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Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)

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Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) Updated August 28, 2026 (IF10177) The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an interagency body chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. It serves the President in overseeing the potential national security risks of certain foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. economy. CFIUS jurisdiction includes the review of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business; certain noncontrolling investments in businesses involved in critical technologies, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data (so-called "TID U.S. businesses"); and certain real estate transactions. At the recommendation of CFIUS, the President may suspend or prohibit transactions that threaten to impair U.S. national security. The United States is the world's largest foreign investor and recipient of FDI. U.S. policy has supported a rules-based and open investment environment domestically and globally to promote U.S. economic growth and ensure the U.S. position as a premier FDI destination. Against this backdrop, CFIUS has reviewed a small subset of foreign investment with an exclusive focus on national security. The focus of CFIUS's national security actions has evolved over time in response to emerging issues and concerns. Congressional focus on CFIUS has intensified since 2016 amid growing attention to the potential national security ramifications of investments by firms directed, controlled, or funded by a foreign government, notably the People's Republic of China (PRC), and in strategic sectors. Members are engaged in oversight of CFIUS reforms that Congress mandated in 2018, and some have introduced legislation to address perceived gaps in CFIUS's jurisdiction and actions. CFIUS Authorities and Composition CFIUS derives its authorities from Section 721 of the Defense Production Act (DPA), as amended (50 U.S.C. §4565), and implementing regulations (31 C.F.R. Chapter VIII). CFIUS initially was created and operated through a series of executive orders. In 1988, Congress passed the "Exon-Florio" amendment to the DPA (50 U.S.C. App. §2170), which codified the review process, at the time largely driven by concerns over Japanese firms' acquisitions of U.S. defense-related firms. In 2007, amid concerns over the proposed purchase of commercial operations of six U.S. ports by a firm based in the United Arab Emirates, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-49 ), which formally gave CFIUS statutory authority. In 2018, Congress passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA, Title XVII, P.L. 115-232 ), which expanded CFIUS's jurisdiction and review process in key ways. FIRRMA was intended to "strengthen and modernize" CFIUS and enhance its ability to address concerns involving nonpassive, noncontrolling investments (e.g., minority stake) in TID businesses and real estate transactions (e.g., land purchases) in proximity to military installations, or part of maritime ports or airports. Foreign investors with ties to countries that are part of the "five eyes" alliance—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—may be exempt from some of the rules. CFIUS consists of nine members: the Secretaries of the Treasury (chair), State, Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, and Energy; the Attorney General; the U.S. Trade Representative; and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Secretary of Labor and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) are non-voting, ex officio members. The President can appoint other officials to serve on a case-by-case basis. The Secretary of Agriculture is to be included on a case-by-case basis for transactions involving agricultural land, agriculture biotechnology, or the agriculture industry, as determined by the CFIUS chair. Five White House offices (e.g., National Security Council) may participate as observers. CFIUS Review Process The review process begins with notification to CFIUS by the parties to the transaction, which is a voluntary step except in certain cases. Even when notification is not mandatory, firms have an incentive to do so to receive potential "safe harbor" from CFIUS, which limits future CFIUS action on a transaction after it is cleared. Non-notified transactions remain subject indefinitely to future CFIUS review and possible divestment or other actions mandated by the President. As directed by FIRRMA, CFIUS has increased attention and resources to monitoring non-notified transactions of concern. CFIUS may also unilaterally initiate a review. The President can exercise authority to suspend or prohibit a foreign investment, subject to a CFIUS review, if he/she finds that (1) credible evidence exists that the foreign person might take action that threatens to impair national security, and (2) no other laws provide "adequate and appropriate authority" to protect the national security risks. Notification. A party's filing of a transaction can be submitted as (1) a declaration (an abbreviated, short-form filing; 30-day CFIUS assessment) or (2) a traditional written notice (45-day CFIUS review). Declarations and notices are distinguished by submission length, timeline for consideration, and CFIUS's options for disposition of the submission. Filing is mandatory in select cases where a transaction involves (1) a foreign government acquiring a "substantial interest" in a TID U.S. business, and (2) a TID U.S. business that produces, designs, manufactures, etc. a critical technology subject to export licensing/controls. In 2026, Treasury proposed a Known Investor Program (KIP) that may streamline filing processes and offer benefits for certain foreign investors that frequently file with CFIUS. National Security Review . Treasury and a co-lead agency conduct a 45-day review (30-day review for declarations) to determine the effects of the transaction on U.S. national security, informed by a DNI threat analysis. CFIUS's "risk-based assessment" considers the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences to national security related to the transaction. In its assessment, CFIUS is to consider an illustrative list of national security factors. Factors for consideration in statute include the domestic production needed for national defense; control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens; effects on sales of military goods or technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates missile technology or chemical and biological weapons; U.S. technological leadership in areas affecting national security; and effects on U.S. critical infrastructure and critical technologies. In 2022, President Biden issue d E.O. 14083 to elaborate and expand on such factors. These include effects on the resilience of critical supply chains and technological leadership; aggregate industry investment trends; cybersecurity risks; and risks to U.S. sensitive data. National Security Investigation. The review proceeds to a 45-day investigation if CFIUS finds that a transaction threatens U.S. national security and the risk has not been mitigated; is foreign-government controlled; or would result in foreign control of any U.S. critical infrastructure. A 15-day extension is allowed in "extraordinary circumstances." CFIUS can negotiate and impose mitigation conditions on the parties to address its concerns; a lead agency is tasked with monitoring compliance with such agreements. CFIUS Enf orcement and Penalty Guidelines emphasize monitoring and compliance with mitigation measures as priorities. Presidential Decision . If CFIUS determines a transaction poses unresolved concerns, it may recommend to the President that the deal be prohibited, unless the parties abandon the transaction. The President has 15 days to act. Presidents have prohibited 11 transactions to date, most in the past decade ( Table 1 ). President Trump issued orders in 2025 and 2026 to block two PRC acquisitions of U.S. firms. Trump also reopened a CFIUS review and reversed a Biden order that had prohibited Japanese firm Nippon Steel from acquiring U.S. Steel Corp. A national security agreement gives the U.S. government some rights in U.S. Steel. Table 1. Presidential Blocks of Foreign Transactions Year U.S. Business Acquirer Sector 1990 MAMCO CATIC Aerospace 2012 4 wind farms Ralls Corp. (Sany Group) Renewables 2016 Ai x tron SE Grand Chip (China IC Fund) Semiconductor 2017 Lattice Canyon Bridge Capital Partners Semiconductor 2018 Qualcomm Broadcom Semiconductor 2020 StayNTouch , Inc. Shiji Information Technology Co. Software 2020* Musical.ly ByteDance Digital platform 2024 Real e state MineOne Crypto mining 2025* U.S. Steel Nippon Steel Steel 2025 Jupiter Systems Suirui Int'l AV equipment 2026 EMCORE HieFo Corp. Semiconductor Source: Presidential orders and Federal Register . Note: * Orders ultimately were not enforced. Recent Activity CFIUS must re port annually to Congress on its activities ( Table 2 ). In most years since FIRRMA, there has been an increase in transactions reviewed. In 2025, CFIUS reviewed 347 filings (140 declarations, 207 notices). CFIUS cleared 92 declarations and requested parties submit a subsequent notice in 26% of cases. Seven declarations involved real estate. Over half of total notices proceeded to an investigation. In 58 cases, parties withdrew the notice during the investigation to address issues, and most refiled. CFIUS adopted mitigation measures for 25 notices (12% of total). In 7 cases, parties abandoned the deal after CFIUS was unable to resolve its concerns, or after the parties refused proposed measures. As of the end of 2025, CFIUS was monitoring 234 mitigation agreements and conditions. Table 2. Transactions Reviewed by CFIUS, 2020-2025 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Declarations 126 164 154 109 116 140 Notices 187 272 286 233 209 207 Investigations 88 130 163 128 116 114 Withdrawals 28 72 87 57 49 58 Presidential Decision* 1 0 0 0 2 2 Source: CFIUS Annual Re port to Congress for CY 2025 , Aug. 2026. Note: * Reported based on the year review was initiated. Filing numbers are greater than the number of distinct transactions, for example, due to withdrawals and refiles. Issues for Congress Congress remains engaged in oversight of implementation of FIRRMA and CFIUS activities. Some Members say that PRC state-directed investments require a proactive and strategic approach. Some say that PRC investments in new operations and emerging technologies may evade or fall outside current authorities. Some Members have introduced bills to expand CFIUS jurisdiction over agricultural land; ban some investments by the PRC and foreign adversaries; or add the Secretary of Agriculture as a full CFIUS member. These efforts stem in part from reports of PRC land buying and Treasury's 2022 decision that CFIUS did not have jurisdiction to review a PRC firm's land purchase in North Dakota near a U.S. Air Force base. (Treasury since has added some military bases subject to CFIUS' real estate jurisdiction.) Congress also enacted legislation on outbound investment to China ( P.L. 119-60 ). Other issues include How well is CFIUS balancing an open U.S. investment posture with the aim to protect national security? How should CFIUS protect critical technologies in ways that promote competitiveness and a market-driven economy? Post FIRRMA, how sufficient are CFIUS's authorities to achieve current and emerging policy objectives? How has E.O. 14083 affected CFIUS reviews in practice? There may be incentives to file declarations instead of notices due to their fast turnarounds. What types of transactions is CFIUS clearing through declarations? How is the Commerce Department's role in identifying emerging technologies for export controls affecting CFIUS reviews? In what ways has CFIUS improved coordination with U.S. allies and partners in information sharing and in investment-screening efforts as mandated by FIRRMA? How would KIP reforms affect CFIUS decisionmaking and review outcomes?

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