The Misalignment of Justice, Interests, and Rules: A Tension Analysis of System Self-Preservation and External Correction

This paper analyzes the fundamental tension between system self-preservation and external correction mechanisms. It argues that in any system where power is highly concentrated and lacks effective external checks and balances, the driving force for self-correction is inevitably weaker than the inertia of self-preservation. This is not a moral judgment but basic systems theory. The paper further examines whether external forces—such as crises, public opinion, or internal generational succession—can truly shift the equilibrium. It concludes that their effectiveness depends on whether they are transformed into institutionally endogenous correction mechanisms, rather than merely being events that can be absorbed and digested. The paper positions justice as the last ballast for ordinary people, while interests serve as the ballast for the advantaged; when the two collide, ordinary people sound the alarm through intuition, while the advantaged use rules to immunize themselves.