_Theaetetus_ Diyaloğu Bağlamında Platon’da Bilginin Tanımı Sorunu

The fundamental question addressed by epistemology is “What is knowledge?”. This study examines the problems Plato presents regarding the definition of knowledge in his Theaetetus dialogue. Plato’s epistemology is shaped by his theory of forms and involves the recollection of forgotten knowledge (anamnesis) and the understanding of the nature of knowledge through the dialectical method. In the Theaetetus dialogue, three different propositions are considered for defining knowledge: perception (aisthesis), true belief (alêthê doxa), and justified true belief (logou alêthê doxan). While detailing how these definitions are debated and refuted, Plato’s epistemic concerns about knowledge and the implications of the “logos” condition he adds to the definition of knowledge are also examined. Plato’s effort to unify knowledge in the realm of forms with knowledge in the perceptible world, specifically through the condition of logos, explains why he does not reach a definitive conclusion about the definition of knowledge in the context of the Theaetetus dialogue. Plato indicates that none of the three definitions are sufficient and chooses not to arrive at a definitive definition of knowledge. This study evaluates Plato’s epistemic concerns regarding the traditional definition of knowledge and how these concerns manifest in contemporary epistemology as the Gettier problem.