Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain

[2605.14502] Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Electrical Engineering and Systems Science > Systems and Control arXiv:2605.14502 (eess) [Submitted on 14 May 2026] Title: Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain Authors: Hongwei Zhen , Ze Yu , Xin Xiang , Wuhua Li , Mingyang Sun View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space. To make the proposed assessment computable when inverter models are unavailable, a practical gray-box workflow is further established by integrating existing impedance identification and differentiable surrogate tools. Case studies on a 4-bus system and a modified IEEE 39-bus system show that coordinated cross-layer manipulations are markedly more damaging than isolated single-layer attacks, and that the proposed metric reveals vulnerability patterns that cannot be inferred from grid-strength indicators. Subjects: Systems and Control (eess.SY) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.14502 [eess.SY] (or arXiv:2605.14502v1 [eess.SY] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14502 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Journal reference: IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics, 2026 Related DOI : https://doi.org/10.1109/TPEL.2026.3721495 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources Submission history From: Hongwei Zhen [ view email ] [v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 07:47:43 UTC (1,226 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: eess.SY < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.SY eess References & Citations SciX Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab)

Related documents

• Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain#670592
• Cyber-attack-induced equilibria of high-voltage direct-current power transmission systems#252038
• Solidity Meets LLMs: A Transformer-Based Approach to Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection#1063302
• Current-Limiting Control for Fault Ride-Through of LLC-based Solid-State Transformer in Data Centers#986914
• Cognitive and programmable attack response for next-generation networks#257670