The Phenomenological Reduction in Qualitative Research and Philosophy: Bytautas and Husserl

The phenomenological and eidetic reductions have long been misunderstood and misused in qualitative research, hindering cumulative and cooperative progress. To restore conceptual clarity and to reframe any possible use of the reductions within qualitative inquiry, this paper advances a three-step remedy. First, because current difficulties stem from proliferating divergent interpretations, I return to Edmund Husserl’s own descriptions to establish a historical and conceptual baseline. I provide an orthodox, succinct, and practical outline of Husserl’s phenomenological and eidetic reductions. Second, I shift from Husserl’s account of the reductions to the uptake of these reductions in qualitative research. I specifically unpack one example, where the reductions are mischaracterized, by critically engaging Marius Bytautas’s recent article in this journal, “What is Reduction in Phenomenology, Really?”. I show that Bytautas describes the reduction in such vague ways that his account can offer no methodological guidance. I also demonstrate that Bytautas presents what he takes to be the outcome of the reduction – essences – in ways that contradict or confuse central phenomenological terms and insights. Third, I situate Bytautas’ difficulties within the broader literature, showing that his problems are not anomalies, but reflect recurring challenges in attempts to operationalize phenomenological reductions for empirical research. Using Bytautas as a case in point, I highlight how these difficulties arise when phenomenological reductions are asked to bear incompatible demands within qualitative inquiry. I conclude by indicating more viable ways phenomenological insights can be taken up in qualitative research without reproducing the analytic breakdown evident in Bytautas’ reconstruction.