Conceptio › Archive › PhilArchive
PhilArchive open access

Structural Nominalism

Gage, Lucas
PhilArchive · Papers
Open Source ↗
philosophy
This paper defends Structural Nominalism, the view that abstract objects do not exist as mind-independent substances, but that real structural regularities instantiated in the physical world are sufficient to ground mathematical and logical necessity without appeal to a Platonic realm, a divine mind, or any transcendent ontological category. The paper argues, first, that immaterial objects fail a basic causal criterion of existence (Quine, 1948; Armstrong, 1978); second, that abstractions are functional shadows, real as states of physical cognitive systems, unreal as substances; third, that the apparent necessity of mathematics is explained by the stable structural regularities of physical reality, accessed through embodied cognitive simulation rather than rational intuition of a separate realm; and fourth, that this position transcends both classical Platonism and bare nominalism by integrating structuralism into a fully naturalist ontology (Shapiro, 1997; Resnik, 1997). The paper closes by arguing that Plato’s Cave, properly understood, is precisely inverted: the abstract realm, not the physical world, is the shadow.
Conceptio Open Archive

Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio

Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.

This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗

Related documents

Record · ID 693871
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive