Simulation, Dual-Closure, and Post-Empirical Closure: A Diagnostic Application of the Dual- Closure Framework to Bostrom's Simulation Hypothesis

This thesis builds on my previously formulated Dual-Closure framework (The Dual-Closure Law of Authentic Feeling, The Dual-Closure Law of Normative Grounding, The Dual-Closure Thesis, and A Constraint-Based Framework for Ultimate Grounding). The framework is independently established in pre-print manuscripts; this paper applies it diagnostically to Bostrom's Simulation Hypothesis, not to rely on his probabilistic argument, but to reveal the ontological and normative incompleteness inherent in any purely contingent or simulated model of reality. While Bostrom fosters epistemic skepticism about empirical reality, he leaves ontological and normative grounding unresolved. My framework supplies non-contingent closure for authentic subjective experience and objective moral normativity—conditions unmet in contingent or simulated realms. Extending this framework via a post-empirical closure domain explains why human death differs ontologically from AI deletion and why naturalistic simulationism cannot ground fnality, consciousness, or morality. The analysis demonstrates that dual-closure conditions are structurally necessary for existential and normative completion, showing the limits of simulationism while retaining conceptual neutrality. Reader Note on Framework Independence: The Dual-Closure framework is fully independently established and does not rely on Bostrom’s hypothesis for validity. Bostrom’s argument serves solely as a diagnostic case to illustrate the structural incompleteness of contingent or simulated models of reality.