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Naturalistic intuitionism for physics
Recently, a novel intuitionistic reconstruction of the foundations of physics has been primarily developed by Nicolas Gisin and Flavio Del Santo drawing on naturalism. Our goal in this paper is to examine and develop the philosophical background of their naturalistic intuitionism for physics in contrast with Brouwer's defense of his intuitionistic mathematics. To be exact, we propose a systematic rearticulation of Brouwer's so-called two acts of intuitionism to serve as the self-contained philosophical framework justifying naturalistic intuitionism in physics. This revision is accompanied by an investigation of the distinctive naturalistic treatment of some central intuitionistic topics, including logic, language, time, ontology, meaning, and truth.
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