Kant’s solution to the antinomy of teleological judgment as a transcendental argument

In previous work, Gava has argued that Kant’s solution to the third antinomy offers a new model for transcendental arguments, one in which the main purpose is to provide a solution to an antinomy. In this chapter, Gava develops this approach further by considering whether Kant’s solution to the antinomy of teleological judgment fits this model. He begins by making some conceptual distinctions regarding the structure of Kant’s solution. First, it is suggested that in order to properly understand Kant’s solution, one needs to distinguish between two problems. The first problem concerns how we should generally characterize the generation of material things in nature. The second problem concerns how mechanical laws and teleological laws can be unified in a unitary system of natural laws. It is then suggested that once we have distinguished between these two problems, we can read Kant’s solution as proceeding in four steps. Gava shows that interpreters of the antinomy have sometimes talked past each other, because they focused on one or another of these problems and steps. After having provided this reconstruction, it is considered whether the argument can be described as a transcendental argument and of which sort.