Moral Illusions

When one fails to have an accurate moral percept, a defect in character is often invoked. Little attention has been given to a certain kind of inaccurate moral percept – namely moral illusions – and what this would mean for virtue. This paper aims to show that moral illusions may in fact be a manifestation of virtue. By examining how an optimal perceptual system can give rise to perceptual illusions, a similar argument is made when it comes to moral perception: an optimal moral perceptual system, or that which a virtuous person would have, plausibly operates by using stored probabilistic information and can likewise give rise to moral illusions. Lastly, in light of this, I consider how we are to proceed. First, I argue that we should rethink our conception of the ideal virtuous person. Second, I suggest alternative moral resources which a virtuous person could use to navigate cases of moral illusions.