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Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas
We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.
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