From Epistemic Injustice to Artificial Communication: Why False Information Spreads as a Social Solution

This paper argues that misinformation spreads not only because people believe false claims, but because false information can serve important social functions. First, I show that common approaches to misinformation focus too much on error and correction, and not enough on why falsehoods travel so effectively. Second, drawing on Miranda Fricker and José Medina, I argue that communication already takes place within unequal credibility relations, where some voices are trusted more than others. Third, using Elena Esposito’s idea of artificial communication, I show that communication can succeed through circulation, response, and coordination even without shared understanding. Bringing these together, I argue that misinformation works as a social solution: it helps people orient themselves, coordinate reactions, and affirm group belonging. This explains why correction alone often fails. Misinformation persists not simply because it is believed, but because it is socially functional under conditions of epistemic inequality and communicative systems organized around uptake rather than understanding.