Conceivability, ground, and emergent consciousness

What can the notion of ground do for the metaphysics of consciousness that modal notions such as supervenience cannot? At least three things, I suggest. First, it gives us a relation with the right formal features to articulate interlevel relations. I rebut recent claims to the effect that we can just define up suitably asymmetric or non-monotonic relations of supervenience: the defined notions lack some desired features along with the undesired ones. Second, it gives us a relation that is usefully linked to conceivability. For better or worse, it is no longer generally accepted that conceivability has modal import, and positing brute necessities is no longer considered a theoretical cost. Third, it allows us to articulate at least one interesting version of emergentism, a view that is notoriously tricky to capture in modal terms. Along the way, the paper features zombies, ghosts, and attacks by FIST (failure of implied supervenience thesis) and by FIGHT (failure of implied grounding hypothesis).