¿Deleuze como naturalista?

Can Gilles Deleuze be read as a naturalist philosopher within analytic philosophy of science? This position has recently been defended by Manuel DeLanda. In order to examine it critically, I first delimit a minimalist conception of ontological naturalism, understood as a broad commitment to the ontology inherited from our best scientific theories and to criteria of intersubjective evaluability. I then reconstruct, following DeLanda, the Deleuzian notions of multiplicity, virtuality, event, and individuation, showing that they can be understood as theoretical resources for thinking real dynamic processes. On this reading, Deleuzian ontology leads to a processual and anti-essentialist realism sensitive to scientific modelling. However, this reading depends on a selective reconstruction which is philosophically fertile but exegetically problematic, and whose explanatory yield diminishes where scientific mediation becomes more tenuous. I conclude by arguing that Deleuze can be accepted as a sui generis ontological naturalist, but that this is insufficient to make his philosophy of science especially useful when set against clearer, more revisable, and more fully integrated analytic naturalist alternatives within contemporary scientific practice. [Abstract prepared specifically for PhilPapers]