Aristotle’s Non-Dialectical Inquiry into Friendship in the Eudemian Ethics

The discussion of friendship in Eudemian Ethics VII is often taken as evidence of Aristotle’s reliance on the dialectical method in the Eudemian Ethics. In this paper, I challenge that view. I argue that Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in Eudemian Ethics VII is best understood as non-dialectical—one ultimately consistent with the strategies and procedures of scientific inquiry. Although Aristotle employs some dialectical tools and strategies in this discussion, the resources of dialectic are ultimately inadequate for fully developing his account of friendship and resolving problems it raises. His approach is characterized by four key aspects: the logoi, i.e. arguments he employs are philosophical in nature, focusing on examining the subject’s nature and establishing the truth about it; the phainomena that should be acknowledged and respected in guiding and constraining arguments are facts that might involve both endoxic and non-endoxic propositions; aporetic tools are used to advance the investigation, though resolving puzzles requires the supplementation of substantial philosophical knowledge; and driven by epistemic optimism, this method seeks to preserve the true aspects of the existing beliefs and opinions. This contrasts sharply with dialectical arguments, which prioritize reasoning from the most endoxic premises without necessarily aiming to reach the most endoxic conclusions.