The For-Whom Constraint and the Limits of Integrated Information Theory

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with intrinsically integrated informational structure quantified as Φ. While IIT provides a sophisticated account of informational organization and phenomenological structure, a prior question remains unresolved: for whom is this structure present as experience? This paper introduces the For-Whom Constraint (FWC), which states that a theory of consciousness is explanatorily incomplete if it accounts for the structure or organization of experiential content without explaining the condition under which such content is present for a subject. Applying this constraint to IIT, the paper argues that integrated information, as a formally definable structural property, may explain the organization of experience while leaving the condition of subject-relative presence underdetermined. The analysis distinguishes between the structure of experience and the existence of experience as subjectively present, and situates the discussion within a subject-first framework informed by the Knower Centred Model of Consciousness (KCM). The aim is not to reject structure-based theories, but to articulate a general criterion of adequacy applicable across contemporary approaches to consciousness.