The Price of Submission

[2608.14760] The Price of Submission Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Search arXiv Press Enter to search · Advanced search Economics > General Economics arXiv:2608.14760 (econ) [Submitted on 14 Aug 2026] Title: The Price of Submission Authors: Johan Fourie View a PDF of the paper titled The Price of Submission, by Johan Fourie View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: Economics journals ration access to peer review with time and money. A July 2026 census of 500 RePEc-ranked economics journals accepting unsolicited submissions finds that 113 (22.6 per cent) charge a fee, with incidence falling from 68 per cent in the top 50 to 2 per cent in the bottom 50. A sequential-submission model shows that waiting pays part of the capacity-clearing price, leaving the fee as a residual. Because rejected manuscripts move down the ranking, a fee reduces system-wide referee demand only when authors stop, shorten their submission chains or switch to journals requiring fewer reports. Comments: 20 pages, 4 figures, 1 table. JEL codes: A11, D82, I23, L15, O33. Department of Economics, Stellenbosch University Subjects: General Economics (econ.GN) Cite as: arXiv:2608.14760 [econ.GN] (or arXiv:2608.14760v1 [econ.GN] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.14760 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Johan Fourie [ view email ] [v1] Fri, 14 Aug 2026 09:24:59 UTC (140 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled The Price of Submission, by Johan Fourie View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: econ.GN < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: econ q-fin q-fin.EC References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation × loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab) Major funding support from

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