Power, reasons and ideology: On the epistemology and metaphysics of noumenal power

Forst’s theory of noumenal power is designed to model power relations as driven by reasons. In this chapter, I maintain that it fares well with both agential and structural powers, yet contend that adjustments are needed to meet two demands it places on critical theory. First, a demand for diagnosing domination. Forst advances a conception of domination as arbitrary power that answers this demand, yet it is unclear how noumenal power can accommodate arbitrariness. I suggest that introducing a distinction between first-order and second-order noumenal powers allows understanding how noumenal powers can be arbitrary and licenses a consistent account of domination. Second, the demand for a theory of ideology that suitably sorts out ideologies from contingently flawed justifications. The crux here is that ideologies trade on merely apparent reasons and causally depend on the power relations they function to undergird. I suggest that, in order to take ideology critique on board, a critical theory of power must make room for a sharp distinction between real and apparent reason, as well as for functional explanations and causal mechanisms that noumenal powers can hardly deliver.