The Phenomenology of Anatta: Reconciling Buddhist Non-Self with Existential Subjectivity

This paper examines the Theravada Buddhist doctrine of Anatta (Not-self) as a rigorous phenomenological deconstruction of the empirical ego rather than an ontological negation of consciousness. By contextualizing the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta (SN 22.59) alongside Immanuel Kant’s transcendental apperception and Jean-Paul Sartre’s ontic formulation of consciousness as absolute subjectivity, we address the inherent logical contradictions of literalist "No-Self" dogmas. We posit that while the five aggregates (khandhas) constitute a shifting, contingent object of experience, the underlying capacity for awareness operates as an irreducible, non-intentional plenum of existence. Ultimately, this synthesis demonstrates that Anatta functions as an existential strategy of detachment, allowing individual awareness to disengage from the phenomenal stream and stabilize as unconditioned Pure Awareness.