Modelos de identidad. Hermenéutica, filosofía analítica y el cuasi-budismo de Derek Parfit

The hermeneutic accounts of identity defended by authors such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Paul Ricoeur confront (1) other hermeneutic approaches, such as that of Richard Rorty, which adhere to a notion of radical contingency; and (2) certain reductionist conceptions within the analytic tradition, such as those defended by Derek Parfit, which seek to explain human identity exclusively on the basis of impersonal events. Despite the points of convergence between Rorty’s and Parfit’s positions in their opposition to positive ontologies, their views are not equivalent. From the notion of the radical contingency of human identity, Rorty aims to draw ethical consequences for determining the status of agents. Parfit, by contrast, uses his “discovery” to radically sever the supposed connection between identity and morality. The Oxford philosopher’s attempt to establish parallels between his utilitarian version grounded in the indeterminacy and emptiness of our identity and the Buddhist notion of “no-self” compels us to undertake a critical examination of both the reductionist and non-reductionist positions within that tradition.