and a private key. FIG. 2 further illustrates a web browser 104 as being co-located with the client 102 , as in FIG. 1A . However, the web browser may be in communication with the client 102 directly and/or via the network 122 , as illustrated in FIG. 1B . While FIG. 2 illustrates the homomorphic encryption module 202 , homomorphic decryption module 204 , and an encryption key 206 as components of the client 102 , in some embodiments, the homomorphic encryption module 202 , homomorphic decryption module 204 , and/or the encryption key 206 are components of the web browser 104 . Thus, encryption and/or decryption may be performed by the client 102 or the web browser 104 or a combination of the client 102 and the web browser 104 .
An action over the web content D may be specified by a user via the web browser 104 . The client 102 may receive the action from the web browser 104 . The action may be a single operation (e.g., fetch of an object) or a chain of actions (e.g., database search and classification of search results). The client 102 may convert the action into a query Q to be executed over the web content D. Using the homomorphic encryption scheme E, the encryption system 100 may encode the query Q as a homomorphically encrypted query Q_E using the homomorphic encryption module 202 and encryption key 206 . In various embodiments, the query Q_E is encoded as a homomorphic query vector, a homomorphic query matrix, homomorphic query parameters, and/or the like. The encrypted query Q_E is completely encrypted. The query Q cannot be recovered from encrypted query Q_E without using the encryption key 206 , which is associated with encryption scheme E. The homomorphic decryption module 204 is configured to use the encryption key 206 to evaluate an operation K{Q_E, E}, which decrypts the encrypted query Q_E using the encryption scheme E and encryption key 206 . In some embodiments, the homomorphic decryption module 204 uses a private key of the encryption key 206 to evaluate an operation K{Q_E, E}, which decrypts the encrypted query Q_E using the encryption scheme E and the private key.
The client 102 may send the encrypted query Q_E to one or more servers 110 containing the web content D in data 112 . However, the client 102 does not send the encryption key 206 to any of the servers 110 . Thus, servers 110 are not able to recover the query Q from the encrypted query Q_E, without the encryption key 206 .
FIG. 3 illustrates details of the server 110 of FIG. 1 . In addition to the data 112 , the server 110 includes the encrypted query (Q_E 302 ) received from the client 102 and an evaluation module 304 . The encrypted query Q_E 302 may be received from the client without the encryption key 206 . Thus, the server 110 is unable to recover or expose the query Q, because the server 110 is unable decrypt the encrypted query Q_E 302 without the encryption key 206 . The evaluation of a homomorphically encrypted query Q_E 302 over data may produce an encrypted response E(R), from which an unencrypted contents R may be recovered using the encryption key 206 .
Using techniques of the homomorphic encryption scheme E, one or more server 110 evaluates the encrypted query Q_E 302 over web content D, which resides within the one or more of, respective, data 112 . The evaluation may produce an encrypted response E(R).
The operation of evaluating the encrypted query Q_E 302 is performed without decrypting the encrypted query Q_E 302 at the server 110 , and without revealing the unencrypted query Q to the owner of the data 112 , an observer, or an attacker. Further, the operation of evaluating the encrypted query Q_E 302 is also performed without decrypting the encrypted response E(R), or revealing the contents R of the encrypted response E(R) to the owner of the data 112 , an observer, or an attacker. This is because encryption key 206 is not available at any of the one or more servers 110 .
The server 110 sends the encrypted response E(R) to the client 102 . Using the encryption key 206 associated with encrypted query Q_E 302 , the homomorphic decryption module 204 of the client 102 may apply the operation K{E(R), E} to decrypt the encrypted response E(R) to obtain the results R of the query Q. The results R may be used and/or displayed by the web browser 104 .
In general, a server (e.g., server(s) 110 ) comprises one or more programs that share their resources with clients (e.g., client 102 ). Server programs may be implemented on one or more computers. A client may request content (e.g., web content D) from a server or may request the server to perform a service function while not sharing any of the client's resources. Whether a computer is a client, a server, or both, is determined by the nature of the application that requires the service functions.
While a single client 102 is illustrated in the encryption system 100 of FIG. 1 , the encryption system 100 may comprise multiple clients 102 that share one or more web browsers 104 . For example, a first client 102 may encrypt a query using the homomorphic encryption scheme E. The encrypted query may be sent via a first web browser 104 to one or more servers 110 with directions to evaluate the encrypted query Q_E 302 over the web content D, and to return the encrypted response E(R) to a second client 102 , via a second web browser 104 where the encrypted response E(R) may be decrypted to obtain the unencrypted result or result R.
In some embodiments, the client 102 and/or servers 110 may implement an application programming interface (API) to formalize data exchange. Both client 102 and server 110 may reside in the same system, and client software may communicate with server software within the same computer.
In some instances, the functions of the client 102 and/or servers 110 are implemented within a cloud-based computing environment, not illustrated. The client 102 and/or servers 110 may be communicatively coupled via the network 122 with a cloud based computing environment. In general, a cloud-based computing environment is an internet resource that typically combines the computational power of a large model of processors and/or that combines the storage capacity of a large model of computer memories or storage devices. For example, systems that provide a cloud resource may be utilized exclusively by their owners; or such systems may be accessible to outside users who deploy applications within the computing infrastructure to obtain the benefit of large computational or storage resources.
FIG. 4 is a flowchart of an exemplary method 400 for end-to-end encryption, in accordance with various aspects of the technology. The method comprises a step 402 of receiving an action. The action may be received at the client 102 , from a user via the web browser 104 . At step 404 , the action is converted to a query. The action may be converted to a query Q at the client 102 and/or web browser 104 . At step 406 , the query Q is converted to an encrypted query Q_E 302 . The query may be encrypted at one or more client(s) 102 using a homomorphic encryption scheme. The encrypted query Q_E 302 may be sent from the client 102 to the server 110 without the encryption key. The method 400 comprises a step 408 of receiving the encrypted query from the client 102 . The encrypted query may be received directly or via a network, e.g., the Internet, at one or more servers 110 .
The method 400 further comprises a step 410 of evaluating the encrypted query Q_E over web content D to generate an encrypted response E(R). The web content D may reside in data 112 at one or more servers 110 . The encrypted query may be evaluated without decrypting the encrypted query Q_E 302 and without exposing the unencrypted query Q at the server 110 to the owner of the data 112 , an observer, or an attacker. The encrypted query may also be evaluated over web content D without decrypting the encrypted response E(R) and without exposing the unencrypted results R of the encrypted response E(R) at the server 110 to the owner of the data 112 , an observer, or an attacker.
The method 400 further comprises a step 412 of sending the encrypted response E(R) to the client 102 . The encrypted response E(R) may be sent from one or more servers 110 to the client 102 via the network 122 . The method 400 also comprises a step 414 of decrypting the encrypted response E(R) received from the one or more servers 110 at the client 102 . The decryption of the encrypted response E(R) generates an unencrypted result R of the evaluation of the encrypted query Q_E over the web content D, as if the unencrypted query Q had been evaluated over the web content D. The method 400 further comprises a step 416 of using the unencrypted result at a web browser. The unencrypted result may be displayed or otherwise used at the web browser 104 .
Thus, using the method 400 , the query may be evaluated over the web content D in a completely secure and private manner. Moreover, neither the contents nor the results of the query are revealed by the method 400 to the owner of the web content D, an observer, or an attacker.
FIG. 5 is a diagrammatic representation of an example machine in the form of a computer system 500 , within which a set of instructions for causing the machine to perform any of one or more of the methodologies discussed herein may be executed. In various example embodiments, the machine operates as a standalone device or may be connected (e.g., networked) to other machines. In a networked deployment, the machine may operate in the capacity of a server (e.g. server 110 ) or a client (e.g., client 102 ) machine, in a server-client network environment, or as a peer machine in a peer-to-peer (or distributed) network environment. The machine may be a personal com
CLAIMS
Claims ( 20 )
What is claimed is:
1. A method comprising:
receiving at a server an encrypted query from a client, the encrypted query being a homomorphic query matrix encrypted from a query using a homomorphic encryption scheme, the encrypted query received without a key for decrypting the encrypted query;
evaluating the encrypted query over web content D without decrypting the encrypted query to produce an encrypted response; and
sending the encrypted response from the server to the client for decryption at the client.
2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving at the client an action via a web browser;
converting the action to the query at the client;
encrypting the query using the homomorphic encryption scheme at the client;
sending the encrypted query from the client to the server;
receiving at the client the encrypted response from the server;
decrypting the response to produce an unencrypted result at the client; and
using the unencrypted result at the web browser.
3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the web browser and the client communicate via a network.
4. The method of claim 2 , wherein the client and the web browser are co-located on a same computing device.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the query is a chain of series of operations to be performed over the web content D.
6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising receiving at the client an action from a web browser.
7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving at the client an action from a web browser; and
converting the action to the query at the client.
8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving at the client the encrypted response;
decrypting at the client the response to produce an unencrypted result; and
using the unencrypted result at a web browser.
9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the homomorphic encryption scheme is Paillier encryption.
10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the key includes a private encryption key.
11. A system comprising:
a browser configured to receive an action from a user;
a client configured to:
convert the action to a query;
encrypt the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme and an encryption key, the homomorphic encryption scheme encrypting the query as a homomorphic query matrix;
send the encrypted query to a server without the encryption key; and
decrypt an encrypted response using the homomorphic encryption scheme and the encryption key; and
the server configured to:
receive the encrypted query without the encryption key from the client via a network;
evaluate the encrypted query over web content D to generate the encrypted response without decrypting the encrypted query and without decrypting the encrypted response; and
send the encrypted response to the client.
12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the action is a chain of series of operations to be performed over the web content D.
13. The system of claim 11 , wherein the client and the browser are co-located such that client computations are computed on a same computing device on which the browser is located.
14. The system of claim 11 , wherein the encryption key is a private encryption key.
15. A non-transitory computer readable storage media having a program embodied thereon, the program being executable by a processor at a client to perform a method for secure queries of web content D, the method comprising:
converting an action to a query;
encrypting the query using a homomorphic encryption scheme and a public encryption key, the homomorphic encryption scheme encrypting the query as a homomorphic query matrix;
sending the encrypted query to one or more servers without a corresponding private encryption key;
receiving an encrypted response from the one or more servers, the encrypted response generated from an evaluation of the encrypted query over the web content D at the one or more servers, the evaluation having been performed without decrypting the encrypted query and without decrypting the encrypted response; and
decrypting the encrypted response to generate an unencrypted result of the action over the web content D.
16. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15 , wherein the action is a chain of series of operations to be performed over the web content D.
17. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 16 , wherein the operations include a document search and a classification of the unencrypted result of the document search.
18. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15 , wherein the method further comprises:
receiving the action from a web browser; and
providing the unencrypted result to the web browser for use by the web browser.
19. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 18 , wherein the web browser and the client are co-located such that client computations are computed on a same computing device on which the web browser is located.
20. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15 , wherein the homomorphic encryption scheme is Paillier encryption.
US15/876,043
2017-01-20
2018-01-19
Secure web browsing via homomorphic encryption
Active
2038-12-22
US10972251B2
( en )
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number
Priority Date
Filing Date
Title
US15/876,043
US10972251B2
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