Responsible Suspension Theory: Subject Preservation, Dynamic Capacity, and the Weighted Structure of Practical Rationality

Abstract Contemporary theories of practical rationality emphasize commitment, coherence, and optimization as central features of agency. This paper argues that such frameworks systematically neglect a foundational dimension of human agency: the dynamic vulnerability and finite capacity of the subject itself. I propose Responsible Suspension Theory (RST), according to which rational agency is not exhausted by the formation and maintenance of commitments, but includes the normative authority to suspend commitment under conditions where continued action threatens the integrity of the subject. RST introduces a preservation-centered account of practical rationality grounded in four interacting variables: dynamic subject-capacity, epistemic revision pressure, irreversibility constraints, and existential weight. Practical stability emerges from the weighted interaction of these factors, rather than from coherence or maximization alone. The central claim is that the preservation of the subject has normative priority over the continuation of projects. Responsible suspension is therefore not a failure of rationality but a constitutive expression of it.