Using Empirical Methods to Draw Metaphysical Conclusions: Shedding Light on Temporal Experiences and Beliefs

Several arguments trade on the idea that the (purported) fact that it seems to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes—the argument from experience—or the (purported) fact that we have pre-theoretic or naïve beliefs according to which time robustly passes—the argument from belief—gives us a reason to conclude that time robustly passes. In what follows I present empirical work that investigates whether these purported facts obtain. I argue that given substantial variation in people’s temporal beliefs and reported temporal seemings, our evaluation of these empirical claims, and the arguments from experience and belief, depends on what explains this variation. I outline new empirical work that aims to explain the variation, and argue that it tends to undermine the argument from experience. I then consider a further puzzle that this data generates: the association puzzle. This is the puzzle of why we find no association between people’s reported temporal seemings and their temporal beliefs. I consider a new hypothesis to explain this, according to which people have disunified temporal beliefs, only some of which are associated with their reported temporal seemings. Having presented evidence that this is so, I argue that it tends to undermine the argument from belief. Ultimately, I argue that this empirical work taken as a whole suggests we should be sceptical of arguments that proceed via claims about our temporal experiences or beliefs, to the conclusion that time robustly passes.