Hinge Epistemology?

Hinge epistemology’s main claim to fame lies with its purported advantages in dealing with the problem of radical scepticism. In this paper I argue that the framework reading, one of its most promising formulations, is unsuccessful. In a nutshell, the framework reading argues that the system of our rational evaluation is essentially local —i.e., resting on a set of arational propositions —hinges— that constitute the limits and the conditions of validity of our epistemic practices. The discussion develops in two main parts. First, I show that, unless important clarifications are made, the framework reading is incapable of offering any solace against the problem of radical scepticism. I then present two ways in which framework theorists may want to clarify their view —following lines of argument found in Coliva (2015) and Pritchard (2016)— but find them both wanting. To the extent that hinge epistemology represents one of the most relevant options available to internalists to avoid sceptical collapse, the results of this discussion contribute to cast a grim light on the chances of a successful defence of internalist epistemic justification more in general.