Objectivism: An Epistemological Stance Without First-Principle Presupposition

[Purpose] Materialism and idealism, as two fundamental epistemological positions, have each achieved significant success in explaining material and conscious phenomena respectively, but both share an unexamined structural presupposition: that one side must be primary. This paper aims to propose an epistemological stance that presupposes neither side as primary—Objectivism—taking observable phenomena as the sole reliable starting point and logical consistency as the criterion of judgment, providing a new approach to handling cross-level theoretical conflicts. [Method] Starting from the explanatory power and explanatory boundaries of materialism and idealism respectively, this paper identifies the shared "first-principle presupposition" problem. On this basis, three epistemological rules of Objectivism are established, and logical deduction of observable phenomena from these rules naturally presents the emergence of layer division. Through the specific treatment of the consciousness layering problem, the operational mode of this stance is demonstrated. [Results] 1. The core conflict between materialism and idealism can be traced to their shared "first-principle presupposition"—a presupposition that is itself unverifiable yet treated as self-evident in both positions; 2. Objectivism avoids the explanatory difficulties arising from this presupposition by suspending the first-principle question and taking observable phenomena as the starting point; 3. From the rules of Objectivism, logical deduction of observable phenomena naturally presents a "three-layer division" (ontological layer / linking layer / manifest layer)—this is neither an independent ontological claim nor an artificial classification tool, but a natural product of logical deduction itself; 4. The key distinction between Objectivism and positivism lies in: observability is a constraint condition rather than a prohibitive boundary—allowing inference about unobservable structures while requiring that inferences be traceable to observable phenomena. [Conclusion] Objectivism is not a compromise between materialism and idealism, but a structurally different epistemological position. It does not start from "what the world is made of" but from "what entitles us to judge whether an explanation is valid." The high consistency between the author's series of derived conclusions and the Eastern philosophical structure of mind-matter unity is not the result of presupposition, but the direction naturally pointed to by logical deduction from observable phenomena. Mind-matter unity need not be presupposed—it is the product of deduction. In the contemporary academic context where cross-disciplinary conflicts are increasingly prominent, this stance provides an analytical tool for handling level confusion without presupposing any side.