Deconstructing the Turing Paradigm: Why Evolving AGI Fails the Epistemological Threshold of Consciousness Attribution

For over seven decades, Alan Turing's functional criterion—the "Imitation Game"—has served as the dominant benchmark for evaluating machine intelligence and consciousness. This paper deconstructs the logical foundations of the Turing paradigm by introducing a unified framework grounded in a first-person relational ontology and a discrete model of subjective experience. We argue that consciousness attribution is fundamentally an asymmetric, first-person projection mechanism that relies on strict structural and behavioral homology between the observer and the observed. Furthermore, by accounting for the dynamic and divergent nature of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) evolution, we demonstrate that AGI will never settle into a static, human-identical state. Consequently, any micro-divergence or super-human capability breaks the prerequisite for psychological projection, placing AGI beyond the epistemological threshold of consciousness attribution. We conclude that while AGI may achieve arbitrary operational proficiency, it can never, in principle, be attributed subjective consciousness by human observers.