Conceptio › Archive › PhilArchive
PhilArchive open access

The Ethics of Punitivism from the Perspective of Shatibi's Maghasid al-Sharia and Bentham's Utilitarianism

Karimi, Saeid et al. · 2025
PhilArchive · Papers · 2025
Open Source ↗
philosophy
Punishment, its justification, and the relationship between punishment and justice are important topics in moral philosophy and jurisprudence. In this article, first, the definition of retributivism and its purpose are stated, and then the theories of Shatibi and Jeremy Bentham regarding punishment are presented. After a comparative discussion, the objections against the utilitarian school regarding punishment are mentioned. In Bentham's utilitarianism, punishment itself causes suffering unless its benefit outweighs its harm. It is desirable to punish when it brings the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people, even if it causes injustice. Based on Shatabi's criminalism, the criminal must be punished. One of the most important reasons is the deterrence of punishment. If it does not cause deterrence in rare situations, he should still be punished; Because it may have ingredients that are hidden from us. Through Shatibi's retributive theory, which operates based on rules, objections are raised against Bentham's retributive theory, which proceeds based on utilitarianism, including the issue of justice being called into question in punishment. Additionally, three major differences between Shatibi's purposes of Sharia and Bentham's utilitarian retributivism are discussed, which in a way demonstrate the strength and superiority of the purposes of Sharia over utilitarianism. The first difference is the temporal criteria for benefit. The second difference is the confinement of pleasure to material pleasures in utilitarianism, while the purposes of Sharia consider both material and spiritual pleasures. The third difference is that in utilitarianism, the consideration of …
Conceptio Open Archive

Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio

Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.

This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗

Related documents

Record · ID 696687
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive