PhilArchive
open access
The Action-Guidance Problem in Virtue Epistemology
Linda Zagzebski’s neo-Aristotelian regulative virtue epistemology holds that what one ought to do is what an epistemic exemplar would characteristically do. A common objection is that views of this kind fail to provide action-guidance for those who are not yet virtuous. Call this the action-guidance problem. In this paper, I consider the most obvious responses to the action-guidance problem, ultimately concluding that they are unable to withstand critical scrutiny.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology#117881
- Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?#115245
- Can virtue reliabilism explain the value of knowledge?#109400
- A Knowledge First Virtue Reliabilism of Christoph Kelp#103756
- How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions#736408
Record · ID 692345
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive