A Defence of Intrinsic Necessity on the Metaphysical Unity of Nature

This article analyzes the three approaches proposed to explain the metaphysical unity of nature, which is thought to be implied by its uniformity and reliability. The study concludes that both the Regularity Thesis and the Extrinsic Necessity Thesis fail to account for the uniform and reliable structure of nature compared to the Intrinsic Necessity Thesis. While the Regularity Thesis reduces causation to observed patterns and overlooks the causal connection between the object and the subject, the Extrinsic Necessity Thesis weakens its explanatory power by transferring epistemic regularities between universals into ontological facts and leaving the relationship between particulars and universals unexplained. In contrast, the intrinsic necessity theory offers a much stronger justification for nature’s unity by attributing causal necessity to the intrinsic properties of objects. This view allows for differentiating objects by their causal capacities and explains why certain properties are manifested by particular objects rather than others. In doing so, it accounts for the unity of nature without relying on external authorities or arbitrary laws. Unless an independent counter-argument is developed against the unity of nature, an intrinsic causal necessity remains the most robust metaphysical explanation for the operation of the natural world.