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In defence of a correspondence theory of truth
I want to show that truth is an important concept, and that it can be explained. However, we must deal with what are called ‘deflationist’ concepts of truth first. Deflationism is the view that there is nothing more to be said about truth once a semantic theory for the truth-predicate (such as Tarski's) has been provided.
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