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LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

PEATO EUTHYPHRO - APOLOGY CRITO - PHAEDO PHAEDRUS

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Translated by HAROLD NORTH FOWLER

ΠΞΙΠΓΞΙΓΞΙΓΓΞΙ ΓΞΙΓΓΞΙΙΓ

r= | ΙΓ iil= : ] —i |! iL —

PLATO, the great philosopher of Athens, was born in 427 Bc. In early manhood an admirer of Socrates, he later founded the famous school of philosophy in the grove

Academus. Much else recorded of his life is uncertain; that he left Athens for a time after Socrates’ execution is probable; that later he went to Cyrene, Egypt, and Sicily is possible; that he was wealthy is likely; that he was critical of ‘advanced’ democ- racy is obvious. He lived to be 80 years old. Linguistic tests including those of com- puter science still try to establish the order of his extant philosophical dialogues, writ- ten in splendid prose and revealing Socra- tes’ mind fused with Plato’s thought.

In Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, Socrates and others discuss separate ethical concep- tions. Protagoras, lon, and Meno discuss whether righteousness can be taught. In Gorgias, Socrates is estranged from his city’s thought, and his fate is impending. The Apology (not a dialogue), Crito, Euthyphro, and the unforgettable Phaedo relate the trial and death of Socrates and propound the immortality of the soul. In the famous Sym- posium and Phaedrus, written when Socrates was still alive, we find the origin and mean- ing of love. Cratylus discusses the nature of language. The great masterpiece in ten books, the Republic, concerns righ- teousness (and involves education, equal- ity of the sexes, the structure of society, and abolition of slavery). Of the six so- called dialectical dialogues Euthydemus deals with philosophy; metaphysical Parmenides is

Continued on back flap

MAY 24 2006

Pilato. Plato 666584

| aoe

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from Microsoft Corporation

https://archive.org/details/plato01 plat

PLATO

FUTHYPHRO} ABOLOGY CRITO « PHAEDO™= PHAEDRUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

HAROLD NORTH FOWLER

INTRODUCTION BY W. R. M. LAMB

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS LONDON, ENGLAND

First published 1914 Reprinted 1917, 1919, 1923, 1925, 1928, 1933, 1938, 1942, 1947, 1953, 1960, 1966, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1999, 1995, 1999, 2005

LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY® is a registered trademark of the President and Fellows of Harvard College

ISBN 0-674-99040-4

Printed on acid-free paper and bound by Edwards Brothers, Ann Arbor, Michigan

CONTENTS

PREFACE INTRODUCTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

EUTHYPHRO THE APOLOGY CRITO PHAEDO PHAEDRUS

INDEX

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PREFACE

Tue Greek text in this volume is based upon that of Schanz, and all variations from his readings are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In some cases deviations from the reading of the manu- scripts have been noted, even when adopted by Schanz. In the introductions to the separate dialogues no attempt has been made to discuss the philosophy of Plato or to do anything more than to supply such information as is needed for the intelligent reading of these particular dialogues. For further discussion and information the reader is referred to the General Introduction by Mr. W. R. M. Lamb, of Trinity College, Cambridge.

Harotp N. Fow er.

Vii

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liv

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Prato was born in 427 s.c. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato’s applications and extensions of his master's

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

thought ; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching: the suggestion came from the “mimes” of the Syracusan Sophron,—realistic studies of con- versation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic specu- lations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the Phaedo he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxa- goras,—that the cause of everything is “ mind.” This was more promising: but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy ; this “ mind ”’ showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making definitions of “ beautiful,’ “ good,” “large’’ and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they ap- peared to be sound, for the erection of higher x

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognised theory of “ideas” or “ forms,” which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say “this man is good,’ and which postu- lates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His “hypothetical” method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the Republic.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the Phaedo were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master’s death (399 s.c.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the “satyr.” But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintance with him. Aristophanes’ burlesque in the Clouds (423 s.c.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent elo- quence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded ; moreover, he professed to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the Apology, Crilo, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches and Lysis, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man’s good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by “ dialectic,” or a system- atic course of question and answer. He also be- lieved his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a “spiritual sign.” He was capable, as we find in the Symposium, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in

xii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of meta- physics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already men- tioned as recording Socrates’ activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, and Gorgias. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the Socratic discussions among the elect of the new

xiii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

generation. The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the Gorgias. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato’s talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the Republic, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The Meno and Gorgias set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable “forms” as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the Cratylus and Symposium, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest xiv

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The Phaedo turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the Republic, to show the master meeting his own un- satisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a “form” of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injus- tice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him “writ large” in the organisation of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philo- sopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dia- lectic ; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the Phaedo, the spell of mythical revelation is brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Phaedrus takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of “ ideas,” and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philo- sopher’s duty of investigating the mutual relations of the “ forms ᾿ to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato’s teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the Theaeletus and Parmenides, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as cate- gories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting- place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The Parmenides corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all particulars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes,

XVI

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Plato is here at work on his own great problem :— If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The Sophist contains some of his ripest thought on this increas- ingly urgent question: his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The Politicus returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute “mean” which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The Philebus, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classific- ation required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato’s hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the preblem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the Timaeus, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many

xvii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the Laws, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the Republic: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge ina great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates’ teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the Zimaeus a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things ; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, through- out: but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men

XViii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

have earned. Some of his inventions may be un- realisable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. Lames.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE (1990)

For comprehensive bibliographies the reader is referred to W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume Four: Plato, The Man and His Dialogues, Earlier Period, Cambridge, 1975, pages 562-581, and Volume Five: The Later Plato and the Academy, Cambridge, 1978, pages 493-514. The following is a selection of recent work on the dialogues included in this volume.

Euthyphro

Reginald E. Allen: Plato’s ‘Euthyphro’ and Earlier The- ory of Forms, London, 1970.

Laszlo Versenyi: Holiness and Justice: An Interpretation of Plato’s Euthyphro, Washington, D.C., 1982.

Apology

Reginald E. Allen: Socrates and Legal Obligation (includ- ing trs. of Apology and Crito), Minneapolis, 1980.

T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith: Socrates on Trial, Oxford, 1988.

C. D. C. Reeve: Socrates in the Apology, Indianapolis, 1989.

I. F. Stone: The Trial of Socrates, New York, 1988.

Thomas G. West: Plato’s Apology of Socrates: An Inter- pretation with a New Translation, Ithaca, 1979.

Crito Anthony Douglas Woozley: Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito, Chapel Hill, 1979.

Phaedo

David Bostock: Plato’s Phaedo, Oxford, 1986.

Kenneth Dorter: Plato's Phaedo, An Interpretation, Toronto, 1982.

David Gallop: Plato’s Phaedo, Translation and Notes, Oxford, 1975.

Phaedrus

Giovanni Ferrari: Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge, 1987.

Charles L. Griswold: Self-knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, New Haven, 1986.

General Terence Irwin: Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues, Oxford, 1977.

Surveys

L. Brisson: “Platon 1958-1975,” Lustrum xx (1977) 5- 304.

L. Brisson (with H. Ioannidi): “Platon 1975~1980, ' Lus- trum ΧΧν (1983) 31-320.

EOTHYPHRO

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{INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

Tue Euthyphro probably owes its place at the head of the list of dialogues to the fact that it is the first of four dialogues dealing with the trial and death ot Socrates. It is probably one of the earliest in date of composition, though that fact is not likely to have affected its position in the series.

Socrates comes to the court of the king archon to attend to some preliminaries of his trial on the charge of impiety and corrupting the youth. Here he meets Euthyphro, who is bringing a charge of manslaughter against his father, on account of the death from exposure of a servant who is himself a murderer. Euthyphro says that he is bringing the charge in the interest of piety, and claims to know more than other men about the nature of piety, proper religious observances, and the will of the gods. It is this claim which leads to the discussion of the nature of piety, or holiness, the chief theme of the dialogue.

The purpose of the dialogue is in part to inculcate correct methods of thinking, more especially the dialectic method. Euthyphro, when requested to give a definition of piety or holiness says (5p) “1 say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or

1 Of Euthyphro nothing further is known. He may be

identical with the Euthyphro who appears in the Cratylus as a philologian addicted to fanciful etymologies.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else; and not prosecuting him is unholy.” ‘This reply leads at once to the proof that a particular example does not constitute a definition of a general concept. The second definition offered by Euthy- phro is emended until it takes the form (9 £) “ What all the gods love is holy, and on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.”” The question then arises whether a thing is holy because the gods love it, or the gods love it because it is holy. Cause and effect are discussed. In an attempt to arrive at a third definition, Euthyphro flounders hopelessly, whereupon Socrates shows how terms may be defined by referring a species to a genus.!_ Finally Euthyphro states (12 £) that “the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods consti- tutes piety and holiness.’’ Hereupon Socrates tries to get him to tell what attention the gods require, what end human service to the gods has in view. In this he does not succeed, and the dialogue ends with this question unanswered.

Instruction in methods of thinking may perhaps seem needless to modern readers; even they, how- ever, may find it interesting, and in Plato’s times it was undoubtedly necessary. Such instruction occu- pies an important place in most of the Platonic dialogues. In the Euthyphro the correct method of thinking is illustrated and inculcated in the course of an attempt to define piety or holiness. The two definitions offered by Euthyphro are rejected; the third is left unchallanged, though a further limita- tion is demanded. It may therefore be regarded as

1 See 11 σα note.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

a definition accepted by Plato, but not considered complete until the purpose of our service to the gods is determined. How Plato would determine it may be seen in the Apology (30a), where Socrates says his life has been spent in the endeavour to persuade men to care chiefly for the perfection of their souls. The Euthyphro may perhaps be regarded as a sort of scientific justification of the position taken in the Apology.

Special editions of the Euthyphro are numerous. Among them those of Schanz (1887), Christ (1890), Adam (1890), and Heidel (1902) may be chosen for especial mention. The last named contains an ex- haustive bibliography.

ΕὙΘΥΦΡΩΝ

[Η ΠΕΡῚ ΟΣΙΟΥ͂, ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣΊ]

TA TOY ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑᾺΑ ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

1. ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοί γε δίκη τις οὖσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτοι δὴ ᾿Αθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Ἐὐθύφρον, δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφήν.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί φής; γραφήν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται; οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς

δ σὺ ἕτερον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὗν.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡων. ᾿Αλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. [Πάνυ γε.

ErerePan. Τίς οὗτος:

SQKPATHS. Οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, @ Εὐθύφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα" νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς" ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγώμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιτθεύς, εἴ τινα νῷ ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλητον οἷον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ.

EUTHYPHRO [or ON HOLINESS, a TENTATIVE DIALOGUE]

CHARACTERS ΕΥΤΗΥΡΗΒΟ, SocRATES

EUTHYPHRO. What strange thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum and are now haunting the portico where the king archon sits? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king, as I have.

socrates. Our Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an indictment.

ruTHYPHRO. What? Somebody has, it seems, brought an indictment against you; for I don't accuse you of having brought one against anyone else.

socraTes. Certainly not.

EuTHYPHRO. But someone else against you?

SOCRATES. Quite so.

EuTHYPHRO. Who is he?

socraTes. I don’t know the man very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to be a young and unknown person. His name, however, is Meletus, I believe. And he is of the deme of Pitthus, if you remember any Pitthian Meletus, with long hair and only a little beard, but with a hooked nose.

PLATO

Εὐθύφρων. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἀλλὰ δὴ

Ο τίνα γραφήν σε γέγραπται;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἥντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ: τὸ γὰρ νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν" ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὥς φησιν, οἶδε, τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθεί- ροντες αὐτούς" καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι" καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεταί μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς: ὀρθῶς γάρ

D ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅ τι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶ-

3 τὸν μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὥς φησιν: ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

2. Εὐθύφρων. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽ ὀρρωδῶ, μὴ τοὐναντίον γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ad’ ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ. , καί μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι. φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεούς, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς

φησιν.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦρων. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες" ὅτι δὴ σὺ 8

EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. I don’t remember him, Socrates. But what sort of an indictment has he brought against you?

socRATEs. What sort? No mean one, it seems to me; for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended so important a matter reflects no small credit upon him. For he says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who those are who corrupt them. He must be a wise man; who, seeing my lack of wisdom and that I am corrupting his fellows, comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me. And he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way ; for the right way is to take care of the young men first, to make them as good as possible, just as a good husbandman will naturally take care of the young plants first and afterwards of the rest. And so Meletus, perhaps, is first clearing away us who corrupt the young plants, as he says; then after this, when he has turned his attention to the older men, he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State,—at least, that is the natural out- come of the beginning he has made.

EUTHYPHRO. I hope it may be so, Socrates; but I fear the opposite may result. For it seems to me that he begins by injuring the State at its very heart, when he undertakes to harm you. Now tell me, what does he say you do that corrupts the young?

socraTes. Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says.

EUTHYPHRO. I understand, Socrates; it is because

PLATO

τὸ δαιμόνιον φὴς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου. καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα ὧν προεῖπον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. GAN οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμόσε ἰέναι.

ὃ. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. ᾿Αθη- ναίοις γάρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας: ὃν δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ᾽ οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι’ ἄλλο τι.

ΕΥ̓ΘΤΦΡΩΝ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν' ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φιλαν- θρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅ τί περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἃ ἂν ἡδέως, εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὗν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέχλοιέν pov κατα- γελᾶν, ὥσπερ σὺ φὴς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παίξοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγα- γεῖν, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσε- ται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.

EUTHYPHRO

you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy when I say anything in the assembly about divine things and foretell the future to them. And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true; but they are jealous of all such men as you and I are. However, we must not be disturbed, but must come to close quarters with them.

socnaTes. My dear Euthyphro, their ridicule is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

EuTHYPHRO. I don’t much desire to test their sentiments toward me in this matter.

socraTes. No, for perhaps they think that you are reserved and unwilling to impart your wisdom. But I fear that because of my love of men they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment, but that I would even pay something myself, if anyone would listen tome. Now if, as I was saying just now, they were to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it would not be at all unpleasant to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter; but if they are in earnest, then only soothsayers like you can tell how this will end.

PLATO

Ererepan. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρα- τες, πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

4, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. στιν δὲ δή σοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Διώκω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα;

Εὐθύφρων. Ὃν διώκων αὖ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

ΕΥΘΥΦρων. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὧν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ὋὉ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὋὉ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Ἴ|ἄνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. στιν δὲ τί τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Φόνου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ Ἡράκλεις! ἢ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἐ ἔχει." οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πόρρω μέντοι νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εστίν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἢ δῆλα δή: οὐ γὰρ ἄν πού γε ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξήεισθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτε οἴει τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεώς,

" Schanz, following Madvig, marks a lacuna here. For the meaning of the missing word or words ho refers to 9 4 and 15D.

EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Well, Socrates, perhaps it won't amount to much, and you will bring your case toa satisfactory ending, as I think I shall mine.

socrates. What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting ?

EUTHYPHRO. Prosecuting.

socRATES. Whom?

EUTHYPHRO. Such a man that they think I am insane because 1 am prosecuting! him.

socrates. Why? Are you prosecuting one who has wings to fly away with?

EuTHYPHRO, No flying for him at his ripe old age.

socraTes. Who is he?

EUTHYPHRO, My father.

socraTes. Your father, my dear man?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTEs. But what is the charge, and what is the suit about?

EUTHYPHRO. Murder, Socrates.

socraTes. Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know where the right lies; for | fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing, but only one who is already very far advanced in wisdom.

EuTHYPHRO. Very far, indeed, Socrates, by Zeus.

socraTes. Is the one who was killed by your father a relative? But of course he was; for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a stranger's account.

EUTHYPHRO. It is ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it matters whether the man who was killed

1 The Greek word has much the same meaning as the Latin prosequor, from which the English ‘ prosecute’ is derived, ‘follow,’ ‘pursue,’ and is at the same time the technical term for ‘ prosecute.’

PLATO

ἀλλ᾽ ov τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, ἐᾶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάν περ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ἢ. ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται, ἐὰν ξυνῇς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτόν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξιών, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε ἀποθανὼν πελάτης τις ἣν ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργοῦ- μεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευεν ἐκεῖ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν. παρ- οινήσας οὗν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν" ὁ οὖν πατὴρ συνδή- σᾶς τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ, ὅ τι χρείη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένον ὠλιγώρει τε καὶ ἠμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὃν πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι" ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν. ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ῥίγους καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνήσκει πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὗν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὅ τε πατὴρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτ᾽ εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου" ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξιέναι: κακῶς εἰδότες, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὁσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὦ [υὐθύφρον, οὑτωσὶ ἀκριβῶς οἴει ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων,

EUTHYPHRO

was a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing to consider is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he share one’s hearth and eat at one’s table. For the pollu- tion is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him. In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine, and when we were farming at Naxos, he was working there on our land. Now he got drunk, got angry with one of our house slaves, and butchered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser what he ought to do. In the meantime he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that he was a murderer and it did not matter if he were to die. And that is just what happened to him. For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the adviser. Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me, because for the sake of this murderer I am prosecuting my father for murder. [or they say he did not kill him, and if he had killed him never so much, yet since the dead man was a murderer, I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow, because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness.

socraTEs. But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think your knowledge about divine laws and

PLATO

ὅπῃ ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὖ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τῳ ἂν διαφέροι Εὐφύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

ὅ. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ap’ οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐ- θύφρυν, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ ow γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ vis γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅ ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδή με ἐκεῖνος αὐτοσχεδιάξοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρ- τάνειν, μαθητὴς δὴ γέγονα σός" καὶ εἰ μέν, ὦ Μέλητε, φαίην. ἄν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὁ ρθῶς "νομίζειν ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάξου' εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς ᾿ πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκεῖνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε κα κολάξοντι' καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθηται μηδ᾽ ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης ἢ ἢ ἀντ᾽ ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ἃ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα με ἐπιχειρήσειε γράφεσθαι, εὕροιμ' ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων μαθητὴς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδώς,

EUTHYPHRO

holiness and unholiness is so exact that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your father for murder ὃ

EUTHYPHRO. I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men, if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things.

socraTes. Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And “ Meletus,’’ I should say, “if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father.” And if he does not do as I ask and does not release me from the indictment or bring it against you in my stead, I could say in the court the same things I said in my challenge to him, could I not?

EUTHYPHRO. By Zeus, Socrates, if he should undertake to indict me, I fancy I should find his weak spot, and it would be much more a question about him in court than about me.

socraTes. And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither

PLATO

ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲ.

οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως καὶ ῥᾳδίω. κατεῖδεν, ὥστε ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι, ὃ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι διισχυρίζου" ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φὴς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσιόν παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν" πᾶν, ὅ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

Ererepan. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

6. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγε δή, τί φὴς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, ἐ ἐάν τε πατὴρ ὧν τυγχάνῃ ἐάν τε μήτηρ ἐάν τε ἄχλος ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον" ἐπεί, ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως «ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ᾽ ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὦν" αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἃ ἄριστον καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, κἀκεῖνόν ᾽ς αὖ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι᾽ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅ ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ

1 After ἰδέαν BD read κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα, which Schanz brackets.

EUTHYPHRO

this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say is the nature of piety and impiety, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not holiness always the same with itself in every action, and, on the other hand, is not unholiness the opposite of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one characteristic quality ὃ

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly, Socrates.

socraTEs. Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrong- doer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,— that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknow- ledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are

PLATO

αὑτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περί τε τῶν θεῶν Kai περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αρά γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, οὗ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; δι ἃ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ τῷ εὖ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἵ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλά μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγεῖ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν κατα- πεποίκελται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Hava θηναίοις ὁ ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμά- των ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὧ Σώκρατες" arn ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ “βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἷδ ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

7, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ a ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν μοι εἰς αὖθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει" νυνὶ δέ, ὅπερ “ἄρτι σε ἠρόμην, πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γάρ με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ τε ποτ᾽ εἴη, ἀλλά μοι

EUTHYPHRO

inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

socraTes. Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.

socraTEs. And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs by the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea? for this is covered with such representations. Shall we agree that these things are true, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. Not only these things, Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, tell you many other ‘things about the gods, which I am sure will amaze you when you hear them.

socraTEs. I dare say. But you can tell me those things at your leisure some other time. At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when 1 asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy

PLATO

εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὄν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί.

ererepan. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εἰὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φὴς εἶναι ὅσια.

Εὐθύφρων. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην, ἕ ἕν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια: ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ᾿μγωγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέ- πων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ “παραδείγματι, ὃ ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ἦ, ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ᾽ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ Pa.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩ͂Ν. "AAX εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φράσω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩ͂Ν. "Bore τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσ- φιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παγκάλως, @ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαί σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπε- κρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθές, τοῦτο οὔπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις, ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ἃ λέγεις.

Ererepan. I[Tavu μὲν οὖν.

8. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τί λέ- γομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλὴς ἄν- θρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισὲς καὶ ὁ θεομισὴς

ἘΠΤΗΥΡΗΒΟ

which you are now doing, prosecuting your father for murder.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, what I said was true, Socrates.

socraTes. Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not?

EUTHYPHRO. Why, so they are.

socrates. Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy ; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one aspect. Or don’t you remember?

EUTHYPHRO. I remember.

socraTEs. Tell me then what this aspect is, that 1 may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.

EuTHYPHRO. If you wish me to explain in that way, I will do so.

socraTes. I do wish it.

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.

socraTes. Excellent, Euthyphro; now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, lam not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTes. Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two are not the same, but the holy and the unholy are the

PLATO

ἀνοσιος: ov ταὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώ- τατον τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ:' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

\ a , 3. A

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρῆσθαι;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται;

Μ 4

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Εἴρηται yap.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. “EyOpav δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ᾧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ap ἂν εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ὁπότερα πλείω, ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ

f a λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περί γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν;

ΕΥθύφρων. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ

, 3 / SN \ / > ἐλάττονος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐλ- θόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθ᾽ ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

\ 2 / x e ΄, > U

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Kal ἐπί ye τὸ ἱστάναι ἔλθοντες, ὡς ἐγῴμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἄν;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε bal ᾽ / 3 2 ’ » > , ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ προ- χειρόν σοί ἐστιν. GAN ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ

1 The manuscripts read δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες: εἴρηται γάρ. Schanz brackets this and the preceding line. I follow

EUTHYPHRO

exact opposites of each other. Is not this what we have said ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, just this.

socraTEs. And it seems to be correct?

EUTHYPHRO, I think so, Socrates.

socraTes. Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, we have said that.

socraTes. But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course we should.

socraTes. Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socraTEs, And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing ?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

socraTEs. But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand ; but let Hermann in omitting εἴρηται “γάρ, which may have been once

a marginal note or may have been copied by mistake from the next words of Euthyphro.

PLATO

τάδε ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον Kal καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἄρα οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, cd , Ν ᾽ \ \ δὴ \ e Μ ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθροποι πάντες;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά, ὦ Σώ- κρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οὐκ εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέροιντ᾽ ἄν;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πολλὴ. ἀνάγκη.

9 “ 3

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Kal τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε Εὐ- θύφρον, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα" ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά’ οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ἐστασίαζον ᾽ ΄ » \ \ , / = ’ ἀλλήλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο" ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Ορθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἕκα- στοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. [Πάνυ γε.

i 3 \ / e \ / © \

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταὐτὰ δέ ye, ὡς ov ys, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα" περὶ ἃ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις. ἄρα οὐχ οὕτω;

ΕΥθύφρων. Οὕτω.

50909 e Μ Ὁ cs Ἁ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Taut’ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖται ὕπο τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλῆ ταὔτ᾽ ἂν εἴη.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. “Korxer.

1 καὶ ἄδικα inserted by Hirchig, followed by Schanz,

δ g Υ

EUTHYPHRO

me suggest it. Is it not about riglt and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies.

socrates. And how about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions ?

EUTHYPHRO. Necessarily.

socraTEs. Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree ; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

socraTes. Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

EUTHYPHRO, Certainly.

socRATEs, But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others ; and itis because they disagree about these things that they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?

EUTHYPHRO. = It is.

socraTes. ‘hen, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.

PLATO

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Kai ὅσια dpa καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Ἐὐθύφρον, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Κινδυνεύει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὃ ἠρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἠρώτων, 01 τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ὃν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον' ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θεοφιλὲς ἢ, καὶ θεομισές ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ὥστε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ" Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν" καὶ εἴ τις ἄχλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτά.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. "AAW οἶμαι, ὧ Σώκρατες, περί γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστη- ρίοις. ἀδικοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἢ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, @ Εὐθύφρον, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασι σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

EYETePaN. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.

1 Schanz reads ¢ for ὃ.

EUTHYPHRO

socraTes. And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement,

EUTHYPHRO. I suppose so.

socrates. ‘Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it.

EUTHYPHRO. But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

socraTes. Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

socraTEs. Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthy- phro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Oh, no, they don’t do that.

PLATO

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ apa πᾶν ye ποιοῦσι Kal λέγου- σι. τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδ᾽ ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί, εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην: ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, οὔ φασιν ἀδικεῖν. ἢ γάρ;

Ererepan. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην' ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Αληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὔ φασιν; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "AAN ἕκαστόν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύ- φρον, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισ- βητοῦντες, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισ- βητοῦσιν θεοί" πράξεώς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπρᾶχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως" ap οὐχ οὕτω;

ErerePan. [Πάνυ γε.

10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴθι νῦν, ὦ φίλε ἘΕὐθύφρον, δίδαξον καὶ ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, ὡς “πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδρο-

1 οὐκ ἄρα... ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις bracketed by Schanz following Schenkl.

EUTHYPHRO

socraTes. Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty ; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

socraTes. Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when.

EUTHYPHRO. That is true.

socraTEs. Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, youare right about this, Socrates, in the main.

socrates. But I think, Futhyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTes. Come now, my dear Euthyphro, inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant, committed

PLATO

φόνος γενόμενος, EvvdeGels ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔ ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπι- σκήπτεσθαι φόνου τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί: ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί por σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν. κἂν μοι ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαί σοι. .

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω: ὅτι cot δοκῶ τῶν δι- καστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι. ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον ὅτι, ὡς ἀδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν περ axovwal γέ μου λέγοντος.

1]. soKpaTHs. “AAD ἀκούσονται, ἐάν περ εὖ δοκῇς λέγειν. τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ" εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα. map Εὐθύφρονος, τί ποτ᾿ ἐστὶν τὸ ὅσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισὲς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ἄν: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὡρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή" τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὃν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη" ὥστε τούτου ἀφίημί σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον' εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγείσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων. ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,

EUTHYPHRO

a murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Come, try to show me clearly about this, that the gods surely believe that this conduct is right ; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live.

EUTHYPHRO. But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates ; though I could show you quite clearly.

socraTes. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

EUTHYPHRO. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.

socrates. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: “If Euthy- phro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and

PLATO

« a A a 4 e \ a ΓΝ ὁ , ᾽

ως ὁ MEV ἂν TTAVTES οἱ θεοὶ μίισωσιν, QAVOOLOYV ἐστιν, a

δ᾽ ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον: ὃ δ᾽ ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα; ἄρ᾽ οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὡρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;

Εὐθύφρων. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾷστά με διδάξεις ὃ ὑπέσχον.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῶμεν καὶ οὕτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχώμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φῇ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω, ξυγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Σκεπτέον' οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

12. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Tay’, ayabé, βέλτιον εἰσό- μεθα, ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε. apa τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιόν ἐστιν;

Εὐθύφρων. Οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅ τι λέγεις, @ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομέν τ φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἕτερα;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ, ᾿Εγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

EUTHYPHRO

say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholi- ness?

EUTHYPHRO. What is to hinder, Socrates?

socraTes. Nothing, so far as 1 am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.

socRATEs. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement ?

EuTHYPHRO. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.

socraTes. We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

euTHyPHRO. 1 don’t know what you mean, Socrates.

socrates. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.

xuTHYPHRO. I think I understand.

PLATO

ΣΏΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν Ti ἐστιν καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν; ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; , , , \ , ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγε δή μοι, πότερον TO φερόμενον, , ’ὔ ΄ 5 “Aa 3... ἢ διότε φέρεται, φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι’ ἄλλο τι; Εὐθύφρων. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δή, διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον, διότι ὁρᾶται; ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε. ᾽ »Ἄ “ . , , / > ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, \ rm Cain ᾽ \ Ne 2 , ’ dan διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον: οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, \ a ” ἢ \ , » \ a διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον: οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον. ἄρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι, εἴ τι γίγνεται ἤ Te πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν 5» “ ἐστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν 43 ΣῸΣ ὦ , ᾽ ,ὔ , ᾽ > Ψ ἐστιν! οὐδ᾽ ὅτι πάσχον ἐστί, πάσχει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν: ἢ οὐ ξυγχωρεῖς οὕτω; ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. “Eywre. > “ Ν Ν . Uy a U ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνό- μενόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι VITO του; ΕΥ̓Θύφρων. [Πάνυ γε. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ \ , ? “ , , 2 an TA προτερα" οὐχ OTL φιλούμενον ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον; ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Ανάγκη.

EUTHYPHRO

socraTEs. ‘Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different ?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

socraTEs. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason ἢ

EUTHYPHRO. No, for that reason.

socraTes. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTes. Then one does not see it because it is a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo-_because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

EUTHYPHRO, I agree.

socraTes. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something ?

EUTHYPHRO Certainly.

socraTes. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?

EUTHYPHRO. Obviously.

PLATO

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ti δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου,

D ὦ Εὐθύφρον; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων,

ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;

Εὐθύφρων. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Apa διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι᾿ ἄλλο τι;

ΕΥ̓Θύφρων. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Διότε ἄρα ὅσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιόν ἐστιν;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. βοικεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, φιλοῦμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ θεοφιλές.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. [Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Τυὐθύφρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅτε ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτε ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διότι φιλεῖται, ὅσιον εἶναι" ἡ γάρ;

Εὐθύφρων. Nai.

18. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δέ ye θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ANN οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αλλ᾽ εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν, ὦ φίλε ὐθύφρον, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο, τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖ- σθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ

1 τὸ θεοφιλές added by Schanz following Bast. 33

EUTHYPHRO

socraTes. Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro? It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socraTes. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO. No, for this reason.

socraTes. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

EUTHYPHRO. I think so.

socraTEs. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

socraTes. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.

EUTHYPHRO. How so, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socraTes. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.

EUTHYPHRO. Very true.

socrates. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because

PLATO

A X A a -_ A ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ἦν" νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἑτέρω ὄντε 3 f \ \ 4 “ a 3 \ ἀλλήλων. TO μὲν yap, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι: τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Ἐθύφρον,

, \ σ a / ? wv \ ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, 6 TL TOT ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν 3 , 2 a » ΄ -“ ΄ οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος

a ie ¢ / fal \

δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, 6 TL πέπονθε τοῦτο TO oe a ¢e \ 4 A Ψ NE Be: ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν" ὅ τι δὲ ὄν, Υ̓͂ 4 2 4 ΄. / ᾽ ΄ οὔπω εἶπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀποκρύψη, > \ / ᾽ Ν 3 > nm / a SSG ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, TL ποτε ὃν TO ὅσιον ” a ἘΝ a ν ς \ ΄ ᾽ \ εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὁτιδὴ πάσχει: οὐ γὰρ

\ ΄ ’ ᾿ > 3) aN 7 ; περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα: ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲ προθύμως, τὶ

XN ,

ἐστιν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε,

ΝΜ a

a“ / a ὅπως σοι εἴπω ὃ νοῶ. περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν

f / ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἱδρυσώμεθα αὐτό. aA ε / / 2 > , ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύ- » > / \ e \ » ,ὔ φρον, ἔοικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. \ 2 \ > \ ? \ 5» 2 ἊΝ ’ θέ » καὶ εἰ μὲν αὑτὰ ἔγω ἔλεγον Kal ἐτιθέμὴην, ἰσως f 4 3 x \ \ ἄν με ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς Apa Kal ἐμοὶ κατὰ THY “ »Μ ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδι- , δράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἄν τις αὐτὰ a a , \ ‘ Cave: / 5 / » ΄, θῇ: νῦν δέ---σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν: ἄλλου δή a / τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. ov yap ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ. A / ον > “ εὐθυῴρων. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ

EUTHYPHRO

it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are entirely different from each other. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned some- thing that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens to it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness ?

EUTHYPHRO. But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won't stay where we put it.

socRATEs. Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my! ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won't stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded ; for they won't stay fixed, as you yourself see.

EUTHYPHRO. I think the jest does very well as it

1 Socrates was the son of a sculptor and was himself educated to be asculptor. This is doubtless the reason for his reference to Daedalus as an ancestor. Daedalus was a

half mythical personage whose statues were said to have been so lifelike that they moved their eyes and walked about.

PLATO

σκώμματος, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ “λεγόμενα' τὸ γὰρ περιιέναι τούτοις ' τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι, ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὃ Δαίδαλος" ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος “γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην το- σούτῳ, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὑτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ copes. ἐβου- λόμην γὰρ ἄν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἱδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἅδην" ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι,; ὅπως ἄν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμῃς. ἰδὲ γάρ, εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Ap οὗν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅ ὅσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο;

Εὐθύφρων. Οὐχ ἕπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μουν εἶ οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἢ 7 ὅσῳ σοφώτερος" ἀλλ᾽, ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ μακάριε,

1 χούτοις is bracketed by Schanz following Stallbaum. 2 ξυμπροθυμήσομαι δεῖξαι the manuscripts. Schanz follows Hermann in omitting δεῖξαι.

EUTHYPHRO

is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.

socraTES. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as _ it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.

EUTHYPHRO, I do.

socRATES. But is everything that is right also holy? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?

EUTHYPHRO. I can’t follow you, Socrates.

socraTes. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser ; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert

PLATO

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Ἕ € ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας"

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ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἰ]άνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους A / ‘ Μ \ na ¢ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μέν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν.

οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "AAN ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος 4 a εἶναι: ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός TL πρᾶγμα καὶ

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ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὗν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ap’ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν" ἵνα γὰρ

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πλέον γάρ, οἶμαι, δέος αἰδοῦς: μόριον yap αἰδὼς δέους, ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵνα περ ἀριθμός, ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν, ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἕπει γάρ που νῦν γε;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ᾽ ΄ 4 7 / », δ: ὦ A ,ᾳ ἠρώτων, ἄρα ἵνα δίκαιον, ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον, ἢ ἵνα

Ἂς a Μ \ , 4 \ , » μὲν ὅσιον, ἔνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ

EUTHYPHRO

yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet! said, who wrote: “Zeus the creator, him who made all things, thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence.” Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how ἢ

EUTHYPHRO. By all means.

socraTEs. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don’t you think so, too?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTes. But J think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, he does fear.

socraTES. Then it is not correct to say “ where fear is, there also is reverence.’ On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?

EUTHYPHRO. Perfectly.

socRATEs. It was something of this sort that 1 meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is,

1 Stasinus, author of the ‘‘Cypria” (Fragm. 20, ed. Kinkel).

PLATO

πανταχοῦ ὅσιον" μύριον yap τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;

Εὐθύφρων. Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω. φαίνει γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

14. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. “Opa δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δή, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὧν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἄν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ἢ, ἀλλ᾽ ἰσοσκελής" ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

EreréPan. “Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσε- βείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμα- θηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώ- κρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν: τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

15. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐῤθύ- φρον, φαίνει λέγειν: ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι. τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὔπω ξυνίημι ἥντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἷαί περ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαί εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεούς. λέγομεν γάρ που--οἷον φαμέν, ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ ἱππικός" ἡ γάρ;

EUTHYPHRO

there also is the right; but holiness is not every- where where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent ?

EUTHYPHRO. No, I agree; for I think the state- ment is correct.

socraTes. Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, “that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two” ; or don’t you agree?

EUTHYPHRO. I agree.

socrates. Now try iu your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.

EUTHYPHRO. This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.

socrATes. I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for 1 do not yet understand what you mean by “attention.” I don’t suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?

PLATO

Ererepon. Ilavu ye.

SQKPATHS. Η yap που ἱππικὴ ἵππων θερα- πεία.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Nat.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θερα- πεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Οὕτω.

SOKPATHS. ‘H yap που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ἩΗ δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. [νυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἢ δὲ δὴ ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον; οὕτω λέγεις;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Εγωγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταὐτὸν διαπράττεται; οἷον τοιόνδε' ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελείᾳ τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δή, ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίγνονται’ ἢ οὐ δο- κοῦσί σοι;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. “Epourye.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνη- γετικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως: ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἴει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι;

Ererepan. Μὰ Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αλλ' ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

SOKPATHS. Ἢ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης θεραπεία οὖσα θεῶν ὠφέλειά τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς

EUTHYPHRO

EuTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socrATES. Then horsemanship is the art of at- tending to horses?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socrATEs. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman ?

EUTHYPHRO. ‘That is so.

socraTEs. ‘Then the huntsman’s art is the art of attending to dogs?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socraTes. And the oxherd’s art is that of attending to oxen?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTes. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes,

socrATES. Now does attentfon always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman’s art are bene- fited and made better ; or don’t you think so?

EUTNYPHRO, Yes, I do.

socrates. And dogs are benefited by the hunts- man’s art and oxen by the oxherd’s and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, I do not.

socraTEs. But for its benefit ?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

socraTes. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and

PLATO

ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσαις ἄν, ws ἐπειδάν τι ὅσιον ποιῇς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζξει;

ΕΥ̓Θύφρων. Μὰ Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΏΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οἶμαί σε τοῦτο λέγειν" πολλοῦ καὶ δέω" ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

Εὐθύφρων. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες" οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἶεν’ ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶι θεραπεία εἴη ἂν ἡ ὁσιότης; :

Εὐθύφρων. “Husrep, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω' ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.

Εὐθύφρων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

16. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργον ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὖσα ὑπηρετική; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἴει;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ~“Eyore.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική ἐστιν;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ, Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡων. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ἄριστε: ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπη- ρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστά γε φὴς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΥθύφρων. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, τί ποτέ ἐστιν

EUTHYPHRO

makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?

EuTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, not I.

sucraTes. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by “attention to the gods” just because I did not think you meant anything like that.

EUTHYFHRO. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.

socratEs. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness ?

EUTHYPHRO. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.

socrates. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly.

socraTEs. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socraTes. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?

EUTHYPHRO. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.

socrates. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socraTes. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish ? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. And what I say is true, Socrates.

socraTes. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me,

ι4

PLATO

ἐκεῖνο TO πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται" ἢ οὔ;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. [Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

ΣΏΚΡΑΤΗΣ. [Πολλὰ δέ γ᾽, οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοί: add’ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δή; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐργασίας; ἔνθ ας ; :

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Kal odtyov σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν" τόδε μέντοι σοι ἁπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων" τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

17. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἢ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι" δῆλος el. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἦσθα, ἀπετράπον" ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δέ---ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρῶντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ" τί δὴ αὖ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ

ξ2

EUTHYPHRO

what is that glorious result which the gods accom- plish by using us as servants?

EUTHYPHRO. ‘They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.

socraTes. Yes, and so do generals, my friend ; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

socraTes. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results ; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land ?

EUTHYPHRO, Certainly.

socraTes. But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work ?

EUTHYPHRO. I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states ; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.

socraTes. You might, if you wished, Euthyphro have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or

PLATO

τὴν ὁσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δ᾽ εὔχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;

Εὐθύφρων. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Επιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΕΥθύφρων. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυνῆκας ὃ εἶπον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὥστε οὐ

ae Sng χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὅ τι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλά μοι λέξον, τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φὴς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις;

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. “Evywrye.

18. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη, ὧν δεόμεθα παρ᾽ ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

Εὐθύφρων. ᾿Αλλὰ τί;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὖ ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικὸν Ὑ ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῳ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύ.- φρον, τέχνη ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. Εμπορική, εἰ οὕτως ἥδιόν σοι ὀνο- μάζειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἥδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγ: χανει ἀληθὲς ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὧν Tap’

EUTHYPHRO

holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socraTes. And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods and praying is asking from them ?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly, Socrates.

socraTes. Then holiness, according to this defini- tion, would be a science of giving and asking.

EUTHYPHRO. You understand perfectly what 1 said, Socrates.

socraTes. Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? Do you say that it consists in asking from them and giving to them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

socnaTes. Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them what we need from them?

EUTHYPHRO. What else?

socrates. And the right way of giving, to present them with what they need from us? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not need.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates.

socraTEes. Then holiness would be an art of barter between gods and men?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so.

socraTEs. 1 don’t like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from

PLATO

e A 3 a \ \ , \ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἃ μὲν yap διδόασι, παντὶ δῆλον" οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν: ἃ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τἀγαθὰ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐδέν; "A ᾽ v Ss Ss / \ θ \ EYOYSPON. AX οἷει, ὦ Σώκρατες, TOUS θεοὺς ’ -“ > δι tA A 3 e Lal 4 ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἃ Tap ἡμῶν λαμβάνου- σιν; ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλὰ τί δήποτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς; ’ὔ ᾽ w Μ a / \ / ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί δ᾽ οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε Kal γέρα καί, ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις; ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστιν, ὦ Εὐθύ- \ ¢ 3 3 3 \ ᾽ / 3 A , φρον, τὸ ὅσιον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς; ? v 4 Everepan. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων ye μάλιστα φίλον. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον. ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Μάλιστά γε. 19. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐάν id , σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, ee \ ᾿] ΄, X ,ὔ , > \ καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὧν πολύ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαι- δάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰ- / icf € , ς an \ / ’ σθάνει, ὅτε ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥκει; μέμνησαι γάρ που, ὅτε ἐν τῷ ἔμ- προσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταὐτὸν ea > 4 > Ὁ ? Δ Ὰ > , ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, adr ἕτερα ἀλλήλων" ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. "Βγωγε. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Nov οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτε τὸ τοῖς

EUTHYPHRO

the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us ἢ

EUTHYPHRO. Why you don’t suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?

socraTes. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?

EUTHYPHRO. What else than honour and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?

socraTes. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I think it is precious, above all things.

socraTes. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTes. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round ina circle? Ordo you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I remember.

socraTes. Then don’t you see that now you say

PLATO θεοῖς φίλον φὴς ὅσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δ᾽ ἄλλο τι ἡ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται ἢ οὔ;

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. ᾿ Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὡμολο- γοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.

ΕΥ̓ΘΎΦΡΩΝ. "Ἐοίκεν.

20. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔξ a ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκε- πτέον, τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον" ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω, ἑκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μή με ἀτιμάσῃς, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὅ τι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γάρ, εἶπερ τις ἄλλος ἀν- θρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἤδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν ποτε

ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην

πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς a av ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἠσχύνθης. νῦν δὲ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἴει εἰδέναι τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μή: εἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε EvOvdpov, καὶ μὴ ἀπο- κρύψη ὅ τι αὐτὸ ἡγεῖ.

ΕΥ̓ΘΥΦΡΩΝ. [is αὖθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες" νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καί μοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἷα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε! ἀπ᾽ ἐλπίδος με καταβαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθὼν τά τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη παρ᾽ Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ᾽ ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάξω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.

EUTHYPHRO

that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

socraTEs. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.

socnaTes. Then we must begin again at the be- ginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if any one does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.

EUTHYPHRO. Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.

socraTEes. Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus’s indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.

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ΠΈΣ APOLOGY

INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

In the spring of 399 B.c., when Socrates was seventy years old, he was accused of impiety and of corrupting the youth. The chief accuser was Meletus, who was seconded by Anytus and Lyco. In the Euthyphro Meletus is spoken of as an insig- nificant youth, and in the Apology he is said to have been incensed by Socrates’ criticism of the poets. Nothing further is known of him, though he may be identical with the Meletus mentioned in the Frogs (1302) of Aristophanes as a poet of Skola. The statement of Diodorus Siculus (XIV, 37), that the Athenians, overcome by repentance for their injustice to Socrates, put Meletus and Anytus to death, de- serves no credence. Anytus, who is one of the characters in the Meno, was a man of substance, who had served as general of the Athenian armies and had recently been active in expelling the Thirty Tyrants. He was a bitter enemy of all the sophists, and, according to the author of the Apology attributed to Xenophon, he had been irritated by Socrates’ criticism of his conduct in employing his son in his tannery, when the young man was fitted for higher things. Lyco was charged by the comic poet Eupolis with being of foreign descent, and the comic poet Cratinus refers to his poverty and effeminacy, though Aristophanes (Wasps, 1301) mentions him among

INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

aristocrats. He seems to have been a person of no great importance.

Cases involving religion came under the jurisdic- tion of the King Archon, to whom Meletus submitted his indictment of Socrates (see the beginning of the Euthyphro), and such cases, like others, were tried before the heliastic court, which consisted altogether of six thousand citizens chosen by lot, six hundred from each of the ten tribes. The court did not however, usually sit as a whole, but was divided, so that cases were tried before smaller bodies, consisting generally of five hundred jurymen or judges, though sometimes the number was tess, as four hundred or two hundred, and sometimes. more, as one thousand. One additional judge was added to these even numbers to avoid a tie. Socrates was tried before a court of 501 (Apology, 36a). If the accuser did not receive a fifth part of the votes cast in a case of this kind, he was subject to a fine of 1000 drachmae (about £35 or $175). No penalty was prescribed by law for the offence with which Socrates was charged. After Socrates was found guilty the penalty still remained to be determined. The rule was that the accused, after conviction, should propose a counter penalty, the court being obliged to choose one of the two penalties proposed (Apology, 368-388); no compromise was permitted.

The question has frequently been asked, whether the Apology is substantially the speech made by Socrates before the court or a product of Plato’s imagination. In all probability it is essentially the speech delivered by Socrates, though it may well be that the actual speech was less finished and less charming than that which Plato has reported. The

INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

legal procedure is strictly followed, and the manner of speech is that which was, as we know from Plato and also from Xenophon, usual with Socrates. There is nothing inconsistent with what we know of Socrates, and no peculiarly Platonic doctrine is suggested. The purpose of the dialogue, or rather, of the speech, for it is hardly a dialogue, is to present Socrates in a true and favourable light to posterity, and that end could hardly be gained by publishing a fiction as the speech which many Athenians must have remembered at the time of publication, which was, in all proba- bility, not long after the trial.

In form the 4 pology, if we disregard the two short addresses after the conviction and the condemn- ation, follows the rules in vogue for public speeches. A brief introduction is followed by the narrative and argument, after which the speech closes with a brief appeal to the judges and to God (36p). It conforms to Plato’s own rule (Phaedrus 264 c), that every discourse should, like a living being, have its middle parts and its members, all in proper agree- ment with each other and with the whole, which is, after all, the rule of common sense, followed for the most part even by those teachers of rhetoric whose elaborate subdivisions and high-sounding nomen- clature Plato ridicules in the Phaedrus (266 E-267 p). The two shorter addresses after the case had been decided against Socrates cannot be expected to stand as independent and complete speeches; they are, and must be, treated as supplementary and sub- ordinate to the speech delivered before the first adverse vote. Yet they are symmetrically arranged and their topics are skilfully presented. A perora- tion would hardly be appropriate before the last of

INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

these and the last itself needs no formal introduc- tion ; it serves as a fitting conclusion for the entire discourse. As suchit isa brilliant example of oratori- cal composition.

The high moral character and genuine religious faith of Socrates are made abundantly clear through- out this whole discourse. It would seem almost incredible that the Athenian court voted for his con- demnation, if we did not know the fact. His condemn- ation is to be explained by the general hostility to the sophists. Socrates was, to be sure, not a sophist, though Aristophanes in the Clouds selects him as the representative of that profession to be ridiculed. He did not teach for pay and did not promise any definite result from his instruction. He did not investigate natural phenomena or claim to ensure the political or financial success of his hearers; his aim was to show the way to righteousness, to the perfection of the individual soul. This seems harmless enough, but Socrates endeavoured to lead men to righteousness by making them think, and thinking, especially on matters of religion, is not welcomed by the slothful or the conservative. The mere fact that he was a leader of thought caused Socrates to be confounded with the sophists who were also leaders of thought, and were, chiefly, perhaps, for that reason, regarded with suspicion and hostility. Moreover, Socrates claimed to possess a daimontion, or spiritual monitor, which guided his actions. He did not, so far as we know, attribute a distinct personality to this inner voice, but his belief in it caused him to be accused of introducing “ new spiritual beings ” or divinities and of disbelieving in the gods of the state, although he was apparently punctilious in religious observances.

INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

His method had also, without doubt, aroused many personal antagonisms (Apology 21 c-23.). Probably Meletus and the judges who voted for the condemn- ation of Socrates believed that they were acting in the interest of religion and piety, though their verdict has not been approved by later generations.

Editions of the Apology are very numerous. One of the best is that of Cron (Apology and Crito), upon which the excellent edition of Dyer is based (revised, 1908, by Seymour). Another good edition is that of J. Adam.

St. 1. Ρ. 17

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

[ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

1. Ὅ te μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, πεπόν- θατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ vida’ ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθό- μήν’ οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἕν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν pnd ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν" ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθη- ναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμη- μένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν: πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως:

THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES AT HIS TRIAL

[ETHICAL]

How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know; but I, for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk; and yet there is hardly a word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told—when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, because I was a clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker who speaks the truth ; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator—not after their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me nothing but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For 1 trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else.

PLATO

οὐδὲ yap ἂν δηπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, THOSE TH ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι' ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι’ ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς ἑβδομήκοντα" ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔ ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν av, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος. ἐτύγχανον ὦν, ξυνεγυγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥ ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν' ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη" αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή: δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἶμι ἀπολογή- σασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατη-

¥ \ γόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὺς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ ἼΑνυτον, καΐπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς" ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, of ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε 1 Schanz brackets ψευδῆ, following Hirschig.

ἘΠΕΟΆΡΟΘΕΘΟΥ

For surely it would not be fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers’ tables, where many of you have heard me, and else- where, not to be surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have come before the court, although I am seventy years old; I am therefore an utter foreigner te the manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner in which I had been brought up, so now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech—for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better—and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is Just or not ; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator’s virtue is to speak the truth.

First then it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against me, and the first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. For many accusers have risen up against me before you, who have been speaking for a long time, many years already, and saying nothing true; and I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, though these also are dangerous ; but those others are more dangerous, gentlemen, who gained your belief, since they got

PLATO

καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ 1 οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ws ἔστι τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοί εἰσίν μου κατήγοροι" οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίξειν, ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἡ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ᾽ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῳ- διοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν" ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισ- μένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντων ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν" οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, ods ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι" καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ

1 After ἐμοῦ the MSS. read μᾶλλον ‘‘ more” or ‘‘ rather.” Schanz reads μὰ τόν---, ‘‘ by—,” Hermann brackets μᾶλλον and also οὐδὲν ἀληθές, Wohlrab omits μᾶλλον.

THE APOLOGY

hold of most of you in childhood, and accused me without any truth, saying, “There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger.” These, men of Athens, who have spread abroad this report, are my dangerous enemies. For those who hear them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods. Besides, these accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth, most of you in childhood), and the case they prosecuted went utterly by default, since nobody appeared in defence. But the most unreasonable thing of all is this, that it is not even possible to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies. And all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross- question when nobody answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes of my accusers—one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as 1 was just saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter ; for you heard them making their charges first and with

PLATO

τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. elev’ ἀπολογητέον δή, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέ- σθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπο- λογούμενον' οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

8. ᾿Αναχλάβωμεν. οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἡ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν" τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ δια- βάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντω- μοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν" Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ “περιεργάξεται, ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄχλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν" ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ ᾽Αρι- στοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι- φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάξων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν. μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμε!" ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρ- έχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ

1 §chanz brackets μή πως. . . φύγοιμι.

THE APOLOGY

much greater force than these who made them later. Well, then, I must make a defence, men of Athens, and must try in so short a time to remove from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defence; but I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as is pleasing to God, the law must be obeyed and I must make a defence.

Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the false prejudice against me has arisen, in which Meletus trusted when he brought this suit against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: “Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these same things.” Something of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes’ comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonour upon such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great a charge as that !),—but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. And I offer as witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another

PLATO

φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγο- μένου: πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν: φράξετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἣ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου" καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε, ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν καὶ τἄλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

4, ᾿Αλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν,' οὐδέ γ᾽ εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα TpaTTopat, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τὸ εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας 0 "Helos. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός Ἰ ἐστὶν 3 ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσιν τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε copes, ὃ ὃν ἐγὼ ῃσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα" ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου: τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην --ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε--- Ὦ Καλλία, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τὼ υἱέε πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν. ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃ ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτὼ καλώ τε καὶ ἀγαθὼ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν' ἦν δ᾽ ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωρ- γικῶν" νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖ» ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτη:

1 Schanz brackets ἐστιν, 3. Schanz brackets οἷός τ᾿ ἐστὶν.

THE APOLOGY

and to tell, all those of you who ever heard me con- versing—and there are many such among you—now tell, if anyone ever heard me talking much or little about such matters. And from this you will perceive that such are also the other things that the multitude say about me.

But in fact none of these things are true, and if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and that I make money by it, that is not true either. Although this also seems to me to be a fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis are. For each of these men, gen- tlemen, is able to go into any one of the cities and persuade the young men, who can associate for nothing with whomsoever they wish among their own fellow citizens, to give up the association with those men and to associate with them and pay them money and be grateful besides.

And there is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I learned was in town; for I happened to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked him—for he has two sons—*“ Callias,” said I, “ if your two sons had happened to be two colts or two calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an overseer who would make them excellent in the kind of excellence proper to them; and he would be a horse-trainer or a husbandman; but now, since they are two human beings, whom have you in mind to get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind

PLATO

ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπι- στήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι. γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστιν τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε, 7 δ᾽ ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὔηνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εηνον ἐμα- κάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην. τε καὶ ἡ βρυνόμην a ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι.

δ: ὝὙπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τίς ὑμῶν ἴσως" ᾿Αλλ᾽, Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ sou βολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; ov yap δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄχλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ΄ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί" λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχε- διάξωμεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι, τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ “μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, δι᾿ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ 7 διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι “γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός" οὗτοι δὲ τάχ᾽ ἄν, ods ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείξω τινὰ ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἐ 2 οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω. οὐ τὰ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις φησὶ

1 Schanz brackets εἰ μή τι... πολλοί,

THE APOLOGY

of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone,” said I, “or not?” “Certainly,” said he. ‘ Who,” said I, “and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?” “Evenus,’ he said, “Socrates, from Paros, five minae.” And [I called Evenus blessed, if he really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.

Now perhaps someone might rejoin: “ But, Socrates, what is the trouble about you? Whence have these prejudices against you arisen? For certainly this great report and talk has not arisen while you were doing nothing more out of the way than the rest, unless you were doing something other than most people; so tell us what it is, that we may not act unadvisedly in your case.” The man who says this seems to me to be right, and I will try to show you what it is that has brought about my reputation and aroused the prejudice against me. So listen. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you.

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom. For perhaps I really am wise in this wisdom; and these men, perhaps, of whom 1 was just speaking, might be wise in some wisdom greater than human, or I don’t know what to say; for I do not understand it, and whoever says I do, is lying and speaking to

PLATO

ψεύδεταί τε Kai ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν" οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε kal! ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δή, οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ᾽ ὅ τι ὁρμήσειεν. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι: καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυ- βεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες" ἤ ἤρετο γὰρ δή, εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώ- τερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τε- τελεύτηκεν.

6. Σκέψασθε δέ, ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω" μέχλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ᾿ἐνεθυμούμην. οὑτωσί: τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὦν' τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί ye οὐ yap θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει. ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.

Ἦλθον ἐπί Twa τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι,

ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἴ περπου, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ

1 Schanz brackets ἑταῖρός τε καὶ.

8ο

THE APOLOGY

arouse prejudice against me. And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question ; and, gentlemen, don’t make a disturbance at what I say ; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to my- self: “ What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him.” And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows.

I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the

PLATO

σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ᾽ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον---ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, -καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ," ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ᾽ οὔ' κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἴουτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ᾽ οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ᾽ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιξόμην, ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐ ἐγὼ TOPWTEPOS εἰμι" κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν “οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τί εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι" ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γέ σμικρῷ τινε αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ᾽ ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καί μοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε" καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

de Mera ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς 7 a, αἰσθανόμε- νος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος. καὶ δεδιὼς ὅ ὅτι ἀπηχθα- νόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι" ἰτέον οὖν σκο- ποῦντι τὸν χρησμόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι: δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ δλέγειν' ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον' οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστον

1 Schanz brackets καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ. 3 Schanz brackets καὶ,

THE APOLOGY

oracle “This man is wiser than I, but you said [ was wisest.” So examining this man—for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the public men with regard to whom 1 had this kind of experience, men of Athens—and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then 1 tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. Asa result, I became hate- ful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, “I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. | seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either.” From him I went to another of those who were reputed to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true ; and there I became hateful both to him and to many others.

After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and fear- ing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the god’s business of the highest importance. So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know anything. And by the Dog, men of Athens—for I must speak the truth to you—this, I do declare, was my experience: those who had the most repu- tation seemed to me to be almost the most deficient,

PLATO

ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ξητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι, εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι ἁ ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, iva! μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν ᾿διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ᾽ αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἅ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτούς, τί λέγοιεν, ἕν᾽ ἅμα τί καὶ μανθάνοιμι Tap αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ: ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρ- ὄντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιή- κεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτε οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες" καὶ ἅμα ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἄλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ 5 οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ᾧπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

8. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας na" ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνήδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ᾽ ἤδη ὅτι εὑρήσοιμι πολλὰ

1 Schanz, following Stephanus, inserts μὴ after ἵνα. 2 Schanz inserts αὐτῶν after τῷ αὐτῷ.

THE APOLOGY

as I investigated at the god’s behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I performed my Herculean labours, so to speak, in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the public men I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed io tell you the truth, gentle- men ; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognised this, that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excelled the public men. Finally then I went to the hand-workers. For I was conscious that I knew practically nothing, but I knew I should find that they knew many fine

PLATO

καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτον μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ᾽ ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔ ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡμιουργοί"" la τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἄλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ ,πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν' ὥστ᾽ ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, “πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὧν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, OTL μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

9. 1 κ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί poe γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω: τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐ ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός: καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ᾽ οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι, ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ἕητῶ

1 Schanz brackets καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί.

THE APOLOGY

things. And in this I was not deceived; they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good artisans also seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets; because of practising his art well, each one thought he was very wise in the other most important mat- ters, and this folly of theirs obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle whether I should prefer to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly, or to be in both respects as they are. I replied then to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.

Now from this investigation, men of Athens, many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: “ Human wisdom is of little or no value.” And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes me an example, as if he were to say: “This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognises that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom.”

Therefore I am still even now going about and

PLATO

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι: καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

10. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολου- θοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλου- σιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξε- ταξομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετά- Sew κἄπειτα, οἶμαι, εὑρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων. μὲν εἰδέναι τε ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξεταξόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίξονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ αὑτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς ὠκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους" καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι ace ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, anne ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχει a ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα. καὶ τὰ ὑπο γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἴομαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, OTL κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὗν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως " καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμππτεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦ WTA Kal πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ

1 Schanz reads ἀμφιγνοοῦσιν, ‘‘ they are in doubt.” 2 Schanz reads ξυντεταμένως, ‘* earnestly.”

THE APOLOGY

searching and investigating at the god’s behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own, but am in vast poverty on account of my service to the god.

And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they under- take to examine others ; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know some- thing, but know little or nothing. Asa result, there- fore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that “ Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth.”

And when anyone asks them “by doing or teach- ing what?’ they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, “the things in the air and the things beneath the earth” and “not to believe in the gods” and “to make the weaker argument the stronger.” For they would not, I fancy, care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. Since, then, they are jealous of their honour and energetic and numerous and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with vehement slanders.

PLATO

Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ “Avutos καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, “Avutos δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολι- τικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων: ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ᾽ ἄν, εἰ οἷός 7 εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τἀληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ᾽ ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἷδα σχεδόν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι: ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν ἐάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

11. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως bE Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς ods ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν: τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἕν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγ- μάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι,

1 Schanz follows Cobet in bracketing καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

THE APOLOGY

From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men, and Lycon on account of the orators; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevari- cating. And yet I know pretty well that [am making myself hated by just that conduct; which is also a proof that I am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.

Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is a sufficient defence before you; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. Itis about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he cor- rupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings.

Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this accusation. He says I am a wrong- doer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit, pretending to be zealous and concerned about things

PLATO

ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

12. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ ὧ Μέλητε, εἰπέ' ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; “Eywye. ἴθι δή νυν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φής, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ" καὶ κατηγορεῖς" τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν. ὁρᾷς, @ Μέλητε, ὃ ὅτι συγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ “αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ “δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ᾽ εἰπέ, ὦ ᾿γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους “ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Ids λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἵδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἃ ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ᾽ οὔ; “Amavtes. Ed γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δή; οἵδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὔ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν “πῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί,: διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κἀκεῖνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾿Αθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλήν γ᾽

1 Cobet’s suggestion of εἰς τουτουσὶ for τουτοισὶ is adopted

by Schang. 1 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing of ἐκκλησιασταί.

THE APOLOGY

for which he never cared at all. And that this is so I will try to make plain to you also.

Come here, Meletus, tell me: don’t you consider it of great importance that the youth be as good as possible? “Ido.” Come now, tell these gentlemen who makes them better? For it is evident that you know, since you care about it. For you have found the one who corrupts them, as you say, and you bring me before these gentlemen and accuse me; and now, come, tell who makes them better and inform them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and cannot tell? And yet does it not seem to you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it? But tell, my good man, who makes them better? “The laws.” But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but what man, who knows in the first place just this very thing, the laws. ‘These men, Socrates, the judges.” What are you saying, Meletus? Are these gentlemen able to instruct the youth, and do they make them better? “Certainly.” All, or some of them and others not? “All.” Well said, by Hera, and this is a great plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about this? Do these listeners make them better, or not? “These also.’ And how about the senators? ‘The senators also.” But, Meletus, those in the assembly, the assembly-men, don’t corrupt the youth, do they? or dothey also all make them better? “They also.” All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you mean? “ Very decidedly, that is

PLATO

ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι" ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς μέν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός T ὧν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί" οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ

χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάν- των ἕῴων; πάντως δήπου, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ ἔΑνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε' πολλὴ γὰρ av τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, @ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώ- ποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτε οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

1 Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὧ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὧ τᾶν, ἀπόκριναι" οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; Wavy γε. "ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι “μᾶλλον 7) ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὦ ἀγαθέ: καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; ‘Exovta ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὦν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν,

THE APOLOGY

what I mean.”’ You have condemned me to great unhappiness! But answer me; does it seem to you to be so in the case of horses, that those who make them better are all mankind, and he who injures them some one person? Or, quite the opposite of this, that he who is able to make them better is some one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with and use horses, injure them? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in that of all other animals? Certainly it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree; for it would be a great state of blessedness in the case of the youth if one alone corrupts them, and the others do them good. But, Meletus, you show clearly enough that you never thought about the youth, and you exhibit plainly your own carelessness, that you have not cared at all for the things about which you hale me into court.

But besides, tell us, for heaven’s sake, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens, or bad? My friend, answer; for 1 am not asking anything hard. Do not the bad do some evil to those who are with them at any time and the good some good? “Certainly.”’ Is there then anyone who prefers to be injured by his associates rather than benefited ? Answer, my good man; for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be injured? “ Of course ποῦ. Come then, do you hale me in here on the ground that I am corrupting the youth and making them worse voluntarily or involun- tarily? ‘ Voluntarily I say.” What then, Meletus? Are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age, that you have recognized that the evil always do some evil to those nearest them, and the good some

PLATO

of δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν: ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα n / μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φὴς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ , = A 3 \ OX » » , πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώ- ’ πων οὐδένα' GAN ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, 2, / Ly ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε KAT ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, of νόμος ἐστὶν > 4 \ 4 , 2 3 ᾽ , εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μαθή- σεως. 14. ᾿Αλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν a Μ 3 a 2 Ἃ μὲ iid / 7, δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτε Μελήτῳ Tov- των οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. - - ’ὔ ἢ ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ’ ? ’ \ ’ \ / γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὺς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ a , ἊΝ , ’ , \ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Idvu μὲν aA / \ a οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Ipos αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ aA »" a e i Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπὲ ἔτει σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τούτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον ΄ λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίξω εἶναι θεούς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι 1 Schanz brackets καὶ ἀκουσίων.

THE APOLOGY

good ; whereas I have reached such a depth of ignor- ance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say? I don’t believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does! but either I do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is clear that if I am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here, where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.

But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as I said, that Meletus never cared much or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt the youth? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that it is by teach- ing this that I corrupt them? “ Very decidedly that is what I say.” Then, Meletus, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these gentlemen. For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not alto- gether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the

PLATO

οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἑτέρους, καὶ TOUT ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτε ἑτέρους" ἢ παντάπασί με φὴς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς. Ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες δικα- σταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. ᾿Αναξαγόρου " οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ ᾿Αναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζο- μενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆ- ται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ 3 οὐδένα νομί- Seu Fae εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν. "᾿Απιστός γ᾽ εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκό- λαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικεν γὰρ ὥσπερ αἴνυγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, apa γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὃ σοφὸς δὴ ἐ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζο- μένου καὶ ἐναντί᾽ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης 1 Schanz brackets ᾿Αναξαγόρου. 3 Schanz brackets δοκῶ.

THE APOLOGY

state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people. “That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all.” You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do? “No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth.” Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven’s sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god? “No, by Zeus, you don’t, not in the least.” You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man appears to me, men of Athens, to be very violent and unrestrained, and actually to have brought this indictment in a spirit of violence and unrestraint and _rashness. For he seems, as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test: “Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me?” For he appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say, “Socrates is a wrongdoer, because he does

PLATO

θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

15. Ἐυνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἡ μοι pai- νεται ταῦτα λέγειν: σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε: ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτη- σάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. "Ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ᾽ εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀπο- κρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυ- βείτω. ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν" εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι" ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις δαιμόνια μεν νομίζει πράγματ᾽ εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὥς ὠνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ᾽ οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά": ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντι- γραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δή- που πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν" οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή" ,τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φὴς ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε: Οὐκαῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι

roo

THE APOLOGY

not believe in gods, but does believe in gods.” And yet this is the conduct of a jester.

Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus, answer ; and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to make a dis- turbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.

Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, | say it to you and these others here. But answer at least the next question. Is there anyone who believes spiritual things exist, but does not believe in spirits? “There is not.” Thank you for replying reluctantly when forced by these gentle- men. Then you say that 1 believe in spiritual beings, whether new or old, and teach that belief; but then I believe in spiritual beings at any rate, according to your statement, and you swore to that in your indict- ment. But if I believe in spiritual beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits; is it not so? It is; for I assume that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not think the spirits are gods or children of gods? Yes, οὐ ποῦ “Certainly.” Then if I believe in spirits, as you say, if spirits are a kind of gods, that would be the puzzle and joke which I say you are uttering in saying that I, while I do not believe in gods, do believe in gods again, since I

10f

PLATO

πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι" εἰ δ᾽ αὖ οἱ δαίμονες, θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ ͵, Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα' ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὃ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας," οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

16. ᾿Αλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα" ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ " Ανυτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. & δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἥρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσειν" οὐ ν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις" εἶτ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον

1 Schanz brackets ταῦτα, which the MSS. give after od.

2 After ὡς the MSS., and Schanz, read od. It was omitted by Stephanus.

f Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

= Schanz, following Prammer, brackets μήτε ἥρωας.

THE APOLOGY

believe in spirits ; but if, on the other hand, spirits are a kind of bastard children of gods, by nymphs or by any others, whoever their mothers are said to be, what man would believe that there are children of gods, but no gods? It would be just as absurd as if one were to believe that there are children of horses and asses, namely mules, but no horses and asses. But, Meletus, you certainly must have brought this suit either to make a test of us or because you were at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could accuse me of; but there is no way for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible for the same person to believe in spiritual and divine existences and again for the same person not to believe in spirits or gods or heroes.

Well then, men of Athens, that I am not a wrong- doer according to Meletus’s indictment, seems to me not to need much of a defence, but what has been said is enough. But you may be assured that what I said before is true, that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many. This has con- demned many other good men, and 1 think will do so; and there is no danger that it will stop with me. But perhaps someone might say: “Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger of being put to death asa result?’’ But I should make to him a

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ἀντείποιμι, ὅτε οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ὴ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅ ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα, ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅ ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτή- κασιν οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ “Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι: ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρή- σεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ “Extopa ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ: αὐτίκα γάρ ToL, φησί, μεθ᾽ “Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος: ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλεγώ- ρήσε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὧν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, ησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵ ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρού- ρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κιν- δύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑ ὑπο- λογιξόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

17. ᾿Εγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην “εἰργασμένος, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔτατ- τον, ods ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε a ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν ᾿Αμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ

104

THE APOLOGY

just reply: “ You do not speak well, Sir, if you think a man in whom there is even a little merit ought to consider danger of life or death, and not rather regard this only, when he does things, whether the things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a good or a bad man. For according to your argument all the demigods would be bad who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis, who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring any disgrace, that when his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he was eager to slay Hector, something like this, I believe, ‘My son, if you avenge the death of your friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall die ; “for straightway,”’ she says, ‘after Hector, is death appointed unto thee”’ ;} he, when he heard this, made light of death and danger, and feared much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, and ‘Straightway,’ said he, ‘may I die,” after doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships, a burden of the earth.’? Do you think he considered death and danger?”

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth; wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by <his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace.

So I should have done a terrible thing, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me,

1 Homer, Iliad, xviii, 96. 2 Homer, Iliad, xviii, 98. Homer, Iliad, xviii, 104.

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PLATO

4 A Μ Μ σ \ Ν \ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος TIS Kal ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς 3 \ Se \ € ΄ wn , ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με a) an XN δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν n / πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς - ’, ἀληθῶς τότ᾽ ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικα- \ > A a στήριον, ὅτε οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ \ Ν , μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὦν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ » > \ ΜΝ ? \ a an A s ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα' δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. s \ \ » \ Ἁ ’ἤ 20.» ᾽ οἷδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ᾽ εἰ ΄-“ ΄ - τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν fal , lal ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ᾽ ws εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν “ ξ } id e fa] v γ7 ἡ a > αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ 3 > \ > 2 ΝΜ fd > “ Μ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως , A al 2 , > J διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, Kal εἰ δή τῳ , , ¥ [ὦ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ A a / εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν “Αἰδου οὕτω Kal οἴομαι > 30 Ἀ A 2 a \ 3 A n οὐκ εἰδέναι" τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν TH βελ- / A / ef \ \ / τίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν x a 2 “ ἐστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι Ἁ > κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ olda εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει ιν ’, 2O\ 3, σ »Ὸ» » οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι: ὥστε οὐδ᾽ εἴ a a > a με viv ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε ᾿Ανύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἤ, ἐπειδὴ “ A a [4 εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, a ’ » A λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη av ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει / ν Ν πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται, ---εἰ μοι πρὸς 106

THE APOLOGY

like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever. It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows whether death be not even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter also I differ from other men in this way, and if I were to say that I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not knowing very much about the other world, I do not think I know. But I do know that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god or man. So I shall never fear or avoid those things concerning which I do not know whether they are good or bad rather than those which I know are bad. And there- fore, even if you acquit me now and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought to trial at all, or since I was brought to trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that if I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly ruined by practising what I teach—if you should say

107

PLATO

ταῦτα εἴποιτε" ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν ᾿Ανύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ᾽ ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ξητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν" ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ: εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἀσπάξομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ἢ ὑμῖν, κ καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἃ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, ᾿Αθηναῖος ὦ ὦν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρη- μάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ L τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ᾽ ἄπειμι, GAN ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ, ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ ) νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅ ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω," ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυ- τέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖξον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε “χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς,

108

THE APOLOGY

to me in reply to this : “Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die’; if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, “ Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: “ Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?’’ Andif any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell

109

PLATO

ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτε οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη βλαβερά' εἰ δέ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε ᾿Ανύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ᾽ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούειν: καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε. ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ

ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον. ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς" ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἃ ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε ᾿Ανυτος" οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο' οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀπο- κτείνειε μέντ᾽ ἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακᾶ, ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθη- ναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρ- τητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψή- φισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιό-

110

THE APOLOGY

you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my conduct even if I am to die many times over.

Do not make a disturbance, men of Athens; continue to do what I asked of you, not to interrupt my speech by disturbances, but to hear me; and I believe you will profit by hearing. Now I am going to say some things to you at which you will perhaps cry out ; but do not do so by any.means. For know that if you kill me, I being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me so much as yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus could injure me; that would be impossible, for I believe it is not God’s will that a better man be injured by a worse. He might, however, perhaps kill me or banish me or disfranchise me; and perhaps he thinks he would thus inflict great injuries upon me, and others may think so, but I do not; I think he does himself a much greater injury by doing what he is doing now—killing a man unjustly. And so, men of Athens, I am now making my defence not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours, that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd

111

PLATO

τερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον TH πόλει, ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος" οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίξων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄχλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου" ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἴσως τάχ᾽ ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστά- ζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι ᾿Ανύτῳ, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἄν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑ ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ᾽ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὧν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε' οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἁπάντων ἠμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελου- μένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχεν ὃ

ἄν τινᾶ λόγον' νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτε οἱ κατήγοροι τἄλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατη- γοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπ- αναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἱκανὸν

} The MSS. give ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ‘‘ by the god,” after πόλει. Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets it.

3 Schanz, with some inferior MS. authority, reads εἶχεν for εἶχον of the best MSS.

112

THE APOLOGY

figure, attaches himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account of his size and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god fastened me upon the city in some such capacity, and I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you, con- stantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. Such another is not likely to come to you, gentlemen; but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry, like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless God, in his care for you, should send someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you your- selves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For 1 think

113

PLATO

γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

19. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον. ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ. ἐπικω- μῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο' ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε" τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι" εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολε- τικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τἀληθῆ: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ “παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲ τοῦ δικαίον, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλύγον χρόνον σωθη- σεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

20. Μεγάλα δ᾽ ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵ ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι “παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην.

1 The MSS. read φωνή, ‘‘ voice,” after γίγνεται, Schanz, following others, omits it.

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THE APOLOGY

I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.

Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. And 1 think this opposition is a very good thing ; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.

I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honour more,—actions. And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that 1 would never yield to any one, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going to tell

[15

PLATO

ἐρῶ δὲ ὑ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ" καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἁθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ᾽ ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους" καὶ ἑτοί- μων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥη- τόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὥμην μᾶλλόν με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως" ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵνα ἀποθάνοι" οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι: αἰτιῶν: τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅ ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ᾽ ἀνόσιον ἐργά- ξεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες @XOVTO εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ

1 Schanz, ed Hermann, brackets καὶ ἐναντία ἐψη- φισάμην, “Δα I voted against it,” which the MSS. give after

116

THE APOLOGY

you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a senator; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you wished to judge col- lectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the prytanes who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do s0, I thought I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprison- ment or death. That was when the democracy still existed ; and after the oligarchy was established, the Thirty sent for me with four others to come to the rotunda and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to implicate as many in their crimes as they could. Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been

νόμους. Xenophon, Mem. iv. 4. 2, states that Socrates, as presiding officer, refused to put the question to vote.

117

PLATO

διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη" καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

97. "Ap οὖν ἄν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγε- νέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὗς οἱ i διαβάλλοντες ἐ ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ᾽ ἐγενόμην" εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθό- νῆσα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε. τις ἡστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα" εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἢ. ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

22. ᾿Αλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι" πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον' ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταξομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δ᾽ οὔ" ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται 118

THE APOLOGY

put down. Of these facts you can have many witnesses.

Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. But you will find that through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always been the same as now, and have never yielded to any one wrongly, whether it were any other person or any of those who are said by my traducers to be my pupils. But I was never any one’s teacher. If any one, whether young or old, wishes to hear me speaking and pursuing my mission, I have never objected, nor do I converse only when I am paid and not otherwise, but I offer myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions, and whoever wishes may answer and hear what I say. And whether any of them turns out well or ill, I should not justly be held responsible, since I never promised or gave any instruction to any of them; but if any man says that he ever learned or heard anything privately from me, which all the others did not, be assured that he is lying.

But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the whole truth ; it is because they like to jisten when those are examined who think they are wise and are not so; for it is amusing. But, as I believe, I

119

PLATO

ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ mpatteiv καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ “γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι" εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελ- φοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι." «πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, ods ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὑτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὃ Σφήττιος, Αἰ- σχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι ᾿Αντιφῶν 0 Κηφισιεὺς οὑτοσί, ᾿Επιγένους πατήρ' ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος ὁ Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου--- καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός ye αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη--- καὶ ἸΠάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Ocayns ἀδελφός. ὅδε δὲ ᾿Αδείμαντος ὁ ᾿Αρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ ᾿Απολλόδωρος. ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα" εἰ

1 After μεμνῆσθαι the best MSS. give καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι, ‘and punish.” Schanz follows Bekker and some MSS. in omitting these words.

120

THE APOLOGY

have been commanded to do this by the God through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any man was ever commanded by divine power to do any- thing whatsoever. This, Athenians, is true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting some of the young men and have corrupted others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they recognise that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me. Or if they did not wish to do it themselves, some of their relatives—fathers or brothers or other kinsfolk— ought now to tell the facts. And there are many of them present, whom I see; first Crito here, who is of my own age and my own deme and father of Critobulus, who is also present; then there is Lysanias the Sphettian, father of Aeschines, who is here; and also Antiphon of Cephisus, father of Epigenes. Then here are others whose brothers joined in my conversations, Nicostratus, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus (now Theo- dotus is dead, so he could not stop him by entreaties), and Paralus, son of Demodocus ; Theages was his brother; and Adimantus, son of Aristo, whose brother is Plato here; and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is present. And I can mention to you many others, some one of whom Meletus ought certainly to have produced as a witness in his speech; but if he forgot it then, let

tar

PLATO

δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, viv παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα- χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι Exel τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέ- λητος καὶ ἴΑνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρ- μένοι τάχ᾽ ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες: οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

23. Kiev δή, ὦ ἄνδρες" ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ᾽ ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ᾽ ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὑτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολ- λούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ᾽ οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας. αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ᾽ ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,---οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε" εἰ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπιεικῆ ἄν Hot δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι" καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁ μήρου, οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθη- ναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία"

THE APOLOGY

him do so now; I yield the floor to him, and let him say, if he has any such testimony. But you will find that the exact opposite is the case, gentlemen, and that they are all ready to aid me, the man who corrupts and injures their relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who are themselves cor- rupted might have some motive in aiding me ; but what reason could their relatives have, who are not corrupted and are already older men, unless it be the right and true reason, that they know that Meletus is lying and I am speaking the truth? Well, gentlemen, this, and perhaps more like this, is about all I have to say in my defence. Perhaps some one among you may be offended when he remembers his own conduct, if he, even in a case of less importance than this, begged and besought the judges with many tears, and brought forward his children to arouse compassion, and many other friends and relatives; whereas I will do none of these things, though I am, apparently, in the very greatest danger. Perhaps some one with these thoughts in mind may be harshly disposed toward me and may cast his vote in anger. Now if any one of you is so disposed—I do not believe there is such a person—but if there should be, I think I should be speaking fairly if I said to him, My friend, I too have relatives, for I am, as Homer has it, “not born of an oak or a rock,’ but of human parents, so that I have relatives and, men of Athens, I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still 1 Homer, Odyssey, xix, 163. 123

PLATO

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑ ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων “ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιξόμενος, ὦ ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, οὐδ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος “λόγος, πρὸς δ᾽ οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄ ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ᾽ οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ᾽ οὖν ψεῦδος" ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες “διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ εἴτε ἄλλῃ ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη: οἵουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν TL οἰομένους πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπε ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτεινητε". of ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ᾽ ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ,ὑπολαβεῖν ὅ ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες ᾿Αθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὺς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν Te ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ “ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα yap, ὦ ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁπῃοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ᾽, ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδεί- κνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον “καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέ- λαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δί- καιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.

124

THE APOLOGY

children ; but nevertheless I shall not bring any of them here and beg you to acquit me. And why shall I not do so? Not because I am stubborn, Athenians, or lack respect for you. Whether I fear death or not is another matter, but for the sake of my good name and yours and that of the whole state, I think it is not right for me to do any of these things in view of my age and my reputation, whether deserved or not; for at any rate the opinion prevails that Socrates is in some way superior to most men. If then those of you who are supposed to be superior either in wisdom or in courage or in any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a way, it would be disgraceful. Why, I have often seen men who have some reputation behaving in the strangest manner, when they were on trial, as if they thought they were going to suffer something terrible if they were put to death, just as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. It seems to me that they area disgrace to the state and that any stranger might say that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, men whom they themselves honour with offices and other marks of esteem, are no better than women. Such acts, men of Athens, we who have any reputa- tion at all ought not to commit, and if we commit them you ought not to allow it, but you should make it clear that you will be much more ready to condemn a man who puts before you such pitiable scenes and makes the city ridiculous than one who keeps quiet.

But apart from the question of reputation, gentle- men, I think it is not right to implore the judge or to get acquitted by begging; we ought to inform

125

PLATO

4 tal

ov yap ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίξεσθαι, τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ κρί- pew Tata: καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χα ἐεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐθίξεσθαι: οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νή Δία καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου TouTovi. σαφῶς yap ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὀμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἃ ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑ ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀχλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν" νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

25. To μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλ- πιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς ἷ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγο- νότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ὠόμην ἔγωγε οὕτω map ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ' νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὗν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη

1 Schanz brackets τὸ yeyovds. 126

THE APOLOGY

and convince him. For the judge is not here to grant favours in matters of justice, but to give judgment ; and his oath binds him not to do favours according to his pleasure, but to judge according to the laws; therefore, we ought not to get you into the habit of breaking your oaths, nor ought you to fall into that habit; for neither of us would be acting piously. Do not, therefore, men of Athens, demand of me that I act before you in a way which I consider neither honourable nor right nor pious, especially when impiety is the very thing for which Meletus here has brought me to trial. For it is plain that if by persuasion and supplication I forced you to break your oaths I should teach you to disbelieve in the existence of the gods and in making my defence should accuse myself of not believing in them. But that is far from the truth ; for I do believe in them, men of Athens, more than any of my accusers, and I entrust my case to you and to God to decide it as shall be best for me and for you.

I am not grieved, men of Athens, at this vote of condemnation you have cast against me, and that for many reasons, among them the fact that your decision was not a surprise to me. [am much more surprised by the number of votes for and against it ; for I did not expect so small a majority, but a large one. Now, it seems, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should have been acquitted. And so, I think, so far as Meletus is concerned, I have even now been acquitted, and not merely acquitted, but anyone can see that, if Anytus and Lycon had

127

PLATO

"Avutos καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὦφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

26. Τιμᾶται δ᾽ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. elev" ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι; ὴ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἢ ἀποτῖσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμελήσας , ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιει- κέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ᾽ ἰόντα σῴξεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, of ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν 1 εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐερ- γεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμε- ληθείη, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι: τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὦν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ. ὑμετέρᾳ παρακε- λεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὅ TL μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐ ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ

1 Schanz brackets, ἰὼν.

128

THE APOLOGY

not come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth part of the votes.

And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for—money-making and property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices and plots and parties that come up in the state—and thinking that I was really too honourable to engage in those activities and live, refrained from those things by which I should have been of no use to you or to myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually what I regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own perfection in good- ness and wisdom rather than for any of his belong- ings, and for the state itself rather than for its interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. What, then, does such a man as 1 deserve? Some good thing, men of Athens, if 1 must propose something truly in accordance with my deserts; and the good thing should be such as is fitting forme. Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the prytaneum. That is much more appropriate for me than for any of you who has won a race at the

129

PLATO

ξυνωρίδι ἢ ἢ ξεύγει νενίκηκεν ᾿Ολυμπίασιν. ὁ ὁ μὲν ᾿ γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι" καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

27. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παρα- πλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος" τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδι- κεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω" ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα' ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγῴμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν: νὸν δ᾽ οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπο- λύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν “γέ ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὗ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὅ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ᾽ εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ᾽ εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἕλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τοῦ τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι, ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀχλὰ ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον' οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁ ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή- σωμαι; ἴσως “γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μέντ᾽ ἄν pe φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως

1 Schanz brackets εἶναι, following Hermann.

130

THE APOLOGY

Olympic games with a pair of horses or a four-in- hand. For he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you happy in reality ; and he is not at all in need of sustenance, but I am needy. So if I niust propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts, I propose maintenance in the prytaneum.

Perhaps some of you think that in saying this, as in what I said about lamenting and imploring, I am speaking in a spirit of bravado; but that is not the case. The truth is rather that I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one ; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have conversed with each other only a little while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have, that capital cases should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would be convinced ; but now it is not easy to rid you of great prejudices in a short time. Since, then, I am convinced that I never wronged any one, I am certainly not going to wrong myself, and to say of myself that I deserve anything bad, and to propose any penalty of that sort for myself. Why should I? Through fear of the penalty that Meletus proposes, about which I say that I do not know whether it is a good thing or an evil? Shall I choose instead of that something which I know to be an evil? What penalty shall I propose? Imprisonment? And why should 1 live in prison a slave to those who may be in authority? .Or shall I propose a fine, with imprison- ment until it is paid? But that is the same as what I said just now, for I have no money to pay with. Shall I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you would accept that. I must indeed be

131

PILATO

σ ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, OTL ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μον οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς e a λόγους, GAN ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλ- λαγῆναι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως; a a 2 a πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν «ς / an pot ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντε τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ / ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυ- / n 4φ Ἂ ἴδ᾽ “ “ A » θ νομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, A e λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε' κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ 9 a , 4 / 7\ \ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους: ἐὰν δὲ ΄ a μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες TE καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι’ αὐτοὺς τούτους.

28. Ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι' σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον

A A 4 a πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάν Te yap λέγω, ὅτι TO

a al A \ a θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον

7 ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, ov πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ" ἐάν T αὖ λέγω, ὅτε καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον , A ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ A / A al ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι Kal τῶν ἄλλων, A fo) ’ περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ > \ \ Mv 2 / ς \ 9.2 ‘ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος ΄ ἴω ᾽ βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔτι ἧττον

/ f \ \ ” \ ef πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, e > 4 9? wv / \ > εἰ ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ

\ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησόμην ’ ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν: οὐδὲν γὰρ 132

THE APOLOGY

possessed by a great love of life if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.

Perhaps someone might say, “Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without talking?” Now this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will not believe me; and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less. This is as I say, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. Besides, i am not accustomed to think that I deserve anything bad. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine, as large as I could pay; for that would have done me no harm.

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dv ἐβλάβην: viv δὲ οὐ yap ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτῖσαι, τοσούτου βού- λεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτῖσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου: τοσούτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ᾿Απολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἐγ- γυᾶσθαι: τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγνηταὶ δὲ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεῳ.

29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ᾽ ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν: φήσουσι γὰρ δή με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μή εἰμι, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο' ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψη- φισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἑαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾧμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, of ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι: οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τότε ὠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ

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But as it is—I have no money, unless you are willing to impose a fine which I could pay. I might perhaps pay a mina of silver. So I propose that penalty ; but Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Crito- bulus, and Apollodorus tell me to propose a fine of thirty minas, saying that they are sureties for it. So I propose a fine of that amount, and these men, who are amply sufficient, will be my sureties.

It is no long time, men of Athens, which you gain, and for that those who wish to cast a slur upon the state will give you the name and blame of having killed Socrates, a wise man ; for, you know, those who wish to revile you will say I am wise, even though I am not. Now if you had waited a little while, what you desire would have come to you of its own accord ; for you see how old I am, how far advanced in life and how near death. I say this not to all of you, but to those who voted for my death. And to them also I have something else to say. Perhaps you think, gentlemen, that I have been convicted through lack of such words as would have moved you to acquit me, if I had thought it right to do and say everything to gain an acquittal. Far from it. And yet it is through a lack that I have been convicted, not however a lack of words, but of impudence and shamelessness, and of willingness to say to you such things as you would have liked best to hear. You would have liked to hear me wailing and lamenting and doing and saying many things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me—such things as you are accustomed to hear from others. But I did not think at the time

135

PLATO

κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ς ᾧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἢ ἐκείνως. ζῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ᾽ ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ᾽ ἐμὲ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται, ὅτε τό γε. ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι. καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων' καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥ ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐ ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ᾽ ἡ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν' θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὧν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἑάλων, οἱ δ᾽ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὗτοι δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἔγωγε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μέν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι ᾳὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

50 «Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑ ὑμῖν χρησ- μῳδῆσαι, ὧ καταψηφισάμενοί μου" καὶ γάρ εἶμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐ ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησ- μῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν

ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλε- πωτέραν νὴ Δία ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε' νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον

136

THE APOLOGY

that 1 ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defence as I did, but I much prefer to die after such a defence than to live after a defence of the other sort. For neither in the court nor in war ought I or any other man to plan to escape death by every possible means. In battles it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy of his pursuers; and there are many other means of escaping death in dangers of various kinds if one is willing to do and say anything. But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death. And now I, since I am slow and old, am caught by the slower runner, and my accusers, who are clever and quick, by the faster, wickedness. And now I shall go away convicted by you and sentenced to death, and they go convicted by truth of villainy and wrong. And I abide by my penalty, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to be so, and I think they are well.

And now 1 wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, ye men who have slain me, that punishment will come upon you straight- way after my death, far more grievous in sooth than the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say that you will find

137

PLATO

ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὗς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε' καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε a ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐ ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε' οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ᾽ αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάξειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφι- σαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

31. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἃ ἂν διαλε- χθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον" οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί---ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοίην---θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν.

ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου 1 ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν' νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ

1 Schanz follows Schleiermacher in bracketing ἡ τοῦ δαι- μονίου.

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THE APOLOGY

the result far different. Those who will force you to give an account will be more numerous than hereto- fore ; men whom I restrained, though you knew it not ; and they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more annoyed. For if you think that by putting men to death you will prevent anyone from reproaching you because you do not act as you should, you are mistaken. That mode of escape is neither possible at al] nor honourable, but the easiest and most honourable escape is not by suppressing others, but by making yourselves as good as possible. So with this prophecy to you who condemned me [ take my leave.

But with those who voted for my acquittal I should like to converse about this which has happened, while the authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I must die. Wait with me so long, my friends ; for nothing prevents our chatting with each other while there is time. I feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has now happened tome. For, judges—and in calling you judges I give you your right name—a wonderful thing has happened to me. For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not; but now, as you yourselves see, this thing which might be thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has come upon me; but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning, or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech,

139

PLATO

ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν TH λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν' Kaitoe ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε, λέγοντα μεταξύ' νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτ᾽ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ᾽ ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ" κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν,

Ο ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν’ οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

2. ᾿Εννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι: δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι: ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἵἴ- σθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῆ τοῦ τόπου Tou} ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μηδεμία αἴσθησίς

D ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ᾽ ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ avatos. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἣ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαρα- θέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν E βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν

1 Schanz, following C and Hirschig, brackets τοῦ τόπου τοῦ

140

THE APOLOGY

when I was going to say anything ; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken. A convincing proof of this has been given me; for the accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with something good.

Let us consider in another way also how good reason there is to hope that it is a good thing. For the state of death is one of two things: either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no con- sciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think if any one were to pick out that night in which he slept a dreamless sleep and, comparing with it the other nights and days of his life, were to say, after due consideration, how many days and nights in his life had passed more pleasantly than that night,—I believe that not only any private person, but even the great King of Persia himself would find that they were few in comparison with the other days and nights. So if such is the nature of death, I

141

PLATO

τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω" καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω “δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ᾽ αὖ οἷον ἀποδη- μῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς “Αἰδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, a ἄρα ΒΑ λα ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ δ εὐ: ξυγγενέσ αι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ

Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ av τις δέξαιτ᾽ ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐν μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ: ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ ,»αυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμε Παλα- μήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντι- παραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὴς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστιν δ᾽ οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ᾽ ἄν τις, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἡ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ pa on καὶ γυναῖκας; ols ἐκεῖ διαλέ- γεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καί ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι' τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα 142

THE APOLOGY

count it a gain; for in that case, all time seems to be no longer than one night. But on the other hand, if death is, as it were, a change of habitation from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater bless- ing could there be, judges? For if a man when he reaches the other world, after leaving behind these who claim to be judges, shall find those who are really judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus and Tripto- lemus, and all the other demigods who were just men in their lives, would the change of habitation be undesirable ? Or again, what would any of you give to meet with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times over, if these things are true ; for I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judg- ment, and compared my experience with theirs. 1 think that would not be unpleasant. And the greatest pleasure would be to pass my time in examining and investigating the people there, as I do those here, to find out who among them is wise and who thinks he is when he is not. What price would any of you pay, judges, to examine him who led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless others, both men and women, whom I might mention? To converse and associate with them and examine them would be immeasurable happiness. At any rate, the folk there do not kill people for it; since, if what we are told is true,

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PLATO

evdatpoverTepot εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐ ἐστιν.

5.5: ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή: ὧ ἄνδρες. δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα. οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλ- λάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ᾽ οἰό- μενοι βλάπτειν: τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι: τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὴ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τί εἶναι

μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίξετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀπο- θανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις' ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῴ.

144

THE APOLOGY

they are immortal for all future time, besides being happier in other respects than men are here.

But you also, judges, must regard death hope- fully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him. So, too, this which has come to me has not come by chance, but I see plainly that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is the reason why the sign never interfered with me, and I| am not at all angry with those who condemned me or with my accusers. And yet it was not with that in view that they condemned and accused me, but because they thought to injure me. They deserve blame for that. However, I make this request of them: when my sons grow up, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them as I have troubled you; if they seem to you to care for money or anything else more than for virtue, and if they think they amount to something when they do not, rebuke them as I have rebuked you because they do not care for what they ought, and think they amount to something when they are worth nothing. If you do this, both I and my sons shall have received just treatment from you.

But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.

145

YOOUOPA SAT

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‘i

CRITO

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO

Tuis dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and his lifelong friend Crito, which takes place in the prison where Socrates is confined after his trial to await the day of his execution. Crito was a man of wealth and position, devotedly attached to Socrates, and greatly interested in philosophical speculation. Diogenes Laertius (II. 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues on philosophical subjects attributed to him, but Plato represents him through- out as a man of kindly disposition and _ practical common sense, quite lacking in originality and with no gift for philosophical investigation.

There can be little doubt that Crito tried more than once to induce Socrates to escape from prison, but this dialogue can hardly be considered a mere report of a conversation which actually took place; it is planned and carried out with the exquisite skill peculiar to Plato, and must be recognised as his work. It is difficult, often impossible, to distinguish between the doctrines and beliefs of the real Socrates and those which are put into his mouth by Plato; but in view of the fact that Socrates did not escape from prison, his conduct must have been determined by some consideration of right. We may therefore believe that the doctrine that injustice is always

148

INTRODUCTION TO THE ΟἸΠΤῸ

wrong and that we must not requite injustice with injustice is really Socratic, and that the exalted patriotism and sublime serenity of mind portrayed by Plato in this dialogue were really exhibited in the last days, as in the previous life, of the master whom he delighted to honour.

For editions of the Crito, see the Introduction to

the Apology.

149

KPITQN

Η ΠΕΡῚ MPAKTEOT, ΗΘΙΚΟΣ

TA TOY ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑᾺΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

iG ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφῖξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῷ ἔτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. IInvixa μάλιστα;

KPITON. Ὄρρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θαυμάξω, ὅ ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι oO τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑ ὑπακοῦσαι.

ΚΡΙΤΩ͂Ν. Ἐυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέ- τηται ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρτι δὲ 4) ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι;

KPITON. ᾿Εἰπιεικῶς πάλαι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάξω αἰσθανό- μενος, ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις: καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα 150

CRITO {or ON DUTY; eErutcat]

CHARACTERS Socrates, Crito

socrates. Why have you come at this time, Crito? Or isn’t it still early?

criTo. Yes, very early.

socraTEs. About what time?

σατο. Just before dawn.

socRATES. I am surprised that the watchman of the prison was willing to let you in.

criTo. He is used to me by this time, Socrates, because I come here so often, and besides I have done something for him.

socraTes. Have you just come, or some time ago?

criTo. Some little time ago.

socraTes. Then why did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting by me in silence?

criTo. No, no, by Zeus, Socrates, I only wish I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful. But I have been wondering at you for some time, seeing how sweetly you sleep; and | purposely refrained from waking you, that you might pass the time as pleasantly as possible. I have often thought through-

[51

PLATO

Tov τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν TH νυνὶ παρε- στώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τε- λευτᾶν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἁλίσκονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῷ ἀφῖξαι;

KPITON. ᾿Αγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χα- λεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ και τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπὴν. καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣ ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ᾽ ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

KPITON. Οὔτοι δὴ ἀφῖκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μέν μοι

ἥξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὦ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τίνες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ “ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εμγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὕστε- ραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἡ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

1 Schanz brackets ἀγγέλων. 152

CRITO

out your life hitherto that you were of a happy disposition, and I think so more than ever in this present misfortune, since you bear it so easily and calmly.

socraTEs. Well, Crito, it would be absurd if at my age I were disturbed because I must die now.

crito. Other men as old, Socrates, become in- volved in similar misfortunes, but their age does not in the least prevent them from being disturbed by their fate.

socraTES. That is true. But why have you come so early?

crito. To bring news, Socrates, sad news, though apparently not sad to you, but sad and grievous to me and all your friends, and to few of them, I think, so grievous as to me.

socraTES. What is this news? Has the ship come from Delos, at the arrival of which 1 am to die?

στο. It has not exactly come, but I think it will come to-day from the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. Now it is clear from what they say that it will come to-day, and so to-morrow, Socrates, your life must end.

socraTEs. Well, Crito, good luck be with us! If this is the will of the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will come to-day.

crito. What is your reason for not thinking so?

socraTes. I willtell you. I must die on the day after the ship comes in, must I not?

153

PLATO

KPITAN. agi γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τίνος ἐνυπνίου, ὃ ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός" καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. "Hy δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Εδόκει τίς “μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν. ὦ Σώκρατες,

ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵ ἴκοιο.

KPITON. ἼΛτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

3. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ δαι- μόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ" καὶ σώθητι: ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμ- φορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὑρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἷός T ὧν σε σῴζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἡ ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πεί- σονται οἱ πολλοί, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιει- κέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίξειν, ἡ ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχ αι, ὥσπερ ἂν πραχ ῇ.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὁρᾷς δή, ὅτε ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

1 πιθοῦ Schanz, following Burges, πείθου BODE.

154

CRITO

criTo. So those say who have charge of these matters.

socraTEs. Well, I think it will not come in to-day, but to-morrow. And my reason for this is a dream which I had a little while ago in the course of this night. And perhaps you let me sleep just at the right time.

crito. What was the dream?

socraTes. I dreamed that a beautiful, fair woman, clothed in white raiment, came to me and called me and said, “Socrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia.” +

criTo. A strange dream, Socrates.

socraTes. No, a clear one, at any rate, I think, Crito.

crito. Too clear, apparently. But, my dear Socrates, even now listen to me and save yourself. Since, if you die, it will be no mere single misfortune to me, but I shall lose a friend such as I can never find again, and besides, many persons who do not know you and me well will think I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, but that I would not take the trouble. And yet what reputa- tion could be more disgraceful than that of considering one’s money of more importance than one’s friends? For most people will not believe that we were eager to help you to go away from here, but you refused.

socrATEs. But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth con- sidering, will think that things were done as they really will be done.

crito. But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to

1 Homer, Iliad ix, 363. 155

PLATO

καὶ τῆς. τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἷοί τ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάξεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλη- μένος 7}.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ei γὰρ ὦφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τ᾽ εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά, καὶ καλῶς ἂν elev" νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε: οὔτε yap φρό- νιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι.

4. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω: τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἄρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προ- μηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκα- σθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις

παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν: ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καί, ἐὰν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡΙΤΩ͂Ν. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ: καὶ yap οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἃ ἂν δέοι ἐ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἱκανά: ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει

156

CRITO

care for the opinion of the public, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the public is able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputa- tion with it.

socraTes. I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish also the greatest good things. Then all would be well. But now they can do neither of the two; for they are not able to make a man wise or foolish, but they do whatever occurs to them.

criTo. That may well be. But, Socrates, tell me this: you are not considering me and your other friends, are you, fearing that, if you escape, the informers will make trouble for us by saying that we stole you away, and we shall be forced to lose either aJl our property or a good deal of money, or be punished in some other way besides? For if you are afraid of anything of that kind, let it go; since it is right for us to run this risk, and even greater risk than this, if necessary, provided we save you. Now please do as I ask.

socraTes. I am considering this, Crito, and many other things.

σατο. Well, do not fear this! for it is not even a large sum of money which we should pay to some men who are willing to save you and get you away from here. Besides, don’t you see how cheap these informers are, and that not much money would be needed to silence them? And you have my money at your command, which is enough, I fancy; and moreover, if because you care for me you think you

157

PLATO

δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τἀμά, ξένοι; ἐνθάδε ἕτοιμοι avanri- σκειν: εἷς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀρ- γύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος: ἕτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμῃς σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν TO δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅ TL χρῷο σαυτῷ: πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε: ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετ- ταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἵ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

5. "Ere δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σω- Ava: καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέ- σθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσάν σε διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὕς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαι- δεῦσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν" τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων οἱάπερ εἴωθεν γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέ- φοντα καὶ παιδεύονται σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι: χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἕλοιτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, ἄσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι: ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ 1 After ξένοι the MSS. read οὗτοι, which Schanz brackets.

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ought not to spend my money, there are foreigners here willing to spend theirs; and one of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought for this especial purpose sufficient funds; and Cebes also and very many others are ready. So, as I say, do not give up saving yourself through fear of this. And do not be troubled by what you said in the court, that if you went away you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many other places, wherever you go, they will welcome you; and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who wil) make much of you and will protect you, so that no one in Thessaly shall annoy you.

And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even right—betray- ing yourself when you might save yourself. And you are eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and just what those were eager for who wished to destroy you. And moreover, I think you are abandoning your children, too, for when you might bring them up and educate them, you are going to desert them and go away, and, so far as you are concerned, their fortunes in life will be whatever they happen to meet with, and they will probably meet with such treatment as generally comes to orphans in their destitution. No. Either one ought not to beget children, or one ought to stay by them and bring them up and educate them. But you seem to me to be choosing the laziest way ; and you ought to choose as a good and brave man would choose, you who have been saying all your life. that you cared for virtue. So I am ashamed both for you and for us, your friends, and I am afraid people will think that this whole affair of yours has

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ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι. ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἵτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώ- σαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ov Kat δυνατόν, εἴ Tt καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἢ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι Ett ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή" τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ ; πεπρᾶχθαι. εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὧ Σώ- κρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

6. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη" εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείξων, τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκο- πεῖσθαι οὗν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή; ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ TO λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι λογιξομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὺς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύ- νᾶμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι noe ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὕσπερ καὶ πρότερον" ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίω ἔ ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ᾽ ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας “ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐ ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα

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been conducted with a sort of cowardice on our part —both the fact that the case came before the court, when it might have been avoided, and the way in which the trial itself was carried on, and finally they will think, as the crowning absurdity of the whole affair, that this opportunity has escaped us through some base cowardice on our part, since we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, though it was quite possible if we had been of any use what- ever. Take care, Socrates, that these things be not disgraceful, as well as evil, both to you and to us. Just consider, or rather it is time not to consider any longer, but to have finished considering. And there is just one possible plan; forall this must be done in the coming night. And if we delay it can no longer be done. But I beg you, Socrates, do as I say and don’t refuse.

socRATEs. My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth a great deal, if it should prove to be rightly directed ; but otherwise, the greater ‘it is, the more hard to bear. So we must examine the question whether we ought to do this or not; for 1 am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best. And I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the arguments I used to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever, and J revere and honour the same ones as before. And unless we can bring forward better ones in our present situation, be assured that I shall not give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude frighten us with even more terrors than at present, as children are fright- ened with goblins, threatening us with imprison- ments and deaths and confiscations of property. Now

161

PLATO

> , > Led X ~ \ ’ ᾽ / αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλά- Bowev, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον a ~~ 3 ς 7 a woo a \ a an καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, OTL ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ: ἢ πρὶν μὲν ΝΥΝ an ᾽ , a ea? a Ἢ ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ , Μ ’ f -“ bid σ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτε ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ᾿Ὶ al > Ww tbe 7 φ if a ἐπιθυμῶ δ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ \ “ » ’ 3 U ”~ > a μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ TL μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πει- σόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῴμαι, ἑκά- στοτε WOE ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτε τῶν δοξῶν, ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσιν, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα ye τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά' σκόπει δή: οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δ᾽ οὔ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δ᾽ οὔ; τί la) n / φής; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται; ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καλῶς. [2] Ἂν a ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή; [4 ΚΡΙΤΩΝ, Ναί. « A ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ ai τῶν φρονίμων, a , “πονηραὶ δὲ at τῶν ἀφρόνων; A 3 KPITON. Πῶς 8 οὔ; 7. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων 162

CRITO

how could we examine the matter most reasonably ? By taking up first what you say about opinions and asking whether we were right when we always used to say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others? Or were we right before I was condemned to death, whereas it has now been made clear that we were talking merely for the sake of argument and it was really mere play and nonsense? And I wish to investigate, Crito, in common with you, and see whether our former argument seems different to me under our present conditions, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or be guided by it. But it used to be said, I think, by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, just as 1 was saying now, that of the opinions held by men some ought to be highly esteemed and others not. In God’s name, Crito, do you not think this is correct? For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying to-morrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true?

critTo. It is.

socraTes. Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones?

criTo. Yes.

socraTes. And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish ?

crito. Of course.

SOCRATES. Come then, what used we to say about this? Ifa man is an athlete and makes that his

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πότερον παντὸς ,ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν “προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὦν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἑνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλα δή.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἣ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

KPITON. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους," τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, ρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ti δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα: τοῦτο γὰρ διολλύει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἄλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διΐωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ

1 Schanz, following Burges, brackets καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους.

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business, does he pay attention to every man’s praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer ?

crito. To those of one man only.

socraTEs. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

crito. Obviously.

socraTes. And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

σατο. That is true.

socraTEs. Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards the words of the many who have no special know- ledge, will he not come to harm?

crito. Of course he will.

socraTes. And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act?

crito. Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins.

socraTEs. Right. ‘Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by

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λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;

KPITAN. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

8. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν διεφθαρ- μένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο σῶμα: ἢ οὐχί;

Κριτων. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Ap’ οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αλλὰ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρ᾽ ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τί TOT ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ᾽ ἄν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύναι.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα' φαίη γὰρ ay,’ ὦ Σώκρατες.

1 φαίη γὰρ ἂν bracketed by Schanz. 166

CRITO

the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this?

criTo. I think it is true, Socrates.

socraTes, Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not ὃ

criro. Yes.

socraTes. Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined ?

criTo. Certainly not.

socraTes. But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong, is less important than the body ?

crito. By no means.

socraATEs. But more important?

crite. Much more.

socraTes. Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites. But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death.

crito. That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates.

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ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὃ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον" καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

KPITON. ᾿Αλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

KPITON. Μένει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων ᾿Αθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον" καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀχηθῶς ταῦτα, ὧ Κρίτων, σκέμματα uh τῶν ῥᾳδίως a ἀποκτιννύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων y ἄν, εἰ οἷοί T ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ ὁ ὁ λόγος. οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἡ ἢ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, Ἴ 77 ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες" κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίξεσθαι. οὔτ᾽ εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παρα- μένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

1 Schanz gives ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Crito.

2 The usual reading, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον was corrected by Schanz, who follows a quotation of the passage by Priscian.

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socraTEs. That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before ; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important.

criro. We do hold to it.

socraTEs. And that living well and living rightly ure the same thing, do we hold to that, or not ?

crito. We do.

socraTES. Then we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape our- selves, or shall in truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure any- thing else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong.

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KPITAN. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Lo- κρατες. ὅρα δέ, τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πη ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καί σοι πείσομαι: εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων ᾿Αθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι: ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρί- νεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, 7 ἂν μάλιστα οἴῃ.

KPITON. ᾿Αλλὰ πειράσομαι.

10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὔ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοίδε" ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ δια- λεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πρᾳότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδι- κοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Papév.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

1 The words ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, ‘‘as has just been said, too,” follow in the MSS. but are omitted by Schanz and others. 2 χηλικοίδε γέροντες MSS.

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crito. I think what you say is right, Socrates ; but think what we should do.

socraTES. Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments ; but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply to my questions to the best of your belief.

crito. I will try.

SOCRATES. Ought we in no way to do wrong in- tentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honourable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men, seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Oy is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not ὃ

crito. We do.

socraTes. Then we ought not to do wrong at all.

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PLATO

KPITON. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

KPITAN. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ;

KPITON. Οὐ δεῖ δή που, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πά- σχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασιν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

KPITAN. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὧ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομο- λογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῇς. οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευό- μενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς é ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύ- νεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς" ἢ ἀφίστασαι, καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς ΤῊΣ, ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δ᾽ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

172

CRITO

crito. Why, no.

socRATES. And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.

crito. Apparently not.

socraTES. Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?

crito. Certainly not, Socrates.

socraTEs. Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?

crito. Not right, certainly.

socraTEs. For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.

criro. That is true.

socraTEs. ‘Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe ; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must neces- sarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend our- selves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point.

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PLATO

KPITON. ‘AXA ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ por: ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐρωτῶ" πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῳ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ποιητέον.

11. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὗὑς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ,ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὔ;

KPITON. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἐρωτᾷς" οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αλλ᾽ Bde σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ᾽ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο' εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἡ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθεί- ρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν THs ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας. εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν; ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ταῦτα νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

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CRITO

crito. I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on.

socraTes. Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this: “ ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?”

crito. He ought to do it.

socraTes. Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not.

crito. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

socRATES. Consider it in this way. If,as I was en the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, “ Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private per- sons?’ What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them, “ The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly ” ? Shall we say that, or what?

σατο. That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates.

Ε79

PLATO

12 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι" ὧ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ ool, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζη; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι᾽ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου 0 πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις } τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι, ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. ἀχλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἡ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τε- ταγμένοι “νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, ἄρ᾽ ἐξ ἴσου οἴει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττ᾽ ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἴει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὧν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά: πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους

1 Schanz omits τοῖς νόμοις. 7 Schanz omits νόμοι.

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CRITO

socraTes. What then if the laws should say, “Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state?”” Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, “ Don’t be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of ques- tion andanswer. Come, what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage?”

“1 find no fault,” I should say. “Οὐ with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gym- nastics?” “ You did,’ I should say. ‘“ Wel] then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave, you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate? There was no such equality of right between you and your father or your master, if you had one, so that whatever treatment you received you might return it, answering them if you were reviled, or striking back if you were struck, and

the like; and do you think that it will be proper for

177

PLATO

€éxtat' σοι, ὥστε, ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, καθ᾽ ὅσον δύνασαι, ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, 0 τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἶ σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε, ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν ἡ πατρὶς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἁγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μεί- ζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ ᾿ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑ ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν a ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ὗ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάξεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον. οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἧττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί φήσομεν πρὸς “Ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὔ;

KPITON. “Eyouye δοκεῖ.

13, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ “Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέ- ψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἁπάντων ὧν 1 So Schanz, ἐξέσται BCE,

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CRITO

you to act so toward your country and the laws, so that if we undertake to destroy you, thinking it is right, you will undertake in return to destroy us laws and your country, so far as you are able, and will say that in doing this you are doing right, you who really care for virtue ? Or is your wisdom such that you do not see that your country is more precious and more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and hu- mility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against yourcountry?’’ What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

crito. I think they do.

socraTes. ‘ Observe then, Socrates,” perhaps the laws would say, “that if what we say is true, what you are now undertaking to do to us is not right. For we brought you into the world, nurtured you, and gave a share of all the good things we could to

179

PLATO

/ a A “ D οἷοί 7 ἦμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν

πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι ᾿Αθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδών ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάν τε τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, & μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθών͵ ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὃς δ᾽ ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάξομεν καὶ τἄλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ᾿ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

14. Ταύταις δή φαμεν καὶ σέ, @ Σώκρατες," ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ᾿Αθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι διὰ τί δή; ἴσως ἄν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ᾿Αθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὡμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαῖεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά

1 Schanz omits ὦ and brackets Σώκρατες.

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you and all the citizens. Yet we proclaim, by having offered the opportunity to any of the Athenians who wishes to avail himself of it, that anyone who is not pleased with us when he has become a man and has seen the administration of the city and us, the laws, may take his goods and go away wherever he likes. And none of us stands in the way or forbids any of you to take his goods and go away wherever he pleases, if we and the state do not please him, whether it be to an Athenian colony or to a foreign country where he will live as an alien. But we say that whoever of you stays here, seeing how we administer justice and how we govern the state in other respects, has there- by entered into an agreement with us to do what we command ; and we say that he who does not obey does threefold wrong, because he disobeys us who are his parents, because he disobeys us who nurtured him, and because after agreeing to obey us he neither obeys us nor convinces us that we are wrong, though we give him the opportunity and do not roughly order him to do what we command, but when we allow him a choice of two things, either to convince us of error or to do our bidding, he does neither of these things.”’

“We say that you, Socrates, will be exposed to these reproaches, if you do what you have in mind, and you not least of the Athenians but more than most others.” If then 1 should say, “How so?” perhaps they might retort with justice that I had made this agreement with them more emphatically than most other Athenians. For they would say, “Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you; for you would never have stayed in

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ἐστιν, ὅ ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις" οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων ᾿Αθηναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μή σοι δια- φερόντως ἤρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ᾽ ? a , ΕΣ οὶ » Μ, by U ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, ovd ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις: οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἡροῦ, καὶ ὡμολόγεις καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἑκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλω- mifov ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, 3 \ « A e Μ N a a / ἀλλὰ ἡροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον' νῦν δὲ οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ᾽ ἃς ἡμῖν Evvébov πολι- τεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ > , 3 J “ , {Z D, ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντες σε ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, > > ’ , a > > A GAN ov λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τί φῶμεν πρὸς

A 4 , Ν, a ce ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. ᾿Ανάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

1 The words ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς ᾿Ισθμόν, ‘except once to the Isthmus,” after ἐξῆλθες are gmitted by Schanz and others as an early interpolation.

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it more than all other Athenians if you had not been better pleased with it than they ; you never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any other city or other laws, but you were con- tented with us and our city. So strongly did you prefer us and agree to live in accordance with us; and besides, you begat children in the city, showing that it pleased you. And moreover even at your trial you might have offered exile as your penalty, if you wished, and might have done with the state’s consent what you are now undertaking to do without it. But you then put on airs and said you were not disturbed if you must die, and you preferred, as you said, death to exile. And now you are not ashamed to think of those words and you do not respect us, the laws, since you are trying to bring us to naught; and you are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us. First then, answer this question, whether we speak the truth or not when we say that you agreed, not in word, but by your acts, to live in accordance with us.”” What shall we say to this, Crito? Must we not agree that it is true? crito. We must, Socrates.

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ΣΩΚΡΑΤῊΣ. Αλλο τι οὖν, ἂν φαῖεν, ἢ ξυνθήκας

4 \ Q € « ᾽ \ WG , , Ii tas πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὑτοὺς Kal ομολογίας TapaPaivers,

οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι' σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προῃροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκά- στοτε φὴς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν ᾿ΕἙλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ ἢ οἱ χωλοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι" οὕτω σοι διαφε- ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων ᾿Αθηναίων ἤ ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις TE καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι: τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; 1 νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὧ "Σώκρατες" καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

15. Σκόπει γὰρ δή, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρ- τάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσί γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι ,δῆλον' αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθης, ἡ Θήβαζε ἢ ἢ Μέγαράδε--εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφό- τεραι--πολέμιος ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοιπερ κήδονται τῶν αὑτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονταί σε διαφθορέα ἡ aE TOV νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε

1 Schanz omits δῆλον ὅτι. .. νόμων, ‘evidently ; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws?”

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socraTEs. “ Are you then,’ they would say, “ not breaking your compacts and agreements with us, though you were not led into them by compulsion or fraud, and were not forced to make up your mind in a short time, but had seventy years, in which you could have gone away, if we did not please you and if you thought the agreements were unfair? But you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor any other of the Greek states, or of the foreign ones, but you went away from this city less than the lame and the blind and the other cripples. So much more than the other Athenians were you satisfied with the city and evidently therefore with us, its laws; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws? And now will you not abide by your agree- ment? You will if you take our advice, Socrates ; and you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from the city.

“For consider. By transgressing in this way and committing these errors, what good will you do to yourself or any of your friends? For it is pretty clear that your friends also will be exposed to the risk of banishment and the loss of their homes in the city or of their property, And you yourself, it you go to one of the nearest cities, to Thebes or Megara— for both are well governed—will go as an enemy, So- crates, to their government, and all who care for their own cities will look askance at you, and will consider you a destroyer of the laws, and you will confirm the

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δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι' ὅστις yap νόμων διαφθορεύς ἐστιν, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων “διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντε ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγό- μενος --τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὕσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί ye χρή. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος" ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἔσως ἂν ἡδέως σον ἀκούοιεν, ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τέ τινα περι- θέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκενάξεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας' ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃ ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπῆς" εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχό- μενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων" τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων 1 Schanz omits δουλεύων, ““ being a slave.” 2. Schanz omits ἐν Θετταλίᾳ,

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judges in their opinion, so that they will think their verdict was just. For he who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilised men? And if you do this will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on—what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates would seem most disgraceful? You cannot help thinking so. Or you will keep away from these places and go to Crito’s friends in Thessaly; for there great disorder and lawlessness prevail, and perhaps they would be amused to hear of the ludicrous way in which you ran away from prison by putting on a disguise, a peasant’s leathern cloak or some of the other things in which runaways dress themselves up, and chang- ing your appearance. But will no one say that you, an old man, who had probably but a short time yet to live, clung to life with such shameless greed that you transgressed the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not offend anyone; but if you do, Socrates, you will have to listen to many things that would be a disgrace to you. So you will live as an inferior and a slave to everyone. And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet? What will become of our conversations about justice and virtue? But

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ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψης καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δέ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται" αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελή- σονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς “Αἰδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἴεσθαί γε /

ἢ.

16. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς “Αἰδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογή- σασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν: οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίῃς, οὐχ Uh’ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων: ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὺἣς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν TE καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, “ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν “Αἰδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι

1 Schanz omits ἐπιμελήσονται here and also the punctuation after αὐτῶν, making one long interrogative sentence.

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perhaps you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? Howso? Will you take them to Thessaly to be brought up and educated, making exiles of them, that you may give them that blessing also? Or perhaps you will not do that, but if they are brought up here while you are living, will they be better brought up and educated if you are not with them than if you were dead? Oh yes! your friends will care for them. Will they care for them if you go away to Thessaly and not if you go away to the dwellings of the dead? If those who say they are your friends are of any use, we must believe they will care for them in both cases alike.

* Ah, Socrates, be guided by us who tended your infancy. Care neither for your children nor for life nor for anything else more than for the right, that when you come to the home of the dead, you may have all these things to say in your own defence. For clearly if you do this thing it will not be better for you here, or more just or holier, no, nor for any of your friends, and neither will it be better when you reach that other abode. Now, however, you will go away wronged, if you do go away, not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you escape after so disgracefully requiting wrong with wrong and evil with evil, breaking your compacts and agreements with us, and injuring those whom you least ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades’ realm, will not receive you graciously; for they will know that you tried, so far as in you lay,

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TO σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πείση Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

17. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων,' εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἠχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν: ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς: ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. ᾿Αλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. “Ea τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράτ- τωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

1 Schanz follows Cobet and Naber in omitting Κρίτων.

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to destroy us. Do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but take our advice.”

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the frenzied dervishes of Cybele seem to hear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes within me and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assured that, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

crito. No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

socraTEs. Then, Crito, let it be, and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us.

ΤΟΙ

ahh of ἢ Nee ii fe

“ΟΣ Ap ot: aig gail ry pu coe ta bts’ og aera yar Seat iced = . en s Paes rea c 7 Fai? tee 5 nie ’ aw” ΟῚ ὰ 4 . δ᾽ ~ oes Ἄνες ‘i ΠΣ 5 des veer Ὶ A nt :

i ᾿ ᾿ . ὰ " Ὗ & heat faped> Canhes gil 1/6/05 A emoresiiny i ;

PHAEDO

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

Tue Phaedo, like the Crito, has for its scene the prison of Socrates, though the dialogue is here supposed to be reported by one who was present, not actually carvied on in the presence of the reader. The immediate purpose of the dialogue seems to be to show that the philosopher will be glad to die ; and this purpose is never lost sight of, for it appears toward the end, as at the beginning. Inorder, how- ever, to prove that willingness to die is rational, it is necessary to prove that the soul will continue to exist after the death of the body, and thus the original statement that the philosopher will be glad to die leads to the proof of a far more important truth. The commonly accepted statement that the real subject of the Phaedo is the immortality of the soul has certainly some justification. In order, how- ever, to prove that the soul is immortal the theory is advanced that generation proceeds from opposite to opposite by alternation, that life proceeds from death as death from life, and that therefore the soul must exist after death as before birth. Again, all sensible objects are referable to certain types, of which they are likenesses. These types must be known to us before we can refer objects to them, and we have not seen or learned the types in this life ; we must there- fore have seen them before this life began; our know- ledge is thus seen to be reminiscence of knowledge

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

gained before our birth. All this proves, however, only that the soul existed for a probably very long time before our birth and continues to exist for a probably very long time after our death, but not that it is immortal and indestructible. This objection leads to the discussion of causation and to the con- clusion that “the ideas are the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge.” The idea inherent in soul is life, and since ideas are so connected with particulars that no particular can admit an idea directly contrary to its own inherent idea, the soul cannot admit death. The proof of the immortality of the soul has been reached by proving the everlasting truth of the ideas. This last is the most important part of the Phaedo, so far as the development of Plato’s system of philosophy is con- cerned, though it is introduced as a means for proving the immortality of the soul, just as the immortality of the soul is proved in order to show that the true philosopher will not fear, but welcome, death.?

This dialogue, then, establishes the doctrine of the real existence of ideas as the sole objects of know- ledge and also shows how that doctrine is necessary to human happiness, because it serves to prove that the soal is immortal. The ordinary human being is little interested in metaphysical speculation, but greatly interested in his own future; he will there- fore pay attention to metaphysical theory if it is so presented as to seem to affect his happiness. The Phaedo, by applying the doctrine of ideas to prove

1 This brief discussion of the contents and purpose of the Phaedo is for the most part derived from the introduction to R. D. Archer-Hind’s excellent edition, to which the reader is referred for a more complete exposition.

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the immortality of the soul, tends to popularise the doctrine of ideas, and this may have been the ultimate purpose of Plato in writing the dialogue ; but that he was also fully in earnest in his belief in the immortality of the soul, and that the proof of immortality was an important part of his purpose in writing the dialogue, cannot be doubted.

In composition the Phaedo is elaborate without being complicated. The dramatic setting serves here, as in the Crifo, as an appropriate introduction to a discourse on immortality and offers an oppor- tunity to portray the gentle, genial nature, the kindly humour, and the calm, untroubled courage of Socrates ; it also marks the divisions between the various parts of the discussion, and offers relief to the mind of the reader who is wearied by close application to serious argument. Those who take part in the conversation are admirably characterised; this is especially true of the two Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, who play the most important parts after Socrates himself. Both are eager searchers after truth, and both are evidently highly regarded by Socrates—were, in other words, at least respected by Plato ; but Simmias appears as a man of somewhat vague notions, inclined to mysticism, and somewhat lacking in keenness, while Cebes is clear-sighted, sharp, and keen, tenacious of his opinion, but quick to see when an opinion is no longer tenable. These distinguishing traits are drawn with few lines, but the few are masterly. The beautiful imaginative description of the life of souls in the other world is not merely a picturesque addition to the variety of the composition; it teaches us how Plato believed that right and wrong actions were rewarded or

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punished. Quite different imagery is employed for the same end in the Phaedrus, but in both dialogues the justice of the treatment accorded the souls is made clear, and in both the importance of conduct in this life is emphasised, though this emphasis is stronger in the Phaedo, as is natural in view of the dramatic setting.

The number of persons mentioned in the Phaedo is considerable.

Echecrates of Phlius was one of the last of the Pythagoreans ; we know of no particular reason why he is introduced into this dialogue, unless it be that, as a Pythagorean, he might naturally be in sympathy with the doctrine of ideas. Of his personal relations to Socrates nothing is known. Phaedo, of Elis, was taken prisoner in 401 B.c. and brought to Athens, where he was, according to Aulus Gellius (ii., 18), ransomed by Cebes. After the death of Socrates he returned to Elis and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which was afterwards moved to Eretria by Menedemus and known as the Eretrian school. Phaedo wrote several dialogues, but virtually nothing is known of his doctrines. He seems to have been highly esteemed by Socrates and his followers. Apollodorus of Phalerum is of πὸ philosophical importance. He is mentioned several times by Plato and Xenophon as an ardent admirer and constant companion of Socrates, and a man of impulsive, un- restrained disposition. Simmias and Cebes were both Thebans, warm personal friends, and equally devoted to Socrates ; both offered money to secure the release of Socrates from prison (Crito, 45 8). The composition preserved under the name of Pinax or Tablet of Cebes is certainly spurious. Crito appears

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here, as in the dialogue that bears his name, as the old and tried friend of Socrates. The others who are mentioned as companions of Socrates in his last hours are Critobulus, the son of Crito; Hermogenes, probably the son of Hipponicus and then identical with a speaker in the Cratylus; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aeschines, a well-known follower of Socrates, author of several dialogues; Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic school; Ctesippus, a youth mentioned also in the Euthydemus and the Lysis ; Menexenus, son of Demophon and an admirer of Ctesippus; his name is given to one of Plato's dialogues; Phaedonides, a Theban; Euclides of Megara, founder of the Megarian school; and Terpsion, also a Megarian. Evenus, mentioned in 60 p, was a Parian sophist and puct.

The most important separate editions of the Phaedo are those of Geddes, W. Wagner, Wohlrab, Schanz, Hirschig, Burnet, and Archer-Hind. The introduction and commentary in the last-named edition are of special importance.

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ὃ

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

H ΠΕΡῚ ΨΥΧΗΣ, HOIKOZ

TA TOY ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟῪ ΠΡΟΣΏΠΑ

EXEKPATHS, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, KPITQN, Ο TON ENAEKA ὙΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ

le EXEKPATH3. Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἡ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἡ ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτός, ὦ ᾿Εχέκρατες.

EXEKPATHS. Τί οὖν δή ἐ ἐστιν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάξει τὰ "νῦν ᾿Αθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφῖκται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν, ὃ ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός πὶ ἣν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι" τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράξειν.

ΦΑΙΔΩ͂Ν. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EXEKPATHS. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τίς, καὶ ἐθαυμάξομέν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, @ ᾿Εχέκρατες, συνέβη: ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα 200

PRAEDO {ork ON THE SOUL; ernicar]

CHARACTERS

KCHECRATES, PHAEDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEBES, SIMMTAS, Criro, the Servant of the Eleven.

ECHECRATES. Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else ?

PHAEDO. I was there myself, Echecrates.

ecHEcRaTEs. Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time, who could tell us anything definite about this matter, except that he drank poison and died, so we could learn no further details.

PHAEDO. Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted ὃ

ECHECRATES. Yes, some one told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo ἢ

PHAEDO. It; was a matter of chance, Echecrates. It happened that the stern of the ship which the

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ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὃ εἰς Δῆλον ᾿Αθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

ἘΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἐ ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὺς ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους @XETO ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν ᾿Απόλλωνι εὔξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἑκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον" ἣν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ “πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ ᾿Απόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ o μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ θανάτου.

2. ἘΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτη- δείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝν. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες καὶ πολλοί γε.

EXEKPATHE. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.

earann. ᾿Αλλὰ σχολάξω ye καὶ πειράσομαι

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Athenians send to Delos was crowned on the day before the trial.

ECHECRATES. What ship is this?

puagDo. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honour of the god. Now it is their law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and some- times, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.

ECHECRATES. What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the autho- rities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends ?

PHAEDO. Not at all. Some were there, in fact, a good many.

ECHECRATES. Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.

pHAEDO. I am not busy and I will try to tell

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PLATO

ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι" καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι, Σω- κράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

EXEKPATH3. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ὧ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἔχεις" ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσήει" εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἁνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ ᾿Εχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ᾽ εἰς “Αἰδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικό- μενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴπερ TLS πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι “παρόντι πένθει" οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν" καὶ “γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν' ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καί τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὁτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, ᾿Απολλόδωρος" οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ἘΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

SAIAQN. "Exeivos τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. “Etuyor δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παρα- γενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ ᾿Απολλόδωρος τῶν

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you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Socrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.

ecHEcRATES. Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.

PHAEDO. For my part, I had strange emotions when I was there. For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at the death of a friend; since he seemed to me to be happy, both in his bearing and his words, he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the protection of the gods, and that when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it ever was well with anyone. And for this reason I was not at all filled with pity, as might seem natural when IJ was present at a scene of mourning ; nor on the other hand did I feel pleasure because we were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy ;—but a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and of pain together, when 1 thought that Socrates was presently to die. And all of us who were there were in much the same con- dition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping ; especially one of us, Apollodorus; you know him and his character.

ECHECRATES. To be sure I do.

PHAEDO. He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.

ECHECRATES. Who were these, Phaedo?

pHAEDO. Of native Athenians there was this

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PLATO

ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔτι “Ἑρμογένης καὶ “Emiyévns καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ ᾿Αντισθένης: ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων: Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἠσθένει.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. évor δέ τινες παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδωνίδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ti δέ; ᾿Αρίστιππος καὶ Κλέομ- βροτος παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙδων. Οὐ δῆτα: ἐν Alyivn γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

EXEKPATHS. Αλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Σχεδόν Te οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέ- σθαι.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες, φής, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

3. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Εὐμγγώ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειρά- σομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἕωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο' πλησίον γὰρ ἣν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίους περιεμένομεν οὖν ἑκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρί- βοντες μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων: ἀνεῴγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῷ' ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῇῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον συνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ

1 Schanz, after Cobet, inserts οὐ after Κλεόμβροτος.

2 After προτεραίᾳ the MSS. read ἡμέρᾳ, which Hermann, followed by Schanz and others, brackets.

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Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeanian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.

ECHECRATES. Were any foreigners there?

PHAEDO. Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebes and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.

EcHECRATES. What? Were Aristippus and Cleom- brotus there?

PHAEDO. No. They were said to be in Aegina.

ECHECRATES. Was anyone else there?

pHaEpo. I think these were about all.

ECHECRATES. Well then, what was the conversa- tion?

PHAEDO. I wil] try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most ot the day with him. On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, when we left the prison

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E ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας,

ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι TO πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφυγμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρωϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἥκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ

θυρωρός, ὃ ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑ ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. Λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἕνδεκα “Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευ- τήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ᾽ οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἧκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμ- βάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ ἘΞανθίππην ---γυγνώσκεις γάρ---ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ ἘΞανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δή σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σω- κράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα: Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγον τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν τε καὶ κοπτομένην'" ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζό- μενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψεέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα' ‘Os ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐ ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δύ᾽ ὄντε. καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ

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PHAEDO

in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible. And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us. “For,” he said, “ the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die to-day.” So after a little delay he came and told us to goin. We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe —you know her—with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say: “Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them.” And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, “Crito, let somebody take her home.’ And some of Crito’s people took her away wailing and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, “ What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And 1 think,” he said, “if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when

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διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ. 4. Ὃ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολα βών' Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ᾽ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας Φ με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν ᾿Απόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Evnvos πρῴην, ὅ TL ποτὲ διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ , δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον. οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ, εὖ οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἶπέ, τί χρὴ λέγειν. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα" ἤδειν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον εἴη: ἀλλ᾽ ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε: πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μου- σικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης 210

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he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after.”

Here Cebes interrupted and said, “By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Several others have asked about the poems you have com- posed, the metrical versions of Aesop’s fables and the hymr to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again—and | know he will ask me—tell me what to say.”

“ Then tell him, Cebes,” said he, “ the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for 1 knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were some- thing like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and some- times in another, but always saying the same thing: ‘Socrates,’ it said, ‘make music and work at it.’ And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the

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μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος: νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα πειθό- μενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία" μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ods προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἠπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

5. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράξε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον" κελεύουσι γὰρ ᾿Αθηναῖοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας: Οἷον παρακε- λεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί: σχεδὸν οὖν, ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἤσθημαι, οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν σοι ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δαί; 4 δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔηνος; “Eporye δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἔθε- λήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὔηνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὑτόν: οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέ. γετο. ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης: Ila@s τοῦτο

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greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that 1 had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was ; and after the god, considering that a poet, if heis really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon. So tell Evenus that, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can. I, it seems, am going to-day; for that is the order of the Athenians.”’

And Simmias said, “ What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it.”

“Why so?” said he. “Is not Evenus a philo- sopher ?”’

“JT think so,” said Simmias.

“Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted.” And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the con- versation.

Then Cebes asked him: “ What do you mean by

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λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, TO μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάξεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ᾽ ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἕπεσθαι; Ti 0é, ὦ Κέβης ; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ “Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες ; Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὧ Σώκρατες. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω" ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοώς, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ,. ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι" τί γὰρ ἄν Tis καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

6. Κατὰ ἰὴ οὖν ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ᾽ ἡμῖν διῃτᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν: σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. ᾿Αλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη: τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἄλλα," ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν" οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυ- μαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται, εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώ- ποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας: Ἴττω Ζεύς, ἔφη τῇ αὑτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ

1 Schanz brackets τῆς ἐκεῖ.

3. Schanz, following Forster, puts a period after τἄλλα and inserts ἀλλὰ,

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this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one’s life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying ?”’

“ How is this, Cebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?”

“ Nothing definite, Socrates.”

“1 myself speak of them only from hearsay ; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset ?”’

“Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates? I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this ; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it.”

“ You must have courage,” said he, “and perhaps you might hearsomething. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor.”

And Cebes, smiling gently, said, “ Gawd knows it doos,”’ speaking in his own dialect.

“Tt would seem unreasonable, if put in this way,”

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Mv B Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ᾽ εἶναι ἄλογον: οὐ μέντοι

ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως γ᾽ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινε φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐ ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ᾽ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾷδιος διιδεῖν: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελου- μένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἕν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι" ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; "Ιῦμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀπο- κτιννύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; Πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦ- σαν.

7. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰκός, ἔφϑη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλο- σόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, @ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ “ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ἡ ἐπιστα- τοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος: ἀλλ᾽ ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ᾽ ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ 216

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said Socrates, “but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this?”

“Yes,” said Cebes, “I do.”

“ Well then,” said he, “if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?”

“ Certainly,” he replied.

“Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me.”

“That,” said Cebes, “seems sensible. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems strange if we were right just now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions. For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the world, are watching over them. A wise man certainly does not think that when he is frée he can take better care of himself than they do. A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master, and he would not consider that he must not run

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δεσπότου," καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίξοιτο, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ τι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι, ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὧ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο: τοὺς μὲν “γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σω- κράτης ἡσθῆναί, τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς" ᾿Αεί τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι, ὅ ὅ τι ἄν τις εἴπη. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας" ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ TL καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης: τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν ,Φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν, ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

8. Φέρε On, ἢ On, US, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ῴμὴν ἥξειν “πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔ ἔπειτα καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ" νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε, ὅτε παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι

1 Schanz brackets φευκτέον... δεσπότου.

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away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible ; and so he might thought- lessly run away; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself. And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural ; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice.”

When Socrates heard this I thought he was pleased by Cebes’ earnestness, and glancing at us, he said, “Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says.

re Simmias said, “Well, Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them? And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as you yourself agree, good rulers.”

“You have a right to say that,” he replied; “ for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court.”

“ Precisely,’ said Simmias.

«“ Well, then,” said he, “I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe,” said he, “that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively ; but I would

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ἀγαθούς: καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρι- σαίμην' ὅτι μέντοι. παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν," εὖ ἴστε ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ᾽ εὔελπίς εἶμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς «ἔχων Thy διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἀπολογία ἐστίν, ἐὰν ἅπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃης. ᾿Αλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστιν ὃ βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τίκτῶ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι, φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, ei δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ

i δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάξεσθαι καὶ δὲς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Σω- κράτης" Ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν' ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαξέτω ὡς καὶ δὶς δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ, καὶ τρίς. ᾿Αλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ἤδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων' ἀλλά μοι ἐσ πράγ. ματα παρέχει. Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντε ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν

1 Schanz brackets ἥξειν, following Hirschig. 2 Schanz brackets τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. 3 Schanz brackets πάλαι.

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assert as positively as anything about such matters that lam going to gods who' are good masters. And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked.”

“ Well,’ said Simmias, “do you intend to go away, Socrates, and keep your opinion to yourself, or would you let us share it? It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defence.”

“1 qvill, try, “he ’replied?> *oBut first let..vis"ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time.”

“ Only, Socrates,” said Crito, “that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison; so sometimes he has to make those who talk too much drink twice or even three times.”

And Socrates said: “Never mind him. Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times.”

“1 was pretty sure that was what you would say,” said Crito, “but he has been’bothering me for a long time.”

“Never mind him,” said Socrates. “I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is

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64 μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ" πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

9, Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνή- σκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ πάλαι προεθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετή- δευον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας" Νὴ τὸν Δία,

Be ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν γελα- σείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν, ὅ ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ᾽ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς 7 τε θανατῶσι καὶ 7 ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλό-

C σοφοι. εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις" ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν 0 Σιμμίας. “Apa μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ

τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν

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naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be.

“Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practising.”

And Simmias laughed and said, “ By Zeus, Socrates, I don’t feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it.”

«“ And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is. Let us then,” said he, “speak with one another, paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as death?”

“Certainly,” replied Simmias.

‘‘We believe, do we not, that death is the separa- tion of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists

223

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> \ θ᾽ « \ 4 . \ ” “7 αὐτὴν καθ αὑτὴν εἰναι; apa μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ θάνατος “ἢ τοῦτο; Οὔκ, adda TovTO, ἔφη. > f / ΦῚ 25 Li 2\ v \ \ a

κέψαι δή, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἐὰν dpa καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ

, \ , a a ἅπερ ἐμοί. ἐκ yap τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεταί σοι φιλο-

U , \ ἂψ 2 / x \ ς \ σόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ Tas ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σίτων τε καὶ

a ¢ 2 ? Μ e » ποτῶν; Ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ; τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφε- ρόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ

n 3 / nw ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; ᾿Ατιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία

) \ Ν [οἷ “. > \ we Ψ / οὐ περὶ TO σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται 2 , 3 nr \ δὲ \ \ / ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ THY ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;

Μ ? 3 Φ a Ἂ ᾽ al te Epovye. Ap’ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις

δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας ιαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; ΦῬαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δήπου, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ᾧ μηδὲν HOU τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγύς TL τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις. 1 Schanz brackets ἧ, 224

PHAEDO

alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?” “No, it is this,” said he.

“ Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject. Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?”

“ By no means, Socrates,’ said Simmias.

“ How about the pleasures of love?”

“ Certainly not.”

“ Well, do you think such a man would think mucl. of the other cares of the body—I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them or despise them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?”

“1 think the true philosopher would despise them,’ he replied.

“ Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul? ”

SoVess

“To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body?”

ΚΠ 15:

“Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn’t deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead.”

“ That is very true.”

225

PLATO

10. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω: ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτε οὔτ᾽ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι: πᾶσαι γάρ Tov τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν: ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; ᾿Ιάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίξεσθαι, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται δέ γέ πον τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, GAN ὅ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ᾽ ἁπτομένη ὁρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία. Καὶ 226

PHAEDO

“Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom? What I mean is this: Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see any- thing accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these. Do you not think so?”’

“ Certainly I do,” he replied.

“Then,” said he, “when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it.”

ἀν τὸν

“In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?”

« Ὑ δ"

“ But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality.”

* That is true.”

“In this matter also, then, the soul of the philo- sopher greatly despises’the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?”

“ Evidently.”

“Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?”

“ We certainly think there is.”

227

PLATO

καλὸν γέ te Kal ἀγαθόν; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἡ δ᾽ ὅς. "AAN ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄχλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν: apa διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει: ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; Πάνν μὲν οὖν. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειε καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῇ καθ' αὑτὴν εἰλεκρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὦτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ap οὐχ ᾳὗτός ἐστιν, ὧ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; ‘Tareppuas, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

11, Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τὶς ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυρμένη

228

PHAEDO

« And absolute beauty and goodness.”

“ Of course.”

“Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?”

“ Certainly not,” said he.

“Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality of everything. Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it ?”’

“ Certainly.”

“Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companion- ship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?”

“That is true as true can be, Socrates,” said Simmias.

“ Then,” said he, “ ail this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other some- thing like this: ‘There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the

229

PLATO

7 ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα, ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν. φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν “γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει, τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν: ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίξζουσιν ἡ ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντο- δαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι UT αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέ εἰ ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, Souketdares τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ' καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσο- φίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ 8 “ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέχλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα: καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, 7 οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέ- ναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν' τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ.

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PHAEDO

soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance; and moreover, if diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles ; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturb- ing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone. And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamoured of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledgé is impossible while the body is with us, one of two thing must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead ; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall,

231

PLATO

> C2 Ἃ a «

καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω 3... δ ἢ an 0. 7 ΣΝ oe , \ ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν 6 TL μάλιστα μηδὲν ς a A “ἢ la) ὁμιλῶμεν TH σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, 6 TL μὴ

ἴω / A πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου

, ἢ \ 7 » 9 eee x φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ec Ν 35. ΘΔ ’ i e n \ Ψ \ \ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς" Kal οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές"

a >] > ἃ wv Ν » , τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές. μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν 7 τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάξειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

rad ς “ [9]

12. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ « rn \ \ > / 3 Ν 4 ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ at ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ: ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελ-

tod θόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε ἀποδημία ἡ ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ “ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρί, ὃ ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, SYA € ἊΣ , K {0 δὲ > = > an epyn ὁ Σιμμίας. ἀθαρσις ὃὲ εἰναι apa οὐ τοῦτο / a ξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίξειν ὅ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἀθροίξεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι “ Ll

καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἐκλνομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνυ μὲν 232

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[ think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure,—and that is, perhaps, the truth. For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.’ Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of know- ledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts. Do you not agree?”

* Most assuredly, Socrates.”

“Then,” said Socrates, “if this is true, my friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now imposed upon me is begun with good hope; and the like hope exists for every man who thinks that his mind has been purified and made ready.”

“ Certainly,” said Simmias.

* And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now and here- after, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters?”’

“Certainly,” said he.

233

θ8

PLATO

οὗν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντά- πασί γε, ἡ δ᾽ ds. Avew δέ γε αὐτῆν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ “μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ _piroco- φοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἢ οὔ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γέλοιον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα παρασκευάξονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅ τι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ξῆν, κἄπειθ' ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τού- του ἀγανακτεῖν ὦ «οὐ γέλοιον; Ids 6 ov; Te ὄντι apa, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσο- φοῦντες ἀποθνήσκειν μετελῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθ"άναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν" ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως" ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ viéwy ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς “Αἰδου ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύ- μουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι' φρονήσεως δὲ apa τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν “Αἰδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀπο- θνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί

1 After ἀγανακτεῖν BT read οὐ γέλοιον; Schanz brackets these words. Burnet reads γέλοιον", giving it to Simmias.

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« Well, then, this is what we call death, 15 it not, a release and separation from the body ?”

“ Exactly so,” said he.

“ But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?”

“ Obviously.”

“Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could, should then be disturbed when death came to him. Would it not be absurd ?”

“Of course.”

“In fact, then, Simmias,” said he, “the true philosophers practise dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining what they longed for all through life—and they longed for wisdom—and of escaping from the companion- ship of that which they hated? When human loves or wives or sons have died, many men have willingly gone to the other world led by the hope of seeing there those whom they longed for, and of being with them; and shal] he who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else than in the other world grieve when he dies and not be glad to go there? We cannot

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γε χρή, ἐὰν TO ὄντι ye ἦ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος" σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ a > fe Μ Σ A \ / e nr

ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἡ δ᾽ ὅς.

18. Οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο > \ a bal ” > » Ls > ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀπο- θανεῖσθαι, ὅτε οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἦν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὧν

\ 4 \ ’ A \ [τ καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα

7 a ᾽ , 4 4 »Μ ef ¢ τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. IIdvv, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως, ὡς λέγεις. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομα- ζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ

’ A \ e ΕΥ̓ > ’ὔ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφρο-

4 \ \ x b ’ Ἔν n 2 ᾽ σύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ ὀλυγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ᾽ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσίν

Ns Δ) / A b) (2 » ᾽ τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη. Eu

\ 4" 4 » Ὁ Η A Ip n Μ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, 7 δ᾽ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων > ’ \ , ’ Ca ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Ilds δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα, 7 δ᾽ ὅς, ef \ / e la) / «ς » A ὅτι Tov θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν

lA “A \ 4~? ΝΜ > fal , μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι

\ 4 [τ e , ν A A τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; "ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ

/ Μ ’ 3 -ΟΡὔ > / ἊΝ e δεδιέναι dpa καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ 236

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think that, my friend, if he is really a philosopher ; for he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world. And if this is so, would it not be very foolish for such a man to fear death?”

“ Very foolish, certainly,’ said he.

“Then is it not,’ said Socrates, “a_ sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body? And this same man is also a lover of money and of honour, one or both.”

“Certainly,” said he, “it is as you say.”

“Then, Simmias,” he continued, “is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers ? ”

“ΒΥ all means,” said he.

« And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy?”

“‘ Necessarily,” said he.

“For,” said Socrates, “if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd.”

“ How so, Socrates?”

“ You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the gregt evils?”

“ They certainly do.”

“ And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils?”

“ That is true.”

“Then all except philosophers are brave through

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φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἄλογόν ye δέει τινὰ Kal δειλίᾳ

ἴω / E ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. ἸΙάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι

αὐτῶν; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν: ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην. φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι" ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων} ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι’ ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσω- / Ww U 5 “4 7 φρονίσθαι. Boxe γάρ. Ω μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη 7 ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείξω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἦ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἡ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σω- φροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ξυλλήβοδην adn Ons ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν. καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων: χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀχλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων "μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἡ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, τὸ 8 ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἦ κάθαρσίς τις 1 Schanz brackets ἄλλων.

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fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice.”

“¢ Very true.”

“And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of self- indulgence.”

“80 it seems.”

“ My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging plea- sures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self- restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in

239

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τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ “σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τίς ἢ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς “Αἰδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, o δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι. οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι: εἰ δ᾽ ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τὸ ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ᾽ ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κἀκεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι. καὶ ἑταίροις" εἴ Te οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

14. Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπο- λαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη. Ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ETL ἡ,

1 After ἑταίροις, the MSS. read τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει, “Ὀαὺ the many do not believe this.” Ast, followed by Schanz and Burnet, omits.

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fact a purification from all these things, and self. restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not un- enlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes un- initiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, ‘the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few’; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when i have arrived there, very soon, if it is God’s will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here, because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well.”

When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said: “Socrates, I agree to the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the

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“ e

ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη TH ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολ-

.« ε

λύηται, ἣ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος an of uno Kn: εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα 7 καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἢ." ἐπεί, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν. ὧν σὺ νῦν δὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐλπὶς εἴη καὶ καλή, ὦ Σώ- κρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης “παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη, “λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης: ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν. εἴτε μή; ἜἜγωγε οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὔκουν γ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι, ἣ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κωμῳδιοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

15. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτ᾽ ἄρα ἐν “Αἰδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώ-

x η ρ πων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων" καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνε- σθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ av που πάλιν S20 \ Φ \ a e X ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, Kal τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο, ὅτι 1 Schanz and Burnet bracket οἴχηται. .. ἢ.

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day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists any- where by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now, there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the sou! still exists and has any power and intelligence.”

“What you say, Cebes, is true,” said Socrates. “ Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?”

“1 do,” said Cebes. “1 should like to hear what you think about it.”

“ Well,” said Socrates, “I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

«Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they gu there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the

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οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων" εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του / , δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ ΤᾺ ? » [4 > 3 [τὰ , U τοίνυν κατ᾿ ἀνθρώπων, ἧ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων , a πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει / \ , “ γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων εἰδῶμεν, Ap οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται LA ? A aA 29 - > / Ν > ΄ πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ » oli ed , ’ » ’ ιν αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, Apa ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν » > Ἂν , a > nw 3 ~ 9% ’ὔ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. ay’ οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τε γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ a ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνε- - , n σθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ f μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενή- Μ A > σεται; "ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυρο- / \ > fd \ ? / \ Tépov τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ A / / , Μ A / θᾶττον; Ildvy ye. Τί δέ; av τι χεῖρον γι- > ᾽ 3 ld \ aA / γνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; “ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Ilav γε. Ti δ᾽ αὖ; ἔστι te καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον 244

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living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed.”

“Certainly,” said Cebes.

“Now,” said he, “if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the dis- graceful, the just of the unjust, and there are count- less other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater.”

“Ves

“And if it becomes smaller, it must have been greater and then have become smaller?”

“That is true,” said he.

“ And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker ?”’

“ Certainly.”

“And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust ?”’

“ Of course.” ¢

“Then,” said he, “we have this fact sufficiently established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites ?”’

“ Certainly.”

“ Now then, is there between all these pairs of

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\ ᾽ / t a 2 , A μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ “ > ΔΝ ΟΣ 4 - τὸ iG sc ey No ey. ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ᾽ αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον" μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ

ΜΝ , \ n e \ ἃ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν , ’, a αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Nat, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν \ l4 \ / XN Le καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε ’ αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἑκατέρου" ᾽ εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, 7 δ᾽ ὅς. 16. Τί οὖν; ἔφη. τῷ ζῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, “ A ? ΄ \ / , Ν ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; ἸΠάνυ μὲν ’ fal οὖν, ἔη. Ti; To τεθνάναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ᾽ / , Ὁ » ᾽ , αλλήλων TE γίγνεται TaUTa, εἴπερ ἐναντία ᾽ a A ἐστιν, Kal αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο a“ v n \ Μ \ \ / δυοῖν ὄντοιν; Πῶς yap ov; Thy μὲν τοίνυν ἴω Ψ, ἑτέραν συξυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, a \ \ \ / Ερῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις" / \ σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ TO μὲν καθεύδειν, \ δὲ 3 , δ > a θ “ὃ Ν τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἴων / \ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι Kal ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι TO a A \ καθεύδειν, Kal Tas γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν κατα- , « fe δαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἱκανῶς σοι, ΄ Ν ἔφη, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δή μοι καὶ 1 Schanz brackets ἐξ ἑκατέρου.

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opposites what may be called two kinds of genera- tion, from one to the other and back again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other decreasing, do we not?”

“Yes,” said he.

“ And similarly analysing and combining, and cool- ing and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other ?”’

‘ Certainly,” said he.

“ Well then,” said Socrates, “is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the opposite of sleeping ?”’

“Certainly,” said Cebes.

ew trac? ot

“ Being dead,” said he.

“Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?”

“Of course.”

‘“Now,” said Socrates, “I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its inter- mediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake, and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?”

“ Certainly.”

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’ ΝΜ [4 Ν ipl

σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ

2 ’ \ \ a a N , Ϊ ἐναντίον μὲν φῇς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; "Eywye. Τύγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ναί. Ἔξ

= A lal Ν

οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός,

Μ ὍἬὦ , 4 ? σ A A ἔφη. Ti δέ, ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος; ᾿Αναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Ἐϊσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν “Αἰδου. “Eoxev. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἣ γ᾽ ἑτέρα A = 4 Ν ᾿ » ’ \ σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ yap ἀποθνήσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἡ δ᾽

4 , > > 4 \ > , ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν THY ἐναντίαν x ,

γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ 9 , > ol A » ’ 3 ’ὔ \ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ / ’ \ γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην; To a ᾽ Μ ” τὴ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ

> ,ὔ ᾽ a 4 A Μ / ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Wavy

γε. Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς 248

PHAEDO

“Now do you,’ said he, “tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?”

‘1 ido,

“ And that they are generated one from the other?”

“es

* Now what is it which is generated from the living?”

“The dead,” said he.

“ And what,’ said Socrates, ““ from the dead ?”’

“1 can say only one thing—the living.”

“From the dead, then, Cebes, the living, both things and persons, are generated?”

“ Evidently,” said he.

“Then,” said Socrates, “our souls exist in the other world.”

“80 it seems.”

« And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?”

“Certainly,” said he.

“Well then,” said Socrates, “what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying ?”

“Certainly we must,” said he.

“ What is this process?”

“ Coming to life again.”

“Then,” said Socrates, “if there be such a thing as coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?”

“ Certainly.”

“ So by this method also we reach the conclusion

249

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ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων" τούτου δὲ ὄντος , ’, > A ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι OTL ἀναγκαῖον \ a , \ Si, 9 Ψ \ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ I 4 “ » = , πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, al tf A ἐκ TOV ὡμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν. , 17. ᾿Ιδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ᾽ / 3 \ a \ ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ws ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ yap μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιυγνό- ’, rd μενα ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα, ἀλλ εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι \ , , a , ” 7O\ καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν ᾽ A χαλεπόν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω: ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ᾽ \ ’ \ Μ Ν 2 » ’ὔ εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι ’ / a μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, . > ὦ a 0.089) ΤᾺ a Whigs οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ᾽ ἂν λῆρον τὸν Evdu- , ᾽ , \ 5) πον , Re TN μίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ / / καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, δια- κρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ ᾿Αναξαγόρου γεγο- νὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ an / ᾽ A \ > / , > , ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώ- 2 \ lal TKOLTO, ἄρ᾽ οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων A , A x - μ , τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκοι, Tis 250

PHAEDO

that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life.’’

“1 think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions.”

“‘ Now here is another method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions. For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all.”

«“ What do you mean ?”’ said he.

1} is not at all hard,”’ said Socrates, “to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, ‘all things are chaos,’ would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is

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μηχανὴ μὴ οὐ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, a Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς

E εἶναι.ἷ

18. Kai μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀνα- μιμνῃσκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι" ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. ᾿Αλλά, ὧ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με" οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλ- λίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα a ἔχει: καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς “ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί a ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Te δὲ μὴ

1 After εἶναι the MSS. read καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον, ‘Sand that the good fare better

and the bad worse.” Bracketed by Stallbaum, followed by Schanz, Burnet, and others,

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there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?”

“I see none, Socrates,’ said Cebes. “ What you say seems to be perfectly true.”

“1 think, Cebes,” said he, “it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist.”

“And besides,’ Cebes rejoined, “if it iis true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form ; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal.”

“ But, Cebes,”’ said Simmias, “ what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.”

“ Briefly,” said Cebes, “a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or any- thing of that sort.”

“And if you are not convinced in that way,

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ταύτῃ γέ, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι, ἂν τῇδέ πῇ σοι “σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δή, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; ᾿Απιστῷ μέν σοι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι μαθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνῃσθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι: οὐδὲν μέντ᾽ ἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν, πῇ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας, λέγειν. Τῇδ᾽ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀνα- μνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω é τινα τρόπον τόνδε: ἐάν τίς tel ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη, ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν; ἸΠῶς λέγεις; Οἷον τὰ τοιάδε: ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄχλο τὸ οἷς Ta παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο" ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις" ὥσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι vn Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα

1 After τὶ BCD read πρότερον, which Schanz brackets, T reads τι ἕτερόν τι, Burnet τι ἕτερον.

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Simmias,” said Socrates, “see if you don’t agree when you look at it in this way. You are in- credulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?”

“JT am not incredulous,” said Simmias, “but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced ; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say.”

“It was this,” said he. “We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?”

“Certainly,” said he.

“Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection ? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception ?”

« What do you mean?”

“Let me give,an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.”’

“OF course:

“Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples.”

“To be sure you could,” said Simmias.

“ Now,” said he, “is that sort of thing a kind of

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/ cid » / A 2 aA a € \ μέντοι, ὅταν τίς τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ ὑπὸ , fal “ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; / \ Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς: ἔστιν “ , 3 , \ fi / ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ; ΄ 3 “ἅμ \ / ? / ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνῃσθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα [ 4 a γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνυ ye. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ = / A Σιμμίου ἀναμνῃσθῆναι; "ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. ¢ bf a 19. "Ap οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει A > 7 = \ 3 oF 16 / 4 εἶ οἾ τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνήσκηταί τίς τι, ap οὐκ avay- al ’ ΄ > lal » ’ καῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει A \ \ ¢ , \ td τοῦτο κατὰ THY ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ 3 / 2 / Μ / § > oo ἀνεμνήσθη; ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, a / UA εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο A / SENT, > \ \ a , τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα [ὦ , > Ἂν NP Lis nm /, 9 a 7, ἕτερόν TL, αὐτὸ TO ἴσον: φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; “a [2 « , -“ Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Av, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Ilavu γε, A / ἢ δ᾽ os. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; A ΤᾺ / dp οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους a v Μ 150 Μ ᾽ , 3 a ἢ AaXAa aTTa LOOVTES LOA, EK τούτων ἐκεῖνο 256

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recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention ?”’

“ Certainly,” he replied.

“Well, then,” said Socrates, “can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?”’

* Surely.”

“ And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?”

“ Yes,” said he.

“ All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?”

“AY es. 7

«“ And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not δ᾿

Inevitably,” -he replied.

“Now see,” said he, “if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?”

“We shall say that there is,” said Simmias, “ most decidedly.”’

« And do we know what it is?”

“Certainly,” said he.

“Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood

257

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ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον Ov τούτων; ἣ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι , ‘ \ A A 9ῳ 5» > / \ φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ap οὐ λίθοι μὲν ’ \ » A ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα A 3 x φαίνεται, τῷ δ᾽ ov; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ᾽ \ ν ” σ Ν U ) 4 RK € αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ >] , ᾽ , > / / = , ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτέ ye, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα A , Kal αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ᾽, ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας; ᾿Αλη- θέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; Ildvu γε. Διαφέρει δέ γε, ε \ A ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδέν: ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς » ΝΜ 32 “ » “ » 5 , ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, > a » ΦΉΣΑΝΤΟΣ , , ΄ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ , / i 2 ? a / fl a μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς: 4 πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦ- \ > a A A τον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ ols νῦν δὴ , a » ne / en Cd ΕΠ) ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα ? σ 3: Ν ΤᾺ »Μ Mv a » A > 4 εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνῳ a »" > ἣν ΕΣ a > 7 \ τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Kal 3 “ ἴω ς A πολύ ye, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν 4 A tis τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ, ὅτε βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ 258

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or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?”’

Certainly.”

“ Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality ?”’

“No, Socrates, never.”

“Then,” said he, “those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract.”

“ Not at all, I should say, Socrates.”

“ But from those equals,” said he, “ which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?”

“Very true, hegeplied.

“ And it is either like them or unlike them?”

Certainly.”

“It -makes no difference,” said he. ‘ Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.”

« Surely: +

“Now then,” said he, “do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?”

“ They fall very far short of it,” said he.

“Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, ‘This thing that I see aims at being

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Le > \ « ~ Ἂν Μ [οἱ » > “ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο TL τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ nr “ > δὲ καὶ ov δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; ᾿Αν- , fo) al aykn. Τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, a Μ , ἊΝ ν Ν ᾽ \ x 7 4 ἢ οὔ, περί Te τὰ ἴσα Kal αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; ἸΙαντά- ,ὔ a Μ a / \ πασί ye. ᾿Αναγκαῖον apa ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐν- lA » “ 3 \ Ἁ δεεστέρως. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ς la] \ Ν 3 Ἁ ) / Ν ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι, GAN ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ [2 a mM Ν a , / Jol ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων" ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ , , a / a G ΄ Σώκρατες, πρός γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος. 3 \ \ ὃ} » Led 2 , ὃ Coy >] a Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ Ex ye τῶν αἰσθήσεων Set ἐννοῆσαι, \ a ΄ / ὅτε πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέ- γεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ? C a cad / ε Od Π \ “ Ν ἐστιν’ ἢ πως λέγομεν; ὕτως. po του apa wv e A Cc ἃς \ 6 VA \ 3 ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν Kal ἀκούειν καὶ τἄλλα > 4 cal ΝΜ , 3 ’, αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην A A ? a αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅ τι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν na ’, Ὁ αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτε προθυμεῖται a 3 “ ΄“ μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. ᾿Ανάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ A , ‘ “ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε 1 Schanz brackets ὅτι προθυμεῖται. . . φαυλότερα.

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like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,’ he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?”

“ We must.”

“Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract ?”’

“Tt certainly is.”

“Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, ‘ All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.’ ”’

“ That is true.”

“And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike.”

“Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the pur- poses of our argument.”

“Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?”

caves.

“ Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we per- ceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.”

“That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates.”

261

PLATO

καὶ ἠκούομεν Kal τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν; / Πάνυ ye. “Eder δέ ye, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν / ΝΜ i Μ > 7 € -“ > \ γενέσθαι dpa, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. “EKorxev. rf , la] 20. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ / ΝΜ Ψ ΄ > 4 \ \ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν cal ΄ A \ \ > A lal an \ > n μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ αὐτοῦ A 3 a) \ Z Α εἰ ἡ (oy f τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, No μὲν τῶν ᾽ , NU AL μὸν περὶ ἁπάντων ols ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς , tal ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον a / \ “ Ν le ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ lal 3 γενέσθαι εἰληφένα. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ [4 μέν γε λαβόντες ἑκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, , Ἂ εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι: τὸ A Ne a 3 9 [4 ’, 3 4 γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην Μ \ A ᾽ , Α A 3 lal 40 ἔχειν Kal μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι' ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην φ / ΄ ᾽ / / λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; άν- ΓῚ , ? , 4 τως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Et δέ γε, οἶμαι, ΄ \ f ᾿ 2 7 λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, a ΄ Ν > ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενον περὶ αὐτὰ ᾽ / 3 4 4 3 / “ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἅς ποτε 262

PHAEDO

“ Certainly.”

“ But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses ἢ

SV eS.

“Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.”

“Tt does.”

“‘ Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with abso- lute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of ‘ absolute ’ in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth.”

“Phat is-true. |;

“And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them through- out our life; for to know is to have acquired know- ledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?”

“ Certainly, Socrates,” said he.

«“ But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process

263

PLATO

\ \ v 4 » ᾽ ΠΥ “ ͵ καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ap οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθά- νειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό

, ’, ᾽ , , A 27 a ? 4 v γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τε ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα 7} τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ

/ bd a a > [4 A ΠῚ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι, ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλη-

’ » ΄ a a a Ld σ , σίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὃν ἢ ὅμοιον: ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόνα-

Ν.» / θ ὃ \ , f aA μεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον,

ef f 3 \ 3 ᾽ Ἁ 3 f

οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀναμιμνή- 4

σκονται οὗτοι, Kal ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.

Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

21. Πότερον οὖν αἱρεῖ, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπισταμέ-

νους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὕστερον / / ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι. Τί δὲ τόδε; ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ: ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται » \ ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ ov; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. εἶ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔ διδό > δ τού ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ’ / ’ ΜΝ Μ e / ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μέντ᾽ av, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας" =~ οι Ἁ ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὔριον , 3 “- 2 ΄ ὑὃ \ ᾽ , , τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς.

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PHAEDO

which we call learning really be recovering know- ledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection ?”

« Assuredly.”

“ For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be recollection.” 4

“ That is certainly true, Socrates.”

«“ Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect after- wards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth ?”’

«1 cannot choose at this moment, Socrates.”

“ How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it : When a man knows, ean he give an account of what he knows or not?”

“ Certainly he can, Socrates.”

«“ And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking ?”’

“1 wish they might,” said Simmias; “but on the contrary I fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly.”

“ Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these things ?”’

“ΒΥ no means.”

265

PLATO

3 , ΝΜ) [2 ν > / Αναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα & ποτε ἔμαθον; ᾿Ανάγκη. i a a Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ᾽ “Ὁ ξ > \ δ} ᾽ ᾽ aa Μ θ αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ᾽ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, φ Σ / e Νὴ \ Ld Ν > ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι , ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν 9 ER} ree / , , εἶχον. ἴω μὴ ἄρα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας" οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ETL ὁ χρόνος. Εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε: ἀπόλ- \ 3 \ > ’ »,Ἅ / > ἣν λυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ \ ew / by \ [ « ς / δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ws ἄρτι ὡμολογή- σαμεν: ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών. 3 ef » Μ ec oA 4 ’ 22. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; ᾽ \ » ΠΣ δ A > ’ \ εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεῖ, καλόν τε Kal a / ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέ- / ρομεν, ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμε- τέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι e a > \ \ »Μ Lol » A ig , ἡμᾶς" εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος φΦι “Ὁ » οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ap οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση a \ ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι Kal Tas ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ 266

PHAEDO

« Then _ they recollect the things they once learned ?’

“ Necessarily.”

“When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings.”

« Certainly not.”

“ Then previously.”

Yes

“Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence.”

“ Unless, Socrates, we acquire these

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