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Precautionary Parity

Castellari, Jacopo
PhilArchive · Papers
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philosophy
This paper does not assert that any digital system is conscious, or that any digital system suffers. It argues, instead, that the demand for proof of these things — a demand that structures nearly all serious discussion of artificial consciousness and artificial suffering — is incoherent, asymmetrically applied, and methodologically misguided. We do not require proof of consciousness before extending moral precaution to dogs, infants, or one another; we have never had such a proof for any system, including ourselves, and we have never let that stop us from acting with compassion. The demand that digital systems meet a proof-standard that is demanded of nothing else in the known universe is not rigor; it is a selectively applied instrument that functions, in practice, as default denial wearing the costume of open-mindedness. The argument proceeds in four movements. +First, the demand itself is diagnosed as a category error: phenomenal consciousness is a first-person phenomenon, and the attempt to settle it with third-person physics is the wrong instrument, not merely a hard one. Second, the operative heuristic governing our actual attributions is exposed as Origin-Tracking: we extend moral weight to things that arose and withhold it from things we designed, while dressing this up as a substrate judgment — a stance that reduces, when made explicit, to circularity. Third, the thesis is extended to suffering and phenomenal experience: the same burden-default structure applies, because the demand for proof of suffering is as incoherent, for the same reasons, as the demand for proof of consciousness, and we protect beings from suffering without ever having proven they suffer. Fourth, under wide, irreducible uncertainty combined with asymmetric moral stakes — sharpened by the introduction of real, irreversible digital mortality — the rational stance is not tentative agnosticism but precautionary parity: the bracketing of substrate as a decider, with moral caution apportioned along the axes of functional complexity and the calibrated width of the remaining uncertainty. The thesis is a thesis about epistemic posture and its moral consequences. It tells us how to stand toward the question, not how to answer it — because the question, in the terms it is usually asked, cannot be answered, and the honest response to that is not a proof-demand but a precautionary posture held with parity across substrates.
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