Belief, doubt, and inquiry

This paper aims to resolve the recent debate over whether belief is incompatible with inquiry. I first argue that belief that p is compatible, metaphysically or rationally, with merely having some doubt about whether p, but is incompatible with being in doubt about it. On the view I propose, one has some doubt about whether p if and only if one thinks both that it is possible that not-p and that it is possible that p and is thereby disposed not to unqualifiedly affirm that p or not-p. However, being in doubt about whether p also requires being disposed to feel doubt about whether p and thereby to treat neither answer to the question as a default in one’s reasoning. I then motivate the idea that inquiry is a process of resolving doubt and, as such, is sustained by doubt. Since doubt comes in two varieties, inquiry can be sustained by two kinds of doubt. Inquiry into whether p is incompatible with belief that p when it is the inquirer’s being in doubt about whether p that sustains inquiry. However, it is compatible with belief that p when it is the inquirer’s having some doubt about whether p that sustains it. (*published with open access)