The Misframing Hypothesis: A Dynamic, Feedback‑Sensitive Theory of Meaning‑in‑Life

This paper develops the Misframing Hypothesis — a second‑order theory that reconceives the philosophical question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ as a cognitively generated, time‑dependent life‑utilization problem rather than a metaphysical search for a single eternal answer. I argue that much philosophical and psychological puzzlement about meaning arises because humans systematically expect a determinate, stable answer to a question that is intrinsically non‑stationary: the optimal allocation of one’s resources, commitments, and narratives across temporal stages and situational states. Building on insights from existentialism, psychological theories of motivation and feedback, and decision‑theoretic models of bounded rationality, I offer a conceptual taxonomy, a semi‑formal model, and empirically falsifiable predictions. Central claims: (1) the ‘surface’ question — What is the meaning of life? — is typically a misframed proxy for the practical question Have I truly lived prior to death?; (2) humans exhibit a certainty preference (the desire for single, narrativeable answers), which induces repeated reframing attempts and structural frustration when life is non‑stationary; (3) episodes of existential questioning concentrate in low‑feedback states and function as compensatory self‑validation mechanisms. I outline experimental paradigms, longitudinal designs, and computational simulations to test these claims, and discuss implications for psychotherapy, meaning‑centered interventions, and broader philosophical debates about value, narrative identity, and practical rationality.