Mnemic representations of individuals: Accounting for the diverse singular content of episodic memory

Much work in philosophy of memory (at least implicitly) assumes the ‘Dogma of Extensionality’ (DoE). According to DoE, all episodic memory contents are actual [= about real-world individuals] and particular [= about certain individuals]. Some recent work has argued that memories of multiple and non-veridical experiences (e.g. my memory of my daily bike ride to school; my memory of my dream last night) should also be treated as episodic memories. The present paper shows that the inclusion of these cases confronts philosophical theories of memory with serious challenges. Specifically, while causal theories of memory fail to account for memories with non-actual contents (like memories from dreams), the simulation theory of memory fails to account for some memories with non-particular contents. The paper suggests a way out of this impasse that uses the various representational properties of concept neurons (e.g. previous acquaintance, counterfactuality, associativity) and their possible role in episodic construction.