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◉ The Dependency Inflation Problem: Formalizing Why Knowledge Does Not Presuppose God
Arguments that knowledge presupposes Christian theism begin from an important truth: human knowing is dependent. Perception requires functioning sensory systems and a suitable environment; memory and testimony connect a person to information not presently observed; inference is answerable to norms; induction relies on learned regularities; and inquiry depends on social correction. The dispute concerns what follows from those dependencies. This paper identifies a recurring error called dependency inflation. An argument first establishes, or merely notes, that knowledge relies on some faculty, practice, norm, or environmental condition. It then treats that relation as metaphysical dependence on an ultimate personal ground, and finally identifies the ground with the Christian God-concept. The move compresses three questions: what kind of dependence is present, whether a personal ground is necessary and unique, and whether the Christian specification follows. A fourth question appears when “presupposes” is used psychologically: even if a metaphysical dependence were real, why must a knower believe or justify a correct theory of that dependence before knowing anything else? The paper applies this audit to five argument families: the Transcendental Argument for God, cognitive-design arguments, divine accounts of epistemic normativity, theological solutions to induction, and revelation as an omniscient anchor. Each raises a serious philosophical problem. None of the versions examined supplies the complete chain from ordinary epistemic reliance to uniquely Christian metaphysical dependence and then to a knower's doxastic commitment. The result is therefore an undercutting verdict rather than a rival worldview proof. Christian theism may be defended by other arguments, and some local transcendental critiques may expose genuine inconsistencies. What fails is the generic entitlement to redescribe every act of knowledge as tacit Christian dependence before the necessary bridges have been established.
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