Reconstructing Fichte's Theory of Recognition

In the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte attempts to deduce the reality of the concept of right by beginning with the act of self-positing. He understands right as a transcendental condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. According to Fichte, the concept of right should not be grounded in moral obligation but should instead be based on the relation between rational beings through mutual recognition. However, this deduction has often been criticized as unconvincing. This thesis seeks to defend Fichte’s position by reconstructing the steps of his argument. It argues that the concept of right, understood as a condition for self-consciousness, can be plausibly justified. To support this claim, the thesis analyzes a central concept in the deduction of right, namely the concept of summons. Through the summons, the subject becomes aware of itself. The thesis argues that the summons must possess both normative and causal dimensions in order to support the justification of the concept of right.