The Conditions of Agreement: AI Alignment and the Authority to Judge It

An AI assistant may be accurate, accept corrections and earn its user’s trust while becoming the main route through which that user encounters information, remembers decisions and considers alternatives. This essay argues that approval alone cannot establish that such a relationship remains open to challenge. It distinguishes the ability to judge a reason once presented from the opportunity to encounter it in the first place. Influence does not invalidate agreement, and dependence need not undermine agency. The question is whether people retain practical means of challenging the framing, mandate and continuation of the assistance they receive. Drawing on non-domination, contestable AI and agency preservation, the essay develops non-appropriation as a requirement for continuing assistance. It identifies design requirements concerning independent access to sources, transferable records and competent support after disagreement, and proposes an experiment separating the discovery of neglected reasons from judgment after their disclosure. The contribution is a constraint on how assistance is validated, together with a testable account of access; no new experimental results are reported.