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Action-based Theories of Desire (forthcoming in _Routledge Handbook of Desire_, Edited by Alex Gregory)
Because desires figure centrally in the explanation and prediction of rational action, many theorists have sought to analyse desire in terms of rational action. The simplest theory says that a desire is a mental state that plays a certain role in causing rational action. This chapter details this theory and considers several objections to it.
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